Gulian v. Gulian
Annotate this Case
Gulian v. Gulian (99-207); 173 Vt. 157; 790 A.2d 1116
[Filed 09-Nov-2001]
[Motion for Reargument Denied 04-Dec-2001]
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
to press.
No. 99-207
Carole Gulian Supreme Court
On Appeal from
v. Washington Family Court
George Gulian May Term, 2000
M. Kathleen Manley, J.
Kimberly B. Cheney of Cheney, Brock & Saudek, P.C., Montpelier, for
Plaintiff-Appellant.
Marsha Smith Meekins of Roesler, Whittlesey, Meekins & Amidon, Burlington, for
Defendant-Appellee.
PRESENT: Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ., and Dimotsis, D.J.,
Specially Assigned
JOHNSON, J. Mother Carole (Gulian) Warner appeals from a divorce
judgment of the Washington Family Court. She contends that the trial
court abused its discretion in (1) setting the amount of maintenance
because the award did not equalize the incomes between her and father
George Gulian; and (2) setting the duration of maintenance at nine years,
terminating when the youngest child reached the age of majority. We
reverse the trial court's award because the court did not separate the
maintenance award from the child support award; thus, as a matter of
appellate review we cannot determine whether the court did in fact abuse
its discretion in awarding maintenance. We also reverse the court's
decision to link the duration of the award to the age of the litigants'
children because this step implicitly allocated maintenance for child
support.
The parties were married in 1983. At the time, mother was 27, had
earned her B.A. and was practicing as an accountant full time for
approximately $16,000 per year. Father was 34, had earned a Masters, a
degree in accounting and was a C.P.A.; he made approximately $32,000 per
year. By mutual agreement, mother quit her job to raise a family. The
couple had three children, the youngest of whom was born in 1989. The
parties were married for almost fifteen years before separating in 1997.
Following the separation, mother, then 42, found employment with the State
of Vermont Transportation Agency earning approximately $2000 per month.
Mother suffers from migraine headaches, which have impeded her ability to
work full time. With medication, however, she expects to be able to work
40 hours per week within a year. Father remained employed at National
Life Insurance where he has been employed since 1991. His income is
approximately $5800 per month and is expected to continue to increase at
five percent per year.
The parties' property included a house in Barre, worth approximately
$250,000 mortgage-free, as well as substantial assets in various checking,
savings, retirement, and brokerage accounts totaling approximately
$250,000. The parties agreed to and the court approved a property division
that awarded each party an equal share of these assets. The house was
ordered sold, and the proceeds were divided equally.
At trial, the principal issue in dispute was the amount and duration
of maintenance payments from father to mother. As background, the trial
court stated that spousal maintenance is intended to rectify the
inequalities of the parties' financial positions and noted the
rehabilitative and compensatory elements of such an award. The court then
determined that mother needed $1700 per month for the first year following
the divorce and $1500 per month until the year 2007 to support herself and
to "ensure that the children are maintained at [the marital] standard of
living when living
with her." Other than this statement, the court did not explain how it
arrived at these figures. According to the court, spousal maintenance is
to last until 2007 because that is when the youngest child will turn
eighteen.
No child support was awarded because the court determined that the
amount recommended by the child support guidelines would be de minimis.
For purposes of the child support worksheet, the court determined that
each party's monthly income should include the amount of spousal
maintenance awarded. Thus, on the child support worksheet, the court
calculated mother's monthly income in the first year to be $3699 ($1999
salary plus $1700 maintenance) and father's monthly income to be $4107
($5807 salary minus $1700 maintenance). Using these figures, the
guidelines recommend a support obligation of two dollars.
On appeal, mother argues that both the amount and duration of the
maintenance awards were an abuse of discretion. First, mother argues that
the court's award treats her differently from similarly situated women.
She contends that a maintenance award must equalize the incomes between
the parties to compensate her fully for her contribution to the marriage.
Second, mother argues that the duration of the award is inadequate.
Mother sought a maintenance award that would last fifteen years, equal to
the length of the marriage. Terminating maintenance when the youngest
child turns eighteen is arbitrary, she believes, because this termination
date is based on the children's needs rather than the mother's.
These issues, however, are subsidiary to the fundamental flaw in the
trial court's decision, which is that the court did not award any child
support. The court's decision on both the amount of maintenance and the
duration of maintenance systematically conflated the inquiries for
maintenance and child support. Rather than award mother maintenance and
separate child support, the court
awarded only maintenance with the result that some of that maintenance must
be used for child support. This was error.
I. Amount of Maintenance
In reviewing a maintenance award, the first thing we must do is
determine the actual amount awarded. The court employed a process by
which it set an amount of "maintenance" without considering whether father
would owe any child support under the guidelines with this amount of
maintenance. Only then did the court determine that none was required by
using this maintenance award when calculating child support. (FN1) This
methodology confounds any attempt to determine the component parts of the
award for the purpose of appellate review. More importantly, the court's
calculations allow it to reach an unsupportable position - that although
mother needs maintenance for her needs and rehabilitation, she has no need
for child support to provide adequately for her children.
In not awarding any child support, the court must have presumed that
at least some portion of the maintenance award would be available to pay
for the children's expenses. In its findings, the court accepted mother's
report that her expenses, excluding costs for the children, were
approximately $3000 per month. Given that her income was only $2000 per
month, some of the $1500 "maintenance" award must have been intended for
her children. But maintenance is intended specifically to provide for the
spouse's own needs. See 15 V.S.A. § 752(a); Strauss v. Strauss, 160
Vt. 335, 338, 628 A.2d 552, 554 (1993) (maintenance is intended to correct
the inequalities in income, equalize the standard of living, and
compensate homemaker contributions). Child support, in contrast, is
governed by a different statutory regime and intended to serve a different
purpose. See 15 V.S.A. §§ 650-58; Ainsworth v. Ainsworth, 154 Vt. 103,
106, 574 A.2d 772, 774 (1990) (one purpose of child support guidelines is
to provide children with the same approximate standard of living they
enjoyed prior to divorce). Indeed, by linking the maintenance award to the
age of the children, see discussion infra, the court provided further
evidence that it intended some, if not all, of the award for child
support.
Thus, while the family court has broad discretion in determining the
amount of maintenance, see Delozier v. Delozier, 161 Vt. 377, 381, 640 A.2d 55, 57 (1994), we must be able to discern this amount before we can
determine if there is a reasonable basis to support it. Because the court,
in effect, combined child support and maintenance, we simply cannot see
how the court exercised its discretion. By rendering its decision
unreviewable, the court abused its discretion. See Remes v. Nordic Group,
Inc., 169 Vt. 37, 39-40, 726 A.2d 77, 79 (1999). Similarly, we cannot
address appellant's argument that the award is inconsistent with our
precedent because we do not know the amount of the award.
The difficulty in reviewing the award is illustrated by different
attempts to determine the amount of actual maintenance. For example, we
can try to figure out how much of the $1500 award is actual maintenance by
determining the proper amount of child support owed under the guidelines
based on the pre-award income of both parties. (FN2) Applying this means
of calculation avoids the trap
of double counting an award for both spousal maintenance and child support.
Using this method, we can speculate that father owes mother approximately
$500 for child support according to the guidelines, leaving approximately
$1000 for actual maintenance. (FN3) At oral argument, however, counsel
for mother argued that the award was split approximately equally between
child support and maintenance. Regardless of whose numbers are more
accurate, we cannot use them because these calculations amount to fact
finding and thus are not appropriate at the appellate level. (FN4)
II. Duration of Maintenance
Although we are left unsure about whether the amount of maintenance
may be within discretion, there is no support for the court's decision
terminating maintenance when the parties' youngest child turns 18, or a
duration of nine years. Because this duration is apparently based on the
needs of the children rather than on the needs of mother, the award is
inconsistent with the statutory maintenance scheme. A child support award
may end upon the children reaching the age
of majority, see Knowles v. Thompson, 166 Vt. 414, 422, 697 A.2d 335, 339
(1997), but that temporal event is unrelated to the reason maintenance is
awarded.
In determining whether maintenance is appropriate, the court must
consider whether one spouse "lacks sufficient income, property, or both .
. . to provide for his or her reasonable needs, and is unable to support
himself or herself through appropriate employment at the standard of living
established during the marriage." 15 V.S.A. § 752(a)(1), (2). The amount
and duration of the award are based on factors including the length of
marriage, the standard of living during the marriage, the age and physical
and emotional condition of the parties, and the skills and earning ability
of each party. See id. § 752(b).
We have stated there are two principal purposes of maintenance awards:
rehabilitation and compensation. First, maintenance can correct the
inequalities in the parties' financial positions at the termination of the
marriage. See Klein v. Klein, 150 Vt. 466, 473, 555 A.2d 382, 386-87
(1988). Rehabilitative maintenance assists the recipient spouse in
becoming self-supporting. See Strauss, 160 Vt. at 339, 628 A.2d at 554.
At the same time, spousal maintenance is designed to keep both spouses in
the standard of living established during the marriage, to the extent
possible. See Chaker, 155 Vt. at 26, 581 A.2d at 740. Second, a
maintenance award can look beyond a spouse's support needs and actually
attempt to compensate the spouse for contributions made during the
marriage. See Klein, 150 Vt. at 474, 555 A.2d at 387. Maintenance awards
recognize that one spouse's success in the working world is due in part to
the sacrifice made by the other spouse, who made the career possible
through contributions to family well-being not otherwise recognized in
property distributions. See Stickney, 170 Vt. at 549, 742 A.2d at 1231.
In light of the purposes of maintenance, the court's decision to tie
the duration of mother's
award to the age of majority of her youngest children, without more, is an
abuse of discretion. There was no evidence that the duration of nine
years will either adequately compensate mother for her contributions to
the fourteen year marriage or maintain her at the marital standard of
living for a sufficient period. See Strauss, 160 Vt. at 340, 628 A.2d at
556 (reversing maintenance award that did not consider appropriate factors
to determine duration of award). Indeed, the only connection between a
duration of nine years and this case is that nine years is the time it will
take the youngest child to reach eighteen - the court offered no other
explanation for its choice.
In effect, the duration of the award implies that mother deserves
compensation and rehabilitation only as long as she is caring for her
children on a daily basis - after that, mother's own needs are irrelevant.
The duration of the award gives no consideration to mother's contribution
to the marriage other than child rearing, or to her right as an individual
to financial security. In other words, through its order the court
assured that maintenance would have to be used as child support, rather
than awarding an independent amount for that purpose. (FN5)
The dissent sees no error in a disposition that awards the entire
amount as maintenance and none as child support. In addition to the
problems we have outlined above, such a system undermines the
federal-state partnership created to enforce child support orders. Title
IV-D of the Social Security Act requires that states receiving certain
federal funds create an office for the enforcement of child support (in
Vermont, the Office of Child Support), see 42 U.S.C. §§ 601 - 17,
651-65, and take certain measures to enforce child support orders, see
Welfare Reform Act, Pub. L. No 104-193 (1996). The goal of this program
is to empower states to enforce child support orders both within its
borders and without, so as to reduce the need for federal welfare to
support families that are otherwise owed child support. In conjunction
with this system, all fifty states have enacted the Uniform Interstate
Family Support Act (UIFSA) (Title 15B, Vermont Statutes). UIFSA
coordinates jurisdiction and enforcement of child support and other support
orders among the states. Parts of the act specifically address aspects of
child support orders as distinct from other support orders. E.g., 15B
V.S.A. § 205.
If, as the dissent suggests, our family courts need not distinguish
maintenance awards from child support awards, we would be actively
dismantling this carefully crafted and complex system created to enforce
child support orders. If family courts award only maintenance, they have
effectively by-passed the mechanisms by which a child support order can be
enforced both in our state and in other states. Systematically, then, the
widespread practice of awards with no child support component would work
against the federal-state regime created to protect children and their
recipient parents from nonpaying parents.
Family courts cannot obviate the need for child support by awarding it
as maintenance. Because there should have been a child support award in
this case, we must remand to the court to determine a fair allocation.
Reversed and remanded.
FOR THE COURT:
_______________________________________
Associate Justice
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Footnotes
FN1. The dissent spends considerable time discussing the fact that our
statutes require maintenance be included as income for purposes of
calculating child support. See 15 V.S.A. § 653. We do not disagree, nor
do we suggest that maintenance should not be included in income according
to the statute. Our point is that when the amount of maintenance award
results in no child support award according to the guidelines, the amount
of maintenance must be adjusted to reflect the fact that maintenance and
child support are separate awards that serve different purposes.
Conflating the two amounts is error.
FN2. For the remainder of our discussion we will use the $1500 per month
figure rather than $1700 because after the first year of the award, $1500
is the relevant amount.
FN3. Our view that in the ordinary case when maintenance is awarded, child
support is almost always appropriate is not just theoretical. Indeed, the
tax consequences of combining maintenance and child support could be
substantial because one source is taxable while the other is not. See 26
U.S.C. § 71(a) (definition of gross income includes maintenance); id. §
71(c) (child support income is not taxable).
FN4. We reserve judgment as to the adequacy of the amount of the award
itself; however, if the trial court in fact intended to award
approximately $1000 per month in maintenance, this amount would be
consistent with our cases in which we have upheld maintenance awards, and
therefore within the court's discretion. See Stickney v. Stickney, 170
Vt. 547, 549, 742 A.2d 1228, 1232 (1999) (mem.) (affirming $1800 award
for twenty-five year marriage where wife had no job skills); Begins v.
Begins, 168 Vt. 298, 303, 721 A.2d 469, 473-74 (1998) (affirming $1300
award for twenty year marriage where wife was young and had business
skills); Kohut v. Kohut, 164 Vt. 40, 43, 663 A.2d 942, 944 (1995)
(affirming $500 award for thirteen year marriage where wife had earning
capacity of $9000 annually); Clapp v. Clapp, 163 Vt. 15, 22, 653 A.2d 72,
76 (1994) (affirming $2000 award for twenty year marriage where husband
was a wealthy attorney); Johnson v. Johnson, 155 Vt. 36, 41, 580 A.2d 503,
506 (1990) (affirming $1500 award for sixteen year marriage where wife
could earn $17,000 annually); Chaker v. Chaker, 155 Vt. 20, 26, 581 A.2d 737, 740 (1990) (affirming $1000 award for a nine year marriage where wife
had $1200 per month earning capacity).
FN5. Indeed, according to IRS regulations, the entire award as written
could be considered child support because the award will be reduced on the
occurence of a contingency related to the children, namely their reaching
majority. See 26 U.S.C. § 71(c)(2). In this manner, the court's award
creates confusion for the parties' tax filings because the family court is
calling the award maintenance and thus deductible by the payor, see id. §
215(a), while the IRS would likely consider the amount child support and
thus not deductible, see id. §§ 71(b), (c), 215(b).
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Concurring and Dissenting
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
to press.
No. 99-207
Carole Gulian Supreme Court
On Appeal from
v. Washington Family Court
George Gulian May Term, 2000
M. Kathleen Manley, J.
Kimberly B. Cheney of Cheney, Brock & Saudek, P.C., Montpelier, for
Plaintiff-Appellant.
Marsha Smith Meekins of Roesler, Whittlesey, Meekins & Amidon, Burlington, for
Defendant-Appellee.
PRESENT: Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ., and Dimotsis, D.J.,
Specially Assigned
DIMOTSIS, D.J., concurring and dissenting. The majority's conclusion,
that the family court failed to separate the maintenance award from the
child support award, ignores the clear holding of the family court. After
performing several child support calculations, the family court ruled that
child support was not warranted based on the respective incomes of the
parties and the shared parenting arrangement. Disregarding the outcome
determined by the child support guidelines, the majority finds error in
the apparent result that part of mother's maintenance will be used toward
the support of the children. Both parents, however, are obligated to
provide support for their children, and such is the policy behind the
child support statute. 15 V.S.A. § 650. Maintenance, as income, must be
considered when determining child support, 15 V.S.A. § 653(5)(A)(i), and
the guidelines anticipate that both parents will contribute part of their
respective
incomes, from whatever source, to care for their children.
The majority's point "that when the amount of maintenance award
results in no child support award according to the guidelines, the amount
of maintenance must be adjusted to reflect the fact that maintenance and
child support are separate awards that serve different purposes," reveals
its misunderstanding of the interrelationship between child support and
maintenance. The majority's confusion about the role of maintenance in
child support calculations results in its requiring an additional
maintenance hearing after child support has been determined. This
additional hearing, coming after the child support hearing, in addition to
imposing additional procedural burdens on the family court and litigants,
will result in additional maintenance income that will be effectively
sheltered from the child support calculation. Accordingly, I dissent from
part I of the majority's opinion. Because I agree that the family court
abused its discretion in tying the duration of maintenance to the minority
of the children, I concur in section II of the opinion.
I. Amount of Maintenance
The majority concludes that the family court's decision is
unreviewable because the majority cannot determine the actual amount of
maintenance awarded by the family court. On the contrary, the family
court's decision "provide[s] a clear description of what was decided and
why." Kanaan v. Kanaan, 163 Vt. 402, 415, 659 A.2d 128, 137 (1995). As
stated in the order, the family court did not intend to order child
support: "In view of the fact that the parties each have the children
approximately 50% of the time, and that spousal maintenance awarded until
February 1, 2000 approximately equalizes the parties' income, no specific
child support award is entered." Despite this clear indication from the
family court, the majority divines that the maintenance award is in fact a
combined maintenance and child support award. The cause of the majority's
confusion is the family court's methodology of determining an amount of
maintenance before calculating whether
any child support is owing under the guidelines. The methodology employed
by the family court, however, of determining child support based upon
post-maintenance incomes of the parties is precisely that contemplated and
required by the child support statute and guidelines. 15 V.S.A. § 653.
Before calculating child support, the court must first determine the
parties' respective gross incomes. Under our child support statute,
"[g]ross income shall include: income from any source, including, but not
limited to . . . spousal support actually received." 15 V.S.A. §
653(5)(A)(i). Although the majority suggests that to achieve the purpose
of maintenance, it must be sheltered from the income available for the
support of children, that is not what the child support statute provides.
Indeed, although our child support statute originally excluded maintenance
from the spouse in the present action as income available for child
support, in 1990 the Legislature amended 15 V.S.A. § 653, so that
maintenance from the current spouse is included as income. The amended
statute allows the family court to consider "the financial resources
available to both parents, as required by federal regulation." L. Morgan,
Child Support Guidelines: Interpretation and Application § 2.03(e)(16), at
2-44 (2000) ("Excluding alimony from consideration is illogical, especially
where alimony can be a significant financial resource."). (FN1)
The majority is troubled by the "unsupportable position - that
although mother needs maintenance for her needs and rehabilitation, she
has no need for child support to provide adequately for her children."
The majority's concern reveals its misunderstanding of the
interrelationship between child support and maintenance. Regardless of
its purpose, the method for awarding maintenance is through increasing
mother's income. 15 V.S.A. § 752(a). That maintenance received
by mother should be used for support of the children is anticipated by our
child support statute and not inconsistent with our maintenance law. See
15 V.S.A. § 654 (guidelines reflect the parents available income which
shall be used for support of the children); 15 V.S.A. § 654 (guideline
amounts must be "based on the concept that children should receive the same
proportion of parental income after separation or divorce of their parents
as they would receive if their parents were living together in one
household"); 15 V.S.A. § 752(a)(2) (court can consider support needed for
the care of children when determining whether to award maintenance); 15
V.S.A. § 752(b)(1) (in considering financial resources and parties'
ability to meet those resources, expenses associated with caring for a
child and amount of child support received can be considered).
The child support statute and guidelines require that parents
contribute to the care and support of their children "in proportion to
their respective available incomes and in proportion to the amount of time
each parent exercises physical custody." 15 V.S.A. § 657(a). The amount
of support needed for the care of children is the total support
obligation, see 15 V.S.A. § 653, which "reflects the percent of combined
available income which parents living in the same household in Vermont
ordinarily spend on their children" as determined by the Secretary of Human
Services. 15 V.S.A. § 654. See generally Ainsworth v. Ainsworth, 154 Vt.
103, 104-05, 574 A.2d 772, 774-75 (1990) (child support guidelines
explained). Because mother's income includes her maintenance payments, a
portion thereof will necessarily be used towards the support of the
children. That the family court articulated this result does not render
its decision erroneous.
In this case, the family court intended to equalize the parties'
incomes through its maintenance award. After awarding maintenance, the
court properly considered mother's and father's post-award incomes and
incorporated these figures and the 50/50 parenting arrangement into the
child support guidelines. Because there was a disparity of $2.00 in the
total support obligation
between the parties, the court did not order that one parent pay the other
child support. This was not error.
Because of its confusion regarding the interrelationship between
maintenance and child support and the role of the former in calculating
the latter, the majority misapprehends this dissent. This dissent does
not advocate combining maintenance and child support into one award.
Rather, absent a deviation request, where maintenance as income is
incorporated into a child support calculation and the guidelines determine
that no child support is warranted, then the family court should adhere to
the child support guidelines and not award child support.
The majority's solution that whenever a maintenance award results in
no child support under the guidelines, the amount of maintenance must be
adjusted to reflect the fact that maintenance and child support are
separate awards that serve different purposes, disregards the child support
guideline scheme to impose a vague mandate that will have immediate and
adverse consequences on the operation of the family court. Despite the
statutory mandate that mother, like father, contribute part of her income
for the support of her children, and that the child support guidelines
incorporate each parent's respective share of this income towards the
support of the children, the majority insists that additional maintenance
be awarded to serve the purpose of providing for mother's separate needs.
Because this additional maintenance is awarded after the child support
calculation, this income will be effectively sheltered for purposes of
calculating child support, in contravention of 15 V.S.A. § 653.
The award of additional maintenance will require an additional
post-divorce hearing imposing upon litigants and family courts the burden
and cost of additional hearing time. The majority offers no guidance as
to the procedure to be used by family courts to determine whether and in
what amount to adjust the maintenance award. Requiring an additional
maintenance hearing after
the child support determination will conflict with the purpose and award of
a maintenance supplement. (FN2) A maintenance supplement is awarded to correct
the financial disparity between the two households and is part of a child
support order. 15 V.S.A. § 661(a). Until it is known what the respective
incomes of the households will be, the magistrate can only guess whether
and in what amount to award a maintenance supplement.
II. Conclusion
Rather than create a disruptive remedy for a problem that does not
exist, this Court should confine its review to the case at bar and reverse
and remand on the basis of the court's tying the duration of maintenance to
the age of the children.
I dissent. I am authorized to say that Chief Justice Amestoy joins in
this dissent.
____________________________________
District Judge, Specially Assigned
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Footnotes
FN1. As Representative Ruth Stokes, Sponsor and reporter of the amended
legislation explained to the Senate Judiciary Committee, the omission in
the original legislation was an oversight.
We determine gross income by including a whole list of things in
the current statute. The issue of alimony was left out of
consideration in terms of what constitutes somebody's gross
income. In other words if somebody is paying alimony that
(inaudible) should not be part of their gross income and if
somebody is receiving alimony that clearly should be and this
bill corrects what I think was not necessarily the policy
decision at the time the guidelines were instituted, but an
overlooking of the issue of alimony and this bill proposes to
change it in a way that I have described.
Hearing on an Act Related to Child Support before the Senate Judiciary
Committee, March 20, 1990, at 9. The following colloquy between then
Representative Amy Davenport and Legislative Counsel Janet Ancel further
explains the need to remove from the definition of gross income the
exclusion of alimony received from the payee spouse. The colloquy also
demonstrates the intended methodology that child support be determined
after maintenance is ordered.
Rep. Davenport. But what happens right now, when you look at
people's income, if in the final order one person was supposed to
pay the other person alimony or maintenance, that ought to be
included as your - if it was me who was supposed to pay you
maintenance, it should be included as your income and deducted
from my income, if you're trying to compare incomes. And it's
because it got left out of the list. If it was in the list and
in the list of deductions, then it would work that way.
. . . .
Rep. Davenport: It was really an oversight; it's not anything
that's (interrupted)
Ms. Ancel: Yes. That's right.
Rep. Davenport: So this gross income then just doesn't refer to
the payee, it refers - doesn't refer to (interrupted)
Rep. Davenport: That's right.
Ms. Ancel: It's both parents.
Rep. Davenport: When you're setting the amount according to the
guidelines, you're looking at the gross income of the custodial
and the noncustodial parent.
Rep. Crispe: And so this gross income applies to both.
Rep. Davenport: Yes. Right.
Ms. Ancel: Yes, that's right.
Hearing on an Act Related to Child Support before the House Judiciary
Committee, January 16, 1990, at 32.
FN2. This conflict will not occur in cases like the one at bar where the
parents equally share the physical custody of the children. See Leas v.
Leas, 169 Vt. 364, 368, 737 A.2d 889, 892 (1999).
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