State v. Ireland

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2006 UT 17 This opinion is subject to revision before final publication in the Pacific Reporter. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH ----oo0oo---- State of Utah, Plaintiff and Petitioner, No. 20050279 v. F I L E D Jeffrey Don Ireland, Defendant and Respondent. March 10, 2006 --Third District, Salt Lake The Honorable Sheila K. McCleve No. 021902023 Attorneys: Mark L. Shurtleff, Att y Gen., Jeffrey S. Gray, Asst. Att y Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff Debra M. Nelson, Lisa J. Remal, Salt Lake City, for defendant --On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals DURRANT, Justice: INTRODUCTION ¶1 For a Utah court to have jurisdiction over a defendant, the charged offense must have been committed, at least partly, within the state.1 In this case, Jeffrey Don Ireland was charged with unlawful possession or use of a controlled substance2 based exclusively on the fact that he tested positive for the existence of methamphetamines in his bloodstream. We are asked to determine whether the existence of methamphetamines in Ireland s 1 2 Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201(5)(c) (Supp. 2005). Id. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1999) (current version at Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2005)). bloodstream conclusively showed that Ireland possessed or used a controlled substance within the state. ¶2 Utah Code section 58-37-2(1)(dd),3 which defines terms used in the Utah Controlled Substance Act,4 includes consumption of a controlled substance within its definition of use. The answer to whether the district court had jurisdiction over Ireland turns on the definition of consumption. If we conclude that consumption includes the metabolization of a controlled substance, the existence of methamphetamines in the bloodstream is itself a violation of the Utah Controlled Substance Act, and the district court clearly had jurisdiction over Ireland because that violation occurred within Utah. If the definition of consumption is limited to the introduction of a controlled substance into the body, the existence of methamphetamines in the bloodstream is not conclusive evidence that an offense was committed within Utah, and the State must present additional evidence to establish that the district court has jurisdiction over the defendant. ¶3 We conclude that the Legislature did not intend the term consumption to include metabolization of a controlled substance because it did not explicitly criminalize such behavior, as it has in related statutes. As we conclude that the Legislature did not intend consumption to include the metabolization of controlled substances, we need not address Ireland s argument that criminalizing the metabolization of controlled substances violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. BACKGROUND ¶4 This case arises from an automobile collision in which Ireland s vehicle struck another vehicle, killing its driver. When police officer Scott Buchanan went to the hospital to question Ireland about the accident, he noticed that Ireland s pupils were constricted, his eyelids were droopy, his movements were slow and clumsy, he had muscle tremors in his legs, he swayed from side to side, he complained that his mouth was dry, and his speech was slow, slurred, and raspy. Believing that these symptoms evidenced narcotic use, Officer Buchanan obtained a search warrant to test Ireland s blood. A test of the blood sample, which was taken more than five hours after the accident, 3 Id. § 58-37-2(1)(dd) (1998) (current version at Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(1)(ff) (Supp. 2005)). 4 Id. §§ 58-37-1 to -21. No. 20050279 2 revealed a methamphetamine level of 0.1 micrograms per milliliter and a marijuana metabolite level of 6 nanograms per milliliter. ¶5 Ireland was subsequently charged under Utah Code section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i)5 with unlawful possession or use of methamphetamine, a third degree felony, and under section 41-644.66 with driving with measurable marijuana in the body, a class B misdemeanor. The State moved for a pretrial ruling on jurisdiction, arguing that the presence of methamphetamines in Ireland s bloodstream conclusively established that Ireland had possessed or used methamphetamines within the state. In so arguing, the State contended that consumption was an ongoing process of metabolization. The district court agreed, construing consumption as the ongoing process in which the body physiologically metabolizes the substance. The court concluded that Ireland had used a controlled substance within Utah and that it therefore had jurisdiction. Ireland then entered a conditional plea of guilty to both charges, reserving the right to appeal the district court s decision regarding jurisdiction. ¶6 On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the district court s jurisdictional conclusion, holding that consumption did not include metabolization but instead was a catchall term encompassing any form of ingestion.7 The court of appeals reasoned that the list of nouns utilized by the statute application, inhalation, swallowing, injection, or consumption -indicates that consumption is a present tense nominal describing the introduction of a substance into the body, and not an ongoing metabolic process. 8 In reaching this result, the court of appeals looked at dictionary definitions of consumption, other sections of the Utah Code that used the term metabolite in connection with controlled substances, statutes from other states defining consumption narrowly, and cases from Utah and other states that have defined possession in a way that does not include the existence of controlled substances in the 5 Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1999) (current version at Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2005)). 6 Id. § 41-6-44.6 (Supp. 2001) (current version at Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-517 (2005)). 7 State v. Ireland, 2005 UT App 22, ¶ 19, 106 P.3d 753. 8 Id. ¶¶ 9, 11 (internal quotation marks omitted). 3 No. 20050279 bloodstream.9 The court of appeals further reasoned that a broad definition of consumption would render the possession or use subsection unconstitutional because it would subject status criminals . . . to continuous guilt for possession or use of a controlled substance, whether or not [they had] ever used or possessed any narcotics within the State. 10 ¶7 We granted certiorari to review the court of appeals decision. On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of appeals and not that of the district court. 11 We review the decision for correctness, granting no deference to the court of appeals.12 We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2-2(5) (2002). ANALYSIS ¶8 In this case, we are asked to determine whether the district court had jurisdiction over Ireland s possession or use charge based exclusively on the fact that methamphetamines were found in his bloodstream. We conclude that the existence of methamphetamines in the bloodstream alone is insufficient to show that a defendant violated the possession or use subsection within the state. ¶9 In Utah, a judge may determine that the court has jurisdiction over a defendant if the State shows, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the offense was committed either wholly or partly within the borders of the state. 13 Subsection (2)(a)(i) (the possession or use subsection ) of Utah Code section 58-37-8, which defines violations of the Utah Controlled Substance Act, makes it an offense for any person to knowingly and intentionally . . . possess or use a controlled substance, unless it was . . . otherwise authorized. 14 Possession or use is defined within the Utah Controlled 9 Id. ¶¶ 10, 12-14. 10 Id. ¶ 20 (quoting Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 668 (1962)) (second alteration in original). 11 State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ¶ 11, 103 P.3d 699. 12 Id. 13 Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201(5)(c), (8) (Supp. 2005). 14 Id. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1999) (current version at Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2005)). No. 20050279 4 Substance Act as the ownership, control, occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, maintaining, or the application, inhalation, swallowing, injection, or consumption . . . of controlled substances. 15 ¶10 The State argues that the district court had jurisdiction with respect to Ireland s possession or use charge because the existence of a controlled substance in Ireland s bloodstream was itself consumption of a controlled substance that occurred within the state. Ireland argues that the district court did not have jurisdiction over his unlawful possession or use charge because the State failed to offer proof that he possess[ed] or use[d] a controlled substance in the State of Utah. In so arguing, Ireland contends that consumption does not include the ongoing process by which the body physiologically metabolizes the substance, but instead is limited to the act of introducing a controlled substance into the body. ¶11 In determining the scope of consumption, our primary objective is to give effect to the legislature s intent, which is manifested by the language it employed in the statute.16 Only if we find the statutory language to be ambiguous may we turn to secondary principles of statutory construction or look to the statute s legislative history.17 ¶12 As noted above, the statute in question here is section 58-37-2(1)(dd), which includes the consumption of controlled substances within its definition of practices that are unlawful under the possession or use subsection.18 The definition of consumption, however, is not clear from the plain language of that statute. Consumption is not defined by the possession or use subsection nor any section of the Utah Code. The dictionary defines consumption as the act or process of consuming, which includes to do away with completely, to spend wastefully, to use up, to eat or drink, to engage fully or to waste or 15 Id. § 58-37-2(1)(dd) (1998) (current version at Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(1)(ff) (Supp. 2005)) (emphasis added). 16 Smith v. Price Dev. Co., 2005 UT 87, ¶ 16, 125 P.3d 945 (internal quotation marks omitted). 17 Id. 18 See supra ¶ 2. 5 No. 20050279 burn away. 19 Under this definition, the interpretations asserted by both the State and Ireland are reasonable. On one hand, the to eat or drink definition supports Ireland s interpretation that consumption is a method of ingestion. On the other hand, the to waste or burn away definition supports the State s construction that consumption includes the metabolic process. ¶13 As we conclude that the term consumption is ambiguous, we look to the canons of statutory construction to determine what meaning the Legislature intended.20 Ireland contends that consumption is a catchall term encompassing novel methods of ingestion. In support of this interpretation, Ireland implicitly relies on the ejusdem generis canon of statutory construction, which provides that when a statute contains a list of specific words that relate to a certain type of item and those words are followed by a general word, the general word should be construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words. 21 In particular, Ireland argues that because each of the terms preceding consumption in the definition of use -application, inhalation, swallowing, and injection -describes a method of introducing a substance into the body, the term consumption must also be a method of introducing substances into the body and should be construed as a catchall term encompassing any other method of introducing substances into the body. ¶14 The State relies, however, on another canon of statutory construction that requires every word of a statute to be given effect so that no part of the statute will be inoperative or superfluous. Under this canon, when the specific words embrace all the . . . objects of the class designated by the enumeration, the general words take a meaning beyond the The State argues that the enumerated terms preceding class. 22 consumption exhaust the possible methods of ingestion and that 19 Merriam-Webster s Collegiate Dictionary 249 (10th ed. 1998). 20 See Eaquinta v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2005 UT 78, ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 901 (applying canons of statutory construction to determine legislative intent). 21 2A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47:17, at 273-74 (6th ed. 2001). 22 Id. § 47:21, at 295. No. 20050279 6 consumption must, therefore, mean something additional, otherwise the term would be superfluous. ¶15 The State s reliance on this canon of construction is misplaced for two reasons. First, to apply this canon, we must find that the terms preceding consumption exhaust the possible methods of introducing a substance into the body. Admittedly, it is difficult to think of methods of ingestion that are not enumerated in the statutory definition of use. But at least one example exists: insertion, such as through a suppository. ¶16 Second, and more fundamentally, the primary goal of statutory construction is to determine legislative intent.23 No canon of construction can be used to construe a statute in a way that is inconsistent with legislative intent.24 By looking, as we must,25 at statutes relating to the same subject as the possession or use subsection, it is apparent that the Legislature did not intend consumption to include metabolization. ¶17 Most significantly, the Legislature has explicitly referred to the existence of controlled substances in the bloodstream in at least eight other statutes.26 Each of these statutes contains language that refers to the existence of the drug or metabolites of the drug in the person s body. For example, under Utah Code section 41-6a-51727, it is unlawful for a person to operate a motor vehicle if the person has any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled 23 State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123, ¶ 52, 63 P.3d 621. 24 Singer, supra note 21, § 46:07, at 201 ( The literal interpretation of the words of an act should not prevail if it creates a result contrary to the apparent intention of the legislature and if the words are sufficiently flexible to allow a construction which will effectuate the legislative intention. ). 25 See Lieber v. ITT Hartford Ins. Ctr., Inc., 2000 UT 90, ¶¶ 7-10, 15 P.3d 1030 (interpreting a statute in accordance with legislative intent by examining the plain language of the statute as a whole, as well as enactments relating to the same subject). 26 See Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6a-517(2), -520(1)(a)(iii), -525(2)(c) (2005) (dealing with driving while under the influence of drugs or alcohol); id. §§ 53-3-220(1)(a)(xiii), -223(1)(a) (Supp. 2005) (driver licensing); id. §§ 34-41-101(2), -102(2), 34A-2-302(4)(a)(i) (maintaining drug-free workplaces). 27 Utah Code Ann. § 41-60-517 (2005). 7 No. 20050279 substance in the person s body. We assume that, had the Legislature wanted to include the metabolization of controlled substances as a violation of the possession or use subsection, it would have done so explicitly. ¶18 This assumption is bolstered by the fact that the Legislature has subsequently amended the very statute now at issue, Utah Code section 58-37-8, to do precisely that. The statute now explicitly provides that a defendant violates the possession or use subsection by knowingly and intentionally having in his body any measurable amount of a controlled substance. 28 We note that neither party has argued that subsequent amendments to Utah Code section 58-37-829 apply retroactively to Ireland s possession or use charge. Our analysis of the possession or use subsection is accordingly based on the version of the statute under which Ireland was charged, Utah Code section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1999), and obviously would likely be different if we were to interpret the current version of the statute. ¶19 Furthermore, defining consumption as a method of introducing controlled substances into the body is consistent with the definitions of consumption applied by other jurisdictions.30 At least five states, via statute or case law, have limited the definition of consumption, or some derivative thereof, to methods of introducing a controlled substance into the body.31 The State has not presented us with any caselaw or 28 Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 2005). 29 Automobile Homicide Amendments, ch. 10, § 1, 2003 Utah Laws 203, 204; Amendments to Controlled Substance Act, ch. 33, § 6, 2003 Utah Laws 302, 315-17; Unlawful Controlled Substances In Correctional Facilities, ch. 36, § 1, 2004 Utah Laws 182, 18284; Drug Offense Penalty Enhancements, ch. 30 § 1, 2005 Utah Laws 390, 390-92. 30 State v. Wanosik, 2003 UT 46, ¶ 23, 79 P.3d 937 (noting that when a term is not defined by statute and its meaning is unclear, a court may look to other jurisdictions with similar language for guidance ). 31 See Mich. Comp. Laws. § 768.37(3)(b) (2005) (defining consumed as to have eaten, drunk, ingested, inhaled, injected, or topically applied, or to have performed any combination of those actions, or otherwise introduced into the body ); Or. Rev. Stat. § 475.984(3)(c) (2003) (defining ingest as to consume or (continued...) No. 20050279 8 statutes that support including metabolization within the definition of consumption. ¶20 For these reasons, we conclude that the Legislature intended consumption to be a catchall term encompassing all methods of introducing controlled substances into the body. Indeed, it is a common drafting technique for a legislature to list a number of specific terms followed by a general term, which is intended to encompass items or actions of the same nature as the enumerated terms.32 This technique relieves the legislature from spelling out in advance every contingency in which the statute could apply. 33 ¶21 Although we conclude that the existence of a controlled substance in the bloodstream is not itself a violation of the possession or use subsection, the State may nevertheless present evidence of a controlled substance in the bloodstream, along with 31 (...continued) otherwise deliver a controlled substance into the body of a person ); Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.002(21) (Vernon 2005) (defining human consumption as the injection, inhalation, ingestion, or application of a substance to or into the body ); State v. Abu-Shanab, 448 N.W.2d 557, 559 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) ( [C]onsume, in the context of alcoholic beverages, means to drink, and . . . once drunk, alcohol is no longer being consumed. ); State v. Hornaday, 713 P.2d 71, 76 (Wash. 1986) ( [T]he terms consume and possession . . . do not include the stage at which the liquor has already been swallowed but is still being assimilated by the body. ) superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Silva, 1999 Wash. App. LEXIS 297, *7 n.9; see also State v. Flinchpaugh, 659 P.2d 208, 211 (Kan. 1983) (limiting the definition of possession or control as to not include [e]vidence of a controlled substance after it is assimilated in a person s blood ); State v. Sorenson, 758 P.2d 466, 468 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (noting in dicta that the trial court had held the mere presence of alcohol on the breath or in the bloodstream does not constitute possession under a statute that prohibits any person under the age of 21 from purchasing, possessing, or consuming alcohol and stating that such a position is consistent with well-reasoned decisions from other jurisdictions which have addressed the issue ). 32 Singer, supra note 21, § 47:17, at 281-82. 33 Id. 9 No. 20050279 other evidence, to establish that the district court has jurisdiction over such a charge.34 CONCLUSION ¶22 We conclude that consumption, as used in the possession or use subsection, is a catchall phrase for methods of introducing a substance into the body. It does not include mere metabolization of the controlled substance. Accordingly, we hold that the existence of any measurable amount or metabolites of methamphetamines alone is insufficient to show that Ireland possessed or used a controlled substance within the State of Utah. We therefore affirm the court of appeals judgment and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. --¶23 Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Wilkins, Justice Parrish, and Justice Nehring concur in Justice Durrant s opinion. 34 See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201(1) (Supp. 2005) ( A person is subject to prosecution in this state for an offense which he commits . . . if . . . the offense is committed either wholly or partly within the state . . . . ); id. § 76-1-501(3) ( [T]he existence of jurisdiction . . . shall be established by a preponderance of the evidence. ). No. 20050279 10

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