Harris v. Sherman

Harris v. Sherman  (97-082); 167 Vt. 613; 708 A.2d 1348

[Filed 11-Mar-1998]


                                 ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 97-082

                             OCTOBER TERM, 1997


John and Shannon Harris         }     APPEALED FROM:
                                }
                                }
     v.                         }     Lamoille Superior Court
                                }
William Sherman and Joseph      }
Donna d/b/a J & D Transport     }     DOCKET NO. 104-5-96Lecv


       In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Plaintiff Shannon Harris appeals the Lamoille Superior Court's
  dismissal of her loss of consortium claim premised on personal injuries
  sustained by her husband John Harris.  The court granted summary judgment
  for defendants and dismissed the claim because, at the time of the
  accident, Shannon and John were engaged to be married, but not yet legally
  wed.  Plaintiff argues on appeal that 12 V.S.A. § 5431, which provides that
  "[a] loss of consortium [claim] may be brought by either spouse" affords
  relief not only to persons formally married at the time of injury, but also
  to persons engaged to be married at the time of the accident who marry
  prior to commencement of the action.  We affirm.

       The underlying facts are not in dispute.  In May of 1995, John Harris
  allegedly sustained injury in an automobile accident with defendant,
  William Sherman.  At the time of the accident, John and Shannon were
  engaged to be married; approximately two months later, they became legally
  wed.  John Harris later sued defendants alleging negligent operation and
  maintenance of their automobile, and based on those injury claims, Shannon
  Harris claimed loss of consortium. Defendants moved for summary judgment on
  the consortium claim on the grounds that 12 V.S.A. § 5431 does not allow
  recovery for loss of consortium arising from injury sustained before
  marriage.  Defendants argued that the loss of consortium statute was
  enacted for the sole purpose of extending to women the substantive right to
  claim for loss of consortium, see Whitney v. Fisher, 138 Vt. 468, 469, 417 A.2d 934, 955 (1980), and that the Legislature expressed no intention of
  otherwise extending or modifying the action's parameters.  The superior
  court granted defendants' summary judgment motion and dismissed with
  prejudice plaintiff's loss of consortium claim, but did not otherwise
  explain its ruling.  See V.R.C.P. 56 (summary judgment appropriate where no
  genuine issue of material fact exists and moving party is entitled to
  judgment as a matter of law).  Plaintiff appeals.

       Plaintiff contends that the superior court was wrong to dismiss her
  claim because the plain language of 12 V.S.A. § 5431 allows "either spouse"
  to bring a claim for loss of consortium and she is the spouse of the
  injured party.  Her position is that if the Legislature did not specify a
  temporal requirement for when the marriage must be in existence it must
  have intended that no such limitation be imposed.

       In construing statutes, courts have a duty to ascertain and effectuate
  the intent of the Legislature, see In re A.C., 144 Vt. 37, 42, 470 A.2d 1191, 1194 (1984), and where legislative intent can be ascertained on its
  face, the statute must be enforced according to its terms without resort to
  statutory construction.  See Derosia v. Book Press, Inc., 148 Vt. 217, 222,
  531 A.2d 905, 908 (1987).  Conversely, if the statute is ambiguous, we ascertain
  legislative intent through consideration of the entire statute, including
  its subject matter, effects and consequences, as well as the reason and
  spirit of the law.  See Paquette v. Paquette, 146 Vt. 83, 86, 499 A.2d 23,
  26 (1985).

       In the instant case, plaintiff correctly argues that 12 V.S.A. § 5431
  provides a claim for loss of consortium to "either spouse," and that the
  statute is silent as to any temporal requirement for when the marriage must
  have been in existence.  In light of this legislative silence, we must look
  beyond the plain language to determine legislative intent.  Plaintiff
  argues that any ambiguity concerning the term "spouse" must be resolved in
  her favor, because § 5431 was enacted as a remedial statute, and thus
  should be interpreted in a light favorable to those persons it was designed
  to benefit.  She contends that, when construed favorably toward her, the
  statute affords her a claim.

       We find plaintiff's argument unpersuasive because, although § 5431 is
  remedial in nature, and thus entitled to a liberal construction, see State
  v. Therrien, 161 Vt. 26, 31, 633 A.2d 272, 275 (1993), we must look at the
  nature of the remedy enacted to determine its proper scope. The statute at
  issue was enacted to overrule the common law rule under which women could
  not recover for loss of consortium.  See Whitney, 138 Vt. at 470, 417 A.2d 
  at 935 (12 V.S.A. § 5431 created a substantive right in women to recover
  for loss of consortium based upon her husband's injuries).  In all other
  respects, the statute indicates no legislative intent to modify the scope
  and application of a loss of consortium claim.  Had the Legislature
  intended to modify the action's scope, it could have said so.  "[G]reat
  care should be exercised by the court not to expand proper construction of
  a statute into judicial legislation."  Murphy Motor Sales, Inc. v. First
  National Bank, 122 Vt. 121, 124, 165 A.2d 341, 343, (1960).

       We have not before been asked to decide whether loss of consortium may
  be premised on injuries sustained prior to marriage.  We have, however,
  described consortium as a derivative claim "rooted in time, place, and
  circumstance to [the] . . . injury."  Derosia, 148 Vt. at 220, 531 A.2d  at
  907.  The persuasive force of authority from other jurisdictions provides
  that there can be no loss of consortium recovery where the claimant was not
  married to the injured party at the time of the accident.  See, e.g., Doe
  v. Cherwitz, 518 N.W.2d 362, 365 (Iowa 1994); Gurliacci v. Mayer, 590 A.2d 914, 931-32 (Conn. 1991).  Miller v. Davis, 433 N.Y.S.2d 974, 975 (N.Y.
  Sup. Ct. 1980) (wife denied recovery when husband was injured on wedding
  day, causing postponement of marriage ceremony); Gillespie-Linton v. Miles,
  473 A.2d 947, 953 (Md. App. Ct. 1984) (spouse of an injured party could not
  recover where injury occurred four days prior to marriage); see also,
  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 693 cmt. h (1977) (action for tortious harm
  to plaintiff's spouse is "applicable to parties to a valid marriage . . .
  subsisting at the time of the injury").

       Plaintiff points to Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1078
  (D.N.J. 1980), Sutherland v. Auch Inter-Borough Transit Co., 366 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1973), and  Stahl v. Nugent, 514 A.2d 1367 (N.J. Super. Ct.
  Law Div. 1986) to support her contention that the rule should be otherwise. 
  In each of these cases, the courts allowed loss of consortium damages
  premised on premarital injury.  Plaintiff's authority, however, has either
  not been followed or has been repudiated, and is therefore unpersuasive. 
  New Jersey state courts have rejected the result in Bulloch.  See Leonardis
  v. Morton Chemical Co., 445 A.2d 45, 46 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982)
  (loss of consortium claim not available unless formal marriage exists at
  time of injury; "We find no merit in and decline to follow Bulloch."). 
  Similarly, the authority of Stahl has been questioned and was sharply
  criticized in Sykes v. Zook Enterprises, Inc., 521 A.2d 1380, 1382 (N.J.
  Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987) ("From an analytical standpoint . . . Stahl may
  not accurately

 

  represent the current state of New Jersey law.").  Pennsylvania state
  courts have declined to follow Sutherland.  See, e.g., Rockwell v. Liston,
  71 Pa. D. & C.2d 756, 757-58 (1975) (loss of consortium claim not available
  where spouse's injury occurred during engagement, but one month before
  formal marriage).

       We hold that a spouse may bring a loss of consortium claim under 12
  V.S.A. § 5431 only if the claimant was legally married to the injured party
  when that injury occurred.  Vermont has long recognized the vital
  importance of marriage as a contract between spouses with attendant rights
  and obligations.  See Davidson v. Davidson, 111 Vt. 68, 74, 10 A.2d 644,
  646 (1940) ("The law undoubtedly favors the marriage relation and its
  continuance."); In re Hanrahan's Will, 109 Vt. 108, 121, 194 A. 471, 477
  (1937) (noting status of marriage as civil contract).  The significance of
  an engagement to be married is entirely personal, and carries no formal
  responsibilities or recognition by the State.  We are mindful of the
  difficulty to be encountered if courts were required to determine which
  personal relationships were sufficiently harmed to merit recovery.

       Affirmed.




                              BY THE COURT:



                              _______________________________________
                              Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Chief Justice

                              _______________________________________
                              James L. Morse, Associate Justice

                              _______________________________________
                              Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice

                              _______________________________________
                              Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice

                              _______________________________________
                              Frederic W. Allen, Chief Justice (Ret.)
                              Specially Assigned