Alva A. Young, et al v. Sidney Leo Young, et al
Annotate this Casepublication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
----oo0oo----
Alva A. Young, Jr., as personal representative
of the estate of Emily P. Young,
as personal representative of the
estate of Alva A. Young, Sr., and as successor trustee
of the Alva A. Young Trust dated
November 30, 1987,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Sidney Leo Young; Joe Sharkey Young;
Alva A. Young, Jr., in his individual
capacity;
Max Halley Young; Emily Y. McCollaum,
et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
No. 970219
F I L E D
April 20, 1999
1999 UT 38
---
Fourth District, Fillmore Dep't
The Honorable Donald J. Eyre, Jr.
Attorneys:
Matthew C. Barneck, Salt Lake City,
for plaintiff
Darwin C. Fisher, Provo, for defendants
---
RUSSON, Justice:
¶1
Defendants appeal a judgment entered
in favor of plaintiff. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
INTRODUCTION
¶2
In November of 1987, Alva A. Young,
Sr., created the Alva A. Young Trust (the "1987 trust") for the benefit
of his wife Emily P. Young, his five children Alva Jr., Sid, Joe, Hal,
and Sis, and his grandchildren. The trust assets included real property,
water and irrigation stock, various items of farm machinery, and several
bank accounts. Alva Sr. named himself, Emily, and Alva Jr. as trustees.
¶3
In 1987, some of the 1987 trust
property was leased to Sid and his wife Cecilia to conduct farming operations.
Under the terms of this 1987 farm lease, Sid and Cecilia were obligated
to pay fifty percent of the profits from the leased property to the 1987
trust.
¶4
The language of the 1987 trust provided
that upon Alva Sr.'s death, if he should predecease Emily, the trust assets
be distributed into two separate trusts, a marital trust and a residuary
trust.(1) While Emily was to receive income
from each of these two sub-trusts, she was permitted to invade the principal
of the marital trust only. Upon Emily's death, any remaining assets of
the marital trust were to pass to the residuary trust, which then was to
be divided into five separate trusts, one for each child. The income from
each trust was to be distributed to each respective child and, on the death
of each child, shares of the principal were to be distributed among that
child's issue and the surviving children of Alva Sr.
¶5
Alva Sr. died on July 30, 1989,
at which time the corpus of the 1987 trust was valued at $728,505. Emily
believed the corpus was to be divided equally between the marital trust
and the residuary trust. She therefore executed a warranty deed on June
2, 1990, and a grant deed on June 28, 1990. These two deeds purported to
convey the 1987 trust property in equal amounts to two trusts she identified
as the "Alva A. Young Family Trust" and the "Emily P. Young Trust." Emily
also conveyed water shares she owned to a trust she identified as the Emily
P. Young Family Trust.
¶6
Emily died on August 18, 1993. In
the years preceding her death, Emily distributed various amounts of money
to her children. After Emily's death, Alva Jr. found a yellow envelope
in a steel box among her possessions. At the top of the envelope in Emily's
handwriting were the words "Cash Loans." The envelope contained various
checks made out to Emily's children and an itemization of the sums of money
distributed. The envelope also indicated that Emily had delivered $100,000
to Sid, which money Emily had obtained through two separate bank loans--one
for $75,000 and one for $25,000. To secure those two loans, Emily had pledged
assets of the 1987 trust.
¶7
After Emily's death, disputes arose
among the children regarding interpretation of the 1987 trust, namely,
how the assets of that trust were to be allocated to the marital and residuary
trusts, how the trust funds were to be distributed to the children, and
the amount of money Sid and Cecilia owed under the 1987 farm lease. In
1994, Alva Jr., in his capacity as personal representative for the estates
of Alva Sr. and Emily, and in his capacity as successor trustee for the
1987 trust, brought suit to resolve these disputes. A bench trial was held
in January of 1996.
¶8
At trial, the parties disputed how
the 1987 trust assets should be divided between the marital and residuary
trusts. Defendants argued that the trust was ambiguous and that the court
should consider parol evidence in interpreting it. According to defendants,
such evidence showed that Alva Sr. intended the trust assets to be divided
equally between the marital and residuary trusts. Plaintiff, on the other
hand, argued that the trust was not ambiguous and, therefore, the court
should look only to the trust language in determining how to allocate the
trust assets. The plain language of the 1987 trust, according to plaintiff,
required the assets to be allocated in a manner that minimized federal
estate taxes. The trial court agreed with plaintiff and held that the assets
were to be allocated between the marital and residuary trusts in such a
way as to achieve that objective. Accordingly, the court allocated $600,000
to the residuary trust and the remaining $128,505 to the marital trust.(2)
¶9
The parties also disputed at trial
the validity of the warranty deed and the grant deed Emily executed in
June of 1990. As mentioned, these deeds purported to convey the 1987 trust
assets in equal proportions to two other trusts, the Alva A. Young Family
Trust and the Emily P. Young Trust. Relying on their view that the trust
assets were to be divided equally, defendants contended the conveyances
were valid. In contrast, plaintiff argued that an equal allocation was
not permitted because it would result in higher estate taxes and that,
as a result, the deeds were invalid. The trial court agreed with plaintiff,
holding that the warranty and grant deeds were improper and invalid.
¶10
The parties contested the validity
of Emily's conveyances of her own water shares. Emily conveyed her Deseret
Irrigation water shares to "Emily P. Young Family Trust, Emily P. Young
and Eugene W. Young" and her Abraham Irrigation Company water shares to
"Emily P. Young Family Trust, Emily P. Young and Eugene W. Young, Trustees."
The trial court held that the Emily P. Young Family Trust was a nonexistent
entity and that, consequently, the conveyances were void from the outset.
Accordingly, the court held that Emily had retained ownership of the shares
and that they were now part of her estate.
¶11
The parties also contested whether
the monies Emily distributed to Sid and Joe were advancements against their
respective inheritances. Although there was testimony that some parties
who had received sums of money from Emily considered the sums to be gifts,
while others considered the sums to be advancements against their inheritances,
the trial court found that Emily intended to treat her children equally
and, on that basis, ruled that all monies given to her children were advancements.
The trial court then calculated the following advancements: $31,036 to
Sis; $50,000 to Hal; $71,389.50 to Sid; and $33,626 to Joe.(3)
¶12
The parties disputed whether the
$100,000 received by Sid was a loan or a gift. After hearing evidence from
both sides, the trial court found that the $100,000 was a loan that Sid
had to repay.
¶13
The parties also disputed how much
money Sid and Cecilia owed under the 1987 farm lease. At trial, the court
had to determine the amount of profit Sid made on the operation of the
farm from 1988 to 1993 because, under the terms of the lease, fifty percent
of those profits had to be paid to the 1987 trust. The parties agreed that
"profit" meant gross income minus expenses related to the property and
that Sid's tax returns would be the source of those figures. Sid's tax
returns, however, did not distinguish between income and expenses of the
1987 farm lease land as opposed to those of other land Sid farmed. After
determining the total gross income and expenses for all farming operations,
the court multiplied those figures by the percentage of total production
attributable to the 1987 farm lease land.(4)
Having made these calculations for each year, the court then multiplied
the total profits by fifty percent, which constituted the amount due under
the 1987 farm lease. The court determined not to include the following
as expenses attributable to the 1987 farm lease land: certain payments
to Sid's children that were unrelated to operation of the 1987 farm lease
land; mortgage payments on property separate from the 1987 farm lease property;
depreciation for equipment distinct from 1987 farm lease equipment; employee
benefits; and taxes and water assessments on the 1987 farm lease land that
Sid did not pay. In the end, the court found that Sid and Cecilia owed
$60,642 on the 1987 farm lease. To that amount, the court added interest,
calculated at ten percent, totaling $23,175.
¶14
On appeal, defendants attack the
trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Specifically, defendants
contend that the trial court erred (i) in allocating the 1987 trust assets
between the marital and residuary trusts; (ii) in concluding that the 1987
trust owned the land, equipment, and water shares listed on the warranty
deed and the grant deed; (iii) in invalidating Emily's conveyances of her
own water shares; (iv) in concluding that Sid and Joe had received advancements
against their inheritances; (v) in finding that the $100,000 Sid received
from Emily was a loan; (vi) in finding that Sid owed $60,642, plus interest,
on the 1987 farm lease; (vii) in finding that all the water rights listed
in the 1987 farm lease were transferred to the 1987 trust; and (viii) in
finding that the sale of the farm to third parties included the property
and water shares owned by Hal and Alva Jr.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶15
We do not reverse a trial court's
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. See Utah R.
Civ. P. 52(a); Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998).
When challenging a trial court's findings, "[a]n appellant must marshal
the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite
this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as
to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly
erroneous.'" In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989)
(citation omitted). We review a trial court's conclusions of law for correctness.
See Smith v. Batchelor, 934 P.2d 643, 646 (Utah 1997).
ANALYSIS
Interpretation of the 1987 Trust
¶16
The first issue we address is whether
the trial court erred in interpreting the 1987 trust. The trial court held
that the 1987 trust was unambiguous. Considering only the language of the
trust, the trial court concluded that the assets were to be allocated between
the marital and residuary trusts in such a way as to keep estate taxes
to a minimum. With this aim, the trial court allocated $600,000 to the
residuary trust and $128,505 to the marital trust. Defendants' contentions
are that (i) the 1987 trust is ambiguous; (ii) the court, therefore, should
have considered extrinsic evidence in determining how to allocate the 1987
trust's assets between the marital and residuary trusts; and (iii) the
extrinsic evidence shows that the assets were to be divided equally between
the marital and residuary trusts. Defendants do not challenge that the
amounts the court allocated to the respective trusts reduced the estate
taxes to the lowest possible amount.
¶17
Defendants' claim of ambiguity is
rooted in the language of two separate provisions of the 1987 trust.(5)
The first provision, article IV, paragraph 4.2, states:
The Marital Trust shall
consist of the survivor of the decedent's interest in all community property
in the trust estate, the survivor of the decedent's separate property in
the trust estate, and only such fractional interest in all other property
of the first of the spouses to die that qualifies for a marital deduction
under the Federal Estate Tax laws as is necessary to reduce the Federal
Estate Taxes of the first spouse to die to the lowest possible amount.
The second provision, article IV(b),
paragraph 3.2, states, "The trustees shall, in addition to the Settlor's
residence, allocate and place in Trust One [i.e., the marital trust] only
such assets as will qualify for the marital deduction, and no other assets."
Defendants claim that under these provisions, different assets will be
allocated depending on which provision is followed and that, therefore,
the trust is ambiguous. We note, however, that defendants fail to explain
how the two provisions are inconsistent or otherwise ambiguous, and they
articulate no basis for allocating different assets depending on the provision
followed.
¶18
We agree with the trial court's
ruling that the trust is unambiguous as to the allocation of assets between
the marital trust and the residuary trust. Reading the two provisions together,
it is clear that the following assets are to be allocated to the marital
trust:
1. Emily's interest in all
community property in the trust estate, which qualifies for the marital
deduction;
2. Emily's separate property in the trust estate, which qualifies for the marital deduction; and
3. The fractional interest of Alva's
property that qualifies for a marital deduction and reduces the estate
taxes to the lowest possible amount.
¶19
Given the above, we hold that the
trial court did not err in allocating the 1987 trust assets in the manner
it did. In signing the 1987 trust document, Emily released and waived any
right, title, or interest she had in the trust property, and there is no
evidence that any of Emily's separate property later became part of the
1987 trust. Therefore, there was no interest in any community property
or any separate property to allocate to the marital trust pursuant to numbers
1 and 2 above. All that remained to be allocated to the marital trust was
that fractional interest of Alva's property which would reduce the estate
taxes to the lowest possible amount. Accordingly, the trial court allocated
$600,000 of the 1987 trust assets to the residuary trust and the remaining
$128,505 to the marital trust. Defendants concede that this allocation
reduces the estate taxes to the lowest possible amount. The trial court
did not err in concluding that the 1987 trust was unambiguous, nor did
it err in allocating the trust assets so as to minimize estate taxes.
The Warranty and Grant Deeds
¶20
The next issue we address is whether
the trial court erred in concluding that the warranty deed and the grant
deed were invalid. These deeds attempted to convey equal amounts of the
1987 trust assets to two other trusts. However, there is no basis in the
language of the 1987 trust for such an allocation. In fact, the 1987 trust
expressly prohibits Emily from invading the principal of the residuary
trust. By attempting to convey away all of the 1987 trust assets via the
warranty and grant deeds, Emily attempted to circumvent that express prohibition.
¶21
Moreover, as set forth above, the
assets were to be allocated to reduce the estate taxes to the lowest amount
possible. Emily's attempt to convey two equal amounts of the trust assets
is patently incompatible with this objective, as such an allocation would
result in increased estate taxes. Conversely, the court's allocation of
$600,000 to the residuary trust and $128,505 to the marital trust minimizes
estate taxes. For these reasons, the trial court did not err in invalidating
Emily's attempted conveyances.
Conveyance of Water Shares
¶22
We next address the issue whether
Emily's conveyance of her own water shares was invalid. Emily conveyed
the Deseret Irrigation water shares to "Emily P. Young Family Trust, Emily
P. Young and Eugene W. Young" and the Abraham Irrigation Company water
shares to "Emily P. Young Family Trust, Emily P. Young and Eugene W. Young,
Trustees." At trial, no evidence was offered to establish the existence
of the Emily P. Young Family Trust, and the record suggests no such trust
was ever created. Therefore, Emily attempted to convey the water shares
to a nonexistent entity. Such attempted conveyances are void. See
Sharp v. Riekhof, 747 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah 1987) (noting that attempted
conveyances of property interests to nonexisting entities are void). The
trial court, therefore, did not err in invalidating the attempted conveyances
and holding that Emily owned the water shares at her death and that those
shares, as a result, became part of her estate.
Advancements
¶23
The issue we next address is whether
the trial court erred in finding that Sid and Joe had received advancements
on their inheritances. Defendants claim the court erred because there was
no writing from either Emily, Sid, or Joe indicating that the monies received
were advancements. Plaintiff counters that a writing was not required but
that, even if one was, the yellow envelope with Emily's handwritten notation
of "Cash Loans" at the top satisfies such a requirement. For the following
reasons, we agree with defendants that the trial court erred in finding
that the monies received were advancements against their inheritances.
¶24
The determination of whether property
received during the life of a decedent is an advancement against the recipient's
share of the decedent's estate is governed by Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-110
(1993).(6) That section provides in pertinent
part:
If a person dies intestate
as to all his estate, property which he gave in his lifetime to an heir
is treated as an advancement against the latter's share of the estate only
if declared in a writing by the decedent or acknowledged in writing
by the heir to be an advancement.
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, to
qualify as an advancement, the property given must have been owned by the
decedent and there must be a writing declaring that the property given
was an advancement.
¶25
Here, it is unclear whether the
monies Emily distributed were entirely from her own estate or whether a
part or all of those monies were from the principal of the residuary trust,
which Emily was forbidden to access. To the extent the monies were from
Emily's own estate, there must be a writing declaring those monies to be
advancements. The trial court's finding, however, is silent as to the existence
of such a writing. The finding simply states:
Although there is testimony
before the Court that some parties who received money from Emily considered
the money as a gift and some parties considered the money as an advancement
against their inheritance, the Court finds that it was Emily's intent to
treat her children equally and that any money given to her children should
be considered as an advancement.
Because the trial court's finding is
devoid of any analysis concerning the statutory criteria for advancements,
the finding cannot be upheld. It was error to conclude that the sums of
money given by Emily were advancements without applying the statutory standard
for making such a determination.
¶26
Plaintiff argues a writing was not
required because Emily died testate and section 75-2-110 applies only when
a person dies intestate. See Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-110 (1993);
id. editorial board comment ("The present section applies only when
the decedent died intestate and not when he leaves a will."). We disagree.
Under the Utah Code, the determination of whether an intervivos gift is
to be taken into account in the distribution of an estate requires written
evidence. While section 75-2-110 applies when a person dies intestate,
section 75-2-612 (1993)(7) applies when
a person dies testate. That section, titled "Ademption by satisfaction,"
states in pertinent part:
Property which a testator
gave in his lifetime to a person is treated as a satisfaction of a devise
to that person in whole or in part, only if the will provides for deduction
of the lifetime gift, or the testator declares in a writing that the gift
is to be deducted from the devise or is in satisfaction of the devise,
or the devisee acknowledges in writing that the gift is in satisfaction.
Id. The editorial board comment
states, "This section parallels § 75-2-110 on advancements and follows
the same policy of requiring written evidence that lifetime gifts are to
be taken into account in distribution of an estate, whether testate or
intestate." Id. editorial board comment. Thus, regardless of whether
Emily died testate or intestate--a determination not made by the trial
court--there must be a writing evidencing that the monies Sid and Joe received
were advancements. Accordingly, the trial court's finding is reversed and
remanded for further proceedings.
Loans to Sid
¶27
The next issue we address is whether
the trial court erred in finding that the $75,000 and $25,000 amounts Sid
received were loans. Because defendants are challenging the trial court's
findings of fact, they must marshal the supporting evidence and demonstrate
that despite such evidence, the trial court's findings are against the
clear weight of the evidence. See In re Estate of Bartell,
776 P.2d at 886. While defendants have properly marshaled the evidence
on this issue, they have not demonstrated that the trial court's finding
is against the clear weight of the evidence.
¶28
At trial, plaintiff put forth evidence
that Sid himself admitted he had borrowed the $100,000 from Emily and intended
to pay back the money, although he later stated he would not. While Sid
controverted this evidence and put forth other evidence that the money
was not to be repaid, we conclude that the evidence presented adequately
supported the trial court's finding that the $100,000 was a loan Sid was
to repay. The trial court's finding on this issue was not in error.
The 1987 Farm Lease
¶29
We next consider whether the trial
court erred in finding that Sid and Cecilia owed $60,642, plus interest,
on the 1987 farm lease.
¶30
It is undisputed that Sid farmed
other property not included in the 1987 farm lease and that Sid's tax returns
did not distinguish between the revenue and expenses attributable to the
respective properties. Given this, the trial court found that "[t]he proportion
of grain and alfalfa produced on Leased Trust Land, as compared with other
land Sid farmed during the years 1987 through 1993, is the most appropriate
method of determining the percentage of revenue and expenses related to
the Leased Trust Land covered by the 1987 farm lease." Defendants attack
this finding but fail to marshal the evidence supporting it. As a result,
they fail to meet their burden on appeal, and we assume that the evidence
adequately supported the finding. See Interwest Constr. v. Palmer,
923 P.2d 1350, 1358 (Utah 1996).
¶31
The trial court also found that
certain claimed expenses were not related to the 1987 leased property and,
thus, did not include those expenses in its calculation of profits under
the 1987 lease. Defendants attack these findings by claiming, first, that
the trial court erred in finding that monies received by Sid's children
were not expenses related to the 1987 lease property. Evidence was put
forth at trial, however, that Sid classified the monies received by his
children as gifts, not wages. While Sid testified that these were actually
labor payments to his children for farming the 1987 lease property, we
conclude that the evidence presented at trial sufficiently supported the
trial court's finding.
¶32
Defendants contest the trial court's
finding that "[m]ortgage, principal and interest payments on other land
Sid farmed or on other equipment Sid owned during the same time period
as the 1987 Lease were not expenses to be considered in determining 'profits'
under the 1987 Lease." Again, the evidence adduced at trial supported this
finding. For instance, it was undisputed that none of the 1987 lease property
was encumbered by a mortgage. Sid testified that some of the money borrowed
was to finance farming operations and that some was borrowed to finance
land acquisitions. Sid, however, could make only a "rough guess" as to
what amount went to farming operations as opposed to land acquisitions.
Furthermore, there was evidence of sufficient lease equipment and water
to conduct farming operations on the 1987 lease land; thus, there would
have been little, if any, need to finance the farming operations of the
1987 trust land. This evidence sufficiently sustains the trial court's
finding.
¶33
Defendants attack the court's finding
that "[d]epreciation expenses of other equipment owned by Sid were not
expenses to be considered in determining profits under the Lease." The
evidence presented at trial, however, also supported the court's finding.
Trial testimony indicated there was sufficient equipment under the 1987
lease to operate the 1987 lease land and that, as a result, there was no
reason to purchase new equipment to operate that land.
¶34
Defendants claim the trial court
erred in determining that employee benefits were not valid expenses. While
the court did not make a specific finding excluding employee benefits as
an expense, such a finding is implicit in the court's acceptance of the
expense calculations of plaintiff's expert witness, which excluded employee
benefits. In challenging this implicit finding, however, defendants fail
to adequately marshal the supporting evidence and thus fail to meet their
burden on appeal. As a result, we assume that the evidence introduced at
trial adequately supported the finding. See Palmer, 923 P.2d
at 1358.
¶35
Defendants dispute the trial court's
finding that the property taxes and water assessments for the 1987 lease
land were not valid expenses. It is undisputed that Emily, not Sid, paid
these taxes and assessments. The trial court ruled, however, that because
the 1987 lease required payment of fifty percent of the profits, fifty
percent of the tax and assessment payments should be considered advancements
against Sid's inheritance. As outlined above, the trial court's finding
concerning advancements is reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
If, on remand, the court finds that Sid is not responsible for fifty percent
of the taxes and assessments, then Sid cannot use the tax and assessment
payments in calculating the profits due under the lease because he never
incurred those expenses. If, however, the court finds Sid responsible for
fifty percent of the taxes and assessments, then those amounts qualify
as expenses for the purpose of calculating profits under the 1987 lease.
It would be inconsistent, indeed unfair, to hold Sid responsible for fifty
percent of the taxes and assessments but not allow him to subtract those
amounts as expenses in determining the amount he owes under the lease.
Therefore, this finding is also reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
¶36
Finally, defendants claim the trial
court erred in applying interest to the profits determined to be due under
the 1987 farm lease. Section 15-1-1 of the Utah Code states in part: "Unless
parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest, the
legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods,
or chose in action shall be 10% per annum." Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1(2)
(1996). Because the 1987 farm lease contains no provision concerning interest,
section 15-1-1(2) applies, and the trial court properly calculated interest
at ten percent on the amounts due under the lease.
Remaining Issues
¶37
Defendants present two additional
issues. First, they argue that the trial court erred in finding that all
the water rights listed in the lease were transferred to the 1987 trust.
Plaintiff correctly counters that this is not an issue. Although the findings
of fact incorrectly state that all the water rights referred to in the
1987 farm lease were conveyed to the 1987 trust, the court corrected this
error in its written judgment when it stated that Emily owned the 100 shares
of Deseret Irrigation stock and the 140 shares of Abraham Irrigation stock.
¶38
Second, defendants argue the trial
court erred in finding that the sale of the farm to third parties included
the forty-acre parcels and the water stock owned by Hal and Alva Jr. Defendants,
however, fail to adequately marshal the evidence in support of this finding
and thus fail to meet their burden on appeal. Although we do not address
the issue, we note that plaintiff has no objection to modifying the finding
to indicate that the sale "may" include property owned by Hal and Alva
Jr.
CONCLUSION
¶39
We affirm the trial court's decision
with the exception that its findings concerning advancements and the calculation
of profits under the terms of the 1987 lease are reversed. This case is
remanded for further proceedings on that basis.
---
¶40
Chief Justice Howe, Associate Chief
Justice Durham, Justice Stewart, and Justice Zimmerman concur in Justice
Russon's opinion.
1. In the 1987 trust, the marital trust is also referred to as "Trust One" and the residuary trust as "Trust Two."
2. The parties stipulated that the value of the 1987 trust was $728,505.
3. The court found that Alva Jr. had not received an advancement.
4. These percentages were determined from the production records prepared by Sid.
5. Defendants argue the trust is ambiguous in other respects as well. However, these claims of ambiguity are not relevant to the question of allocation between the marital and residuary trusts.
6. Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-110 (1993) was recodified and amended in 1998. See Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-109 (Supp. 1998).
7. Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-612 (1993) was recodified and amended in 1998. See Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-609 (Supp. 1998).
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