State v. Allen

State v. Allen (98-163); 169 Vt. 615; 738 A.2d 113

[Filed 19-Jul-1999]


                                 ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 98-163

                              APRIL TERM, 1999



State of Vermont	               }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
     v.	                               }	District Court of Vermont
                                       }	
                                       }	Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit
Michael Allen	                       }
                                       }	DOCKET NO. 2980-6-97Cncr	



             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:


       Defendant Michael Allen appeals from a conviction on a charge of
  aggravated assault in  violation of 13 V.S.A. § 1024(a)(1) (recklessly
  causing serious bodily injury in circumstances  manifesting extreme
  indifference to the value of human life).  Defendant asserts that the
  district court  erred by (1) not excluding evidence of his prior
  altercations on the date in question, (2) disallowing  a defense of
  diminished capacity due to intoxication, and (3) denying his motion for
  judgment of  acquittal based on a failure to prove the victim sustained
  serious bodily injury.  We affirm.

       Defendant's conviction stems from events that occurred on June 25,
  1997 in Burlington.   Immediately prior to the incident in question,
  defendant, then sixteen years old, had been involved  in several
  altercations in the downtown shopping area.  These included a fight with
  the victim's  brother, during which defendant lost his pager.  This fight
  took place in the presence of the victim  and others.  Defendant shouted
  racially charged remarks while throwing a glass at the victim and his 
  companions.  Soon after, defendant struck a person sitting on a bench with
  a small baseball bat.  At  this point, the incident giving rise to the
  State's charge took place.  Defendant, a white teenager,  approached the
  victim, a black teenager, and his companions.  Suspecting that his pager
  had been  stolen, defendant asked the group where it was.  The victim and
  his companions fled.  Defendant  then chased the victim into the Burlington
  Square Mall, caught up to him, and beat him with the  small baseball bat. 
  As a result, the victim was hospitalized for three days, sustaining a
  permanent  eye impairment that places him at increased risk for developing
  glaucoma.  The State subsequently  charged the defendant with aggravated
  assault pursuant to 13 V.S.A. § 1024(a)(1).  


 

       First, defendant contends that the court should have excluded evidence
  of defendant's prior  encounters on the date in question.  He sought in
  limine to exclude this evidence under V.R.E. 403  (authorizing exclusion of
  otherwise relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially 
  outweighed by unfair prejudice).  Defendant argues that the prior
  altercations and racial slurs  introduced unfair prejudice.  We conclude
  that the trial court reasonably exercised its discretion.  See  State v.
  LaBounty, ___ Vt. ___, ___, 716 A.2d 1, 9 (Vt. 1998) (trial court accorded
  broad discretion  in V.R.E. 403 matters).

       The court determined that evidence of defendant's prior altercations
  was relevant to show his  escalating violent behavior.  See State v.
  Kelley, 163 Vt. 325, 328, 664 A.2d 708, 710 (1995)  (evidence of
  defendant's escalating course of violent behavior is probative of context
  of crime).  The  court also determined that defendant's prior conduct and
  surrounding occurrences were inherently  related to and provided a context
  for the incident.  See State v. Sanders, ___ Vt. ___, ___, 716 A.2d 11, 13
  (1998) (evidence of defendant's prior abuse of victim more probative than
  prejudicial because  they provide jury with understanding of his behavior
  on date in question); Kelley, 163 Vt. at 328-29,  664 A.2d  at 710
  (defendant's acts that occurred hours before shooting provide context in
  which  shooting took place).  We agree that the evidence was relevant, and
  the trial court clearly acted  within its sound discretion in balancing the
  probative value against the prejudicial effect.
 
       Second, defendant asserts that the district court should have allowed
  a defense of diminished  capacity due to intoxication.  We disagree. 
  Although, as defendant notes, voluntary intoxication is  available to
  negate the elements of purpose or knowledge under 13 V.S.A. § 1024(a)(2),
  see State  v. D'Amico, 136 Vt. 153, 156, 385 A.2d 1082, 1084 (1978),
  defendant in this case was charged with  recklessly causing serious bodily
  injury to another under circumstances manifesting extreme  indifference to
  the value of human life in violation of 13 V.S.A. § 1024(a)(1). 
  Intoxication cannot  negate the recklessness element of simple assault, see
  State v. Galvin, 147 Vt. 215, 216, 514 A.2d 705, 707 (1986), and we have
  defined the element of recklessness in § 1024(a)(1) in the same terms  as
  the recklessness element of simple assault, see State v. Bolio, 159 Vt.
  250, 253, 617 A.2d 885,  887 (1992) (defining recklessness for purposes of
  simple assault); State v. LaClair, 161 Vt. 585, 587,  635 A.2d 1202, 1204
  (1993) (mem.) (adopting  Bolio standard in defining recklessness element in 
  § 1024(a)(1)).  From defendant's standpoint, intoxication would merely
  establish the means exercised  for consciously disregarding the risk in
  question; it would not be a defense.  Accordingly, the district  court
  correctly ruled that this defense was unavailable.

       Finally, defendant argues that the judgment of acquittal should have
  been granted due to  insufficient evidence to prove the element of "serious
  bodily injury" under 13 V.S.A. § 1024(a)(1).  "The standard of review for
  denial of a V.R.Cr.P. 29 motion for judgment of acquittal is whether  the
  evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State and
  excluding modifying  evidence, fairly and reasonably tends to convince a
  reasonable trier of fact that the defendant is  guilty beyond a reasonable
  doubt."  State v. Delisle, 162 Vt. 293, 307, 648 A.2d 632, 641 (1994) 
  (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).  From the evidence
  presented, the jury could have  reasonably determined that both the
  victim's injuries and his 

 

  increased risk of glaucoma constitute "[serious] bodily injury which
  creates . . . [a] substantial  impairment of health."  13 V.S.A. § 1021(2). 
  Thus, the district court properly denied defendant's  motion for judgment
  of acquittal. 

       Affirmed.     



                                       BY THE COURT:


                                       _______________________________________
                                       Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Chief Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       James L. Morse, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice

                                      _______________________________________
                                      Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice