Stubblefield v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.

Stubblefield v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.
1980 OK 164
619 P.2d 620
Case Number: 52671
Decided: 11/04/1980
Supreme Court of Oklahoma

ROY E. STUBBLEFIELD, APPELLEE,
v.
GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, APPELLANT.

Appeal from the District Court, Creek County, Charles S. Woodson, J.

Certiorari to the Court of Appeals, Division 1.

¶0 Action by truck owner against insurer to recover for loss by theft. On settlement of claim, owner's lawyer brought ancillary proceeding to impress his fee claim as a lien on that portion of recovery which was due the owner's lender as loss payee in the policy. The District Court, Creek County, Hon. Charles S. Woodson, judge, charged the entire recovery with liability for the fee and refused to entertain the lender's petition to intervene in the owner/insurer action. The Court of Appeals, Div. 1, reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the cause with directions.

CERTIORARI GRANTED; OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT REINSTATED AND AFFIRMED.

Lantz McClain, Sapulpa, for appellee.

Prichard, Norman, Wohlgemuth by Stephen A. Schuller, Tulsa, for appellant.

OPALA, Justice:

[619 P.2d 622]

¶1 The procedural issues on certiorari are: [1] Was this appeal brought in time for review of the trial court's order that impresses a lawyer's charging lien on that portion of recovery by the borrower against his truck insurer which was due the lender as a loss-payee of the policy? [2] Did the trial court err in summarily denying the lender's petition to intervene in the borrower's action against his insurer? Our resolution of the two issues is in the negative.

¶2 At the point of inception this was an action by a truck owner [owner or borrower] against his insurer to recover for loss by theft. The claim was settled shortly after its filing. The controversy that followed arose over liability to the owner's lawyer for payment of his fee. The loss-payee in the policy - General Motors Acceptance Corporation [GMAC or lender] - who was one of three payees on the insurer's settlement draft,

¶3 The lawyer's motion was later reset for hearing on what was admittedly due and timely notice to GMAC. Its counsel failed to appear. While the record does not contain a transcript of that proceeding, the docket shows that at its conclusion the court took the fee controversy under advisement. The ruling, of which GMAC was apparently notified by a copy of the judge's letter to the clerk, came to be rendered February 6, 1978. It determines that (a) GMAC "has entered its voluntary appearance in this case and is before the Court" for disposition of the fee controversy; and (b) the owner's lawyer had "a perfected attorney's lien" for 50% of the total recovery which "represents a reasonable attorney's fee under the circumstances of this case." By direction of this court the February 6th ruling stands memorialized by a journal entry settled during the pendency of the certiorari proceedings now before us.

¶4 By petition in intervention of March 31, 1978 GMAC sought to litigate its "prior and superior" claim over that of the lawyer to the entire settlement with the insurer. The owner's lawyer answered by interposing a res judicata plea and moved for summary judgment in his favor pursuant to Rule 13.

¶5 We granted certiorari to determine whether the appeal came here too late for review of the issues resolved by the February 6th ruling that subjected the entire recovery to a lawyer's charging lien for his 50% fee. We hold that [1] the fee controversy, which has been effectively and finally settled on February 6, is beyond the reach of corrective process in this appeal and [2] the June 14 summary denial of GMAC's petition in intervention is free from legal error.

¶6 One can gain a much clearer perception of this litigation's anatomy by arranging its various phases into a trichotomous division. The first or beginning stage of the controversy was the action of the owner against his truck insurer. That stage ended with a settlement. The second stage was triggered by the filing of a motion by the owner's lawyer to subject the entire recovery to his 50% lien claim. This stage should be described as a proceeding ancillary to the main action. It came to an end when the February 6th order determined all the issues - between GMAC and the owner's lawyer, inter se - which had been raised by the lawyer's motion and GMAC's response to it.

¶7 In Stage I the parties-litigant were the owner and his insurer. In Stage II the adversaries were different. The contest then was between the owner's lawyer and the owner's lender GMAC. At this stage the owner was in no adversary posture either with his lawyer or with GMAC. Nor were the latter parties the owner's adversaries. In the very last or third stage - begun with GMAC's unsuccessful attempt to intervene in what was essentially a post-termination phase of Stage I - GMAC sought to litigate its demands with the owner, his lawyer and with the insurer.

I.

THE COURT'S JURISDICTION OF GMAC TO RESOLVE THE FEE CONTROVERSY INSTITUTED BY THE OWNER'S LAWYER

¶8 A lawyer's claim for impression of his statutory charging lien

II.

ERROR ALLEGED IN THE ASSIGNMENT OF THE LAWYER'S ANCILLARY

CLAIM TO, AND IN ITS ADJUDICATION BY, THE

BRISTOW/DRUMRIGHT-BASED DISTRICT JUDGE

¶12 When the Sapulpa-based district judge retired, his counterpart in the Bristow/Drumright Division became the only resident district judge in the county

III.

THE FEBRUARY 6th ORDER WAS FINAL AND APPEALABLE

¶13 The February 6th order finally determined the fee controversy. The ancillary proceeding between the owner's lawyer and GMAC thus came to a point of termination. The order so made was appealable as a final decision. This is so because it precluded GMAC the defeated litigant in the fee claim's Stage II from proceeding further in the trial court. Rule 1.11(b)(5), Rules on Perfecting a Civil Appeal, 12 O.S. Ch. 15, App. 2; Centorp Corp. v. Gulf Production Corp., 183 Okl. 436, 83 P.2d 181 [1938].

¶14 When, as here, several cognate matters are litigated in the framework of one case, there may be several successive final and appealable orders, although the law contemplates but one judgment that disposes of the main action. State ex rel. Board of Affairs v. Neff, 205 Okl. 205, 236 P.2d 681, 683 [1951].

IV.

THE SUMMARY DENIAL OF GMAC'S PETITION TO INTERVENE WAS ALSO A

FINAL AND APPEALABLE ORDER

¶15 While the subsequent denial of GMAC's quest for intervention was also appealable

¶16 We find no error in the summary denial of intervention, effected June 14, 1978 after the main action had already been terminated by the owner's dismissal of May 1, 1978. In the petition to intervene GMAC attempted to raise issues barred from [619 P.2d 625] relitigation by the February 6th adjudication which had become final for want of an appeal within thirty days of its rendition. 12 O.S. 1971 § 990 .

¶17 The dismissal of the main action by the owner constituted final termination of the case in which intervention was attempted.

¶18 TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT IS THEREFORE REINSTATED AND AFFIRMED.

¶19 LAVENDER, C.J., IRWIN, V.C.J., and WILLIAMS, HODGES, BARNES, DOOLIN and HARGRAVE, JJ., concur.

¶20 SIMMS, J., dissents.

Footnotes:

1 The other two payees were the owner and his lawyer.

2 5 O.S. 1971 § 6 .

3 Rule 13, Rules for the District Courts, 12 O.S., Ch. 2, App.

4 5 O.S. 1971 § 6 .

5 Tisdale v. Wheeler Bros. Grain Co., Inc., Okl., 599 P.2d 1104, 1105-1106 [1979]; Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Rittenhouse, Hanson & Evans, Okl., 285 P.2d 186 [1955].

6 Carter v. Wooley, Okl., 521 P.2d 793 [1974]; see also, Rand v. Nash, infra note 8.

7 Our statute, 12 O.S. 1971 § 162 , clearly provides that ". . . [T]he voluntary appearance . . ., is equivalent to service."

8 Franklin v. Margay Oil Corp., 194 Okl. 519, 153 P.2d 486, 497-498 [1944]; May v. Casker, 188 Okl. 488, 110 P.2d 287, 290 [1940]; Rand v. Nash, 174 Okl. 525, 51 P.2d 296, 297 [1935].

9 The personnel records in the office of the Adm. Dir. of the Judiciary show that the Sapulpa-based district judge retired effective Jan. 1, 1978 and that his successor was appointed Feb. 10, 1978. It is hence clear that at the critical time in question here - Feb. 6, 1978 - the Bristow/Drumright based district judge was the only resident district judge in the county.

10 20 O.S. 1971 § 120 ; Rule 7, Rules on Administration of Courts, 20 O.S., Ch. 1, App. 2.

11 An order that denies leave to intervene is appealable. Morton v. Baker, 183 Okl. 406, 82 P.2d 998, 1000 [1938].

12 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Barnett, Okl., 475 P.2d 167 [1970]; see also, Bell v. Meadors, Okl., 534 P.2d 1288 [1975].