State v. Winnie

State v. Winnie (2002-194); 174 Vt. 626; 816 A.2d 545

[Filed 18-Dec-2002]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2002-194

                             NOVEMBER TERM, 2002

  State of Vermont                       }       APPEALED FROM:
                                         }
                                         }
       v.                                }       District Court of Vermont,
                                         }       Unit No. 2, Bennington Circuit
                                         }
  Richard Winnie, a/k/a Richard Wescott  }       DOCKET NO. 633-6-01 Bncr

                                                 Trial Judge: David A. Howard

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       ¶ 1.  Defendant Richard Winnie appeals the Bennington District
  Court's denial of his motion to dismiss the charges of attempt to elude a
  law enforcement officer, grossly negligent operation of a motor vehicle,
  and operation of a motor vehicle at an excessive speed.  Defendant argues
  that the State violated the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (IAD), 28
  V.S.A. § 1503, by not granting defendant a hearing within 180 days of his
  request for a final disposition of the three charges.  Defendant claims on
  appeal that the district court erred in determining that defendant's final
  disposition request was flawed because it was sent only to the prosecutor
  and not to the district court. Defendant also argues the court erred
  because it granted a continuance sua sponte after the 180-day time limit
  had lapsed.  We hold that the 180-day time period under 28 V.S.A. § 1503(a)
  had not expired, and therefore, we affirm the district court's denial of
  defendant's motion to dismiss.

       ¶ 2.  In June 2001, defendant was charged with attempting to
  elude a law enforcement officer, operating a vehicle in a grossly negligent
  manner, and operating a vehicle at an excessive speed.  On September 19,
  2001, while defendant was incarcerated at the Berkshire County House of
  Correction in Massachusetts, he signed a request for a final disposition of
  the three charges against him.  A prison official also signed a completed
  certificate of inmate status bearing the same date.  The prosecutor was
  notified of the request; however, the district court found that the court
  never received the request and did not have notice of the request until
  October 16, 2001, at the earliest.


       ¶ 3.  On April 1, 2002, defendant filed a motion to dismiss.  He
  argued that the 180-day period within which the State was required to bring
  him to trial had commenced on September 

 

  19, 2001, the date he signed and sent his request for final disposition to
  the Massachusetts correction officer.  Defendant claimed that the time
  limit had expired, and the court should therefore dismiss the charges with
  prejudice.  See 28 V.S.A. § 1503(d).  At the change of plea and sentencing
  hearing held on April 3, 2002, the trial court denied defendant's motion
  and found that the lack of notice to the court "could have the effect that
  the 180 days shouldn't run until the Court was formally aware that Mr.
  Winnie was before it . . . since it didn't receive any other notices under
  the statute before then . . . ."    

       ¶ 4.  Defendant argues on appeal that his actions in
  causing the request to be delivered only to the prosecuting officer
  constitute sufficient compliance with the IAD necessary to invoke the
  180-day rule.  Defendant further claims that he should not be penalized for
  an alleged failure on the part of the sending state, Massachusetts, to mail
  his request to the district court after he gave it to a prison official
  under 28 V.S.A. § 1503(b), and thus did all that he could do to comply with
  the Act.  Even assuming, arguendo, that we were to find defendant's
  contention compelling, the IAD is "a congressionally sanctioned interstate
  compact . . . [and as such] is a federal law subject to federal
  construction."  New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 111 (2000) (internal
  quotation omitted).  The IAD language, "shall have caused to be delivered,"
  which is the subject of this appeal, has been construed by the United
  States Supreme Court in Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43 (1993).  The Court
  held that "the 180-day time period in Article III(a) of the IAD does not
  commence until the prisoner's request for final disposition of the charges
  against him has actually been delivered to the court and prosecuting
  officer of the jurisdiction that lodged the detainer against him." Id. at
  52 (emphasis added).  

       ¶ 5.  We note that each of the five state cases cited by
  defendant to support his argument precede the Court's decision in Fex.  See
  Rockmore v. State, 519 P.2d 877 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974); State v. Barnes, 328 A.2d 737 (Md. 1974); State v. Seadin, 593 P.2d 451 (Mont. 1979); People v.
  Diaz, 406 N.Y.S.2d 239 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978); State v. Ferguson, 535 N.E.2d 708 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987).  Additionally, the only post-Fex case cited at
  oral argument in support of defendant's position interpreted an intrastate
  detainers statute and not the IAD.  See State v. Morris, 892 P.2d 734
  (Wash. 1995).  The Morris court observed that "[r]egardless of how
  convincing one finds the Fex majority, its interpretation now governs the
  Interstate Agreement on Detainers for prisoners subject to the IAD in this
  state."  Id. at 737.  
   
       ¶ 6.  Under Fex, the time period did not commence when defendant
  made his request for a final disposition to a Massachusetts correction
  officer on September 19, 2001, but rather commenced upon delivery to both
  the court and prosecuting officer.  See Fex, 507 U.S.  at 52; State v.
  Somerlot, 544 S.E.2d 52, 60 (W. Va. 2000) (the 180-day time period had not
  commenced where the defendant's request for final disposition was delivered
  solely to prosecutor and not trial court).  Finally, despite his argument,
  defendant was not entirely without power to determine whether the court and
  prosecuting attorney received his request; defendant could have questioned

 

  why he never received a return receipt of the certified mailing from the
  court.  See 28 V.S.A. § 1503(b) (official having custody of prisoner shall
  promptly forward the request for final disposition to the "appropriate
  prosecuting official and court by registered or certified mail, return
  receipt requested").  

       ¶ 7.  The trial court properly denied defendant's April 1, 2002
  motion to dismiss because 180 days had not passed at that time.  In light
  of our decision that the 180-day time limit had not been exceeded, it is
  unnecessary to address defendant's argument that the trial court erred in
  granting a continuance to the State after the time limit had lapsed.  

       Affirmed.
     

                                       BY THE COURT:



                                       _______________________________________
                                       Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Chief Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       James L. Morse, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Frederic W. Allen, Chief Justice (Ret.)
                                       Specially Assigned