Granger v. Town of Woodford

Granger v. Town of Woodford  (97-200); 167 Vt. 610; 708 A.2d 1345

[Filed 10-Mar-1998]


                                 ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 97-200

                             DECEMBER TERM, 1997


Dorothy and Raymond Granger     }     APPEALED FROM:
                                }
                                }
     v.                         }     Bennington Superior Court
                                }
Town of Woodford                }
                                }     DOCKET NO. S0078-96BcCa


       In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:


       Plaintiff landowners Dorothy and Raymond Granger appeal a Bennington
  Superior Court order granting defendant Town of Woodford's motion for
  summary judgment.  Landowners contend that the court erred in concluding
  that town's decision to establish a commercial zone was a constitutional
  exercise of town's police powers.  We affirm.

       On March 1, 1994, a majority of town's electorate voted to change the
  zoning classification of a .82 acre parcel of land owned by David and
  Rosalie Wright from "Rural Residential" to "Roadside Commercial."  This
  parcel of land is used to operate an automobile repair shop out of a
  three-bay garage.  Until 1994, there were several parcels of land that
  contained pre-existing, nonconforming commercial uses within Woodford,
  including landowners' antique business and a motel.  There were, however,
  no parcels of land zoned for commercial use.

       Landowners filed a complaint for declaratory judgment with the
  Bennington Superior Court, alleging that the creation of the "Roadside
  Commercial" district was unconstitutional because it constituted unlawful
  spot zoning.  Landowners and town filed cross-motions for summary judgment. 
  The court, concluding that the rezoning was not unconstitutional, granted
  town's summary judgment motion.  This appeal followed.

       Spot zoning consists of zoning that "single[s] out a small parcel or
  perhaps even a single lot for a use classification different from the
  surrounding area and inconsistent with any comprehensive plan, for the
  benefit of the owner of such property."  Galanes v. Town of Brattleboro,
  136 Vt. 235, 239, 388 A.2d 406, 409 (1978).  In an equal protection clause
  challenge based on the federal constitution (FN1) that alleges impermissible
  spot zoning, the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that the zoning
  classification is not "related to the public health, safety, morals or
  general welfare." Id. at 240, 388 A.2d  at 410.  Furthermore, if the trial
  court grants a motion for summary judgment, we will apply the same standard
  as the trial court, in reviewing the grant of summary judgment.  See Madden
  v. Omega Optical, Inc., 165 Vt. 306, 309, 683 A.2d 386, 389 (1996).  Thus,
  the granting of summary judgment will be affirmed if

 

  there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is
  entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  See Wesco, Inc. v. Hay-Now, Inc.,
  159 Vt. 23, 26, 613 A.2d 207, 209 (1992).

       In the present case, the trial court relied on the four-factor test
  that we have previously authorized trial courts to use to assist them in
  determining whether the zoning classification of a specific parcel of land
  is unconstitutional.  See Smith v. Town of St. Johnsbury, 150 Vt. 351,
  360-61, 554 A.2d 233, 240-41 (1988).  As we noted in Smith, while "[w]e do
  not have to adopt a precise definition of spot zoning to decide this case,"
  these four elements will be factors in any test.  Id. at 362, 554 A.2d  at
  241.  These elements are:  (1) whether the use of the parcel is very
  different from the prevailing use of other parcels in the area; (2) whether
  the area of the parcel is small; (3) whether the classification is for the
  benefit of the community or only to provide a specific advantage to a
  particular landowner; and (4) whether the change in the zoning
  classification complies with the municipality's plan.  See id at 360-61,
  554 A.2d  at 241.  The trial court found that while the "small size of the
  Wright's parcel may work in favor of the [landowners'] claims, this one
  factor is far outweighed by" the facts that (1) the Wright's use of their
  land was not very different from the surrounding uses; (2) there was a
  discernible public benefit; and (3) the change in the zoning classification
  may not have "significantly conflict[ed] with the town plan."

       A review of the record clearly indicates support for the trial court's
  findings and conclusion.  First, at the time the Wright's zoning
  classification was changed, there were two other parcels of land within the
  town that were also used for commercial purposes.  In fact, they were
  located on the same heavily-travelled road -- Route 9 -- and within one
  mile of the Wright's parcel.  Second, the use of the Wright's zone for a
  commercial purpose will provide a benefit to the community, i.e., an
  increase in the town's tax base and an in-town garage and inspection
  station.  Admittedly, the Wright's have also benefited from the
  reclassification.  The Wright's benefit, however, does not render the
  reclassification unconstitutional, because there also is a
  rationally-related benefit to the community.  We also note that the
  majority of the town's electorate voted in favor of the Wright's
  reclassification.  This provides some indication that the town's citizens
  anticipated a potential benefit from this reclassification.  See id. at
  362, 554 A.2d  at 241 ("There is a certain irony in a claim that a zoning
  classification voted for by a majority of the residents of the town
  provides no benefit to the community, but instead is solely for the
  advantage of [the owner of the reclassified parcel].").

       Third, the reclassification does not "significantly conflict" with the
  town's plan.  See id. at 361, 554 A.2d  at 240 ("Zoning is properly
  conceived of as the partial implementation of a plan of broader scope,
  [therefore, it] must reflect the plan, but it need not be controlled by
  it."). Land suitable for development in the Town of Woodford is severely
  limited by federal and state ownership and topography.  Town's boundaries
  encompass thirty-six square miles, of which, eighty-eight percent is owned
  by the federal government and administered by the United States Forest
  Service.  In addition, 400 acres is located within the Woodford State Park. 
  The topography of the land located within town's boundaries consists of
  steep, forested hills and mountains and shallow bedrock.  This topography
  renders a large portion of town's land unsuitable for development due to
  the lack of proper sewage disposal.  With the exception of a few isolated
  areas within town's boundaries, the only land suitable for development is
  located along Route 9.

       According to the 1989 Woodford Town Plan, the plan in existence at the
  time of the reclassification:

    The various land uses proposed in this document should be

 

    located on land best suited for them, and in areas in which they will be
    logically grouped, related to topography, to existing development, and to
    anticipated and planned patterns of future growth. . . .

    Land uses should be provided with area appropriate and sufficient to
    their needs, and each should be protected from any adverse effects of
    others.  Commercial uses should be oriented to complement community
    objectives and policies while contributing to a balanced economy and
    adequate tax base.

    To encourage the location and type of economic activity which will
    complement existing settlement, and have least pollutant characteristics. 
    To encourage economic activity to service the residents of Woodford.  To
    encourage commercial and recreational activity that complements the natural
    landscape and existing land use, and does not burden the community with
    unreasonable service or facility demands.  To limit commercial activity to
    those areas committed to such use at the time of the original Town Plan and
    Zoning laws.

    Rather than permit such uses in any zone along Route 9, specific
    Roadside Commercial Districts are designated to accommodate such uses.  The
    purpose of this approach is to allow from time to time, various types of
    development to those commercial properties existing as commercial
    properties at the time of the original Town plan and Zoning Bylaw.  This
    would have the effect of reducing the potential for strip development,
    protecting non-commercial properties along Route 9, and to avoid
    classifying existing commercial properties as non-conforming, thus allowing
    opportunity for expansion.

       Admittedly, the Wright's business was not in existence at the time the
  original town plan and by-laws were adopted, but this inconsistency does
  not per se place the reclassification in "significant conflict" with the
  town plan.  It is clear from the plan that the town recognizes the
  importance Route 9 plays in its economic viability.  Because of this
  potential, the plan permits and encourages "Roadside Commercial Districts"
  that have access to Route 9.  Due to the lack of land suitable for
  development and because the Wright's land is located on Route 9 and is near
  other parcels that are currently being used for commercial purposes, the
  reclassification does not "significantly conflict" with the town plan. 
  Finally, while the Wright's parcel is relatively small, we agree with the
  court that on balance the other three factors substantially outweigh this
  factor.

       We conclude that due to the lack of land suitable for development, the
  benefits provided to the community, the other commercial uses in the
  immediate vicinity, and the reasonable reflection of the town plan, the
  reclassification of the Wright's parcel is rationally related to the
  public's general welfare and, therefore, is not "unreasonable, irrational,
  arbitrary or


 

  discriminatory beyond dispute."(FN2) Smith, 150 Vt. at 361, 554 Vt. at 240.


                              BY THE COURT:



                              _______________________________________
                              Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Chief Justice

                              _______________________________________
                              John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

                              _______________________________________
                              James L. Morse, Associate Justice

                              _______________________________________
                              Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice

                              _______________________________________
                              Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                  Footnotes


FN1.  The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
  states in part:  "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its
  jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

FN2.  Because landowners fail to adequately brief the equal protection
  challenge based on the Vermont Constitution, we do not address this claim. 
  See Bishop v. Town of Barre, 140 Vt. 564, 579, 442 A.2d 50, 57, (1982).