LINDLEY v. LINDLEY

LINDLEY v. LINDLEY
1998 OK 57
961 P.2d 202
69 OBJ 2146
Case Number: 88922
Decided: 06/09/1998
Mandate Issued: 07/10/1998
Supreme Court of Oklahoma

DEE LINDLEY, TRUSTEE OF THE WILLIE PEARL LINDLEY TRUST, FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION Appellee / Counter-Appellant,
v.
BENNIE JOE LINDLEY, Appellant / Counter-Appellee. )

[961 P.2d 202] 

ON CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION IV

¶ 0 Trustee sued to cancel a life estate deed on grounds of forgery. The District Court in Caddo County, James R. Winchester, J., granted the relief sought, cancelling the deed, extinguishing the life tenant's interest, and quieting the trustee's title, based on expert testimony tending to show forgery of the grantor's signature, occurring between the time the deed was duly executed and delivered in January of 1990, and the time it was filed for record in July of 1995. The trial court denied the trustee's plea for an attorney's fee, and both parties appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. Life tenant petitioned for certiorari, which we have previously granted.

CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED;

OPINION OF THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS VACATED;

JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT REVERSED AND REMANDED

FOR PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.

Richard A. Williams, Pain & Garland, For Appellee /Counter-Appellant, Anadarko, Oklahoma, David A. Stephens, Hefley & Stephens, For Appellant /Counter-Appellee, Anadarko, Oklahoma.

Alma Wilson, Justice:

¶ 1 Bennie Lindley lived in his 87-year-old mother's home, during the final years of her life. Mother had agreed to grant Bennie a life estate to the house, and on January 10th, 1990, they went to a lawyer, who prepared a deed at her direction, granting a life estate to Bennie. The lawyer supervised the execution of the deed according to office routine: mother signed the deed in the presence of the lawyer and a notary, after answering questions relating to her capacity to voluntarily make the deed, and after having satisfactorily identified herself. The deed was immediately delivered to Bennie, who [961 P.2d 203] did not then record it, but kept it in his possession. Bennie continued to live in his mother's house until her death in June of 1995. The following month, he filed the life-estate deed for record with the Caddo County Clerk.

¶ 2 Shortly after executing the life-estate deed, on January 22, 1990, mother conveyed her interest in her home into a family trust, at the urging of her two oldest sons, Carl and Dee Lindley, who were named co-trustees. The trust instrument purported to include the entire fee estate, and made no reference to the fact that it was a remainder only, with the life estate in Bennie Lindley. After mother's death, Dee, the surviving trustee sued to cancel the life estate deed, claiming it was a forgery. The trustee's suit depended on the testimony of a handwriting expert, who had examined a photocopy of the deed secured from the county clerk's office, the original deed having become unavailable. According to the expert, the photocopy showed that mother's signature had been traced over, resulting in a better signature than she was capable of writing. The trustee's claim of forgery rested on this evidence alone. The evidence given by the attorney who drew and supervised the execution of the life estate deed was uncontradicted, and the handwriting expert did not examine the copy of the life estate deed the lawyer had kept in his file. Nevertheless, the trial judge canceled the deed as a forgery, extinguished Bennie Lindley's life estate, and quieted the trust's title to the estate in fee simple, but denied the trustee's claim for an attorney's fee.

¶ 3 Bennie Lindley brought this appeal, and the trustee counter-appealed from the ruling on the attorney's fee. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court based on Bennie Lindley's failure to come forward with evidence tending to show an explanation for the alteration of his mother's signature. The opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals placed primary reliance on Lembo v. Federici, 62 Wash. 2d 972, 385 P.2d 312 (Wash. 1963). That decision supports the proposition that even where there is a general presumption in favor of the validity of an instrument, there is an exception where an apparent alteration is of a suspicious nature, and under such circumstances, the person claiming under the instrument must explain the alteration. The Court of Civil Appeals denied the counter-appeal on the attorney's fee question, notwithstanding the trustee's status as the prevailing party in a quiet title suit, reasoning that Bennie Lindley's claim was colorable at the least, and hence would not give rise to an attorney's fee for bad faith litigation. We have previously granted certiorari.

¶ 4 Because the action to cancel the deed and quiet title is equitable in nature, our task on appeal is to review the record and the evidence to determine whether the decision of the trial court is correct as a matter of law, and supported by, the clear weight of the evidence. Chapman v. Chapman, 1965 OK 48, 400 P.2d 831; See also Hackett v. Hackett, 1967 OK 117, 429 P.2d 753.

¶ 5 Here, the trustee has focused entirely on the copy of the deed obtained from the County Clerk, and based his claim for relief on evidence of demonstrable alterations to the deed occurring between the time it was properly executed in January of 1990 and the time it was finally recorded in June of 1995. The trustee fails to appreciate that as a matter of law, once the deed was executed and delivered to Bennie, the transfer of a life estate was complete, and no subsequent mutilation, defacement or alteration of the deed would invalidate the life estate, or operate as a retransfer of the property to the grantor. Smith v. Fox, 1954 OK 346, 289 P.2d 126.

¶ 6 The trustee points to our decision in Hulbert v. Givens, 1964 OK 115, 392 P.2d 729, as authority for the cancellation of a deed on grounds of forgery, claiming a similarity in facts. There, shortly before his death, an eighty-year-old man purportedly conveyed a parcel of land to his nephew by way of a deed that was allegedly signed and acknowledged before an attorney-notary. The attorney later appeared at trial, identified a photograph of the deceased grantor, and confirmed the signing of the deed. But the attorney's credibility was compromised by a showing that while he and nephew had attempted to appear as strangers at trial, he had in fact represented the nephew on a number of occasions, and they were well [961 P.2d 204] acquainted. This, taken together with other considerable evidence of forgery was held sufficient to meet the burden of proving the deed inauthentic by clear and convincing evidence.

¶ 7 Here in contrast, the attorney who drew and supervised the execution of the deed disclaimed any prior acquaintance with either Bennie Lindley or his mother, and the attorney's testimony was uncontradicted. Furthermore, the attorney took the precaution of keeping a copy of the deed for his file, and trustee made no effort to demonstrate forgery of the signature on that document. Consequently we find from this record that the conveyance of a life estate to Bennie Lindley was fully accomplished upon delivery of the challenged deed, and was unaffected by any subsequent alterations of the deed. The decision of the trial court is both contrary to law and against the clear weight of the evidence, and is accordingly reversed, and remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith. The denial of the trustee's claim for an attorney's fee is left undisturbed.

CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED;

OPINION OF THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS VACATED;

JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT REVERSED AND REMANDED

FOR PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.

¶8 ALL JUSTICES CONCUR.