A bill is bad on demurrer when it appears therefrom that there
have been unreasonable delay and laches on the part of the
complainant or those under whom he claims in asserting the rights
which he seeks to enforce.
By duly recorded deed of July 18, 1818, signed by John P. Van
Ness (his wife uniting in the conveyance) and by Noah Stinchcomb,
the former conveyed to the latter at a fixed annual rent lot 3,
square 455, in the City of Washington, to have and to hold &c.,
unto Stinchcomb, his executors, administrators, and assigns, for
the term of ninety years, renewable forever. Stinchcomb entered
under the deed, made valuable improvements upon the lot, and
remained in possession until the year 1833 or 1884, when Van Ness
repossessed himself of the premises in virtue of a clause in the
deed in these words:
"
Provided always that if the said rent or any part
thereof shall be in arrear and unpaid for the space of thirty days
next after the time at which the same is reserved to be paid as
above, being first lawfully demanded, that then it shall and may be
lawful to and for the said John, his heirs and assigns, into the
demised premises or any part thereof, in the name of the whole, to
reenter, and the same to have again, repossess, occupy, and enjoy
as in his or their former estate until all such arrearages of rent,
with legal interest from the time at which said rent shall have
become payable, and all and every cost, charge, and expense
incurred by reason of the nonpayment of said rent shall be lawfully
satisfied and paid, or make distress therefor at his or their
option."
Stinchcomb died on the 11th of February, 1841, without, so far
as the bill discloses, making any effort to repossess himself of
the property. Van Ness died in 184-, and, upon the division of his
estate, the lot in question was assigned to Matilda E. Van Ness,
one of his heirs-at-law, under whom and her assigns the defendants
hold it.
The complainant, as administratrix of Stinchcomb, having offered
and now offering to pay all rents, interest, charges, and
Page 106 U. S. 392
costs which may have accrued upon the property, filed her bill
wherein she asks a decree permitting her to redeem the same, and
ordering an account, which will show, as well the principal and
interest of rents in arrear due defendants as the rents and profits
received by the latter since they entered into possession, setting
off the one against the other.
Such is substantially the case made, and such the relief asked,
notwithstanding forty-five years have elapsed since the reentry of
Van Ness, "as in his . . . former estate," and more than thirty
since his death and the assignment of the lot in question to one of
his heirs-at-law.
The court dismissed, on demurrer, the bill, and the complainant
appealed here.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, after stating the case, delivered the
opinion of the Court.
It has been a recognized doctrine of courts in equity from the
very beginning of their jurisdiction to withhold relief from those
who have delayed for an unreasonable length of time in asserting
their claims.
Elmendorf v.
Taylor, 10 Wheat. 152;
Piatt v.
Vattier, 9 Pet. 405;
Maxwell v.
Kennedy, 8 How. 210;
Badger v.
Badger, 2 Wall. 87;
Cholmondeley v. Clinton, 2
Jac. & W. 1; 2 Story Eq.Jur. sec. 1520. In 48 U.
S. Baird, 7 How. 234, it was said that long
acquiescence and laches by parties out of possession are productive
of much hardship and injustice to others, and is not to be excused
except by showing some actual hindrance or impediment, caused by
the fraud or concealment of the party in possession. The case must
be one which appeals to the conscience of the chancellor.
And, contrary to the view pressed in argument, a defense
grounded upon the staleness of the claim asserted or upon the gross
laches of the party asserting it may be made by demurrer, not
necessarily by plea or answer. A different rule has been announced
by some authors and in some adjudged cases; generally, however,
upon the authority of
Earl
Page 106 U. S. 393
of Deloraine v. Browne, 3 Bro.C.C. 633. Lord Thurlow,
who decided that case, is reported to have declared, when
overruling a demurrer to a bill charging fraudulent representations
as to the value of an estate, and praying an account of rents,
profits, etc., that his action was based upon the ground that
length of time,
proprio jure, was no reason for a
demurrer; that it was only a conclusion from facts, showing
acquiescence, and was not matter of law, and that he could not
allow a party to avail himself of an inference from facts on a
demurrer. But in
Hovenden v. Lord Annesley, 2 Sch. &
Lef. 637, decided in 1806, Lord Redesdale expressed his disapproval
of the decision of Lord Thurlow, as reported by Brown, and said
that it was rendered in a hurry, when the latter was about to
surrender the seals and when much injury might have been done to
parties had judgments not been given before the latter retired from
office. The rule, as announced in
Hovenden v. Lord
Annesley, was,
"that when a party does not by his bill bring himself within the
rule of the court, the other party may by demurrer demand judgment,
whether he ought to be compelled to answer. If the case of the
plaintiff, as stated in the bill, will not entitle him to a decree,
the judgment of the court may be required by demurrer, whether the
defendant ought to be compelled to answer the bill."
That, the court said, was matter of the law of a court of
equity, to be determined according to its rules and principles.
Such is undoubtedly the established doctrine of this Court as
announced in many cases. In
Maxwell v. Kennedy, supra, the
Court, speaking by Chief Justice Taney, approved the rule as
announced by Lord Redesdale. After referring to
Piatt v.
Vattier, supra, and to
McKnight v.
Taylor, 1 How. 161, and
Bowman v.
Wathen, 1 How. 189, it was said that
"The proper rule of pleading would seem to be that when the case
stated by the bill appears to be one in which a court of equity
will refuse its aid, the defendant should be permitted to resist it
by demurrer. And as the laches of the complainant in asserting his
claim is a bar in equity, if that objection is apparent on the bill
itself, there can be no good reason for requiring a plea or answer
to bring it to the notice of the court."
In the more recent case of
Badger v. Badger, supra, the
Court, speaking by
Page 106 U. S. 394
Mr. Justice Grier, said that a party who makes an appeal to the
conscience of the chancellor
"should set forth in his bill specifically what were the
impediments to an earlier prosecution of his claim; how he came to
be so long ignorant of his rights, and the means used by the
respondent to fraudulently keep him in ignorance, and how and when
he first came to a knowledge of the matters alleged in his bill;
otherwise the chancellor may justly refuse to consider his case, on
his own showing, without inquiry whether there is a demurrer or
formal plea of the statute of limitations contained in the
answer."
P.
69 U. S. 95.
These principles are decisive of the case before us. It is
plainly one of gross laches on the part of Stinchcomb and those
claiming under him. His right under the deed of 1818 to repossess
himself of the premises by paying rents and charges in arrear
accrued the moment Van Ness reentered. But the assertion of it
could not be safely neglected for an unreasonable length of time.
The bill discloses no plausible, much less sufficient, explanation
of the long delay ensuing, after 1833, without any movement upon
the part of Stinchcomb, his representatives or heirs, to recover
the property by discharging the rents and charges in arrear and
reentering, as might have been done, in pursuance of the provisions
of that deed. On the contrary, the facts set out in the bill
justifies the conclusion either that he elected in his lifetime to
abandon his claim or that it was in some way satisfactorily
arranged or discharged. The complainant and those whom she
represents have slept too long upon their rights. The peace of
society and the security of property demand that the presumption of
right arising from a great lapse of time without the assertion of
an adverse claim should not be disturbed. In such cases, sound
discretion requires that the court should withhold relief.
Some reference has been made to the decision of the Supreme
Court of Maryland, the laws of which state, as they existed on the
27th of February, 1801, except as since modified or repealed by
Congress, continue in force in this District. It is only necessary
to say that the principles to which we have referred have been
steadily upheld by that court not upon the ground of any changes in
the law of the state since 1801, but in deference to the
established doctrines governing courts of
Page 106 U. S. 395
equity in giving relief to those who seek the enforcement of
antiquated demands.
Hepburn's Case, 3 Bland (Md.) 95;
Hawkins v. Chapman, 36 Md. 83;
Nelson v. Hagerstown
Bank, 27 Md. 51;
Syester v. Brewer, 27 Md. 288;
Frazier v. Gelston, 35 Md. 298.
For the reasons given, we are of opinion that the court below
properly sustained the demurrer and dismissed the bill for want of
equity.
Decree affirmed.
