In re JB

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 91-223


 In re J.B., Juvenile                         Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
                                              Bennington Family Court

                                              September Term, 1992



 Paul F. Hudson, J.

 Theresa St. Helaire, Bennington County Deputy State's Attorney, Bennington,
    for appellee

 David Putter of Saxer, Anderson, Wolinsky and Sunshine, Montpelier, for
    appellants

 Charles S. Martin and Robert W. Katims (On the Brief) of Martin & Paolini,
    P.C., Barre, for juvenile



 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.



      MORSE, J.     This is an appeal from a decision of the family court
 denying a motion to reopen an adjudication of delinquency for sexual
 assault.  We hold that J.B. and his parents were given ineffective
 assistance of counsel when the police sought, and were granted, an interview
 with J.B. about the allegations of sexual assault.  Accordingly, we reverse
 and remand.
      In late June 1990, Officer Brickell of the Manchester Police
 Department received a report of sexual contact between J.B., who was twelve
 years old, and two five-year-old boys.  Brickell contacted J.B.'s father
 concerning the investigation and asked to talk with J.B. about it.  The
 father called attorney Gerald Cantini, who had previously served as counsel
 to J.B.'s parents but had little experience in criminal law, for advice.
 Right from the outset, Cantini advised J.B.'s parents that they should
 cooperate with the police, that "it would be very smart to, instead of
 fighting it, to work within the system and there is nothing to hide."
      J.B. and his parents, accompanied by Cantini, met with Officer Brickell
 at the Manchester Police Department.  Upon arrival at the station, Brickell
 presented them with a "Miranda Warnings and Public Defender Rights Form,"
 from which Brickell read the juvenile his rights.  The form was not
 explained in particularity by either Cantini or Brickell.  Brickell simply
 read from the form to J.B., waited for verbal responses, and gave no
 elaboration.  Brickell then gave the form to J.B.'s father to read.
 Although Cantini was present, he did not discuss the form in any detail.
 He testified:  "I didn't go through and explain word for word what the
 Miranda rights were.  I would have assumed that [the father], he was looking
 at it, was reading it, and if he had had any questions he would have said,
 'Gerry, what does this mean, what doesn't it mean.'"   Cantini's sole
 explanation of the Miranda form was that "it is normal, it is procedural, it
 protects your rights to have counsel, it is very standard."  When asked by
 Brickell whether he understood the Miranda statement, the father asked
 Cantini, "Should I sign this?" and Cantini responded, "I think it is fine
 for you to go ahead and sign it."  J.B.'s father then signed the Miranda
 waiver.
      Officer Brickell also explained the interview process to J.B. and his
 parents, and told them that J.B. might speak "without embarrassment" if his
 parents were not present during the interview.  Cantini testified at the
 motion-to-reopen hearing:

           Counsel:  [D]id you tell the [B. Family] that if they
           did not speak to the police that the police might not
           bring charges?

           Cantini:  It never came up.

           Counsel:  [D]id you explain to them . . . the type of
           pressure that could possibly be put on [J.B] if he were
           interviewed alone without his attorney or without his
           parents present?

           Cantini:  That is an assumption -- what pressure? . . .
           No, I told them that they had the option of being there,
           of not being there, of me being there, everyone being
           there.  It was up to them.

 Cantini summed up by saying that despite the fact that the police would have
 more evidence against J.B. if he were interviewed, "I advised the [B.
 Family] to have [J.B.] talk to the police."
      During the interview, J.B. did indeed cooperate with the police.
 Alone in the room with Officer Brickell, J.B. confessed to the delinquent
 acts that became the basis for the charges against him.  The State
 subsequently charged J.B. with being a delinquent child.
      J.B. entered pleas of nolo contendere at a merits hearing in October
 1990.  In November 1990, at the disposition hearing attended by J.B.,
 Cantini, and J.B.'s parents, as his guardians ad litem, the parties
 stipulated to the adjudication of delinquency based on the two counts of
 sexual assault.  J.B. was placed on probation, which included the condition
 that J.B. participate in a "psycho-sexual evaluation . . . and any treatment
 program which [the facility] might recommend."
      In December 1990, the parents, through their second attorney, David
 Putter, filed a Motion to Reopen the Adjudication of the Merits pursuant to
 V.R.F.P. 1 and 33 V.S.A. { 5532(a), on the grounds that J.B.'s counsel had
 ineffectively represented J.B. during the course of the proceedings and
 that J.B.'s procedural rights had been violated.  The crux of the motion
 was that Cantini had failed to advise appellants against a police interview
 and of meritorious defenses to the claims against J.B., all of which
 constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
      At the hearing on the motion, appellants presented testimony by
 attorney Robert Sheil, Juvenile Defender in the Office of the Defender
 General.  Sheil testified that Cantini should have more aggressively
 counseled J.B. and his parents about the Miranda waiver and should have
 advised against allowing J.B. to speak with the police.  Sheil concluded
 that because of this omission, along with several others not pertinent to
 our decision, Cantini's representation fell short of the standard of that
 constituting effective assistance of counsel.
      The family court concluded that rather than malfeasance, counsel's
 representation of J.B. involved a deliberate choice of strategy.  Further,
 the court found that no prejudice resulted from Cantini's representation and
 that, although "unorthodox," it was "effective and beneficial."  The motion
 to reopen was denied.  It is from that decision the juvenile and his
 parents now appeal.
      Appellants claim a number of errors, but because we find that counsel
 did not adequately explain to J.B. and his parents J.B.'s right not to speak
 with the police and the consequences of a confession, we need not address
 the others.  We hold that Cantini's failure at that stage of the
 investigation was so unreasonable as to amount to ineffective assistance of
 counsel and that the family court's contrary assessment was clearly
 erroneous.
      The party seeking to establish a claim for ineffective assistance of
 counsel must show that counsel's representation was below an "objective
 standard of reasonableness informed by prevailing professional norms."
 State v. Bristol, 3 Vt. L.W. 280, 281 (Aug. 21, 1992); see Strickland v.
 Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984).  Once that burden is met, the
 challenging party must show a "'reasonable probability that, but for
 counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
 been different.'"  Bristol, 3 Vt. L.W. at 281 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.
 at 694).  Our analysis, however, shifts away from the burdens placed on the
 challenging party where counsel has failed altogether to engage in the
 adversarial process on behalf of the client.  The right to effective
 assistance of counsel requires "that the accused have 'counsel acting in the
 role of an advocate.'"  United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984)
 (quoting Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 743 (1967)).  "[I]f counsel
 entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial
 testing," then the denial of Sixth Amendment rights "makes the adversary
 process itself presumptively unreliable."   Cronic, 466 U.S.  at 659.  Under
 such circumstances, no specific showing of prejudice is required.
      In In re E.T.C., we held:
         [T]he following criteria must be met for a juvenile to
         voluntarily and intelligently waive his right against
         self-incrimination and right to counsel under chapter I,
         article 10 of the Vermont Constitution:  (1)  he must be
         given the opportunity to consult with an adult; (2) that
         adult must be one who is not only genuinely interested
         in the welfare of the juvenile but completely independ-
         ent from and disassociated with the prosecution, e.g., a
         parent, legal guardian, or attorney representing the
         juvenile; and (3) the independent interested adult must
         be informed and be aware of the rights guaranteed to the
         juvenile.
 141 Vt. 375, 379, 449 A.2d 937, 940 (1982) (emphasis added).  As attorney
 Cantini's testimony shows, he did not provide J.B.'s parents or J.B. any
 meaningful consultation before waiver of J.B.'s right to remain silent.
 Although J.B. may have been technically represented by counsel, the record
 indicates that the course of compliance set by Cantini could not be
 considered one which was functionally "independent of and disassociated with
 the prosecution."  Id.
      In finding that Cantini's advice constituted effective assistance of
 counsel, the family court determined that Cantini chose to follow a "medical
 model" rather than a "due process" model.  By this, we assume the court
 meant that Cantini sought to place J.B. in state control to get treatment
 rather than contest the merits.  In the context of juvenile proceedings,
 however, Cantini's approach was no strategy at all.  The police interview,
 during which the twelve-year-old boy was allowed to face his interrogators
 unaccompanied by counsel, simply served to arm the prosecution with
 evidentiary ammunition where it was questionable whether they, prior to the
 interview, had enough to convict him.  The juvenile's well-being before the
 court was not benefitted by his confession.  No plea bargaining took place.
 As the State said at oral argument, the end result it sought was the same
 whether J.B. admitted his guilt or contested the delinquency petition.
 Cantini simply "threw in the towel" and abandoned any strategy to bargain
 for the best outcome for the juvenile client.
      Before J.B.'s confession, the case against him consisted of statements
 made by two five-year-olds.  Cantini failed to consider that the State,
 without J.B.'s confession, might be willing to settle the matter without
 litigation.  Instead, Cantini expressed his own concerns about litigating
 because he would have to cross-examine the alleged victims, and stated that
 "it is not a very nice thing to do because I would have to do my best to
 break down whatever their allegations or their stories were and I don't
 think that that would be a very nice thing to do."  We may infer, however,
 that concern about requiring young children to testify would be contemplated
 by the prosecution also.  Without J.B.'s confession, the case against him
 might have been settled without subjecting the five-year-olds to examination
 and without subjecting J.B. to the stigma of an adjudication of delinquency.
 Once J.B. confessed, his bargaining position was greatly undermined.  The
 risks involved were simply not explained to J.B. or his parents. Under the
 circumstances, J.B.'s confession was the State's strongest evidence.
      The family court concluded, based on the testimony of a psychologist
 who had spent several hours with J.B. and his parents, that J.B. was not
 prejudiced, had "blossomed" since the adjudication, and that the treatment
 had a "cathartic" and "rehabilitative" effect.  Whether or not the treatment
 was effective misses the point.  The proper inquiry is whether the judicial
 process retained "its character as a confrontation between adversaries."
 Cronic, 466 U.S.  at 657.  Counsel's failure to  "subject the prosecutor's
 case to meaningful adversarial testing" is a denial of Sixth Amendment
 rights, and the adversary process becomes "presumptively unreliable."  Id.
 at 659.  Beyond that, no specific showing of prejudice is required.
      We cannot conclude that counsel acted as advocate for J.B. within the
 parameters of the constitutional guarantee.  The posture of the case was
 significantly affected by Cantini's inadequate advice.  If Cantini had
 engaged in a course of advocacy for his client and challenged the
 delinquency adjudication, J.B. might still have received the benefits of
 treatment without the stigma of an adjudication, and may well have
 "blossomed" as a result.  We therefore hold that counsel's representation in
 this case violated J.B.'s right to effective assistance of counsel.
      Reversed and remanded.




                                    FOR THE COURT:



                                    __________________________________
                                    Associate Justice