Elizabeth Willis, et al v Maurice Omar No
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Supreme Court
No. 2007-164-Appeal.
(PC 03-5649)
Elizabeth Willis, individually and PPA, as
mother and natural Guardian of Brianna
Mari Serapiglia
:
v.
:
Maurice Omar et al.
:
Present: Williams, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Suttell, and Robinson, JJ.
OPINION
Justice Goldberg, for the Court. This case came before the Supreme Court on
March 10, 2008, on appeal by the plaintiff, Elizabeth Willis, individually, and as mother
and natural guardian of Brianna Mari Serapiglia (plaintiff), 1 from a Superior Court
judgment in favor of the defendants, Maurice Omar (Maurice) and Barbara Omar
(Barbara and collectively defendants or Omars). The plaintiff has appealed to this Court,
arguing that the trial justice erred in granting the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment; she contends that the trial justice erred in the application of the law and failed
to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. For the reasons stated
in this opinion, we affirm the judgment.
1
In addition to her claim for damages arising from her injuries and defendants’ actions,
plaintiff has filed suit on behalf of her minor daughter seeking recovery for loss of
parental society and companionship.
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Facts and Travel
The facts of this case stem from a Friday night of drinking, mixed with drunk
driving, that resulted in permanent injuries to an intoxicated plaintiff from a single-car
collision in a vehicle operated by plaintiff’s equally intoxicated boyfriend.
On August 30, 2002, at around 5:30 p.m., plaintiff arrived at Steven N. Grise’s
(Grise) apartment in Manville, Rhode Island, for a planned dinner date. After a kamikaze
cocktail 2 at Grise’s apartment, the two left in Grise’s 1975 red pickup truck to meet
defendants for dinner at a pizza restaurant in Smithfield, Rhode Island. At the restaurant,
both the twenty-four-year-old Grise and the twenty-two-year-old plaintiff consumed two
margaritas, along with their pizza. After dinner, defendants invited plaintiff and Grise,
who is Barbara’s nephew, to their home. When they arrived at around 8 p.m., Maurice
produced two pitchers of Long Island Iced Tea―a concoction composed of vodka,
tequila, rum, gin, and Crème de Menthe. He fortified the beverages with Cabo Wabo
Tequila 3 and began pouring.
The record before us discloses that defendants served these drinks to plaintiff and
Grise “non-stop” for more than three hours.
The plaintiff contends that Maurice
encouraged her to continue drinking, telling her: “You’re Irish. You can do better than
that.” The amount of alcohol that Grise consumed is in dispute, as plaintiff informed
police from her hospital room that the couple only “had a couple a drinks,” 4 and that it
was Grise who poured the Cabo Wabo. The plaintiff later recalled consuming eight
2
A kamikaze cocktail is an alcoholic beverage consisting of triple sec, vodka, and lime
juice.
3
Cabo Wabo Tequila was described as a high-proof alcohol that Maurice recently had
purchased in Mexico for $130.
4
The plaintiff alleges that this information was incorrect and that she was medicated and
under significant stress at the time.
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drinks at the Omar residence, and she admitted that she was “blurry-eyed” and Grise was
staggering when they left in the red truck.
The two drove less than a mile to the home of plaintiff’s aunt, intending to pick
up plaintiff’s niece. However, plaintiff’s aunt refused to allow her daughter to leave with
plaintiff because she believed that plaintiff was drunk. Undaunted, a visibly intoxicated
plaintiff left her aunt’s home with the inebriated Grise at the wheel. After driving a short
distance, Grise crashed his vehicle into a utility pole and surrounding rock on Old River
Road in Lincoln, Rhode Island.
At the scene of the accident, Grise was observed
staggering, with a strong odor of alcohol on his person. Blood alcohol tests administered
at Rhode Island Hospital later that night indicated that plaintiff’s blood alcohol was 0.261
and that Grise’s was 0.196. 5
The plaintiff suffered severe injuries, resulting in the amputation of her left leg.
On November 5, 2002, a criminal information was filed, charging Grise with two
felonies―operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol, resulting in serious bodily
injury, in violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.6, and driving to endanger, resulting in serious
bodily injury, in violation of § 31-27-1.1. On June 24, 2003, Grise entered into a plea
agreement to both counts and was sentenced to ten years at the Adult Correctional
Institutions, with two years to serve and the rest suspended, with probation.
The
defendants’ brief indicates that plaintiff settled a personal-injury claim against Grise for
$300,000.
5
A second blood sample taken from Grise, thirty-five minutes after the first, resulted in a
0.185 blood alcohol reading.
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On October 27, 2003, plaintiff filed suit against defendants alleging negligence
and civil liability for crimes and offenses, under G.L. 1956 § 9-1-2. 6 A Superior Court
trial justice granted summary judgment for defendants, holding that Rhode Island has not
embraced social-host liability for drunk-driving casualties, in the absence of an
accompanying special relationship. See Ferreira v. Strack, 652 A.2d 965, 967 (R.I. 1995)
(holding that, absent a special relationship, social hosts do not owe a duty of care to
individuals injured by an intoxicated driver who previously was drinking at the
defendants’ home). Judgment was entered on October 10, 2006, and plaintiff timely
appealed.
Standard of Review
This Court reviews the grant of summary judgment on a de novo basis. United
Lending Corp. v. City of Providence, 827 A.2d 626, 631 (R.I. 2003). “[W]e will affirm a
summary judgment if, after reviewing the admissible evidence in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party, we conclude that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Lucier v. Impact
Recreation, Ltd., 864 A.2d 635, 638 (R.I. 2005) (quoting DiBattista v. State, 808 A.2d
1081, 1085 (R.I. 2002)). “The party opposing summary judgment bears the burden of
proving, by competent evidence, the existence of facts in dispute.” The Providence
6
General Laws 1956 § 9-1-2, “Civil liability for crimes and offenses,” provides:
“Whenever any person shall suffer any injury to his or her person,
reputation, or estate by reason of the commission of any crime or offense,
he or she may recover his or her damages for the injury in a civil action
against the offender, and it shall not be any defense to such action that no
criminal complaint for the crime or offense has been made; and whenever
any person shall be guilty of larceny, he or she shall be liable to the owner
of the money or articles taken for twice the value thereof, unless the
money or articles are restored, and for the value thereof in case of
restoration.”
-4-
Journal Co. v. Convention Center Authority, 774 A.2d 40, 46 (R.I. 2001) (citing Accent
Store Design, Inc. v. Marathon House, Inc., 674 A.2d 1223, 1225 (R.I. 1996). This
burden of proof requires the opposing party to set forth specific facts demonstrating that a
genuine issue of material fact exists. Id. (citing Bourg v. Bristol Boat Co., 705 A.2d 969,
971 (R.I. 1998)).
Analysis
Before this Court, plaintiff’s overarching argument is that the trial justice erred
when she refused to recognize social-host liability in the context of this case. The
plaintiff looks to the Court to create a new cause of action―one that imposes a duty on a
social host to protect a person from injury resulting from alcohol consumption by either a
guest or a drunk driver who leaves the party and is involved in an accident that causes
injury or death. Although plaintiff acknowledges that this Court never has recognized
social-host liability, she implores us to look to the Restatement (Second) of Torts and
what she characterizes as sound public policy to “creat[e] a new frontier that will better
today’s society and provide a remedy for a victim” in circumstances in which the social
host’s hospitality leads to “an atmosphere of reckless drinking and driving.” Although
we are sympathetic to plaintiff and to some of the public-policy issues that she addresses,
we decline the invitation to overturn our well-settled precedent. 7 Whether an injured
party should be able to maintain a cause of action arising from social-host liability rests
with the Legislature, not the Court.
To properly set forth “a claim for negligence, ‘a plaintiff must establish a legally
cognizable duty owed by a defendant to a plaintiff, a breach of that duty, proximate
7
We acknowledge counsel’s advocacy and comprehensive legal research in this case.
-5-
causation between the conduct and the resulting injury, and the actual loss or damage.’”
Mills v. State Sales, Inc., 824 A.2d 461, 467 (R.I. 2003) (quoting Jenard v. Halpin, 567
A.2d 368, 370 (R.I. 1989)). Whether a defendant is under a legal duty in a given case is a
question of law. Martin v. Marciano, 871 A.2d 911, 915 (R.I. 2005) (citing Volpe v.
Gallagher, 821 A.2d 699, 705 (R.I. 2003)). “If no such duty exists, then plaintiff’s claim
must fail as a matter of law.” Selwyn v. Ward, 879 A.2d 882, 886 (R.I. 2005). Because
there is no set formula for finding legal duty, such a determination must be made on a
case-by-case basis. Martin, 871 A.2d at 915 (citing Volpe, 821 A.2d at 705). As part of
this analysis, we look to “all relevant factors, including the relationship between the
parties, the scope and burden of the obligation to be imposed upon the defendant, public
policy considerations, and notions of fairness.”
Volpe, 821 A.2d at 699 (quoting
Hennessey v. Pyne, 694 A.2d 691, 697 (R.I. 1997)). In granting summary judgment, the
trial justice stated that “plaintiff hasn’t come forward with duty triggering facts that I, as a
lower court judge, can recognize and impose liability thereon.” We agree with this
ruling.
We consistently have refused to adopt the principle that a social host owes a duty
to a third party for injuries suffered by an intoxicated guest who was imbibing at his or
her home, and we have only imposed such a duty where a special relationship exists.
Ferreira, 652 A.2d at 968; see Marty v. Garcia, 667 A.2d 282, 283 (R.I. 1995) (affirming
trial justice’s decision dismissing case because the claim rested on social-host liability, a
concept that the Court declined to adopt). Although we have recognized social-host
liability in limited circumstances, we have done so when alcohol was illegally provided
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to minors and injuries resulted. Such a special relationship is not present in the case on
appeal.
This Court recently set forth the elements defining a special relationship in
Martin, 871 A.2d at 914, in which the plaintiff was a guest at a high school graduation
party at which alcoholic beverages, including keg-beer, were readily available to
numerous underage partygoers. An altercation arose, fueled by alcohol, during which the
plaintiff was struck in the head by a party-crasher wielding a baseball bat. Id. We held
that a party host who makes alcohol available to an underage guest owes a duty of
reasonable care to protect the guest from harm, including a criminal assault. Id. at 91516. Such a duty exists as a matter of law between the host and her underage guests
because allowing underage drinking gives rise to a special duty, based on both public
policy and forseeability grounds. Id. at 916-17. “To avoid assuming a duty of protection,
the adult property owner must simply comply with existing law and refuse to provide
alcohol or condone underage drinking on his or her property.” Id. at 916. Although
supplying underage people with alcohol at a high school graduation party may trigger a
special relationship, serving alcohol to an adult guest does not.
Furthermore, we have held that, even if minors unlawfully are furnished with
alcoholic beverages, this act alone is insufficient to trigger a special relationship, if the
resultant risk of injury is not foreseeable. See Selwyn, 879 A.2d at 888-89 (in which this
Court reasoned that, even though a vendor illegally sold alcohol to minors, the seller was
not liable because the alcohol was used in an unforeseeable manner when another minor
deliberately ignited it).
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This Court also recognized a duty-triggering special relationship, in Volpe, in
which the decedent’s family brought a wrongful-death action against the mother of a
mentally ill son, who shot and killed his next-door neighbor. Volpe, 821 A.2d at 702-03.
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant-mother was negligent in permitting her son to
keep firearms and ammunition on her property, where the son resided, believing that he
suffered from paranoid schizophrenia.
Id. A jury found the mother liable for the
wrongful death of the neighbor, but the trial justice granted a motion for a new trial. Id.
at 704. This Court, relying on principles of premises liability, held that the defendant had
a duty to protect the neighbors from the immediate risk posed by the weaponry housed on
her property. Id. at 709-11. Here, we are not confronted with an issue of premises
liability, nor is there a suggestion that plaintiff’s injuries resulted from an unreasonably
dangerous condition that defendants allowed on their property.
This case is more akin to Ferreira, 652 A.2d at 967, a negligence action seeking
damages for the injuries suffered when the plaintiffs were struck by an intoxicated guest.
Because there was no special relationship in Ferreira giving rise to a duty on the part of
the hosts, we concluded that the defendants were not liable for “the negligent operation of
a motor vehicle by an adult guest if the negligence is caused by the guest’s intoxication.”
Id. In the case on appeal, although Grise was an invited guest who consumed alcohol
served by defendants―as distinguished from the drunk driver in Ferreira who consumed
alcohol he personally had brought to the party―there nonetheless was no special dutytriggering relationship between the host and his or her guests. After careful review of the
record in this case, we decline to overturn our well-settled precedent, and will adhere to
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our venerable principle of stare decisis. The issue of liability vel non for social hosts
whose guests cause harm is a matter that belongs in the Legislature.
The plaintiff also contends that the trial justice erred in refusing to find civil
liability for aiding and abetting a criminal act. The plaintiff alleges that Maurice verbally
goaded her into consuming significant quantities of alcohol at his home and even
facilitated that process by pouring more Cabo Wabo into her drinks. However, she failed
to establish that this conduct constituted aiding and abetting a criminal act. Section 9-1-2
of the General Laws imposes civil liability for injuries resulting from a criminal act. But
to prove criminal liability for aiding and abetting a criminal act, under G.L. 1956 § 11-13, 8 a party must show two distinct elements: (1) “the alleged aider and abettor share in
the criminal intent of the principal,” and (2) “a community of unlawful purpose” exists
between them. Curtin v. Lataille, 527 A.2d 1130, 1132 (R.I. 1987). In Curtin, we
reviewed 4 Restatement (Second) Torts § 876(b) (1979), and concluded “that applying
our criminal test of aiding and abetting to a civil action is consistent with the test set forth
in the Restatement.” Curtin, 527 A.2d at 1132. The trial justice, in the case before us,
correctly found that “plaintiff has not been able to come forward with some facts to
demonstrate that these people affirmatively participated in the sense that we use when we
talk about aiding and abetting in the context of criminal conduct.”
The record before us is devoid of evidence that demonstrates any intent by the
Omars to commit a crime. Thus, the crime of aiding and abetting is not present. Even
8
General Laws 1956 § 11-1-3 provides:
“Every person who shall aid, assist, abet, counsel, hire, command, or
procure another to commit any crime or offense, shall be proceeded
against as principal or as an accessory before the fact, according to the
nature of the offense committed, and upon conviction shall suffer the like
punishment as the principal offender is subject to by this title.”
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when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, this was a gathering of adults in a
social setting where some adults knowingly over-indulged in alcoholic beverages.
Although plaintiff alleges that she was encouraged to drink excessively while at the
Omars’ home, this does not amount to willful participation or a community of unlawful
purpose by defendants in Grise’s crime. Because defendants were not engaged in a
criminal act or offense when they furnished alcoholic beverages to their adult guests, the
crime of aiding and abetting is not present on this record.
Finally, we reject plaintiff’s argument that G.L. 1956 chapter 14 of title 3, the
“Rhode Island Liquor Liability Act,” imposes liability on a private individual for serving
alcohol in a social setting. We note that this act creates a cause of action against liquor
licensees or their employees or agents. The statutory language enumerates two distinct
defendants:
“(1) An alcoholic beverage retail licensee, and any
employee or agent of this licensee; or
“(2) Any person who, at the time of an act giving
rise to liability, as provided in § 3-14-6, was required by
law to have had an alcoholic beverage retail license under
chapter 7 of this title and any employee or agent of that
person.” Section 3-14-5.
It is undisputed that defendants were neither licensees, nor required to be licensed. Thus,
§ 3-14-5 does not apply to them. “To inject a judicial remedy * * * into a statute that
plainly does not contain a remedy, particularly when there is no evidence to suggest that
the Legislature had intended to create a cause of action, ‘would be interpretation by
amendment.’” Bandoni v. State, 715 A.2d 580, 585 (R.I. 1998) (quoting Rhode Island
Federation of Teachers, AFT, AFL-CIO v. Sundlun, 595 A.2d 799, 802 (R.I. 1991)).
- 10 -
This Court frequently has recognized the public policy concerns surrounding
drunk driving and the resulting carnage on our highways. See DiSalvo v. Williamson,
106 R.I. 303, 305-06, 259 A.2d 671, 673 (1969) (characterizing the adverse effects of
driving while intoxicated as “carnage occurring on our highways which is attributable to
the persons who imbibe alcohol and then drive”). However, “it is not the function of this
Court to act as a super legislative body and rewrite or amend statutes already enacted by
the General Assembly.” Bandoni, 715 A.2d at 585. Accordingly, we are of the opinion
that summary judgment was warranted in this case.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior
Court. The record shall be remanded to the Superior Court.
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