State of Utah v. Benvenuto
Annotate this Casepublication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE
OF UTAH
----oo0oo----
State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Jorge Martin Benvenuto,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 980155
F I L E D
June 18, 1999
1999 UT 60
---
Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Anne M. Stirba
Attorneys:
Jan Graham, Att'y Gen., Joanne C.
Slotnik, Asst. Att'y Gen., Robert Stott, Roger Blaylock, Salt Lake City,
for plaintiff
Robert L. Booker, David H. Tolk,
Salt Lake City, for defendant
---
RUSSON, Justice:
¶1
Defendant Jorge Martin Benvenuto
appeals the district court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty
plea. Benvenuto pled guilty to one count of aggravated murder and one count
of attempted aggravated murder. Benvenuto then moved to withdraw his plea.
The district court held a hearing, ruled that Benvenuto did not have good
cause to withdraw the plea, and denied the motion. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2
On the evening of August 28, 1996,
eighteen-year-old Zachary Snarr and his friend Yvette Rodier drove to Little
Dell Reservoir in Salt Lake County. As they parked off the road, they noticed
a white truck pull up nearby. Taking a blanket, camera, and tripod, they
walked partway down a footpath and prepared to take photographs of the
moon. As Zachary and Yvette spread out the blanket and sat down, Benvenuto
approached from behind and asked them a brief question about where the
path went. Yvette replied that she did not know. When Yvette and Zachary
turned their attention away from him, Benvenuto fired several shots at
point-blank range with a handgun, hitting both Yvette and Zachary. Two
bullets struck Zachary in the head, and one hit him in the abdomen; he
died at the scene. Yvette survived the initial wounds she received and
started screaming. Approximately thirty seconds after the first volley
of shots, Benvenuto fired more shots at Yvette. He then searched both victims'
pockets, took Zachary's keys, and left in Zachary's car. Although Yvette
suffered multiple bullet wounds to her head, one to her shoulder, one to
her leg, and two to her torso, she survived. She managed to crawl several
hundred feet up to the highway, where a passing motorist saw her and stopped.
Upon being notified of the crime, police officers arrived at the scene
and found a white vehicle at the roadside pullout where Zachary and Yvette
had parked. The vehicle was registered to Benvenuto. When police officers
located Benvenuto and interviewed him, he confessed to the crime and expressed
surprise that Yvette had survived his assault.
¶3
The State charged Benvenuto with
aggravated murder (a capital homicide), attempted aggravated murder, and
two counts of aggravated robbery. While his trial was pending, Benvenuto
was incarcerated for a period of several months. Initially, he was housed
in the mental health section of the Salt Lake County Jail on suicide watch.
He received medication, and after a few months, his condition improved
enough to allow him to be relocated in the general jail population.
¶4
The court appointed three attorneys
from the Salt Lake Legal Defender's Association (LDA) to represent Benvenuto.
A fourth LDA attorney was also appointed to assist with motions, mitigation
issues, and sentencing. Three of the attorneys had prior experience representing
clients charged with capital crimes. All four attorneys had extensive experience
in representing clients charged with felonies and homicides and in dealing
with clients who had mental health problems or whose competence to stand
trial or enter a plea was questionable.
¶5
On November 7, 1996, Benvenuto's
defense team petitioned for an inquiry into his competence to proceed.
His attorneys consulted two mental health experts, Dr. Vickie Gregory,
Ph.D., J.D., a forensic psychologist, and Dr. Breck Lebegue, M.D., J.D.,
a forensic psychiatrist. Dr. Gregory and Dr. Lebegue examined Benvenuto
and provided their opinions to Benvenuto's defense team. After reviewing
the opinions, the defense chose to withdraw Benvenuto's petition. On approximately
October 9 or 10, 1997, the State offered a plea agreement. One of Benvenuto's
attorneys requested an updated evaluation from Dr. Gregory before presenting
the proposed plea agreement to Benvenuto. Dr. Gregory noted that Benvenuto
was somewhat depressed but that there was nothing in his mental condition
that would prevent him from entering a knowing and voluntary plea. The
defense team then consulted extensively with Benvenuto regarding the nature
and consequences of the proposed plea agreement.
¶6
On October 15, 1997, Benvenuto entered
a guilty plea to the counts of aggravated murder and attempted aggravated
murder. In exchange for the plea, the State agreed to dismiss the robbery
charges and not to seek the death penalty. Although the plea agreement
contained no formal sentencing recommendation for the aggravated murder
charge, the trial court made a verbal commitment--based on its discussion
with the attorneys for both parties and the expressed wishes of the victims'
families--to impose life without the possibility of parole if such a sentence
was properly supported during the sentencing phase.
¶7
Prior to accepting Benvenuto's plea,
the trial court conducted a full colloquy pursuant to rule 11 of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure. The court first inquired as to the nature
and scope of the information Benvenuto's attorneys had presented to him
and Benvenuto's responses to that information. In particular, the court
asked one of Benvenuto's attorneys, James A. Valdez, if he believed that
Benvenuto was "offering a guilty plea voluntarily, knowingly, and with
full understanding of his rights and the consequences of his actions here
today." Valdez replied: "Yes, your honor. Mr. Benvenuto is quite an intelligent
young man, and although there are some mental health issues that we know
were present, he is quite capable of understanding everything that is going
on today and exactly what he is doing today."
¶8
During the subsequent colloquy with
Benvenuto, the court asked if he was being treated for any medical or mental
conditions. Benvenuto definitively answered that he was not. Benvenuto's
responses to all other questions were equally clear and forthright. There
is no indication in the transcript of any indecision or equivocation regarding
his plea decision, and Benvenuto never indicated to either the court or
his counsel any feelings or conditions that would detract from his ability
to enter a knowing and voluntary plea.
¶9
After entering the plea but before
formal imposition of a sentence, Benvenuto engaged new counsel and timely
moved to withdraw his plea. On January 16, 1998, the district court held
an evidentiary hearing on the motion. The defense relied on Benvenuto's
own testimony and that of two of his siblings. The gist of this testimony
was that Benvenuto had been confused and depressed at the time he entered
his plea. Benvenuto asserted that he would not have pled guilty if he had
not been confused and depressed. Benvenuto argued that his counsel's failure
to disclose the full extent of his prior mental health history to the court
and the court's failure to sua sponte conduct extensive questioning about
his mental state and condition at the time of the plea constituted good
cause to withdraw the plea. The district court rejected Benvenuto's arguments
and denied the motion to withdraw. In support of its ruling, the district
court entered extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court
sentenced Benvenuto to life in prison without the possibility of parole.
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
¶10
"We review a trial court's denial
of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under an 'abuse of discretion' standard,
incorporating the 'clearly erroneous' standard for the trial court's findings
of fact made in conjunction with that decision." State v. Holland,
921 P.2d 430, 433 (Utah 1996) (citing State v. Blair, 868 P.2d 802,
805 (Utah 1993)). "However, the ultimate question of whether the trial
court strictly complied with constitutional and procedural requirements
for entry of a guilty plea is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness."
Id.; see also State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 372
(Utah 1996).
¶11
The procedures for entering a guilty
plea are set forth in rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
"Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of ensuring that
constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements are complied with when a guilty
plea is entered." State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987).
This "strict compliance" rule requires the trial court to establish (1)
that "the defendant's guilty plea is truly knowing and voluntary," and
(2) that "the defendant knowingly waived his or her constitutional rights
and understood the elements of the crime." State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993).
¶12
In this case, Benvenuto does not
assert that he was incompetent to enter a plea. Compare Holland,
921 P.2d at 434 (mental conditions, including depression, rendered defendant
incompetent to plead guilty) and State v. Romers, 766 P.2d 623, 628 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (where severe depression potentially affected
defendant's competency, plea permitted to be withdrawn)
with Johnson
v. United States, 633 A.2d 828, 833 (D.C. 1993) (judge properly found
defendant competent to plead guilty notwithstanding allegations of mental
difficulties relating to depression) and State v. Comer,
584 A.2d 638, 642-43 (Me. 1990) (allegation of depression did not justify
withdrawal of plea where record evidence showed defendant was competent
at time of plea). Rather, he contends that he was depressed at the time
he entered his plea and that this condition impaired his judgment to such
an extent that he was not capable of entering a truly voluntary plea. He
likens the impairment caused by mild or moderate depression to the effects
of alcohol or chemical intoxicants.
¶13
The trial court investigated this
claim at the evidentiary hearing on Benvenuto's motion to withdraw. At
the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied the motion to withdraw
and entered extensive findings of fact to support its ruling. As noted
above, we do not overturn factual findings supporting a denial of a motion
to withdraw unless they are clearly erroneous. See Holland,
921 P.2d at 433. Because Benvenuto has made no attempt to marshal the evidence
supporting the trial court's decision and demonstrate that such evidence
is insufficient to support the court's findings of fact, we accept the
trial court's findings as stated in its ruling. See State v.
Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 460-61 (Utah 1994).
¶14
The events surrounding the entry
of Benvenuto's guilty plea and the actions of his defense team strongly
support the court's ruling. The court found that Benvenuto's attorneys
had been scrupulously attentive to Benvenuto's mental condition from the
time they were appointed. They consulted with him frequently during the
several months preceding his decision to plead guilty and almost daily
during the week prior to his entry of the plea. Commenting on this attentiveness,
the court noted that "there was nothing uncommon or deficient about Mr.
Valdez' mere mention of 'some mental health issues' [during the plea colloquy]
because Mr. Valdez had no reason to believe Mr. Benvenuto's mental condition
in any way impaired his ability to enter a voluntary, knowing and intelligent
plea."
¶15
Attorney Valdez's testimony at the
hearing on the motion to withdraw supported the court's denial of Benvenuto's
motion. Valdez conceded that he was not a mental health professional and
was not qualified to offer a diagnosis of the severity of Benvenuto's depression.
Nevertheless, his extensive experience in defending persons accused of
serious crimes allowed him to offer relevant information based on his personal
observations of Benvenuto's actions and conduct. Valdez stated that he
was concerned about Benvenuto's mental state because Benvenuto had made
statements shortly after being arrested indicating that he desired to receive
the death penalty. Valdez interpreted this expression as a suicidal tendency.
The staff at the Salt Lake County Jail placed Benvenuto in the mental health
section on suicide watch for approximately three months until he improved
sufficiently to be placed within the general jail population. Thereafter,
Benvenuto exhibited some signs of depression, but Valdez did not perceive
those signs as being peculiar or extreme for a person in Benvenuto's circumstances.
¶16 When the plea was proposed, Benvenuto understandably found the decision confusing and difficult. Valdez testified that he perceived nothing unusual about Benvenuto's difficulties in making the decision because anyone faced with the choice of going to trial for capital murder or pleading guilty and receiving life without the possibility of parole likely would be depressed and upset. Benvenuto's attorneys advised him to take the plea bargain because, as Valdez stated, they believed that the possibility of Benvenuto's being convicted if he stood trial was very strong; and if Benvenuto was convicted at trial, he would be exposed to the death penalty. During the time when Benvenuto was considering whether to accept the plea agreement, he indicated to his brother and sister that the information his attorneys were giving him about the strength of the State's case left him with little choice but to accept the plea agreement.
¶17
In the days leading up to the final
plea colloquy, Benvenuto apparently vacillated between the two options
of going to trial and accepting the State's plea offer. Valdez testified
that it is common in such cases for defendants to "go back and forth until
they finally make the decision they are going to make, which is a grave
decision to make." Indeed, on the morning when the parties anticipated
Benvenuto would enter a guilty plea, and when all interested persons had
assembled for that purpose, Benvenuto elected to take more time to think
about his decision. Later that afternoon, he decided to accept the State's
offer, and the court reconvened to take his guilty plea.
¶18
Benvenuto's behavior did not demonstrate
an extremely fatalistic or indifferent attitude about punishment, which
is the implication raised by Benvenuto's assertion that his depression
impaired his judgment. Instead, the inference raised by the evidence is
that Benvenuto was genuinely agonizing over his decision. The unpalatable
prospects Benvenuto faced would inflict some level of depression on most
persons confronting the same.
¶19
The trial court also relied on the
opinions of several mental health professionals in making its finding that
Benvenuto's depression was not so severe as to render his plea unknowing
or involuntary. Several months before Benvenuto pled guilty, both Dr. Gregory
and Dr. Lebegue concluded that Benvenuto was competent to assist in his
own defense.(1) Dr. Gregory then re-interviewed
Benvenuto only a few days before the guilty plea. According to the court's
findings, Dr. Gregory found "nothing about [Benvenuto's] mental condition
that would prevent him from entering a knowing and voluntary plea."
¶20
Further, in conjunction with Benvenuto's
hearing on his motion to withdraw his plea, Benvenuto's new counsel obtained
a report by Dr. Nancy B. Cohn. Dr. Cohn holds a Ph.D. and is a licensed
psychologist. She interviewed Benvenuto on December 25, 1997, approximately
two months after Benvenuto entered his plea. Her interview focused on Benvenuto's
contemporaneous mental state and his mental state at the time he entered
his plea. Dr. Cohn opined that Benvenuto suffered from mild to moderate
depression, but she found no other psychological issues relevant to his
competence to enter a plea. She concluded that Benvenuto's "depression
did not significantly affect his capacity to understand the details of
the plea agreement, or the implications of entering such a plea."(2)
¶21
The court also referred to its own
observations of the plea agreement. The court stated that Benvenuto "exhibited
no signs of depression; he appeared focused and attentive and gave appropriate
and rational responses to all questions." The court observed "no confusion
on the part of Mr. Benvenuto during the plea hearing" and stated that his
"demeanor and affect at all [of the many] hearings [relating to his case]
has been very consistent and he has never once appeared to be disoriented
or unable in any way to comprehend the proceedings." The court further
noted that at the plea hearing Benvenuto "appeared to be of sound and discerning
mind, [and] free of any mental defect, illness or impairment that would
have prevented him from entering a voluntary, knowing and intelligent plea."
¶22
Benvenuto offered no substantial
evidence to rebut the conclusion that his plea was voluntary. Indeed, the
evidence Benvenuto presented was largely consistent with the observations
of all other persons who testified about his mental condition. Benvenuto's
sister and brother testified as to their interactions with him in the days
immediately preceding and immediately following his guilty plea. Benvenuto's
sister testified that she had spoken to him on the phone shortly after
the proposed plea agreement had been presented to him. She perceived him
to be confused, sad, and disappointed. She stated that Benvenuto's attorneys
had apparently advised him to take the plea, but she felt he should not
agree to it and should go to trial instead. She was surprised when she
found out he had pled guilty. Benvenuto's brother offered similar testimony,
indicating that Benvenuto had difficulty in making the decision about whether
to accept the plea. Even Benvenuto's own testimony to support his motion
to withdraw merely stated that he was feeling a "bit down" or "withdrawn
[and] depressed." The relevant testimony at the hearing demonstrated that
such feelings are not unusual for someone in Benvenuto's situation and
do not suffice as grounds to withdraw a plea. See, e.g., United
States v. Guthrie, 64 F.3d 1510, 1513-14 (10th Cir. 1995) (defendant's
failure to take antidepressant medication did not render plea involuntary
or interfere with understanding of charges against him).
CONCLUSION
¶23
The district court's findings clearly
supported its conclusion that Benvenuto entered a voluntary and knowing
plea. There is no basis for us to hold that the court abused its discretion
in denying Benvenuto's motion to withdraw his plea. We affirm.
---
¶24
Chief Justice Howe, Associate Chief
Justice Durham, Justice Stewart, and Justice Zimmerman concur in Justice
Russon's opinion.
1. Although Benvenuto does not assert that he was at any time incompetent, the determination of competency is relevant to the extent that it demonstrates Benvenuto was capable of manifesting an interest in his own defense and a willingness to participate in that defense.
2. Dr. Cohn's specific diagnosis stated:
In summary, the defendant is an individual
with a long history of psychological difficulties, who does not presently
demonstrate psychotic symptoms (and likely does not have a history
of psychotic disorder) but who at his baseline is mildly to moderately
depressed. Despite such diagnostic considerations, the defendant has no
significant impairment in his understanding of the proceedings against
him and understands the punishment specified for the offenses charged.
At the time he entered his plea, he was undoubtedly confused and distressed,
but not in a way that would impair his reality testing, or his ability
to understand the implications of his entering a plea.
(Emphasis in original.)
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