Simpson v. Rood
Annotate this Case
Simpson v. Rood (2002-183); 175 Vt. 546; 830 A.2d 4
2003 VT 39
[Filed 31-Mar-2003]
ENTRY ORDER
2003 VT 39
SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2002-183
JANUARY TERM, 2003
Steven and Mary Ann Simpson } APPEALED FROM:
}
}
v. } Orange Superior Court
}
Rodney Rood, Sr. }
} DOCKET NO. 145-7-00 Oecv
Trial Judge: Amy M. Davenport
In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:
¶ 1. This is an auto negligence case. Plaintiffs Steven and Mary
Ann Simpson appeal from a jury verdict in favor of defendant Rodney Rood,
Sr. On appeal, the Simpsons claim that the trial court erred in improperly
permitting Rood's cardiologist to testify by telephone. We agree.
Therefore we reverse and remand. (FN1)
¶ 2. The accident occurred just after 7:30 a.m. on January 29,
2000. Steven Simpson was driving his car east on Route 25. Route 25 is a
typical Vermont blacktop highway with a double centerline. Simpson drove
below the posted speed limit and wore his three-point seatbelt. Simpson
followed a line of three cars as he drove east toward the town of Bradford.
The car in front of Simpson suddenly swerved to the left-a large pickup
truck was in his lane. There was a guardrail to the right and no breakdown
lane. Simpson slammed on his brakes, and collided head-on with the pickup
driven by Rood.
¶ 3. The Simpsons brought a negligence action, alleging that Rood
caused his truck to hit Steven Simpson's vehicle head-on, causing injury,
pain, loss of consortium, and other damages related to the accident. Rood
asserted that there was no negligence on his part because the accident
resulted from a sudden and unforeseeable episode of cough syncope that
caused him to black out while driving. Cough syncope can occur after a
prolonged episode of coughing. A combination of factors initiated by such
a spell, including low blood pressure, low blood flow to the brain, and
decreased heart rate, can result in loss of consciousness. (FN2)
¶ 4. Rodney Rood is fifty years old. He has a history of cardiac
problems, including a heart attack and chronic angina. Rood has undergone
bypass surgery and other related procedures. He has continually suffered
painful residual symptoms from his heart attack eleven years ago. After
the accident, Rood told emergency room doctors, and his own long-term heart
specialist, Dr. Nathaniel Niles, that he remembered taking a sip of his
coffee, coughing, and then waking up after the collision. He did not
recall having any dizziness or angina immediately before the accident.
Based on this information, after eliminating a number of other diagnoses,
Dr. Niles concluded that Rood's blackout was due to cough syncope, and that
the episode could not have been anticipated. Therefore, Dr. Niles's trial
testimony regarding the diagnosis had the potential to absolve Rood of
liability-it went to the heart of the negligence issue.
¶ 5. Both parties agreed in advance of trial to proceed with
videotaped testimony by their respective doctor-witnesses. The court
scheduled the trial for April 4 and 11. Although a great deal was made of
the inability to schedule the videotaping of Dr. Niles due to conflicts in
the attorneys' scheduling, Rood had significant advance knowledge that Dr.
Niles's opinions were critical. Nevertheless, Rood did not take sufficient
steps to record the doctor's testimony. At a status conference the day
before the second trial date, with the testimony still unrecorded, Rood's
counsel moved for a continuance. The court denied his motion. Thereafter,
Rood's attorney arranged for issuance of a subpoena ordering Dr. Niles to
appear the following day.
¶ 6. The next day, Dr. Niles's attorney, appearing by telephone,
moved to quash the subpoena citing unreasonable time for compliance and
undue burden-the doctor had a full load of approximately twenty-five
patients that day. Dr. Niles's attorney offered to arrange for him to
testify by telephone. Over the Simpsons' objections, the court allowed Dr.
Niles's telephone testimony. Rood based his defense on Dr. Niles's opinion
that the loss of consciousness resulted from cough syncope, and that the
episode was both unforeseeable and unavoidable. The jury returned its
verdict for Rood later that day.
¶ 7. The Simpsons argue on appeal, as they did below in their
objection to Dr. Niles's testimony, that admission of telephonic testimony
was reversible error. We agree. When the court quashed Dr. Niles's
subpoena and admitted Dr. Niles's testimony in a form other than "orally in
open court," as required by V.R.C.P. 43(a), it committed reversible error.
¶ 8. The Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure require that "[i]n all
trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court,
unless otherwise provided by these rules, the Vermont Rules of Evidence, or
other rules adopted by the Supreme Court." V.R.C.P. 43(a) (emphasis
added). Nowhere in the Rules of Evidence is the general requirement for
testimony "orally in open court" abrogated to allow for testimony of an out
of court witness-out of sight of the jury-either by telephone or by other
means, in a civil trial of this sort under these circumstances. "For
testimony to be presented 'orally in open court,' the witness must be
present in the courtroom." Murphy v. Tivoli Enters., 953 F.2d 354, 359
(8th Cir. 1992). " '[O]rally in open court' means that a witness
testifying in a case must be present in court so that the trier of fact may
observe the demeanor of the witness." In re Gust, 345 N.W.2d 42, 44 (N.D.
1984). Accordingly, the trial court erred in permitting Dr. Niles to
testify by telephone.
¶ 9. Nevertheless, Rood argues that the trial court's decision
should be disturbed only for an "abuse of discretion." See Greene v. Bell,
171 Vt. 280, 288, 762 A.2d 865, 872 (2000) (Court will not disturb trial
court's ruling on admissibility of evidence absent an abuse of discretion).
We disagree. In terms of the presentation of oral testimony in civil
cases, Rule 43(a) leaves nothing to the court's discretion in the absence
of agreement by the parties to allow testimony in a different form. The
Rule provides that "[i]n all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be
taken orally in open court." V.R.C.P. 43(a) (emphasis added). Use of
"shall" in Rule 43(a) makes the "orally in open court" requirement
mandatory. See Town of Victory v. State, __ Vt. __, __, 814 A.2d 369, 376
(2002) ("Use of the word 'shall' in a statute generally means that the
action is mandatory, as opposed to directory."). Of course, nothing
prevents the parties from stipulating, with the court's permission, to
present testimony by other means, such as videotape. See, e.g., Gust, 345 N.W.2d at 44 ("[B]y agreement of the parties, with approval of the court,
the testimony may be presented [other than 'orally in open court'],
including the use of audiovisual means.").
¶ 10. Rood further argues that Vermont Rule of Evidence 611(a)
supports the trial court's ruling because it allows the "court [to]
exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating
witnesses and presenting evidence." V.R.E. 611(a). Rood points to the
Reporter's Notes to Rule 43(a), which state that the "rules do not intend
to impinge on the rules of evidence." Reporter's Notes, V.R.C.P. 43(a).
Following this argument to its logical conclusion would allow courts to
sidestep Rule 43(a)'s call for testimony "orally in open court"-resulting
in the complete disconnection of witnesses from the jury charged not only
with hearing trial testimony, but with observing it as well. We doubt that
Rule 611(a)'s drafters intended this result.
¶ 11. Finally, Rood argues that there is inconsistency among the
various Vermont Rules regarding admission of telephone testimony. For
instance, the Vermont Rules for Family Proceedings provide carefully
limited exceptions where the court may require a witness to testify by
telephone or may allow a party or witness to testify by telephone upon
motion. V.R.F.P. 4(g)(1). The law also provides limited opportunities for
certain witnesses to testify "out of court," by closed-circuit television
or recorded testimony. For example, abuse victims who are under the age of
twelve, or mentally ill or mentally "retarded" adults may, in limited
circumstances, testify over closed-circuit television. V.R.E. 807. Such
testimony, however, is permissible only after a finding that requiring the
child to testify in court "will present a substantial risk of trauma . . .
which would substantially impair the ability of the [witness] to testify."
Id. § 807(c). Different public policy concerns support the rules cited by
Rood, but the important fact is that none of these Rules is applicable to
the present case. This is a civil negligence matter. The Rules for Family
Proceedings are not applicable here. Likewise, this is not a case where
Rule 807 applies. There was no basis to stray from the clear mandate of
Rule 43(a).
¶ 12. "[W]e have placed our confidence in the adversary system,
entrusting to it the primary responsibility for developing relevant facts
on which a determination . . . can be made." United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230 (1975). "Historical experience has taught us that
testimonial evidence has the highest reliability because the credibility of
the witness can be evaluated, and the factual issues narrowed by
cross-examination." Sanders v. Monsanto Co., 574 F.2d 198, 200 (5th Cir.
1978). Thus, within the limitations imposed by the rules, the parties share
their respective evidentiary responsibilities. In this case, defendant had
several years to arrange for Dr. Niles's proper testimony either in court
or by videotape. Under the circumstances, the trial court should not have
quashed the subpoena. See Nobles, 422 U.S. at 230 ("While the adversary
system depends primarily on the parties for the presentation and
exploration of relevant facts, the judiciary is not limited to the role of
a referee or supervisor. Its compulsory processes stand available to
require the presentation of evidence in court . . . .").
¶ 13. Moreover, the error affected a substantial right of a party.
V.R.C.P. 61 ("No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence
and no error or defect in any ruling or order . . . is ground for granting
a new trial or for setting aside a verdict . . . unless refusal to take
such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice.
The court . . . must disregard any error . . . which does not affect the
substantial rights of the parties."); V.R.E. 103(a) ("Error may not be
predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a
substantial right of the party is affected . . . ."); Jakab v. Jakab, 163
Vt. 575, 580, 664 A.2d 261, 263 (1995) ("[W]e will not reverse if the error
is harmless"). Allowing Dr. Niles to testify by telephone stripped the
Simpsons of their opportunity to conduct cross-examination in the jury's
presence. Dr. Niles's testimony was the linchpin of Rood's defense, and
thus conversely, it was equally critical to the Simpsons. Precisely
because the testimony of Dr. Niles was so important to the outcome of the
trial, we find that allowing the examination to occur via telephone, rather
than "orally in open court" where the Simpsons could conduct
cross-examination in view of the jury, warrants reversal.
¶ 14. Rood argues that because all the medical charts were
disclosed, and there was no unfair surprise, Dr. Niles's telephonic
testimony did not prejudice a substantial right. Rood further argues that
the right to a fair trial was preserved because counsel for the Simpsons
was able to effectively cross-examine the witness-that "in reading the
transcript, one cannot tell that Dr. Niles was not physically present in
the courtroom." Along similar lines, the trial court justified its ruling,
in part, on its determination that because the doctor was an opinion
witness, rather than a fact witness, there were no "real credibility"
issues at stake.
¶ 15. Whether presented with a fact witness or opinion witness, the
jury's role is to observe the testimony and weigh the evidence presented.
The simple fact that an expert is qualified to give an opinion does not
preclude the jury from weighing the expert's testimony. "[I]t is the
province of the jury to determine what weight to accord expert witness
testimony." State v. Muscari, __ Vt. __, __, 807 A.2d 407, 415 (2002)
(citing Keus v. Brooks Drug, Inc., 163 Vt. 1, 5, 652 A.2d 475, 478 (1994)).
Reversed and remanded.
BY THE COURT:
_______________________________________
Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Chief Justice
_______________________________________
John A. Dooley, Associate Justice
_______________________________________
Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice
_______________________________________
Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice
_______________________________________
Frederic W. Allen, Chief Justice (Ret.)
Specially Assigned
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Footnotes
FN1. Because we reverse on their first argument, there is no need to reach
plaintiffs' second claim that the court erred in refusing to include a jury
charge regarding a presumption of negligence for violation of a safety
statute.
FN2. Medically, cough syncope is defined as
the loss of consciousness that may be induced by a severe spasm of
coughing. This is the result of the high pressure that may be
induced in the chest . . . by such a spasm. This prevents the
return of blood to the heart, the veins in the neck begin to bulge
and the blood-pressure falls. This may so reduce the blood flow
to the brain that the individual feels giddy and may then lose
consciousness.
Black's Medical Dictionary 225-26 (34th ed. 1984).
In perhaps the most well-known case of cough syncope in recent years,
President Bush suffered an episode while eating a pretzel and watching a
football game.
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