In Re A.C.H
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An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. NO. COA14-239 NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS Filed: 4 November 2014 IN THE MATTER OF: A.H. Appeal by McDowell County No. 10 JT 74 respondent from orders entered 8 May 2013 by Judge C. Randy Poole and 6 November 2013 by Judge Robert K. Martelle in McDowell County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 30 September 2014. Megan N. Silver, for petitioner-appellee McDowell County Department of Social Services. Administrative Office of the Courts, by Appellate Counsel Tawanda N. Foster, for Guardian ad Litem. Mercedes O. Chut, for respondent-appellant mother. CALABRIA, Judge. -2Respondent-mother ceasing reunification (“respondent”) efforts rights to her daughter, Ann.1 and appeals from terminating her orders parental We affirm. I. Background Respondent is the mother of Joy, Ann, Tom, and Nick (“the children”). Respondent’s husband (“the stepfather”) is Ann’s stepfather and the father of Ann’s half-siblings. County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) The McDowell first became involved with the family in 2009 based upon reports of excessive discipline. On 19 August 2010, DSS filed petitions alleging the children were abused and neglected juveniles. In the petitions, DSS alleged that a child medical examination revealed bruising and marks on Joy and Nick; that Joy and Nick indicated their father inflicted the marks for punishment; that Ann and Tom indicated that the stepfather had punched them in the chest for punishment; that respondent admitted her husband uses a belt when he punishes the children; and that respondent “did not think the mark on the children was that bad.” After adjudicated court 1 a hearing the ordered on children 23 September abused respondent to, and 2010, the neglected inter alia, trial court juveniles. “complete The a The parties have stipulated to the use of pseudonyms to protect the identity of the minor children involved in this case. -3psychological assessment with Dr. Peter Sansbury and follow all recommendations[.]” The children were placed in foster homes since they did not have any relatives in the area available for placement. Compact DSS requested a home study through the Interstate on the Placement of Children (“ICPC”) for the stepfather’s sister (“the aunt”), who lived in Florida. On 30 October 2012, the court ordered respondent to submit to another parenting capacity evaluation by Dr. Sansbury. Respondent’s testing revealed a high probability that abuse in the home would reoccur and that respondent and the stepfather continued to minimize the abuse. the trial efforts. court entered an Consequently, on 8 May 2013, order which ceased reunification As part of the order, the court found that placement of the children with the aunt was not in their best interests based upon the results of the home study completed through the ICPC. The trial court ordered the permanent plan to be changed to adoption. On 21 May 2013, DSS filed separate motions in the cause to terminate respondent’s parental rights to Ann and her half- siblings. DSS’s motion for Ann alleged that the parental rights of respondent were subject to termination pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) (abuse and neglect), N.C. Gen. Stat. § -47B-1111(a)(2) (failure to make reasonable progress), and N.C. Gen. Stat. another § child 7B-1111(a)(9) were lacked a safe home). (respondent’s involuntarily parental terminated and rights to respondent After a hearing, the trial court entered an order on 29 October 2013 terminating respondent’s parental rights to Ann’s half-siblings. On 6 November 2013, the trial court entered an order which concluded that all of the grounds for termination alleged by DSS with respect to Ann existed and determined that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in Ann’s best interests. Respondent appeals. II. Permanency Planning Order Respondent argues that the trial court erred by ordering DSS to cease reunification efforts. We disagree. In any order placing a juvenile in the custody or placement responsibility of a county department of social services, . . . the court may direct that reasonable efforts to eliminate the need for placement of the juvenile shall not be required or shall cease if the court makes written findings of fact that: (1) Such efforts clearly would be futile or would be inconsistent with the juvenile’s health, safety, and need for a safe, permanent home within a reasonable period of time[.] N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B–507(b) (2013). “This Court reviews an order that ceases reunification efforts to determine whether the -5trial court made appropriate findings, whether the findings are based upon credible evidence, whether the findings of fact support the trial court’s conclusions, and whether the trial court abused its discretion with respect to disposition.” In re C.M., 183 N.C. App. 207, 213, 644 S.E.2d 588, 594 (2007). Respondent first contends that the trial court erred by making insufficient findings to support its rejection of placing the children with the aunt in Florida. However, “[p]lacement of a juvenile with a relative outside of this State must be in accordance Children.” with the Interstate Compact on the Placement N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-903(a)(2)(c) (2013). of Pursuant to the ICPC, a juvenile cannot be placed with an out-of-state relative until “the receiving state shall notify the sending agency, in writing, to the effect that the proposed placement does not appear to be contrary to the interests of the child.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-3800, Article III(d) (2013). In the instant case, the Florida Department of Children and Families (“DCF”) did not approve of the children’s placement with the aunt. DCF informed DSS via letter that it had conducted a home study of the aunt pursuant to the ICPC request. The home study, which was admitted into evidence at the permanency planning hearing, noted concerns regarding financial -6stability and lack of space and concluded that the agency’s “recommendation is that the children not [be] placed in this home and we are denying foster home licensing.” Based upon this evidence, the trial court found that “[a] home study of [the aunt] through ICPC was conducted in 2011. It was denied because of financial concerns and lack of space in the home.” The court concluded that it was not in the children’s best interests to be placed with the aunt due to the denial of the home study, as well as the fact that the concerns identified in the denial were still present. supported by The competent trial court’s evidence from findings, the which permanency were planning hearing, show that it considered whether placement with the aunt was suitable based upon the evidence at the hearing, and it properly concluded appropriate. that placement with the aunt was not This argument is overruled. Respondent next argues the trial court did not make proper findings of fact pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-907(b) (2011).2 We disagree. “[I]f a juvenile is not returned home at the conclusion of a permanency planning hearing, the trial court must consider 2 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-907 was in effect when the court held its permanency planning hearing in March 2013; however, this section was repealed and replaced by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1 (2013) effective 1 October 2013. -7certain specified criteria and “make written findings regarding those that are relevant.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-907(b). These criteria include whether custody with a relative or some other suitable person responsibilities should that be should established, remain the with the rights and parents, and whether the children should remain in their current placement or be placed in another permanent living arrangement. Stat. § 7B-907(b)(2) and (4) (2011). trial court complied with these N.C. Gen. In the instant case, the statutory requirements by finding: (1) legal guardianship or custody with a relative or some other suitable person should not be established at this time because there are no relatives appropriate to serve; (2) placement of the children with the aunt would not be in their best interests; (3) the children should remain in their current placement; (4) custody with DSS was in the best interests of the children; and (5) visitation was no longer in the children’s best interests. These findings were supported by the evidence presented during the permanency planning hearing. This argument is overruled. Finally, findings were respondent contends insufficient reunification efforts. to that support the the trial court’s cessation of -8The trial court’s findings and the evidence at the hearing demonstrate that (1) respondent’s Child Abuse Potential Inventory test revealed a high probability of physical abuse in the home reoccurring in the next six months to a year; (2) respondent which continued showed how to minimize seriously the the abuse children despite were pictures injured; (3) respondent’s prognosis for improvement of parenting abilities was guarded; and (4) respondent’s inability to adjust her thinking and expectations to appropriately parent, all of which would not findings be and resolved evidence within the demonstrated immediate that future. respondent These would be unable to provide a safe, permanent home for the children within a reasonable amount of time. Based upon its findings and the evidence presented at the hearing, the trial court did not abuse its discretion cease. in that reunification efforts should This argument is overruled. III. Respondent that ordering grounds Termination of Parental Rights contends existed to the trial terminate court her erred parental in concluding rights. We disagree. “The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases is whether the findings of fact are supported by clear, -9cogent and convincing evidence and whether these findings, in turn, support the conclusions of law. We then consider, based on the grounds found for termination, whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding termination to be in the best interest of the child.” In re Shepard, 162 N.C. App. 215, 221- 22, 591 S.E.2d 1, 6 (2004) (internal quotations and citations omitted). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(9) provides that a trial court may terminate parental rights upon finding that “[t]he parental rights of the parent with respect to another child of the parent have been terminated involuntarily by a court of competent jurisdiction and the parent lacks the ability or willingness to establish a safe home.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(9) (2013). Thus, termination pursuant to this ground “necessitates findings regarding two separate elements: (1) involuntary termination of parental rights as to another child, unwillingness to establish a safe home.” and (2) inability or In re L.A.B., 178 N.C. App. 295, 299, 631 S.E.2d 61, 64 (2006). Respondent does not dispute that she had her parental rights involuntarily terminated with respect to another child by a court of competent jurisdiction. Rather, respondent challenges the court’s conclusion that she was unable to provide -10a safe home. not at A safe home is “[a] home in which the juvenile is substantial neglect.” risk of physical or emotional N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(19) (2013). abuse or Respondent argues that the court did not take into account her current circumstances, which include her separation from her husband and compliance with her case plan. The trial respondent’s court’s progress insufficient. completed findings the The tasks but trial in indicate determined court her found case plan separated” from the stepfather. that it the progress was that respondent had and had considered “physically The findings, however, also show: (1) respondent denied domestic violence occurred between her and the stepfather despite the stepfather admitting the acts; (2) respondent continues to believe that Ann was not in danger in the stepfather’s care despite his plea of no contest to felony child abuse in August 2011; (3) respondent believes that the stepfather’s discipline of Joy was appropriate because she was not seriously injured; and (4) respondent blames DSS for the minor children’s behaviors and mental health issues. court further respondent, found there was that no despite the significant services change in utilized The by respondent’s -11understanding of the problems that led to the removal of Ann and her half-siblings. These findings termination are hearing. supported Respondent by evidence testified that from the the children were not in danger while in her or the stepfather’s care; that the children’s injuries were not serious; that her children’s behavior was “fine” until they went into foster care; and that the stepfather’s yelling and hitting was not a problem because he did not do it often. that while acknowledge domestic working the violence children’s In addition, a social worker testified with the seriousness between behavioral of her problems family, the and respondent children’s the before did not abuse, the stepfather, entering or foster her care. Finally, Dr. Sansbury, who evaluated respondent in October 2010, September 2011, and December 2012, testified that respondent can be impulsive, excitable, and has trouble providing structure, which can further significantly testified affect “[respondent] her ability continues to to parent. score He extremely high on [the rigidity] scale, so there’s been no shifting of attitude [] or adjustment of her expectations for her children.” During his interview of respondent, she “continued to be in -12denial” regarding the incident between Joy and the stepfather, and she told Dr. Sansbury, “we were once the perfect family.” This evidence fully supported the trial court’s finding that respondent lacked the ability to establish a safe home for Ann. Therefore, the trial court properly concluded grounds existed to terminate respondent’s rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(9). Since we have concluded that the trial court properly terminated respondent’s rights on this ground, it is unnecessary to address her grounds for termination. arguments regarding the remaining See In re Pierce, 67 N.C. App. 257, 261, 312 S.E.2d 900, 903 (1984) (a finding of one statutory ground is rights). sufficient to support the termination of parental This argument is overruled. IV. Conclusion The trial court’s order ceasing reunification was supported by adequate supported should be 1111(a)(9). findings its of conclusion terminated fact. that pursuant The trial respondent’s to N.C. court’s parental Gen. The trial court’s orders are affirmed. Affirmed. Judges STEELMAN and McCULLOUGH concur. Report per Rule 30(e). Stat. findings rights § 7B-
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