Calabrese v. The City of Charleston
Annotate this CaseJanuary 1999 Term
___________
No. 25430
___________
WILLIAM JOSEPH CALABRESE
and DEBRA CALABRESE,
Plaintiffs,
v.
THE CITY OF CHARLESTON,
a municipal corporation,
Defendant.
________________________________________________________
Certified Questions from the Circuit Court of Kanawha County
Hon. James C. Stucky, Judge
Civil Action No. 95-C-2125
CERTIFIED QUESTIONS ANSWERED
________________________________________________________
Submitted: March 9, 1999
Filed: May 13, 1999
Michael J. Del Giudice, Esq.
G. Kenneth Robertson, Esq.
Ciccarello, Del Giudice & LaFon
Brian D.
Morrison, Esq.
Charleston, West
Virginia
Shuman, Annand, Bailey, Wyant & Earles
Attorney for
Plaintiffs
Charleston, West Virginia
Attorneys for Defendant
CHIEF JUSTICE STARCHER delivered the Opinion of the Court.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. "The
appellate standard of review of questions of law answered and certified by a circuit court
is de novo." Syllabus Point 1, Gallapoo v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
197 W.Va. 172, 475 S.E.2d 172 (1996).
2. "'The
general rule of construction in governmental tort legislation cases favors liability, not
immunity. Unless the legislature has clearly provided for immunity under the
circumstances, the general common-law goal of compensating injured parties for damages
caused by negligent acts must prevail.' Syllabus Point 2, Marlin v. Bill Rich Const.,
Inc., 198 W.Va. 635, 482 S.E.2d 620 (1996)." Syllabus Point 1, Brooks v. City
of Weirton, 202 W.Va. 246, 503 S.E.2d 814 (1998).
3. "Under W.Va.
Code, 29-12A-4(c)(3) [1986], political subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or
loss to persons or property caused by their negligent failure to keep public roads,
highways, streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, aqueducts, viaducts, or public
grounds within the political subdivisions open, in repair, or free from nuisance, except
that it is a full defense to such liability, when a bridge within a municipality is
involved, that the municipality does not have the responsibility for maintaining or
inspecting the bridge. A political subdivision's duty to keep its public roads, highways,
streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, aqueducts, viaducts, or public grounds open,
in repair, or free from nuisance does not extend exclusively to vehicles or vehicular
travel." Syllabus Point 3, Koffler v. City of Huntington, 196 W.Va. 202, 469 S.E.2d 645 (1996).
4. The liability
for political subdivisions created in W.Va. Code, 29-12A- 4(c)(3) [1986] includes
liability for injury, death, or loss to persons or property caused by a subdivision's
negligent failure to keep its sewers and drains open, in repair, or free from nuisance.
5. W.Va. Code,
29-12A-5(a)(10) [1986] does not immunize a political subdivision from liability arising
out of negligently-caused dangerous, injurious, or harmful conditions on the subdivision's
own property.
6. W.Va.
Code, 29-12A-5(a)(16) [1986] does not immunize a political subdivision from liability
arising out of negligently-caused dangerous, injurious, or harmful conditions in
or arising out of the subdivision's sewer system, except insofar as the sewers are located
on and a part of the operation of a dump or landfill by the subdivision.
7. "A
municipal corporation has only the powers granted to it by the legislature, and any such
power it possesses must be expressly granted or necessarily or fairly implied or essential
and indispensable. If any reasonable doubt exists as to whether a municipal corporation
has a power, the power must be denied." Syllabus Point 2, State ex rel. Charleston
v. Hutchinson, 154 W.Va. 585, 176 S.E.2d 691 (1970).
8. A municipal
ordinance that is enacted pursuant to the power granted to municipalities in W.Va.
Code, 8-20-10 [1990] to construct, operate, maintain, care for and protect a sewer
system, and that purports to limit, modify, or eliminate tort liabilities and immunities
in a fashion that conflicts with the general law of the state, is void to the extent of
such conflict.
Starcher, Chief Justice:
In this decision, we
address certified questions from the Circuit Court of Kanawha County. We agree with the
circuit court's determination that a Charleston couple may proceed in a lawsuit in which
they claim that their basement was repeatedly flooded because of the City of Charleston's
alleged failure to use due care in the operation and maintenance of the City's sewer
system.
I.
Facts and Background
The instant case involves
a claim of immunity made by the City of Charleston, West Virginia ("the City")
in a lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County. The lawsuit was filed against the
City by the plaintiffs, William and Debra Calabrese ("the Calabreses").
The Calabreses' lawsuit claims that the
City was negligent in the maintenance and operation of the City's sewer system, and that
such negligence caused injury to the Calabreses and their property.
Specifically, the Calabreses allege that
the City was or should have been aware of obstructions and defects in the City's sewer
system, and that the City did not exercise due care to correct these obstructions and
defects. As a result, say the Calabreses, water and sewage up to 20 inches deep have
backed up into the Calabreses' basement on at least five occasions, causing substantial
damage to their carpets, furniture, etc.
In response to the
Calabreses' lawsuit, the City argued to the circuit court that if one assumes arguendo
that the Calabreses are factually and legally correct in their allegations of negligence,
proximate causation, and damages, the City is nevertheless immune from the Calabreses'
lawsuit -- by virtue of the Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance Reform Act, W.Va.
Code, 29-12A-1 to - 18.
Specifically, the City relies upon
provisions contained in W.Va. Code, 29- 12A-4 [1986]See footnote 1 1 and -5 [1986].See footnote 2 2
The City also claims that
it is immune from suit pursuant to the provisions of Section 25-17 of the Charleston
City Code.See footnote 3 3
Following the filing of a motion for
summary judgment by the City asserting the City's claims of immunity, the circuit court
certified four questions to this Court. Those questions, and the circuit court's answers
to the questions, are as follows:
1. When the
plaintiffs' claim against the City of Charleston arises from an alleged clogged, blocked
or negligently designed/maintained City sewer line and/or storm drain, does the
plaintiffs' claim fall within § 29-12A-4(c)(3) of the Governmental Tort Claims and
Insurance Reform Act (hereinafter "the Act"), stating "political
subdivisions are liable for injury . . . or loss to persons or property that is caused by
their negligent failure to keep public . . . aqueducts, . . . within the political
subdivision open, in repair or free from nuisance . . ." thereby constituting an
exception to the immunity generally provided to political subdivisions in §
29-12A-4(b)(1) of the Act?
Ruling by the Circuit
Court: Yes X No ___
2. If the plaintiffs' claim against the City of Charleston in this case falls within § 29-12A-4(c)(3), does the claim, in turn, fall within the specific exception to liability set forth in § 29-12A-5(a)(16) providing that "a political subdivision is immune from liability if a loss or claim results from [t]he operation of dumps, sanitary landfills, and facilities where conducted directly by a political subdivision?"
Ruling by the Circuit
Court: Yes No X
3. If the plaintiffs' claim against the City of Charleston in this case falls with § 29-12A-4(c)(3), does the claim, in turn, fall within the exception to liability set forth in § 29-12A-5(a)(10) providing that "a political subdivision is immune from liability if a loss or claim results from [i]nspection powers or functions, including failure to make an adequate inspection, or making an inadequate inspection, of any property, real or personal, to determine whether the property complies with or violates any law or contains a hazard to health or safety"?
Ruling by the Circuit
Court: Yes No X
4. Is § 25-17 of the Charleston City Code, providing that "neither the City nor the Sanitary Board shall be liable for any damage resulting from bursting of any sewer main, service pipe or valve . . . or from the accidental failure of the sewage collection, treatment and disposal facilities from any cause whatsoever . . ." a valid and enforceable exercise of municipal power and authority pursuant to W.Va. Code § 8-20-10, thereby insulating the City from suit in this case?
Ruling by the Circuit
Court: Yes No X
We proceed by
identifying the applicable standard of review. We then discuss the issues of liability and
immunity.
II.
Standard of Review
The appellate standard of review of
questions of law answered and certified by a circuit court is de novo. Syllabus
Point 1, Gallapoo v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 197 W.Va. 172, 475 S.E.2d 172 (1996).
III.
Discussion
A.
The Liability- and Immunity-Creating Statutes at Issue in the Instant Case
There are two liability-creating
provisions of W.Va. Code, 29-12A-4(c) [1986] that may be read to apply to the
Calabreses' claim against the City.
The first of these two provisions, W.Va.
Code, 29-12A-4(c)(2) [1986], creates general "negligent act"
liability for political subdivisions, stating that:
Political subdivisions are liable
for injury, death, or loss to persons or property caused by the negligent performance of
acts by their employees while acting within the scope of employment.
(See note 1, supra, for the full text of W.Va. Code, 29-12A-4 [1986 ].
This statutory provision was not referred
to by the circuit court in its certified questions. However, because this provision is
germane to the issues of liability and immunity in the instant case, we discuss it briefly
at III.B.1. infra.See footnote 4 4
The second liability-creating statutory
provision, W.Va. Code, 29-12A-4(c)(3) [1986] -- the provision that is referenced by
the circuit court in its certified questions -- states that:
Political subdivisions are liable for
injury, death, or loss to persons or property caused by their negligent failure to keep
public roads, highways, streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, aqueducts, viaducts,
or public grounds within the political subdivisions open, in repair, or free from nuisance
. . . .
(See note 1, supra, for full text of W.Va. Code,
29-12A-4 [1986 ]. See footnote 5 5 We discuss this provision as well at III.B.2. infra.
The City's position is that neither of
these liability-creating provisions of W.Va. Code, 29-12A-4 [1986] are implicated
by the allegations in the Calabrese lawsuit.
The City further argues that even if
provisions of W.Va. Code, 29-12A-4 [1986] do impose potential liability on the City
-- nevertheless, 2 of the 17 specific immunity-creating provisions of W.Va. Code,
29-12A-5(a) [1986] eliminate any such liability.See
footnote 6 6
The first of these two provisions, W.Va.
Code, 29-12A-5(a)(10) [1986], creates "inspection" immunity, stating
that:
A political subdivision is immune from
liability if a loss or claim results from: . . . [i]nspection powers or functions,
including failure to make an inspection, or making an inadequate inspection, of any
property, real or personal, to determine whether the property complies with or violates
any law or contains a hazard to health or safety[.]
(See the full text of W.Va. Code, 29-12A-5 [1986] at
note 2 supra) . We discuss this provision at III.C. infra.
The second provision that is relied on
by the City, W.Va. Code, 29-12A- 5(a)(16) [1986] , creates "landfill"
immunity, stating that:
A political subdivision is immune from
liability if a loss or claim results from . . . [t]he operation of dumps, sanitary
landfills, and facilities where conducted directly by a political subdivision[.]
(See note 2, supra, for full text of W.Va. Code, 29-12A-5 [1986]
). We also discuss this provision at III.C. infra.
In determining whether the foregoing
statutory provisions regarding liability and immunity bar the Calabreses from maintaining
their lawsuit against the City, this Court applies the principle that:
"The general rule of construction in
governmental tort legislation cases favors liability, not immunity. Unless the legislature
has clearly provided for immunity under the circumstances, the general common-law goal of
compensating injured parties for damages caused by negligent acts must prevail."
Syllabus Point 2, Marlin v. Bill Rich Const., Inc., 198 W.Va. 635, 482 S.E.2d 620
(1996).
Syllabus Point 1, Brooks v. City of Weirton, 202 W.Va. 246, 503 S.E.2d 814 (1998).
See also Randall v. Fairmont City Police Dept., 186 W.Va. 336, 347, 412 S.E.2d 737,
748 (1991); Hose v. Berkeley County Planning Com'n, 194 W.Va. 515, 522, 460 S.E.2d 761, 768 (1995); Parkulo v. West Virginia Bd. of Probation and Parole, 199 W.Va.
161, 174, 483 S.E.2d 507, 520 (1996).See footnote 7 7
B.
Liability Provisions
1.
Negligent Act Liability
The applicability of
the "negligent act" liability provision of W.Va. Code, 29- 12A-4(c)(2)
[1986] to the Calabreses' claim seems clear and straightforward.
W.Va. Code, 29-12A-4(c)(2) [1986]
creates liability by political subdivisions for " injury, death, or loss to
persons or property caused by the negligent performance of acts by their employees while
acting within the scope of employment. " Id.
The Calabreses assert that the City's
employees, acting within the scope of their employment, negligently performed their duties
with respect to the City's storm sewer system -- and that the Calabreses were proximately
injured by such negligence.
Therefore, if the Calabreses can prove
this to be the case, W.Va. Code, 29-12A- 4(c)(2) [1986] imposes liability on the
City for the damages caused by its employees' "negligent performance," unless a
specific immunity applies. (We discuss the immunity issue in part III.C. infra.)
2.
Public Property Liability
W.Va. Code, 29-12A-4(c)(3)
[1986] imposes liability for damages caused by a political subdivision's "negligent
failure to keep public roads, highways, streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, aqueducts,
viaducts, or public grounds within the political subdivisions open, in repair, or free
from nuisance . . . ." (Emphasis added.)
The Calabreses contend that the City's
sewers are included within the term "aqueduct" -- and that therefore this
liability provision applies to the Calabreses' claim.
In support of this contention, the
Calabreses direct us to the dictionary definition of the word "aqueduct" --
which is "a conduit for water." Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (1996).
See also Random House Dictionary of the English Language (1966)
("aqueduct" means "a conduit or artificial channel for conducting water
from a distance, usually by means of gravity.")
The Calabreses contend that because the
City's sewers are a conduit and channel for rainwater runoff (and other excess or waste
water), the sewers are included within the ambit of the statutory term
"aqueduct," as that term is defined in the dictionary.
Therefore, say the Calabreses, because the
statute includes "aqueducts" as one of the kinds of public grounds, ways, and
courses covered by the provisions of W.Va. Code, 29-12A-4(c)(3) [1986], the City is
not immune from suit in the instant case .
In law, the somewhat archaic term
"aqueduct" is used (mostly in older cases) to denote various sorts of
conduits or channels for water -- from ditches in the earth to tunnels, canals, or pipes. See,
e.g., State ex rel. West Virginia Sand & Gravel Co. v. Royal Indemnity Co., 99
W.Va. 277, 286, 128 S.E. 439, 442 (1925) (the term "aqueduct" is used to denote
a masonry structure supplying fresh water to a city water system).
The City contends that the term
"aqueduct" means only conduits or channels that supply "fresh water."
The City says that the term
"aqueduct" cannot be read to include conduits or channels that direct, divert,
or carry away water flows like storm water, rainwater, or water that has been used for
washing, toilet flushing, industrial or agricultural uses, etc. The City points out that
such conduits or channels are commonly referred to as "drains" or
"sewers," not "aqueducts."
However, the legal rights, duties, and
characteristics associated with a conduit or channel that is referred to as an
"aqueduct" are generally identical to those that are associated with a conduit
or channel that is referred to as a "drain" or "sewer." Cf. Pifer
v. Brown, 43 W.Va. 412, 417-423, 27 S.E. 399, 401-403 (1897) (both "drains"
and "aqueducts" are commonly pipes or channels in or under the ground). Cf.
also Miller v. Skaggs, 79 W.Va. 645, 648-649, 91 S.E. 536, 537 (1917) (". . . the
mere fact that a drain or aqueduct may be concealed from casual vision will not prevent it
from being apparent in the sense in which that word is used.")
As the court stated in Martin v.
Louisiana Public Utilities Co., Inc., 13 La.App. 181, 183, 127 So. 470, 471 (1930):
In the sense that they are both water
conduits, an aqueduct and a sewer may be said to be much the same as far as their
construction is concerned . . . the Civil Code . . . uses the term 'sewer or aqueducts' as
convertible or equivalent to each other."
We recently
discussed W.Va. Code, 29-12A-4(c)(3) [1986] in Syllabus Point 3 of Koffler
v. City of Huntington, 196 W.Va. 202, 469 S.E.2d 645 (1996), where we stated:
Under W.Va. Code, 29-12A-4(c)(3)
[1986], political sub- divisions are liable for injury, death, or loss to persons or
property caused by their negligent failure to keep public roads, highways, streets,
avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, aqueducts, viaducts, or public grounds within the
political subdivisions open, in repair, or free from nuisance, except that it is a full
defense to such liability, when a bridge within a municipality is involved, that the
municipality does not have the responsibility for maintaining or inspecting the bridge. A
political subdivision's duty to keep its public roads, highways, streets, avenues, alleys,
sidewalks, bridges, aqueducts, viaducts, or public grounds open, in repair, or free from
nuisance does not extend exclusively to vehicles or vehicular travel.
In Koffler, a circuit court ruled
that W.Va. Code, 29-12A-4(c)(3) [1986] did not permit the City of Huntington to be
held liable for damages caused by the City's alleged negligence for having wide,
unprotected gaps in a storm sewer drain cover in an alley. The drain cover allegedly
trapped the tire of a bicycle, causing the bicycle rider to be injured.
The circuit court in Koffler ruled
that the liability provisions of W.Va. Code, 29-12A-4(c)(3) [1986] applied
narrowly only to injuries occurring in the course of "vehicular travel" on a
public roadway; and that bicycle travel was not "vehicular" travel -- because
bicycles are not considered vehicles for purposes of other provisions of the West
Virginia Code. 196 W. Va. at 204, 469 S.E.2d at 647. This Court reversed both
of the circuit court's rulings. We held that the circuit court's narrow reading of the
liability created by 29-12A- 4(c)(3) [1986] was erroneous, and that the City of
Huntington was not immune from suit.
At common law, this Court's decisions
going back over 100 years have recognized the liability of political subdivisions in West
Virginia for injuries arising out of the negligent maintenance and operation of drains and
sewers.See footnote 8 8
For example, in Syllabus Point 7 of Clay
v. City of St. Albans, 43 W.Va. 539, 27 S.E. 368 (1897), we stated:
If a city or town negligently fails to
keep its existing drains and gutters open and clear of obstructions, and in condition to
carry off the water in them, and by reason thereof land is injured from their overflow,
the city or town is liable in damages, provided the overflow is not due to an unusual or
extraordinary storm or rainfall.
And in Syllabus Point 4 of McCabe v.
City of Parkersburg, 138 W.Va. 830, 79 S.E.2d 87 (1953), we stated:
A municipality, in the maintenance of its
sewerage system, owes only the duty of reasonable care to avoid damage to the property of
others.
Summarizing the foregoing discussion, we
observe as follows:
First, the statutory term
"aqueduct," according to its customary dictionary definition, may be read to
include conduits and channels for water like sewers and drains. Such a
reading is not inconsistent with other legal principles regarding such conduits and
channels.
Second, W.Va. Code, 29-12A-4(c)(3)
[1986], which creates liability for injuries arising from negligence in connection
with public property , covers a wide and inclusive array of public lands, ways, and
grounds. We give such language a broad construction that favors liability, unless the
Legislature has explicitly and specifically created immunity. Marlin v. Bill Rich
Const., Inc., supra. See also Koffler, supra.
Third, a construction of the statute that
recognizes the potential liability of political subdivisions for damages resulting from
lack of due care in connection with public sewers and drains is consistent with the
historic common law of this State. Clay and McCabe, supra.
For the foregoing reasons, we determine
that the term "aqueduct" in W.Va. Code, 29-12A-4(c)(3) [1986] may
be permissibly construed to include the City's sewer system. We hold that the liability
for political subdivisions created in W.Va. Code, 29-12A- 4(c)(3) [1986] includes
liability for injury, death, or loss to persons or property caused by a subdivision's
negligent failure to keep its sewers and drains open, in repair, or free from nuisance.
Consequently, the claims made by the Calabreses against the City fall within the potential
liability established in W.Va. Code, 29-12A-4(c)(3) [1986], unless a
specific immunity applies.
C.
Immunity Provisions
Having established that the provisions of W.Va.
Code, 29-12A-4(c)(2) and (3) [1986] create potential liability for the City under the
allegations made by the Calabreses, we next turn to the two specific immunities in W.Va.
Code, 29-12A-5(a) [1986] that the City says nevertheless create immunity for the City.
The first of those exceptions, W.Va.
Code, 29-12A-5(a)(10) [1986], states that:
(a) A political subdivision is immune
from liability if a loss or claim results from: . . .
(10) Inspection powers or functions,
including failure to make an inspection, or making an inadequate inspection, of any
property, real or personal, to determine whether the property complies with or violates
any law or contains a hazard to health or safety[.]
The City argues that the
Calabreses' lawsuit is based on an allegedly "negligent inspection" of its sewer
by the City . Specifically, the Calabreses allege that after a City
"inspection" found that a sewer was apparently blocked , the City did not
take action to correct the blockage.
The City contends that pursuant to W.Va.
Code, 29-12A-5(a)(10) [1986], the City is specifically immune from liability
arising out of a negligent "inspection" of the City's sewer system.
To our reading, W.Va. Code,
29-12A-5(a)(10) [1986] is intended to immunize a political subdivision from claims
arising out of the subdivision's negligent inspection of the properties of third parties,
not from claims arising out of the subdivision's negligent inspection of the subdivision's
own property.
Such inspections of third-party property,
of course -- by fire inspectors, building inspectors, and the like -- are common
governmental duties.
If we were to give this language the broad
reading that the City suggests, a political subdivision would be immunized from liability
arising out of any injurious conditions on any of its property (public roads, bridges,
etc.) -- regardless of the subdivision's negligence in creating or tolerating those
conditions -- if the subdivision had at some previous time failed to properly inspect its
own property, or to properly follow up on an inspection and correct a problem on the
subdivision's own property.
Therefore, such an immunity would
effectively nullify most if not all liability arising out of negligently-caused dangerous
and injurious conditions on a subdivision's property.
Given the explicit legislative creation
and recognition of subdivision liability for such conditions, we doubt that eviscerating
such liability was the legislative intent -- in providing for "inspection"
immunity.
Therefore, we hold that W.Va. Code,
29-12A-5(a)(10) [1986] does not immunize a political subdivision from liability arising
out of negligently-caused dangerous, injurious, or harmful conditions on the subdivision's
own property.
We next turn to the second statutory
immunity that is asserted by the City, W.Va. Code, 29-12A-5(a)(16) [1986], stating
that:
(a) A political subdivision is immune
from liability if a loss or claim results from: . . .
(16) The operation of dumps, sanitary
landfills, and facilities where conducted directly by a political subdivision[.]
To find that this language immunizes the
City for negligently-caused injuries arising from its sewer system, the City asks us to
take a three-step reasoning approach.
First, the City asks us to read into the
statute, before the word "facilities," the word "sanitary."See footnote 9 9 Thus modified,
this provision would immunize: "the operation of dumps, sanitary landfills, and
sanitary facilities." Second, the City asks us to agree that the City's sewer
system is a kind of "sanitary facility." Third, the City asks us to complete the
syllogism and conclude that because the City's sewer system is an immunized "sanitary
facility," the City is immune from all sewer-related liability.
The City's argument, if we
accepted it, would require us to read W.Va. Code, 29-12A-5(a)(16) [1986] as
including not just landfill- and dump-related facilities -- but as also extending immunity
to all publicly-operated buildings, structures, fixtures, or contrivances -- of whatever
nature and wherever located -- that could be classified as "sanitary
facilities." Such a reading would create a broad, amorphous, and highly uncertain
area of immunity. See footnote 10 10
We decline to adopt such a broad reading.
Rather, we view the immunity that is created by W.Va. Code, 29-12A-5(a)(16) [1986]
as relating to sanitary landfills and dumps that are operated by political subdivisions --
and to associated facilities that are located on and operated in connection with the dump
or sanitary landfill.
Therefore, we hold that W.Va. Code,
29-12A-5(a)(16) [1986] does not immunize a political subdivision from liability arising
out of negligently-caused dangerous, injurious, or harmful conditions in or arising out of
the subdivision's sewer system, except insofar as the sewers are located on and a part of
the operation of a dump or sanitary landfill by the subdivision.
D.
The City's Ordinance
The City also argues that it is immune
from the Calabreses' lawsuit because of City Ordinance 25-17, that purports to create
immunity for claims arising out of the operation of the City's sewer system.
The ordinance states:
Neither the City nor the Sanitary Board
shall be liable for any damage resulting from bursting of any sewer main, service pipe or
valve, or from discontinuing the operation of its sewer collection, treatment and disposal
facilities, for repairs, extensions or connections, or from the accidental failure of the
sewage collection, treatment and disposal facilities from any cause whatsoever . . .
In Brackman's, Inc. v. City of
Huntington, 126 W.Va. 21, 35, 27 S.E.2d 71, 78 [1943], this Court said:
Attached to every statute, every charter,
every ordinance or resolution affecting, or adopted by, a municipality, is the implied
condition that the same must yield to the predominant power of the State, when that power
has been exercised.
We have furthermore stated that:
A municipal corporation has only the
powers granted to it by the legislature, and any such power it possesses must be expressly
granted or necessarily or fairly implied or essential and indispensable. If any reasonable
doubt exists as to whether a municipal corporation has a power, the power must be denied.
Syllabus Point 2, State ex rel. Charleston v. Hutchinson, 154 W.Va. 585, 176 S.E.2d 691 (1970).
The City argues that its "sewer
immunity" ordinance is essentially complementary to and co-extensive with the
immunity for sewer systems that the City urges us to find in the previously discussed
provisions of W.Va. Code, 29-12A-4 [1986] and -5 [1986].
However, we have concluded that there is
no such "sewer immunity" in W.Va. Code, 29-12A-4 [1986] and -5 [1986].
The City therefore cannot rely upon the argument that its "sewer immunity"
ordinance is consistent with the general law of the state. To the contrary, based on our
holdings in this opinion, the City's ordinance is in conflict with the general law of the
state.
In further support of the City's claim to
have the authority to enact a "sewer immunity" ordinance, the City relies on W.Va.
Code, 8-20-10 [1990], that authorize a municipality to "enact . . . rules and
regulations for the . . . operation and management of [a] . . . sewage system . . . and
ordinances for the care and protection of such system." Id.
The City contends that
this authority to build and operate a sewer system includes a grant of power to modify the
principles of tort liability that are established by the state's general law, as those
principles relate to the sewer system. The City cites us to no authority for this
proposition, and we decline to adopt it.
Based on the foregoing discussion, we
conclude that a municipal ordinance that is enacted pursuant to the power granted to
municipalities in W.Va. Code, 8-20-10 [1990], to construct, operate, maintain, care
for, and protect a sewer system, and that purports to limit, modify, or eliminate tort
liabilities and immunities related to that sewer system in a fashion that conflicts with
the general law of the state, is unenforceable and void, to the extent of such conflict.
IV.
Conclusion
Based
on the foregoing reasoning, we conclude that the answers given by the circuit court to the
certified questions were correct.See footnote 11 11 We remand the instant case for further proceedings consistent with the
principles announced herein.
Certified Questions Answered.
Footnote: 1 1 W.Va. Code, 29-12A-4
[1986] states:
(a) The distinction existing between
governmental functions and proprietary functions of political subdivisions is not affected
by the provisions of this article; however, the provisions of this article shall apply to
both governmental and proprietary functions.
(b)(1) Except as provided in subsection
(c) of this section, a political subdivision is not liable in damages in a civil action
for injury, death, or loss to persons or property allegedly caused by any act or omission
of the political subdivision or an employee of the political subdivision in connection
with a governmental or proprietary function: Provided, That this article shall not
restrict the availability of mandamus, injunction, prohibition, and other extraordinary
remedies.
(2) Subject to statutory limitations
upon their venue and jurisdiction, the circuit courts have jurisdiction to hear and
determine civil actions governed by or brought pursuant to this article.
(c) Subject to sections five and six of
this article, a political subdivision is liable in damages in a civil action for injury,
death, or loss to persons or property allegedly caused by an act or omission of the
political subdivision or of any of its employees in connection with a governmental or
proprietary function, as follows:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this
article, political
subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or loss to persons or property
caused by the negligent operation of any vehicle by their employees when the employees are
engaged within the scope of their employment and authority.
(2) Political subdivisions are liable
for injury, death, or loss to persons or property caused by the negligent performance of
acts by their employees while acting within the scope of employment.
(3) Political subdivisions are liable
for injury, death, or loss to persons or property caused by their negligent failure to
keep public roads, highways, streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, aqueducts,
viaducts, or public grounds within the political subdivisions open, in repair, or free
from nuisance, except that it is a full defense to such liability, when a bridge within a
municipality is involved, that the municipality does not have the responsibility for
maintaining or inspecting the bridge.
(4) Political subdivisions are liable for
injury, death, or loss to persons or property that is caused by the negligence of their
employees and that occurs within or on the grounds of buildings that are used by such
political subdivisions, including, but not limited to, office buildings and courthouses,
but not including jails, places of juvenile detention, workhouses, or any other detention
facility.
(5) In addition to the circumstances
described in subdivisions (1) to (4), subsection (c) of this section, a political
subdivision is liable for injury, death, or loss to persons or property when liability is
expressly imposed upon the political subdivision by a provision of this code. Liability
shall not be construed to exist under another section of this code merely because a
responsibility is imposed upon a political subdivision or because of a general
authorization that a political subdivision may sue and be sued.
Footnote: 2 2 W.Va. Code,
29-12A-5 [1986] states:
(a) A political subdivision is immune
from liability if a loss or claim results from:
(1) Legislative or quasi-legislative
functions;
(2) Judicial,
quasi-judicial or prosecutorial functions;
(3) Execution or enforcement of the
lawful orders of any court;
(4) Adoption or failure to adopt a law,
including, but not limited to, any statute, charter provision, ordinance, resolution,
rule, regulation or written policy;
(5) Civil disobedience, riot,
insurrection or rebellion or the failure to provide, or the method of providing, police,
law enforcement or fire protection;
(6) Snow or ice conditions or temporary
or natural conditions on any public way or other public place due to weather conditions,
unless the condition is affirmatively caused by the negligent act of a political
subdivision;
(7) Natural conditions of unimproved
property of the political subdivision;
(8) Assessment or collection of taxes
lawfully imposed or special assessments, license or registration fees or other fees or
charges imposed by law;
(9) Licensing powers or functions
including, but not limited to, the issuance, denial, suspension or revocation of or
failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend or revoke any permit, license, certificate,
approval, order or similar authority;
(10) Inspection powers or functions,
including failure to make an inspection, or making an inadequate inspection, of any
property, real or personal, to determine whether the property complies with or violates
any law or contains a hazard to health or safety;
(11) Any claim covered by any workers'
compensation law or any employer's liability law;
(12) Misrepresentation, if
unintentional;
(13) Any court-ordered or
administratively approved work release or treatment or rehabilitation program;
(14) Provision, equipping, lawful
operation or maintenance of any prison, jail or correctional facility, or injuries
resulting from the parole or escape of a prisoner;
(15) Any claim or action based on the
theory of manufacturer's products liability or breach of warranty or merchantability or
fitness for a specific purpose, either expressed or implied;
(16) The operation of
dumps, sanitary landfills, and facilities where conducted directly by a political
subdivision; or
(17) The issuance of revenue bonds or the
refusal to issue revenue bonds.
(b) An employee of a political
subdivision is immune from liability unless one of the following applies:
(1) His or her acts or omissions were
manifestly outside the scope of employment or official responsibilities;
(2) His or her acts or omissions were
with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner; or
(3) Liability is expressly imposed upon
the employee by a provision of this code.
(c) The immunity conferred upon an
employee by subsection (b) of this section does not affect or limit any liability of a
political subdivision for an act or omission of the employee.
Footnote: 3 3 Charleston
City Code, Section 25-17 states:
Neither the City nor the Sanitary Board
shall be liable for any damage resulting from bursting of any sewer main, service pipe or
valve, or from discontinuing the operation of its sewer collection, treatment and disposal
facilities, for repairs, extensions or connections, or from the accidental failure of the
sewage collection, treatment and disposal facilities from any cause whatsoever . . . .
Footnote: 4 4 In certified question cases, we are not limited to the formulation of the issues that was made by the circuit court. This Court has "traditionally maintained that upon receiving certified questions we retain some flexibility in determining how and to what extent they will be answered." City of Fairmont v. Retail, Wholesale, & Department Store Union, 166 W.Va. 1, 3-4, 283 S.E.2d 589, 590 (1980).
Footnote: 5 5 W.Va. Code, 29-12A-4(c)(3) [1986] is one of two "public property" liability provisions; the other is W.Va. Code, 29-12A-4(c)(4) [1986], creating liability relating to public buildings. "W.Va. Code, 29-12A-4(c)(3) and (4) (1986), permit liability claims to be filed against a political subdivision for injuries or death arising from the negligent failure to maintain its property." Stamper v. Kanawha County Bd. of Educ., 191 W.Va. 297, 298-299, 445 S.E.2d 238, 239-240 (1994) (emphasis added). See full text of W.Va. Code, 29-12A-4 [1986] at note 1 supra.
Footnote: 6 6 "[W.Va.] Code section 29-12A-5 (1992) lists seventeen specific situations in which a political subdivision is immune from liability." Moore v. Wood County Bd. of Educ., 200 W.Va. 247, 250, 489 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1997) (per curiam.) "[T]he legislature has 'specified seventeen instances in which political subdivisions would have immunity from tort liability.'" Koffler v. City of Huntington, 196 W.Va. 202, 204 n.2, 469 S.E.2d 645, 647 n.2, (1996), quoting O'Dell v. Town of Gauley Bridge, 188 W.Va. 596, 600, 425 S.E.2d 551, 555 (1992).
Footnote: 7 7 Thus, as a general rule, the liability-creating provisions of W.Va. Code, 29-12A-4 [1986] are to be broadly construed, and the immunity-creating provisions of W.Va. Code, 29-12A-5 [1986] are to be narrowly construed. Marlin v. Bill Rich Const., Inc., supra.
Footnote: 8 8 We strictly construe statutory language that derogates common-law liability. Stamper v. Kanawha County Bd. of Educ., 191 W.Va. 297, 300, 445 S.E.2d 238, 241 (1994).
Footnote: 9 9 The City says
that one must read some sort of modifying word into W.Va. Code, 29- 12A-5(a)(16)
[1986] -- before the word "facilities" -- because without a modifier that
defines what sort of facilities the statute is talking about, "facilities" does
not have a clear meaning.
The City suggests borrowing the word "sanitary" as a
modifier from the previous two- word phrase, "sanitary landfills." However, the
phrase "sanitary landfill" is a term of art, denoting what was "formerly
known by its more prosaic name as a garbage dump . . . . " Mountaineer Disposal
Service, Inc. v. Dyer, 156 W.Va. 766, 769, 197 S.E.2d 111, 113 (1973), and the word
"sanitary" does not function as an ordinary modifying adjective in that
phrase. See, e.g., W.Va. Code, 7-1-3e [1988]
("Acquisition of land for, and operation of, public refuse dumps and sanitary
landfills.")
As we note in the text, it is not reasonable to expand the
statute's ambit of immunity to include all "sanitary facilities," of whatever
nature and wherever located, based upon the use of the term of art "sanitary
landfill" in the statute.
Assuming that there is a need for reading a modifying word
into the statutory provision to give a more specific meaning to the term
"facilities," there is a simpler, narrower and more logical reading of the
statute, if the logically implied word "associated" is inserted before the word
"facilities." Under such a reading, the provision immunizes "the operation
of dumps, sanitary landfills, and associated facilities."
Footnote: 10 10 The reading of the statutory language in W.Va. Code, 29-12A-5(a)(16) [1986] that is proposed by the City would arguably require us to overrule Koffler, supra -- because the bicyclist in that case was injured by the condition of a cover grate on a storm sewer. According to the City's suggested reading of the statute, such a grate would be part of a "sanitary facility."
Footnote: 11 11 Although we have discussed one issue in this opinion that was not raised by the circuit court -- "negligent act" liability under W.Va. Code, 29-12A-4(c)(2) [1986] -- our discussion and our holdings are consistent with the circuit court's answers to the certified questions.
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