In re Lafayette

In re Lafayette (2005-374); 180 Vt. 610; 910 A.2d 807

2006 VT 73

[Filed 26-Jul-2006]

[Motion for Reargument Denied 24-Aug-2006]

[Motion for Reconsideration Denied 03-Oct-2006]


                                 ENTRY ORDER

                                 2006 VT 73

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2005-374

                               MAY TERM, 2006


  In re Bryan Lafayette             }            APPEALED FROM:
                                    }
                                    }
                                    }            Addison Superior Court
                                    }  
                                    }
                                    }            DOCKET NO. 57-3-05 Ancv

                                                 Trial Judge: Christina C. Reiss

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       ¶  1.  Plaintiff  Bryan Lafayette is a prisoner serving concurrent
  sentences for separate arson and second-degree murder convictions.  He
  appeals from an order of the superior court rejecting his claim that the
  Department of Corrections has been improperly calculating the good-time
  credits to his sentence.  He argues that according to the Department's
  Sentencing Computation Guidebook (Guidebook), because he committed the
  arson before July 1, 1994, his good-time credits should be calculated under
  the version of 28 V.S.A.   811 that was in effect at that time.  We affirm.

       ¶  2.  On November 11, 1993, plaintiff was sentenced to probation
  and a suspended  prison term of five to ten years for an arson he had
  committed in 1992.  In 2000, while still on probation, plaintiff was
  convicted of a second-degree murder committed in 1999.  The superior court
  sentenced plaintiff to twenty-five years to life for the murder.  At the
  same time, the court revoked his probation and ordered him to serve the
  remainder of his underlying five-to-ten-year arson sentence concurrently. 

       ¶  3.  The Guidebook is based in part on 13 V.S.A.   7032(c)(1),
  which instructs the Department to combine the sentences of prisoners
  serving multiple sentences.  Section 7032(c) provides in relevant part:

    In all cases where multiple or additional sentences have been or
    are imposed, the term or terms of imprisonment under those
    sentences shall be determined in accordance with the following
    definitions.

    (1) When terms run concurrently, the shorter minimum terms merge
    in and are satisfied by serving the longest minimum and the
    shorter maximum terms merge in and are satisfied by discharge of
    the longest maximum term.   

  Therefore, plaintiff's five-year minimum sentence merges into and is
  satisfied by serving his twenty-five year minimum sentence, and his
  ten-year maximum sentence merges into and is satisfied by serving his life
  sentence.  The result is plaintiff's "effective" sentence, which is
  computed from his individual sentences and treated as a single sentence. 
  See 28 V.S.A.   722(3) (defining "[t]otal effective sentence" as "the
  sentence imposed under sections 7031 and 7032 of Title 13 as calculated by
  the department in the offender's records"); see also Dep't of Corrections,
  Sentence Computation Guidebook,   VI(A), at 15 (Oct. 2000) ("The effective
  sentence is the single sentence arrived at after computations are made in
  regard to the individual sentences imposed.").  Accordingly, plaintiff's
  effective sentence, to which any good-time credits he earns are applied, is
  twenty-five years to life.


       ¶  4.  Under 28 V.S.A.   811, (FN1) automatic reduction in term (ART)
  and earned reduction in term (ERT) good-time credits may be applied to a
  prisoner's effective sentence.  Prisoners subject to   811 acquire ART
  credits by following the rules and regulations of the institution to which
  they are committed.  Id.   811(a).  To acquire ERT credits, prisoners must
  participate in treatment, or in educational or vocational programs.  Id.  
  811(b).  In recent years,   811 has undergone several amendments, including
  the 1994 amendments relevant to this appeal.  Under the pre-1994 statute, a
  prisoner could accrue up to ten days of ART and up to five days of ERT per
  month.  The 1994 amendments allowed for only five days of ART and ten days
  of ERT per month.  1993, No. 173 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.  Because some prisoners
  are incarcerated for multiple offenses, committed while different versions
  of   811 were in effect, the Guidebook contains guidelines for determining
  whether the pre-1994 system, the 1994 system, or some later version of  
  811 applies.  Section VI(B) of the Guidebook provides:

    CASES WHERE OFFENDER IS INCARCERATED UNDER MORE THAN ONE REDUCTION
    OF TERM SYSTEMS [sic]:  
    Look to the date of the controlling sentence; check the affidavit,
    DDR's or other supporting documents to determine the date(s) of
    the offense(s).  If at least one offense occurred before July 1,
    1994, the offender is to be awarded reduction of term under the
    old system (10 days per month ART, up to 5 days per month ERT
    deducted from both minimum and maximum).  If at least one crime
    was committed between July 1, 1994 and before July 1, 2000, and
    none prior to July 1, 1994, the offender is to be awarded
    reduction in term under the 1994 system (5 days ART, up to 10 days
    ERT deducted from both minimum and maximum).  If the crime(s) of
    the controlling sentence was (were) committed on or after July 1,
    2000, the offender is to be awarded reduction of term under the
    2000 system (5 days ART and up to 10 days ERT deducted from
    maximum only).

  Dep't of Corrections, Sentence Computation Guidebook,   VI(B), at 16.  

       ¶  5.  Based on its interpretation of the Guidebook, 13 V.S.A.  
  7032, and 28 V.S.A. § 811, the Department has been calculating plaintiff's
  ART and ERT according to the 1994 system.  Dissatisfied with the
  Department's calculation, plaintiff filed a complaint seeking to compel
  calculation of his good-time credits under the pre-1994 system, which would
  deduct approximately fifty more days from his sentence.  The superior court
  granted summary judgment in favor of the Department, reasoning that "the
  25-year to life sentence becomes the controlling sentence" because
  "[plaintiff's] larger sentence subsumes his smaller sentence."  The court
  determined that because the controlling sentence was imposed while the 1994
  system was in effect, plaintiff is not entitled to the benefit of the old
  statute.

       ¶  6.  We review grants of summary judgment under the same standard
  applied by the trial court, affirming "only when the record clearly shows
  that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is
  entitled to judgment as a matter of law."  Bacon v. Lascelles, 165 Vt. 214,
  218, 678 A.2d 902, 905 (1996).  Plaintiff argues that his good-time credits
  should be determined under the more favorable pre-1994 system because "at
  least one offense occurred before July 1, 1994."  Dep't of Corrections,
  Sentence Computation Guidebook,   VI(B), at 16.  We disagree.  Although
  that statement, taken in isolation, seems to support plaintiff's position,
  the Guidebook and related statutes as a whole support the conclusion that
  when the minimum and maximum terms of a prisoner's effective sentence are
  both derived from the same individual sentence, the effective sentence is
  the controlling sentence for the purpose of determining which
  term-reduction system to follow.  Thus, in this case, when we "[l]ook to
  the date of the controlling sentence," and consider "the date(s) of the
  offense(s)," id., only the date of the second-degree murder offense is
  relevant, and that sentence alone comprises his effective sentence. 
   
       ¶  7.  This conclusion is consistent with our prior interpretations
  of the Guidebook and sentencing statutes.  See Ladd v. Gorczyk, 2004 VT 87,  
  4, 177 Vt. 551, 861 A.2d 1094 (2004) (mem.) (discussing prisoner's
  "controlling or effective sentence").  Cf. In re Leggett, No. 2004-391,
  slip op. at 2-3 (Vt. Feb. 18, 2005) (unreported mem.) (considering the
  dates of all of the defendant's underlying offenses because each offense
  carried the same minimum and maximum terms, and therefore, each offense was
  as determinative of the effective sentence as the others).  In Ladd, we
  decided which term reduction system applied to an effective sentence under
  similar circumstances.  In October 2000, Ladd was sentenced to sixty days
  to five years for two counts of theft.  Later that month, he received an
  additional concurrent sentence of zero to six months.  In February 2002, he
  was convicted of three more crimes, for which he was sentenced to an
  aggregate consecutive sentence of three years and six months to thirty
  years.  Because the first set of crimes was committed while the 1994 system
  was in effect, and the latter set of crimes was committed while a newer
  system was in effect, there was a question as to which system applied.   We
  concluded that because the minimum and maximum terms of Ladd's earlier
  offenses-those committed while the 1994 system was in effect-"comprise[d]
  no part of the current effective sentence," they had no bearing on which
  term-reduction system should apply to his effective sentence.  Ladd, 2004
  VT 87,   5.  On the other hand, "if at least one crime comprising a part of
  the prisoner's effective sentence" had been committed while the 1994 system
  was in effect, he would have been entitled to term reduction under that
  system.  Id.   4 (emphasis added).  Here, as in Ladd, plaintiff's effective
  sentence is determined solely by the minimum and maximum terms of his
  murder sentence.  Therefore, because plaintiff committed that offense in
  1999, the Department was correct to apply the 1994 system to calculate
  plaintiff's good-time credits.

       Affirmed.



                                       BY THE COURT:



                                       _________________________________________
                                       Paul L. Reiber, Chief Justice

                                       _________________________________________
                                       John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

                                       _________________________________________
                                       Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice

                                       _________________________________________
                                       Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice

                                       _________________________________________
                                       Brian L. Burgess, Associate Justice


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                                  Footnotes


FN1.  Effective July 1, 2005, the Legislature repealed   811 and created a
  new system that provides a one-time award of prospective good-time credits. 
  2005, No. 63,    2-3.  For the purposes of this appeal, we will refer to
  the statute as it existed prior to July 1, 2005.