McCREARY v. CITY OF TULSA

McCREARY v. CITY OF TULSA
1944 OK 235
149 P.2d 502
194 Okla. 256
Case Number: 30841
Decided: 06/06/1944
Supreme Court of Oklahoma

McCREARY, Adm'x.
v.
CITY OF TULSA

Syllabus

¶0 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS -- Charter provision did not prevent city from reducing number of policemen in order to keep expenditures within constitutional debt limit.
A municipality of this state may reduce the number of its policemen when such reduction is necessary to keep its expenditures within the debt limit for municipalities provided in our State Constitution even though its charter contemplates that policemen shall hold their office during good behavior. City of Tulsa v. Johnson, 193 Okla. 501, 145 P.2d 198.

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Tulsa County; Krit Logsdon, Judge.

Action by Charlotte McCreary, administratrix of the estate of Chester McCreary. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Bailey E. Bell and Cleo Wilson, both of Tulsa, for plaintiff in error.
E. M. Gallaher, L. A. Justus, Philip J. Kramer, and C. Lawrence Elder, all of Tulsa, for defendant in error.

BAYLESS, J.

¶1 Charlotte McCreary, administratrix of the estate of Chester McCreary, deceased, instituted an action in the court of common pleas of Tulsa county, Okla., against the city of Tulsa, a municipal corporation, to recover money alleged to be due to the deceased for salary covering a period of time during which it is alleged and contended that the deceased was "an illegally discharged policeman." At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court rendered judgment for the city upon the ground that McCreary was never legally appointed as a policeman of the city, finding that his name was never submitted to the board of commissioners and he was never confirmed and by reason thereof was never a policeman within the meaning of the city charter, section 30, art. 11, relating to the manner in which "policemen" might be discharged from the service of the city. The administratrix appeals.

¶2 In answering the contention made by the administratrix, the city contends: (1) That the trial court was correct in holding that the deceased was never legally a member of the city police force within the meaning of the charter; and (2) that he was legally discharged for economy purposes within the meaning of Jurd v. City of Tulsa, 183 Okla. 239, 80 P.2d 596, and City of Tulsa v. Suttle, 182 Okla. 283, 77 P.2d 104. The city might well have cited also City of Tulsa v. Johnson, 193 Okla. 501, 145 P.2d 198, which we think is fully applicable to this situation under the second contention made by city. There is no occasion to repeat in here the issues discussed in that case.

¶3 The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

¶4 CORN, C. J., GIBSON, V. C. J., and HURST, DAVISON, and ARNOLD, JJ., concur.