Wassick v. WV Dept. of Public Safety
Annotate this Case
January 1992 Term
___________
No. 20460
___________
JOHN WASSICK, JR.,
Plaintiff Below, Appellee
v.
WEST VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY,
Defendant Below, Appellant
_______________________________________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Monongalia County
Honorable Larry V. Starcher, Judge
Civil Action No. 90-C-22
Reversed
________________________________________________________
Submitted: May 6, 1992
Filed: May 15, 1992
John R. Angotti
David J. Straface
Angotti & Straface
Morgantown, West Virginia
Attorneys for the Appellee
William E. Galeota
Morgantown, West Virginia
Attorney for the Appellant
The Opinion of the Court was delivered PER CURIAM.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
"In determining whether there is sufficient evidence to
support a jury verdict the court should: (1) consider the evidence
most favorable to the prevailing party; (2) assume that all
conflicts in the evidence were resolved by the jury in favor of the
prevailing party; (3) assume as proved all facts which the
prevailing party's evidence tends to prove; and (4) give to the
prevailing party the benefit of all favorable inferences which
reasonably may be drawn from the facts proved." Syllabus Point 5,
Orr v. Crowder, 173 W. Va. 335, 315 S.E.2d 593 (1983), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 981, 105 S. Ct. 384, 83 L. Ed. 2d 319 (1984).
Per Curiam:
The West Virginia Department of Public Safety (DPS)
appeals from an order by the Circuit Court of Monongalia County
which set aside a jury verdict in favor of the DPS and granted a
new trial. The plaintiff below, John Wassick, Jr., alleged that
the DPS had negligently damaged a number of slot machines it had
seized from him. The circuit court was of the view that the jury
should have found liability and noted that it could have directed
a verdict for the plaintiff. We disagree.
In October, 1982, the DPS seized 131 slot machines owned
by the plaintiff. The DPS claimed that the machines were gaming
devices prohibited by W. Va. Code, 61-10-1 (1970). In May, 1983,
the circuit court ruled that the machines were not gaming devices
and were, therefore, improperly seized.
Before the machines could be returned to the plaintiff,
they were seized by federal authorities who sought to declare them
as contraband under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1172-1177. They were removed from
DPS custody and transported by the federal government to the
Federal Building in Clarksburg. The federal case was settled some
five years later, and the federal government returned approximately
117 of the machines to the plaintiff in 1988.
Thereafter, the plaintiff filed this suit claiming that
the DPS had damaged the machines when they were seized and stored
in its custody. At trial, the plaintiff presented testimony that
the machines were damaged. On the other hand, the DPS produced
testimony that some of the machines were in a damaged and defective
condition when they were seized. According to the DPS, at the time
of the seizure, the machines were located in the plaintiff's
warehouse, and some were stacked on top of each other, while others
were stored on their sides. The backs had been removed from a
number of the machines. The DPS also brought out the fact that the
federal government had the machines in its custody for a much
longer period of time, i.e., over five years, and that several
persons had had access to them. The jury returned a verdict in
favor of the DPS on December 5, 1990.
The trial court's rationale in granting a new trial was
that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a verdict for the
DPS. Our rule with regard to reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence in a civil trial is set out in Syllabus Point 5 of Orr v.
Crowder, 173 W. Va. 335, 315 S.E.2d 593 (1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 981, 105 S. Ct. 384, 83 L. Ed. 2d 319 (1984):
"In determining whether there is
sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict
the court should: (1) consider the evidence
most favorable to the prevailing party; (2)
assume that all conflicts in the evidence were
resolved by the jury in favor of the
prevailing party; (3) assume as proved all
facts which the prevailing party's evidence
tends to prove; and (4) give to the prevailing
party the benefit of all favorable inferences
which reasonably may be drawn from the facts
proved."
See also Pinnacle Mining Co. v. Duncan Aircraft Sales, 182 W. Va.
307, 387 S.E.2d 542 (1989); McClung v. Marion County Comm'n, 178
W. Va. 444, 360 S.E.2d 221 (1987).
Here, there was sufficient evidence produced by the DPS
to enable the jury to find that it was not negligent in its
handling and storage of the machines.See footnote 1 Consequently, the trial
court erred in setting aside the jury verdict, and its order is
hereby reversed.
Reversed.
Footnote: 1The trial court's memorandum on the motion for new trial suggested the application of Freshwater v. Booth, 160 W. Va. 156, 233 S.E.2d 312 (1977), which dealt with an inadequate damage verdict. This case has no applicability where the jury properly finds no liability on the part of the defendant.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.