State v. Filippo

State v. Filippo  (2001-141); 172 Vt. 551; 772 A.2d 531

[Filed 26-Mar-2001]



                                 ENTRY ORDER

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2001-141

                              MARCH TERM, 2001



State of Vermont	            }	APPEALED FROM:
                                    }
                                    }
     v.	                            }	District Court of Vermont,
                                    }	Unit No. 2, Bennington Circuit
Ryan P. Filippo	                    }
                                    }	DOCKET NO. 279-3-01 Bncr


       In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Defendant appeals an order of the Bennington District Court denying
  bail pursuant to 13  V.S.A. § 7553a.(FN1)

       Defendant was charged with one count of felony unlawful mischief, 13
  V.S.A. § 3701(a), and  four misdemeanor counts, including domestic assault,
  petit larceny and misdemeanor unlawful  mischief. Title 13 V.S.A. § 7553a
  provides as follows:

       A person charged with an offense that is a felony, AN
       ELEMENT OF WHICH INVOLVES AN ACT  OF VIOLENCE AGAINST ANOTHER
       PERSON, may be held without bail when the evidence of guilt 
       is great and the court finds, based on clear and convincing
       evidence, that the person's  release poses a substantial
       threat of physical violence to any person and that no 
       condition or combination of conditions of release will
       reasonably prevent the violence.

  (Emphasis added).

       These charges arise from an incident on March 10, 2001.  It is alleged
  that defendant and his  girlfriend, Erika Carey, got into a heated verbal
  argument that escalated to violence.  Ms. Carey and  defendant had been
  living in the same apartment since January 2001.  Immediately after the
  violent  incident where defendant allegedly grabbed Ms. Carey by the neck
  and threw her to the ground, Ms.  Carey applied for and received a
  temporary relief from abuse order.  While Ms. Carey was away  from the
  apartment, defendant had allegedly "trashed" the bedroom, cut the cords to
  several  appliances, and broke a small table.  Also Ms. Carey's personal
  hygiene products had been thrown 


 

  in the bathtub and left with water running on them.  When the police
  arrived at the apartment to  serve defendant with the relief from abuse
  order later that evening, they found that Ms. Carey's car  had been
  attacked.  Her driver side window had been smashed, bleach had been poured
  on the  dashboard, there were dents in the driver side front quarter and
  the passenger mirror had been torn  off.  On the hood of the car,
  obscenities directed at Ms. Carey had been scratched into the paint.  A 
  next door neighbor gave a statement alleging that he witnessed defendant
  conducting these acts of  destruction on the car.

       Defendant argues that the felony with which he has been charged does
  not contain an element  of physical violence.  The one felony charged was
  13 V.S.A. § 3701(a) which reads as follows:

       A person who, with intent to damage property, and having no right to
  do so or any  reasonable ground to believe that he has such a right, does
  any damage to any property  which is valued in an amount exceeding
  $1,000.00 shall be imprisoned for not more  than five years or fined not
  more than $5,000 or both. The State responds that its offer of proof on the
  felony charge will necessarily involve evidence of  violence against Ms.
  Carey.  At issue is whether the word "element"as used in § 7553a can refer 
  more broadly to 'proof of violence' rather than to the essential statutory
  component of a crime.

       On appeal, defendant submitted a written brief, while, due to the
  expedited nature of the  hearing, the State did not.  Oral arguments were
  held before the undersigned justice.

       Reviewing the statutory language, I am persuaded that "element" as it
  is used in § 7553a  refers  to the statutory components of the felony
  charged, and not the evidence that will be offered to prove  the felony. 
  Our paramount goal in statutory construction is to give effect to the
  Legislature's intent.  Burlington Elec. Dep't v. Vermont. Dep't of Taxes,
  154 Vt. 332, 335, 576 A.2d 450, 452 (1990).  We  apply the plain meaning of
  a statute where the language is clear and unambiguous.  Conn v.  Middlebury
  Union High School Dist. # 3, 162 Vt. 498, 501, 648 A.2d 1385, 1387 (1994). 
  Here, the  ordinary, plain meaning of "element" is the traditional meaning
  associated with criminal charges, i.e.,  "those constituent parts of a
  crime which must be proved by the prosecution to sustain a conviction." 
  Black's Law Dictionary 520 (6th ed. 1990).  "In the absence of contrary
  indication, we assume that  when a statute uses [a term of art], Congress
  intended it to have its established meaning."   McDermott International,
  Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 342 (1991).  There is no indication that
  the  Legislature intended the term "element" to have a meaning other than
  its normal meaning in criminal  law.

       Morever, to accept the State's interpretation that "element" of
  violence should be read to  include 'proof of violence,' would greatly
  increase the number of crimes to which § 7553a could  potentially apply. 
  This position is untenable given the presumption in Vermont that most
  prisoners  are bailable.  Vt. Const. ch. II, § 40; 13 V.S.A. § 7554.  A
  broad expansion of § 7553a is therefore  unwarranted.

       In this case, the central element of the felony charged is property
  damage exceeding $1,000.   For the prosecution to sustain its case, it does
  not need to prove any "act of violence against another  person" because
  such violence is not an "element" of the crime.  That the proof of property
  damage 


 

  exceeding $1000 may necessarily involve evidence of violent acts toward Ms.
  Carey is  inconsequential for the purposes of bail under §7553a. 
  Therefore, I hold that the trial court erred as a  matter of law in holding
  defendant without bail pursuant to 13 V.S.A. § 7553a.   On remand, the 
  court should determine bail and any conditions of release pursuant to 13
  V.S.A. § 7554.


       Reversed and remanded.



FOR THE COURT:



_______________________________________
Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice

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                                  Footnotes


FN1.  Although this appeal was heard before a transcript of the district
  court judge's order was  available, defendant and the State stipulated that
  bail was denied pursuant to this statute.