It is within the discretion of the Legislature of California to
prescribe a system for reclaiming swamp lands, when essential to
the health and prosperity of the community, and to lay the burden
of doing it upon the districts and persons benefited.
Lands in California derived by grant from the Mexican government
are subject to state legislation respecting swamp and overflowed
lands.
The acts of Congress making the notes of the United States a
legal tender do not apply to involuntary contributions in the
nature of taxes or assessments exacted under state laws, but only
to debts in the strict sense of the term; that is, to obligations
founded on contracts, express or implied, for the payment of
money.
The distinction between a tax which calls for no inquiry into
the weight of evidence, nor for anything in the nature of judicial
examination before collection, and a tax imposed upon property
according to its value to be ascertained by assessors upon
evidence, pointed out and commented on. In the former, no notice to
the owner is required. In the latter, the officers, in estimating
the value, act judicially.
A law authorizing the imposition of a tax or assessment upon
property according to its value does not infringe that provision of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution which declares that no
state shall deprive any person of property without due process of
law if the owner has an opportunity to question the validity or the
amount of it either before that amount is determined or in
subsequent proceedings for its collection.
It is not competent for the owner of land which is part of a
grant to a state under the Swamp Land Act, 9 Stat. 519, to set up
in proceedings begun to enforce a tax on the land assessed under a
state law for the purpose of draining and improving it that the
state law impairs the obligation of the contract between the state
and the United States, and so violates the Constitution, because
(1) if the Swamp Land Act constituted a contract between the state
and the United States, he was no party to it, and (2) the
appropriation of the proceeds of the granted swamp lands rests
solely in the good faith of the state.
Mills County v. Railroad
Companies, 107 U. S. 557,
affirmed.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Page 111 U. S. 702
MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the Court.
By an act of the Legislature of California, passed in 1868, a
general system was established for reclaiming swamp and overflowed
salt marsh and tide lands in the state, of which there is a large
quantity, and thus fitting them for cultivation.
It will be sufficient for the purposes of this suit to state the
general features of the system without going much into detail. It
provides for the formation of reclamation districts where lands of
the kind stated are susceptible of one mode of reclamation; such
districts to be established by the board of supervisors of the
county in which the lands, or the greater part of them, are
situated, upon the petition of one-half or more of the holders
thereof. The petition being granted, the petitioners are required
to establish such bylaws as they may deem necessary for the work of
reclamation, and to keep the same in repair, and to elect three of
their number to act as a board of trustees to manage the same. This
board is empowered to employee-engineers and others to survey,
plan, and estimate the cost of the work, and of land needed for
right of way, including drains, canals, sluices, water gates,
embankments, and material for construction, and to construct,
maintain, and keep in repair all works necessary for the object in
view. The trustees are required to report to the board of
supervisors of the county, or, if the district be in more than one
county, to the board of supervisors in each county, the plans of
the work and estimates of the cost, together with estimates of the
incidental expenses of superintendence and repairs. The supervisors
are then to appoint three commissioners, who are jointly to view
and assess upon each acre to be reclaimed or benefited a tax
proportionate to the whole expense, and to the benefits which will
result from the works; which tax is to be collected and paid into
the county treasury or treasuries, as the case may be, and placed
to the credit of the district, to be paid out for the work of
reclamation, upon the order of the trustees, when approved by
Page 111 U. S. 703
the board of supervisors of the county. If the district be in
more than one county, the tax is to be paid into the treasury of
the county in which the land assessed is situated. If the original
assessment be insufficient for the complete reclamation of the
lands, or if further assessments be required for the protection,
maintenance, and repair of the works, the supervisors may order
additional assessments upon presentation by the trustees of a
statement of the work to be done, and an estimate of its cost, such
assessments to be levied, and, if delinquent, collected, in the
same manner as the original assessment.
The commissioners are required to make a list of the amounts due
from each owner of land in the district, and of the amount assessed
against the unsold land, and file the same with the treasurer of
the county in which the lands are situated. The lists thus prepared
are to remain in the office of the treasurer for thirty days or
longer, if so ordered by the trustees, during which time any person
can pay to the treasurer the amount assessed against his land; but
if at the end of the thirty days or the extended time the tax has
not been paid, the treasurer is to transmit the list to the
district attorney, who is to proceed at once against the
delinquents in the manner provided by law for the collection of
state and county taxes.
The Political Code of the state, which went into effect on the
1st of January, 1873, embraces substantially the provisions of the
act of 1868. The changes are more in language than in substance. So
far as subsequent proceedings are concerned, the Code prescribes
the rule. The reclamation district No. 108, the plaintiff in the
court below, was established in September, 1870, under the act of
1868. It embraces over 74,000 acres of land, situated in the
Counties of Yolo and Colusa and forming a compact body susceptible
of one mode of reclamation. The trustees of the district originally
estimated the cost of the reclamation works, including incidental
expenses, at $140,000, and the commissioners appointed assessed
that sum upon the lands in the district. The amount proved to be
insufficient to complete the works, and, upon the report of the
trustees that the further sum of $192,000 was required for that
purpose, the supervisors ordered
Page 111 U. S. 704
that amount to be assessed, and the commissioners appointed by
them levied the assessment upon the lands. This assessment became
delinquent, and the present suits were brought to obtain a decree
that the several amounts charged upon the lands of the appellant
are liens upon them, and for their sale to satisfy the charges. One
of the suits is to enforce the lien on the lands in Yolo County and
the other the liens on the lands in Colusa County. On his motion
they were both removed to the circuit court of the United States.
That court held in each case that the several sums assessed were
valid liens upon the lands of the appellant on which they were
levied, and ordered that the lands be sold for the payment of the
amounts, with interest and costs.
From these decrees the appeals are taken.
Of the several objections to the validity of the assessment
urged in the court below and pressed here, some arise under local
statutes not involving any questions of federal law and some under
the laws and Constitution of the United States. The former relate
to the manner in which the reclamation district was formed, it
being established by the supervisors of one county, while part of
the lands are situated in another county; to the fact that the
appellant derived his title to his lands under a grant from the
Mexican government, and to the requirement that the amounts
assessed should be collected in gold and silver coin of the United
States.
There being no federal question touching these matters, we
follow the decision of the state tribunals as to the construction
and validity of the statutes. It is not open to doubt that it is in
the power of the state to require local improvements to be made
which are essential to the health and prosperity of any community
within its borders. To this end, it may provide for the
construction of canals for draining marshy and malarious districts,
and of levees to prevent inundations as well as for the opening of
streets in cities and of roads in the country. The system adopted
in California to reclaim swamp and overflowed lands by forming
districts, where the lands are susceptible of reclamation in one
mode, is not essentially different from that of other states, where
lands of that description are found. The
Page 111 U. S. 705
fact that the lands may be situated in more than one county
cannot affect the power of the state to delegate authority for the
establishment of a reclamation district to the supervisors of the
county containing the greater part of the lands. Such authority may
be lodged in any board or tribunal which the legislature may
designate.
In some states, the reclamation is made by building levees on
streams whose banks are subject to overflow, in other states by
ditches to carry off the surplus water. Levees or embankments are
necessary to protect lands on the lower Mississippi against annual
inundations. The expense of such works may be charged against
parties specially benefited, and be made a lien upon their
property. All that is required in such cases is that the charges
shall be apportioned in some just and reasonable mode, according to
the benefit received. Absolute equality in imposing them may not be
reached; only an approximation to it may be attainable. If no
direct and invidious discrimination in favor of certain persons to
the prejudice of others be made, it is not a valid objection to the
mode pursued that, to some extent, inequalities may arise. It may
possibly be that in some portions of the country there are
overflowed lands of so large an extent that the expense of their
reclamation should properly be borne by the state. But this is a
matter purely of legislative discretion. Whenever a local
improvement is authorized, it is for the legislature to prescribe
the way in which the means to meet its cost shall be raised,
whether by general taxation or by laying the burden upon the
district specially benefited by the expenditure.
County of
Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 704.
The rule of equality and uniformity prescribed in cases of taxation
for state and county purposes does not require that all property,
or all persons in a county or district, shall be taxed for local
purposes. Such an application of the rule would often produce the
very inequality it was designed to prevent. As we said in
Louisiana v. Pillsbury, 105 U. S. 295,
there would often be manifest injustice in subjecting the whole
property of a city, and the same may be said of the whole property
of any district, to taxation for an improvement of a local
character. The rule that
Page 111 U. S. 706
he who reaps the benefit should bear the burden must in such
cases be applied.
The fact that the appellant's land was derived from a grant of
the Mexican government in no respect affects the question. It is
the character of the land and its susceptibility of being reclaimed
under one system of works, and not the source of the owner's title,
which authorize the action of the state. The lands granted by
Mexico were not, by the treaty under which California was acquired,
exempted from the control that the state exercises over all other
lands. The objection made is founded upon the title of the act of
1868 and the language of some of its provisions, from which it is
inferred that the system of reclamation prescribed was intended to
apply only to lands acquired by the state under the Arkansas swamp
act. But the supreme court of the state has passed directly upon
this objection, in a controversy between the appellant and the
supervisors of Yolo County with respect to this very land, and has
held it untenable. 47 Cal. 222. Besides, the objection, if
originally applicable, was obviated by subsequent legislation in
1872, prior to the assessment in question.
Nor is there anything in the objection that the law requires the
assessment to be collected in gold and silver coin. The original
act of 1868 did not prescribe the currency in which the charges
were to be paid, but before the assessment was levied, it was
amended so as to require payment in gold and silver coin. The acts
of Congress making the notes of the United States a legal tender do
not apply to involuntary contributions exacted by a state, but only
to debts, in the strict sense of that term -- that is, to
obligations for the payment of money founded on contracts, express
or implied. This point was decided in
Lane Co. v.
Oregon, 7 Wall. 71, with reference to the first
Legal Tender Act of 1862. Subsequent acts imparting the legal
tender quality to notes did not change the general language of that
act. They make such notes a legal tender "in payment of all debts,
public and private, within the United States." In the case
mentioned, a statute of Oregon requiring the payment of taxes for
state and school purposes to be collected in gold and silver coin
was sustained on two grounds:
Page 111 U. S. 707
first that it was the right of each state to collect
its taxes in such material as it might deem expedient, either in
kind, that is to say, by a certain proportion of products, or in
bullion, or in coin, the court observing that the extent to which
the power of taxation of the state should be exercised, the
subjects upon which it should be exercised, and the mode in which
it should be exercised, were all equally within the discretion of
its legislature, except as restrained by its own constitution and
that of the United States, and by the condition that the power
could not be so used as to burden or embarrass the operations of
the federal government, and
second that the Legal Tender
Act had no reference to taxes imposed by state authority, but only
to debts, in the ordinary sense of the word, arising out of simple
contracts or contracts of specialty, which include judgments and
recognizances. Assessments upon property for local improvements are
involuntary exactions, and in that respect stand on the same
footing with ordinary taxes. They are therefore covered by this
decision; the state could determine in what manner they should be
discharged.
The objections urged to the validity of the assessment on
federal grounds are substantially these: that the law under which
the assessment was made and levied conflicts with the clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution declaring that no state
shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, and impairs the obligation of the contract between
California and the United States, that the proceeds of the swamp
and overflowed lands ceded by the Arkansas act should be expended
in reclaiming them. That clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is
found in almost identical language in the several state
constitutions, and is intended as additional security against the
arbitrary deprivation of life and liberty and the arbitrary
spoliation of property. Neither can be taken without due process of
law. What constitutes that process it may be difficult to define
with precision so as to cover all cases. It is no doubt wiser, as
stated by MR. JUSTICE MILLER in
Davidson v. New Orleans,
to arrive at its meaning
"by the gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion,
Page 111 U. S. 708
as the cases presented for decision shall require, with the
reasoning on which such decisions may be founded."
96 U. S. 96 U.S. 97,
96 U. S. 104. It
is sufficient to observe here that by "due process" is meant one
which, following the forms of law, is appropriate to the case, and
just to the parties to be affected. It must be pursued in the
ordinary mode prescribed by the law; it must be adapted to the end
to be attained, and wherever it is necessary for the protection of
the parties, it must give them an opportunity to be heard
respecting the justice of the judgment sought. The clause in
question means, therefore, that there can be no proceeding against
life, liberty, or property which may result in the deprivation of
either without the observance of those general rules established in
our system of jurisprudence for the security of private rights.
Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516,
110 U. S.
536.
The appellant contends that this fundamental principle was
violated in the assessment of his property inasmuch as it was made
without notice to him or without his being afforded any opportunity
to be heard respecting it; the law authorizing it containing no
provision for such notice or hearing. His contention is that notice
and opportunity to be heard are essential to render any proceeding
due process of law which may lead to the deprivation of life,
liberty, or property. Undoubtedly where life and liberty are
involved, due process requires that there be a regular course of
judicial proceedings, which imply that the party to be affected
shall have notice and an opportunity to be heard; so also where
title or possession of property is involved. But where the taking
of property is in the enforcement of a tax, the proceeding is
necessarily less formal, and whether notice to him is at all
necessary may depend upon the character of the tax and the manner
in which its amount is determinable. The necessity of revenue for
the support of the government does not admit of the delay attendant
upon proceedings in a court of justice, and they are not required
for the enforcement of taxes or assessments. As stated by MR.
JUSTICE BRADLEY in his concurring opinion in
Davidson v. New
Orleans:
"In judging what is 'due process of law.' respect must be had to
the cause and object of the taking, whether
Page 111 U. S. 709
under the taxing power, the power of eminent domain, or the
power of assessment for local improvements, or some of these; and
if found to be suitable or admissible in the special case, it will
be adjudged to be 'due process of law,' but if found to be
arbitrary, oppressive, and unjust, it may be declared to be not
'due process of law.'"
The power of taxation possessed by the state may be exercised
upon any subject within its jurisdiction and to any extent not
prohibited by the Constitution of the United States. As said by
this Court:
"It may touch property in every shape, in its natural condition,
in its manufactured form, and in its various transmutations. And
the amount of the taxation may be determined by the value of the
property, or its use, or its capacity, or its productiveness. It
may touch business in the almost infinite forms in which it is
conducted, in professions, in commerce, in manufactures, and in
transportation. Unless restrained by provisions of the federal
Constitution, the power of the state as to the mode, form, and
extent of taxation is unlimited where the subjects to which it
applies are within her jurisdiction."
State Tax on Foreign-Held
Bonds, 15 Wall. 300,
82 U. S.
319.
Of the different kinds of taxes which the state may impose,
there is a vast number of which, from their nature, no notice can
be given to the taxpayer, nor would notice be of any possible
advantage to him, such as poll taxes, license taxes (not dependent
upon the extent of his business), and generally specific taxes on
things or persons or occupations. In such cases, the legislature,
in authorizing the tax, fixes its amount, and that is the end of
the matter. If the tax be not paid, the property of the delinquent
may be sold, and he be thus deprived of his property. Yet there can
be no question that the proceeding is due process of law, as there
is no inquiry into the weight of evidence, or other element of a
judicial nature, and nothing could be changed by hearing the
taxpayer. No right of his is therefore invaded. Thus, if the tax on
animals be a fixed sum per head, or on articles a fixed sum per
yard or bushel or gallon, there is nothing the owner can do which
can affect the amount to be collected from him. So if a person
wishes a license to do business of a particular kind, or at a
particular
Page 111 U. S. 710
place, such as keeping a hotel or a restaurant, or selling
liquors or cigars or clothes, he has only to pay the amount
required by the law and go into the business. There is no need in
such cases for notice or hearing. So also, if taxes are imposed in
the shape of licenses for privileges, such as those on foreign
corporations for doing business in the state or on domestic
corporations for franchises, if the parties desire the privilege,
they have only to pay the amount required. In such cases, there is
no necessity for notice or hearing. The amount of the tax would not
be changed by it.
But where a tax is levied on property not specifically, but
according to its value, to be ascertained by assessors appointed
for that purpose upon such evidence as they may obtain, a different
principle comes in. The officers, in estimating the value, act
judicially, and in most of the state, provision is made for the
correction of errors committed by them through boards of revision
or equalization, sitting at designated periods provided by law to
hear complaints respecting the justice of the assessments. The law,
in prescribing the time when such complaints will be heard, gives
all the notice required, and the proceeding by which the valuation
is determined, though it may be followed, if the tax be not paid,
by a sale of the delinquent's property, is due process of law.
[
Footnote 1]
In some states, instead of a board of revision or equalization,
the assessment may be revised by proceedings in the courts and be
there corrected if erroneous or set aside if invalid, or objections
to the validity or amount of the assessment may be taken when the
attempt is made to enforce it. In such cases, all the opportunity
is given to the taxpayer to be heard respecting the assessment
which can be deemed essential
Page 111 U. S. 711
to render the proceedings due process of law. In
Davidson v.
New Orleans, this Court decided this precise point. In that
case, an assessment levied on certain real property in New Orleans
for draining the swamps of that city was resisted on the ground
that the proceeding deprived the owners of their property without
due process of law, but the court refused to interfere for the
reason that the owners of the property had notice of the assessment
and an opportunity to contest it in the courts. After stating that
much misapprehension prevailed as to the meaning of the terms "due
process of law" and that it would be difficult to give a definition
that would be at once perspicuous and satisfactory, the Court,
speaking by MR. JUSTICE MILLER, said that it would lay down the
following proposition as applicable to the case:
"That whenever by the laws of a state, or by state authority, a
tax, assessment, servitude, or other burden is imposed upon
property for the public use, whether it be for the whole state or
of some more limited portion of the community, and those laws
provide for a mode of confirming or contesting the charge thus
imposed in the ordinary courts of justice, with such notice to the
person, or such proceeding in regard to the property as is
appropriate to the nature of the case, the judgment in such
proceedings cannot be said to deprive the owner of his property
without due process of law, however obnoxious it may be to other
objections."
96 U.S.
96 U. S. 97.
This decision covers the cases at bar. The assessment under
consideration could, by the law of California, be enforced only by
legal proceedings, and in them any defense going either to its
validity or amount could be pleaded. In ordinary taxation
assessments, if not altered by a board of revision or of
equalization, stand good, and the tax levied may be collected by a
sale of the delinquent's property; but assessments in California
for the purpose of reclaiming overflowed and swamp lands can be
enforced only by suits, and, of course, to their validity it is
essential that notice be given to the taxpayer, and opportunity be
afforded him to be heard respecting the assessment. In them he may
set forth by way of defense all his grievances.
Reclamation
District No. 108 v. Evans, 61 Cal. 104.
Page 111 U. S. 712
If property taken upon an assessment, which can only be enforced
in this way, be not taken by due process of law, then, as said by
MR. JUSTICE MILLER in the
New Orleans case, these words,
as used in the Constitution, can have no definite meaning. The
numerous decisions cited by counsel, some of which are given in the
note, as to the necessity of notice and of an opportunity of being
heard, are all satisfied where a hearing in court is thus allowed.
[
Footnote 2]
The objection that the law of California authorizing the
assessment in question impairs the obligation of a contract created
between the United States and the state by the Act of Congress of
September 28, 1850, commonly known as the Arkansas Swamp Act, is
founded upon a misapprehension of its provisions. 9 Stat. 519, c.
84. It is true the act granted to the state all the swamp and
overflowed lands within its limits on condition that the proceeds
of the lands, "whether from sale or by direct appropriation in
kind," should be applied, as far as necessary, in reclaiming the
lands by means of levees and drains. Hence the contention of
counsel is that the state is bound to carry out this condition and
apply the proceeds to the reclamation, or provide for their
application to that end, and that its legislation imposing an
assessment upon other lands to raise the necessary funds for that
purpose is in violation of this contract, and therefore void. The
answer to this position is two-fold. In the first place, if a
contract was created by the Arkansas act when the state accepted
its benefits it is for the United States to complain of the breach
if there be any. The plaintiff is not a party to the contract, and
is in no position to
Page 111 U. S. 713
invoke its protection. But in the second place, the
appropriation of the proceeds rests solely in the good faith of the
state. Its discretion in disposing of them is not controlled by
that condition, as neither a contract nor a trust following the
lands was thereby created. This was distinctly held, after
elaborate consideration, in the recent case of
Mills County v.
Railroad Companies, 107 U. S. 557,
107 U. S.
566.
There are several other objections urged upon our consideration
in the elaborate brief of the appellant's counsel, but we do not
deem it necessary to consider them, for they raise only questions
of local law and procedure which have been considered and
determined in the courts of the state, from whose conclusions we
should not depart.
Decrees affirmed.
NOTE
Legislation of the colonies prior to the Revolution, and of the
states since, giving to the taxpayer an opportunity to be heard
respecting the justice of the assessment of his property before it
becomes final.
In Massachusetts, an act passed in 1692, for defraying the
public and necessary charges arising within each county of the
province, provided that
"if any person or persons think themselves overrated in any such
assessment, they shall be eased by the assessors making the same to
appear, or, in default thereof, by the Court of Quarter
Sessions."
Laws Mass.Bay 19.
In Connecticut, an act passed prior to 1750 made it the duty of
the listers to hear complaints of parties complaining that they
were overrated.
"But if such listers will not give just relief, then upon
application made by the aggrieved party to an assistant, or justice
of the peace, with two of the selectmen of the town, notifying two
or more of the listers to show reason, if any they have, why relief
should not be granted them, they shall consider the case, and give
such relief as they shall judge just and reasonable."
Acts and Laws of His Majesty's English Colony of Connecticut
136, 262.
In South Carolina, by an act passed in 1701 for raising money
for the public use and defense of the province, provision is made
that the commissioners appointed by the act shall, upon complaint
or appeal from anyone feeling aggrieved at the rating, examine the
person complaining upon his oath touching the value of his real and
personal estate,
"and upon due examination abate or default proportionably the
said assessments, and the same so abated shall be certified by the
commissioners aforesaid, or any two of them, to the receiver, and
such assessment so certified as aforesaid shall be deemed firm and
valid, and to that end the commissioners are hereby required to
meet together for the determining of such complaint and appeal
accordingly."
2 Statutes of South Carolina 184.
Page 111 U. S. 714
By other and subsequent statutes, the taxpayer was allowed to
"swear off" so much as he should think himself overrated for his
stocks or stores, and the assessors were required to give notice
for that purpose, and were authorized to administer oaths and to
allow the abatement. 3 Statutes of South Carolina 241, 260, 476,
506.
In Maine and Massachusetts, the taxpayer may make his complaint
first to the assessor, and if he refuse to grant the relief
demanded, to the county commissioners. Me.Rev.Stat. 1871, p. 144;
Mass.Gen.Stat. 1860, p. 79.
In Rhode Island, he may petition the supreme court or court of
common pleas, and the court must hear and determine his complaint.
Gen.Stat. 107.
In Vermont, complaints may be heard before listers, and an
appeal lies from their decision to the selectmen of the town.
Gen.Stat. 520.
In New Hampshire, the taxpayer may apply to the selectmen of the
town, and, if dissatisfied with their decision, may apply, by
petition, to the supreme court, in the county at a trial term,
which shall make such order thereon as justice requires. Gen.Stat.
123.
In Connecticut, a board of relief, to consist of five "judicious
electors," is annually elected in each town, for hearing and
determining appeals from decisions of the assessors. Gen.Stat. 24,
159.
In New York, complaints may be made to the board of assessors.
Rev.Stat. (5th ed.) 911, 912.
In New Jersey, to the commissioners of appeal, in tax cases.
Rev.Stat. 1142, 1148.
In Pennsylvania and Delaware, to county commissioners.
Pa.Purdon's Dig. p. 937, § 23; Del.Rev.Stat. 1852, p. 62, § 12.
The Delaware act of 1796 (2 Laws Del. p. 1255, § 14) provided
that commissioners should give notice in each hundred, and at the
time and place specified, meet and
"hear and determine the complaints of any person or persons that
may be aggrieved, and shall generally arrange the said valuations,
so that no person or persons may be unequally or overrated,
provided always that no person or persons shall be prevented from
appealing to the levy court and court of appeals of his or their
respective county as heretofore."
In Virginia and Georgia, if the taxpayer and assessor cannot
agree as to valuation, each can choose an arbitrator, and they an
umpire, to whom the matter of disagreement is submitted for final
determination. Ga.Code 1873, § 840; Va.Code 1860, p. 201.
In Maryland, North Carolina, Florida, and Alabama, the boards of
county commissioners constitute tribunals for hearing and
determining complaints in regard to assessments, except in
Baltimore the board of control and review constitute such tribunal.
Md.Code, Supp. 1861-67, p. 279, § 175; N.C.Laws 1874-75, p. 222, §
18; Thomp.Dig.Laws Fla. 97; Ala.Code 1876.
In North Carolina, under the act of 1819, three freeholders,
appointed by the court of common pleas and quarter sessions,
constitute a board of appeal for adjustment of assessments. 2 Laws
N.C. p. 1480, § 2.
Page 111 U. S. 715
In Arkansas, Mississippi, and Kentucky, the county boards of
supervisors constitute boards for the equalization of assessments.
Ark.Acts Assem. 1873, p. 58; Miss.Rev.Code 1871, p. 351, § 1685;
Ky.Gen.Stat. 1873, p. 724.
In South Carolina, such a board is constituted of the county
commissioner, auditor, and treasurer; in Louisiana, of the county
clerk, recorder, and sheriff; in Tennessee, of the assessor and two
freeholders, and in Missouri, of the presiding judge of the county
court, and the county surveyor and assessor. Rev.Stat.S.C. 69;
Voorhies, Rev.Stat.La. 840; 1 Stat.Tenn. § 581; 2 Mo.Rev.Stat. §§
6719, 6720, 6726.
In West Virginia, the aggrieved party may apply for relief to
the county court with an appeal to the circuit court. Rev.Stat.
1063. In Texas, he may apply to the county court, and its
determinations are final. Paschal's Dig. p. 869, art. 5176.
Boards of equalization or review are provided for,
consisting:
In Illinois, of the assessor, clerk, and supervisor.
Ill.Rev.Stat. 1874, p. 871.
In Indiana, of the county auditor, commissioners, and
appraisers. 1 Gavin & Hords Stat.Ind. p. 82, §§ 54, 320.
In Michigan, Iowa, and Nevada, of the boards of supervisors. 1
Comp.Laws Mich. 366; Code Iowa, 1873, p. 140, Gen.Laws Nev.
3139.
In California, of the boards of supervisors, except where the
property assessed consists of the franchise, roadway, roadbed,
rails, and rolling stock of railroads operated in more than one
county, in which case the state board of equalization acts as
assessor, and over its decisions there is no revisory tribunal.
Pol.Code Cal. §§ 3673, 3692.
In Kansas and Nebraska, of county commissioners. Kans.Comp.Laws
1879, p. 953; Neb.Gen.Stat. 907.
In Ohio, of the county commissioners and county auditor, except
in certain cities, where the board consists of the county auditor
and persons appointed by the city authorities. Rev.Stat. 1880, p.
731.
In Oregon, of the county judge, assessor, and clerk. Deady &
Lane's Gen.Laws Or. 1874, p. 756.
In Wisconsin, the chairman of the board of supervisors, clerk,
and assessors of each town, and the mayor, clerk, and assessors of
each city, and the president, clerk, and assessors of each
incorporated village, constitute a board of review for such town,
city, or village. 1 Taylor's Statutes 1871, p. 406, § 53.
The function of these boards of review, by whatever name called,
is essentially the same.
[
Footnote 1]
That the duties of assessors in estimating the value of property
for purposes of general taxation are judicial,
see Barhyte v.
Shepherd, 35 N.Y. 238, 250;
Hassan v. Rochester, 67
N.Y. 528, 536;
Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N.Y. 183;
Williams
v. Weaver, 75 N.Y. 30, 33; Cooley, Law of Taxation 266;
Burroughs, Law of Taxation § 102;
Jordan v. Hyatt, 3 Barb.
275, 283;
Ireland v. Rochester, 51 Barb. 416, 430-431;
State v. Jersey City, 24 N.J.Law 662, 666;
State v.
Morristown, 34 N.J.Law 445;
Griffin v. Mixon, 38
Miss. 437-438.
[
Footnote 2]
Overing v. Foote, 65 N.Y. 269;
Stuart v.
Palmer, 74 N.Y. 193; Cooley, Law of Taxation 265-266, 298;
Thomas v. Gain, 35 Mich. 155, 164;
Jordan v.
Hyatt, 3 Barb. 275, 283;
Wheeler v. Mills, 40 Barb.
646;
Ireland v. Rochester, 51 Barb. 416, 430-431;
State v. Jersey City, 24 N.J.Law 662, 666;
State v.
Newark, 31 N.J.Law 363;
State v. Trenton, 36 N.J.Law
499, 504;
State v. Elizabeth City, 37 N.J.Law 357;
State v. Plainfield, 38 N.J.Law 97;
State v.
Newark, 1 Dutch. 399, 411, 426;
Patten v. Green, 13
Cal. 325;
Mulligan v. Smith, 59 Cal. 20;
Griffin v.
Mixon, 38 Miss. 438;
County of San Mateo v. Southern
Pacific R. Co., 13 F. 145, 722;
County of Santa Clara v.
Same, 18 F. 385;
Darling v. Gunn, 50 Ill. 424.
See also Gatch v. City of Des Moines, 18 N.W. 310-311,
313.