Salt Lake On Track Corp. v. Salt Lake City, a Memorandum Decision
Annotate this CaseThis opinion is subject to revision before final publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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Salt Lake On Track, a Utah nonprofit corporation, and
L. Scott Nelson, individually
and on behalf of others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
Salt Lake City, a municipal
corporation; Utah Transit
Authority, a public agency;
DeeDee Corradini, in her
representative capacity as
Mayor of Salt Lake City;
Kendrick D. Cowley, Salt
Lake City Recorder, et al.,
Defendants and Appellees.
No. 970188
F I L E D
June 9, 1997
Third District, Salt Lake Div. I
The Honorable Pat B. Brian
Attorneys: Kevin Egan Anderson, Robert S. Campbell, Salt Lake
City, for plaintiffs
Roger F. Cutler, Salt Lake City, for Salt Lake City
defendants
Randall S. Feil, Gordon L. Roberts, Salt Lake City,
for UTA
Memorandum Decision
ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice:
Salt Lake On Track and L. Scott Nelson ("SLOT") appeal from an order and final judgment of dismissal rejecting their effort to compel the Salt Lake City Recorder, Kendrick Cowley, ("City Recorder") to accept for filing a purported initiative petition that reads as follows:
The Salt Lake City Mayor and Salt Lake City Council shall not obligate the people of Salt Lake
City, by ordinance or otherwise, to an agreement with the Utah Transit Authority regarding the
establishment of a permanent light railroad line along Main Street within the corporate limits of
Salt Lake City between South Temple Street on the north and 700 South Street on the south.
The district court held that (i) under section 10-8-14 of the Utah Code, and under the Interlocal
Cooperation Act, sections 11-13-1 to -37 of the Code, Salt Lake City did not need to take
legislative action and pass an ordinance giving a franchise to the Utah Transit Authority ("UTA")
in order to authorize it to construct and operate a light rail system on Main Street; (ii) the City
Recorder properly rejected the initiative petition because the Interlocal Cooperation Act
expressly precludes a referendum challenging the mass transit agreements between UTA and Salt
Lake City, see Utah Code Ann. 11-13-20(2); and (iii) there was no conflict between the Main
Street alignment of light rail and the Salt Lake City transportation master plan.
This court permitted an accelerated briefing and argument schedule at SLOT's request so that
this appeal could be disposed of expeditiously. Also, in recognition of the importance of quickly
settling the questions presented, we today issue a brief memorandum of decision disposing of the
contentions of the parties. This memorandum of decision is intended for publication and will not
be followed by any other opinion.
SLOT's first contention is that under section 10-8-33 of the Code, Salt Lake City has no power to
permit UTA to place light rail on Salt Lake City streets unless it first grants UTA a "franchise"
by ordinance. The court rejects this contention. The second clause of section 10-8-33, which has
been on the books virtually since statehood, provides that a city "may by ordinance grant
franchises to railroad and street railroad companies . . . to lay, maintain and operate in any street
. . . tracks [for public transit]." That section empowers a city to grant a franchise for a railroad on
a city street. However, it is not the exclusive means by which a city may permit a third party to
install a railroad on city streets. An alternative is provided under the Utah Public Transit District
Act, sections 17A-2-1101 to -1199.51 of the Code, the Salt Lake City ordinance adopted in 1969
pursuant to this statute, and the Interlocal Cooperation Act, sections 11-13-1 to -37 of the Utah
Code. These statutes and ordinances were enacted in recent decades and set up a comprehensive
scheme for creating mass transit systems that may serve a number of units of local government.
Under this scheme, a city may grant "use rights" on city streets to UTA for rapid transit. See
Utah Code Ann. 10-8-14 ("[A city] may construct, maintain and operate . . . public
transportation systems, or authorize the construction, maintenance and operation of the same by
others."); see also id. 10-8-8 ("[A city] may lay out, establish, open, alter, widen, narrow,
extend, grade, pave or otherwise improve streets."). No ordinance is necessary to grant such
rights; a "resolution" is sufficient. See Utah Code Ann. 11-13-5. These use rights are
sufficient to permit the construction of, inter alia, a light railway on city streets. Salt Lake City
has chosen to exercise the power given it by these newer statutes to authorize the construction of
light rail on Main Street rather than granting a franchise under section 10-8-33. That alternative
is within the discretion of Salt Lake City.
SLOT's second contention is that the City Recorder is without authority to reject any initiative or
referendum presented for circulation and was required to certify the petition for circulation. We
reject that contention. Our case law, including White v. Welling, 57 P.2d 703, 705 (Utah 1936),
and Keigley v. Bench, 89 P.2d 480, 481-82 (Utah 1939), indicates that a public official to whom
an initiative or referendum petition is presented for filing does have the authority to reject that
petition if, in fact, it is legally insufficient or is directed to a matter that is not subject to an
initiative or referendum. Cf. Utah Code Ann. 20A-7-202(5) (codifying statute passed after
decisions in White and Keigley, and granting lieutenant governor power to reject initiative
petition if proposed law is unconstitutional, is nonsensical, or could not become law if passed).
In the present case, the subject of the proposed initiative is not an appropriate one. The Interlocal
Cooperation Act, section 11-13-20(2) of the Code, specifically provides that actions taken
pursuant to that statute and authorized by resolution may not be the subject of a referendum
petition. The petition in question here proposes, in fact, a referendum on the city's resolution to
permit a Main Street alignment of light rail. The fact that SLOT chose to label the petition an
"initiative" does not change its essential nature.
SLOT's third contention is that the Salt Lake City transportation master plan, which designates
Main Street as "arterial," is inconsistent with Salt Lake City's decision to permit UTA to place
light rail on Main Street. SLOT contends, therefore, that the master plan must be amended
before the City can enter into an agreement to put light rail on Main Street. We reject this
contention. It is true that the Salt Lake City transportation master plan quite plainly designates
Main Street as arterial. However, it also describes Main Street as the location for light rail. This
master plan's designation of Main Street as arterial does not conflict with the presence of light
rail on Main Street. Contrary to SLOT's argument, the term "arterial" is not a narrow one. We
note that there are only three designations in the master plan for streets. Streets may be
"arterial," "collector," or "residential." Plainly, the meaning given "arterial" in this master plan
does not preclude Main Street's having only one lane in each direction following construction of
the light rail system. A number of other streets similarly labeled "arterial" in the master plan also
have only one lane in each direction.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the trial court is affirmed.
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Associate Chief Justice Stewart does not participate herein.
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