Hartford Board of Library Trustees v. Town of Hartford

Hartford Board of Library Trustees v. Town of Hartford (2002-207); 
174 Vt. 598; 816 A.2d 512

[Filed 21-Nov-2002]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2002-207

                             OCTOBER TERM, 2002


  Hartford Board of Library Trustees	}	APPEALED FROM:
                                        }
                                        }
       v.	                        }	Windsor Superior Court
                                        }	
  Town of Hartford	                }
                                        }	DOCKET NO. 21-1-01 Wrcv

                                                Trial Judge: Alan W. Cook

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       This appeal concerns a dispute between the Hartford Board of Library
  Trustees and the Hartford Town Manager over who has the authority to set
  the level of compensation for the town librarian.  The Board appeals the
  superior court's ruling that Vermont statutory law authorizes the Town of
  Hartford, and in particular the town manager, to exercise control over the
  librarian's employment, including her salary and benefits.  We conclude
  that Vermont law, as applied to the facts of this case, gives library
  trustees the final say over such matters, and therefore reverse the
  superior court's decision.

       The West Hartford Municipal Library is a town library governed by an
  elected board of trustees.  See 22 V.S.A. §§ 101-146 (distinguishing
  between incorporated and municipal libraries).  The present dispute arose
  when the Hartford Select Board and town manager (hereinafter the Town)
  reduced the librarian's salary after the Board of Library Trustees had
  given her a raise.  The trustees believed that the Town had usurped the
  Board's authority, not only by lowering the librarian's salary and reducing
  her vacation days, but also by processing library requisitions through the
  town treasurer and negotiating bulk utility rates that predetermined which
  phone company and fuel dealer would serve the library.  In January 2001,
  the Board filed a declaratory judgment action asking the superior court to
  determine the relative authority of the Town and the Board with respect to
  the operation of the library, and in particular the salary and benefits of
  the librarian.  On April 12, 2002, following a January 2002 evidentiary
  hearing, the court ruled that Vermont statutory law gives the Town the
  authority to exercise control over the details of the librarian's
  employment, including her salary and benefits.

       On appeal, the parties debate the primacy of separate statutory
  schemes concerning the respective powers of the Town and the Board.  Our
  review of these statutes and the question of law determined by the superior
  court is nondeferential and plenary.  See Thompson v. Dewey's S. Royalton,
  Inc., 169 Vt. 274, 276, 733 A.2d 65, 67 (1999) (questions of law are
  reviewed on nondeferential and plenary basis); State v. Koch, 169 Vt. 109,
  112, 730 A.2d 577, 580 (1999) (issues concerning proper construction of
  statutes are questions of law, and thus are reviewed on nondeferential and
  plenary basis).

 
          
       In claiming authority over the librarian's salary and other matters,
  the Town relies upon three statutes contained in Title 24.  The first
  provides that select boards "shall have the general supervision of the
  affairs of the town and shall cause to be performed all duties required of
  towns and town school districts not committed by law to the care of any
  particular officer."  24 V.S.A. § 872.  The second provides that
  municipalities "may adopt rules relating to personnel administration,
  including the following: . . . vacations, . . . salaries."  24 V.S.A. §
  1121(a).  These personnel rules "may" apply to any and all town employees,
  but not to employees of a town school district.  Id. § 1121(b).  The third
  provides that the town manager has the authority (1) to cause to be
  performed duties required of towns and town school districts not committed
  to the care of any particular officer; (2) to perform all duties conferred
  by law upon the select board, except for those specified therein; (3) to
  purchase all supplies for every town department, except for purchases by
  departments over which the manager does not have control, which shall be
  made by requisition through those departments; and (4) to have supervision
  over all public town buildings.  24 V.S.A. § 1236(1)-(4).

       On the other side, the Board relies primarily on 22 V.S.A. § 143(a),
  which is part of a chapter dedicated to public libraries and, more
  specifically, a subchapter concerning municipal libraries.  Section 143(a)
  provides that municipal library trustees "have full power to manage the
  public library, make bylaws, elect officers, establish a library policy and
  receive, control and manage property which shall come into the hands of the
  municipality."  That section also allows the Board to "appoint a director
  for the efficient administration and conduct of the library."  Id.  In the
  Board's view, the language contained in § 143(a) demonstrates that the
  Legislature intended to give the Board complete authority to manage the
  library's affairs, which would necessarily include deciding how to allocate
  funds appropriated to the library and, more particularly, setting the
  librarian's level of compensation.  The Town disagrees, contending that §
  143(a) gives the Board the authority to manage only such things as library
  acquisitions, services, and programs, and that the provisions of Title 24
  give the Town the authority to act as the library's purchasing agent and to
  oversee library personnel and the library building itself.

       When interpreting independent statutory schemes with overlapping
  subject matters, "we prefer to first look for a construction that will
  harmonize the seemingly-inconsistent statutes."  Vt. Tenants, Inc. v. Vt.
  Hous. Fin. Agency, 170 Vt. 77, 83, 742 A.2d 745, 749 (1999).  We also bear
  in mind the general rules of statutory construction that a specific statute
  governs over a more general one, Pearson v. Pearson, 169 Vt. 28, 36, 726 A.2d 71, 76 (1999), and that a statute enacted later in time generally
  governs over an earlier statute, Cent. Vt. Hosp. v. Town of Berlin, 164 Vt.
  456, 459, 672 A.2d 474, 476 (1995).  Our ultimate objective, of course, is
  to implement the intent of the Legislature.  Sagar v. Warren Selectboard,
  170 Vt. 167, 171, 744 A.2d 422, 426 (1999).  We achieve that end by
  examining the language of the statute in question, and, if necessary, the
  statutory scheme in its entirety, keeping in mind its subject matter, its
  effect and consequences, and the reason and spirit of the law.  Id.
        
       Construing the two statutory schemes in this case together, we
  conclude that the superior court erred in ruling that the Town is
  authorized to exercise control over the details of the librarian's
  employment.  Title 24 gives town select boards and town managers general
  supervisory powers over the affairs of their towns, but only to the extent
  that the duties they assume are not committed by law to others.  See 24
  V.S.A. § 872; 24 V.S.A. § 1236(1)-(2); see also L'Esperance v. Town of
  Charlotte, 167 Vt. 162, 169, 704 A.2d 760, 764-65 (1990) (select boards
  have broad power to undertake 

 

  administrative duties authorized by statutory law concerning town affairs,
  but Legislature can create exceptions to this broad authority); Kirchner v.
  Giebink, 150 Vt. 172, 174-75, 552 A.2d 372, 374 (1988) (select boards have
  general supervisory power over town matters, "absent some specific
  statutory limitation on their authority").

       In this case, there is specific and more recent statutory authority
  giving library trustees "full power to manage" municipal public libraries. 
  22 V.S.A. § 143(a).  An examination of the entire subchapter on municipal
  libraries reveals that the Legislature intended the forceful phrase "full
  power to manage" to mean more than overseeing the acquisitions, services,
  and programs of the library, as the Town suggests.  "A municipality . . .
  shall appropriate money annually for the maintenance, care and increase of
  the library in an amount voted at its annual meeting."  22 V.S.A. § 142. 
  As noted, under § 143(a), the board of trustees not only has "full power to
  manage" the library but may also appoint a director to help administer the
  library.  The trustees must report to the municipality at its annual
  meeting on, among other things, "the management and the expenditure of
  moneys as have come into their hands."  22 V.S.A. § 144.  In the event no
  trustees have been appointed or elected, "moneys raised for a library shall
  be paid out by an agent to be appointed by the governing body of the
  municipality until trustees are elected or appointed."  22 V.S.A. § 145. 
  Considered together, the language of these provisions suggest that the
  Legislature intended the trustees to have control over the library's budget
  to manage the affairs of the library.  Cf. In re Jones, 238 Vt. 223, 229,
  415 A.2d 202, 206 (1980) (§ 143(a) gives library trustees "control over
  expenditures of money only after it comes into the hands of the town").

       The Legislature could have used the simple infinitive "to manage" in §
  143(a), but instead chose the phrase "full power to manage."  We assume
  that, in doing so, the Legislature acted advisedly.  See Payea v. Howard
  Bank, 164 Vt. 106, 107, 663 A.2d 937, 938 (1995) ("When construing a
  statute, we presume that language is inserted advisedly."); cf. 24 V.S.A. §
  2656(a) (board of directors of emergency medical services district shall
  have "full power to manage" conduct of district); 24 V.S.A. § 2432
  (trustees of public funds shall have "full power" to invest or dispose of
  funds owned by town).

       Nevertheless, the Town cites 24 V.S.A. §§ 1121(a) and 1236(3)-(4) in
  support of its position that the Legislature intended to give town
  officials control over specific administrative duties not mentioned in 22
  V.S.A. § 143(a).  In our view, neither one of these provisions gives the
  Town the authority it claims in this case.  Under § 1121(a), a municipality
  is explicitly authorized to adopt rules relating to personnel matters,
  including vacations and salaries.  Those rules "may apply to any or all
  employees of the municipality, including officers and employees of a fire
  department or police department maintained by the municipality," but do not
  apply to employees of a town school district.  24 V.S.A. § 1121(b). 
  According to the Town, the librarian is a town employee because she
  receives employment benefits through the Town, and thus she is subject to
  town personnel rules governing salaries, vacations, and other personnel
  matters.  We disagree.  The fact that, for the sake of administrative
  efficiency, the library and Town have agreed to include the librarian as a
  town employee for purposes of providing employment benefits such as
  worker's compensation and unemployment insurance does not mean that the
  Board has relinquished its statutory authority to manage the library and
  thus set the librarian's compensation.
          
       As for the relative authority of the Board and town manager with
  respect to purchasing supplies and selecting utilities, the answer, for the
  most part, is spelled out in Farmer v. Haley, 100 

 

  Vt. 75, 78-79, 135 A. 12, 13-14 (1926), wherein this Court construed a
  nearly identical earlier version of § 1236(3)-(4).  To the extent that a
  municipal library can be considered a department of the town, it certainly
  is not a department over which the town manager has been given direct
  control.  Accordingly, as with school districts, the town manager's
  authority is limited to purchasing supplies that the library has deemed
  necessary and requisitioned.  24 V.S.A. § 1236(3); Farmer, 100 Vt. at 78,
  135 A.  at 14.  The same holds true for the purchase of utilities.  See
  Farmer, 100 Vt. at 79, 135 A.  at 14.

       As the Court emphasized in Farmer, the overlapping duties of town
  managers and other municipal entities require a "spirit of cooperation" for
  the efficient daily administration of the affairs of a town.  Id. at 80,
  135 A.  at 14.  In this way, library trustees and town managers across the
  State of Vermont can agree to a wide variety of power-sharing schemes that
  best suit the needs of each particular town.  See The Law of Public
  Libraries, A Joint Publication of the Office of the Secretary of State and
  the Vermont Department of Libraries, at 4-6 (Jan. 2000),
  www.sec.state.vt.us/municipal/pubs/library.html (noting that different
  towns have different power-sharing arrangements with library trustees). 
  But, as in this case, when that spirit of cooperation is lost, the Town
  cannot, in the name of administrative efficiency, infringe upon the Board's
  "full power to manage" the library.  See 22 V.S.A. § 143(a); Farmer, 100
  Vt. at 78-79, 135 A.  at 14.  The Board is directly accountable to the
  voters of the Town of Hartford.  If the townspeople are unhappy with the
  performance of the library trustees, either because of a lack of
  administrative efficiency or for any other reason, they may vote the
  trustees out of office, or they may decide to undertake a system in which
  the trustees are appointed by town officials rather than elected.  See 22
  V.S.A. § 143(a) ("The appointment or election of the trustees shall
  continue in effect until changed at an annual meeting of the
  municipality.").

       Reversed.


                                       BY THE COURT:



                                       _______________________________________
                                       Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Chief Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       James L. Morse, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice