In re L.G

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An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. NO. COA13-875 NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS Filed: 3 December 2013 IN THE MATTER OF: Burke County Nos. 11 J 157-58 L.G. R.G. Appeal by respondent from judgment entered 5 July 2013 Judge Robert M. Brady in District Court, Burke County. by Heard in the Court of Appeals 28 October 2013. R. Kirk Randleman, for petitioner-appellee Department of Social Services. Burke County Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein LLP, by Thomas N. Griffin III, for guardian ad litem. Peter Wood for respondent-appellant. STROUD, Judge. Respondent terminating his appeals parental from the rights district to his court s judgment children. For the following reasons, we affirm. I. On 3 August 2011, Burke Background County Department of Social -2Services ( DSS ) filed a petition alleging that Luke and Roger,1 the children, were neglected. DSS alleged: The family resides in a mobile home that is in a state of serious disrepair. There are holes in the floor. The residence is also filthy, cluttered and roach-infested. There are roaches throughout, including in the refrigerator. . . . The juveniles have no place to sleep due to the clutter. On 7/29/2011, the parents became involved in a physical altercation wherein [the mother] struck [respondent] and was charge[d] with simple assault. (Original in all caps.) At a hearing held in September of 2011, respondent s and the children s mother s attorneys advised the court that they would not resist a finding that the allegations contained in the petition therefore were dependent. were true and that the juveniles On 29 September 2011, the district court found the facts alleged by DSS in its petition and entered an adjudication of dependency as to both juveniles; as to the disposition the trial court noted that DSS was conducting home studies of the homes of several relatives[.] Ultimately in the 29 September 2011 order, the trial court continued custody of the children with DSS and approved of the children s existing foster care placement. 1 Pseudonyms will be used protect the identity of the minors involved. -3On 30 August 2012, the district court found that due to respondent s extremely difficult to treat personality disorder, as well as his substance abuse issues and extensive history of involvement appropriately parenting with [DSS,] he the juveniles. was not The capable district of court further found that [n]o appropriate relatives are known for possible placement of the juveniles[,] and ultimately established a permanent plan of adoption for the children and directed DSS to take all steps necessary to achieve the plan. On 18 September 2012, the district court amended its 30 August 2012 order to require respondent to obtain psychiatric and parenting evaluations. On 1 October respondent s and 2012, the DSS filed children s a motion mother s to terminate parental rights alleging as grounds for termination, inter alia, (1) willful failure to pay a reasonable portion of the children s cost of care in pursuant the six to North months that Carolina preceded General the motion s Statute § filing 7B-1111(a)(3) (2011) and (2) dependency pursuant to North Carolina General Statute § 7B-1111(a)(6) (2011). In support of its claim pursuant to North Carolina General Statute ss 7B-1111(a)(3), DSS alleged the following: -4Respondent father claims to be gainfully employed in the landscaping field but refuses to provide the Department with documentation on which to base a reasonable child support order. Respondent father is currently under a minimal child support order of $50.00 per month. Although Respondent father is currently paying his child support order on time, $50.00 per month is an unreasonable portion of the total cost of care for the minor children. In support of its claim pursuant to North Carolina General Statute § 7B-1111(a)(6), DSS alleged that respondent s mental illness, diagnosed as personality disorder with borderline features, rendered him incapable of caring for his children, as follows: These psychiatric issues have resulted in his hospitalizations previously; his failure to address his parenting issues; and his previous suicidal thoughts and behaviors. . . . Respondent father has elevated scores in the areas of anxiety, mania, paranoia and antisocial behavior. Respondent father lacks an understanding of how his choices and actions impact the minor children. Respondent father continues to deny any problems with his parenting skills/style. Respondent father lacks an appropriate alternative childcare arrangement. In April terminate of 2013, parental the trial rights, on court 5 heard July 2013 DSS s it judgment terminating respondent s parental rights both North Carolina General Statute § motion entered to its pursuant to 7B-1111(3) and (6). -5Respondent appeals. II. Respondent terminating Termination of Parental Rights challenges his parental the rights. district court s Respondent order challenges both grounds for termination as found by the trial court, but since only one ground is necessary to support a termination of parental rights, we will address only respondent s argument as to dependency. In re B.S.D.S., 163 N.C. App. 540, 546, 594 S.E.2d 89, 93-94 (2004) ( Having concluded that at least one ground for termination of parental rights existed, we need not address the additional ground of neglect found by the trial court ). Although respondent makes some argument regarding some of the findings of fact regarding the dependency, his primary argument is that DSS failed to prove and the trial court failed to make a finding of alternative child care. fact regarding a lack of appropriate We disagree. The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases is whether the findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and whether these findings, in turn, support the conclusions of law. Findings of fact supported by competent evidence are binding on appeal even though there may be evidence to the contrary. However, the trial court s conclusions of law are fully reviewable de novo by the appellate court. -6- In re D.T.L., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 722 S.E.2d 516, 517 (2012) (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). North Carolina General Statute § 7B-1111(a)(6) allows termination of parental rights if the parent is incapable of providing for the proper care and supervision of the juvenile, such that meaning the juvenile is of G.S. 7B-101, probability that such foreseeable future. a and dependent that incapability juvenile there will is within a the reasonable continue for the N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(6) (2011). A dependent juvenile is one in need of assistance or placement because the responsible juvenile for the has no juvenile s parent, care guardian, or or supervision custodian or whose parent, guardian, or custodian is unable to provide for the care or supervision and lacks an appropriate alternative child care arrangement. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(9) (2011). Under this definition, the trial court must address both (1) the parent s ability to provide care or supervision, and (2) the availability to the parent of alternative child care arrangements. In re P.M., 169 N.C. App. 423, 427, 610 S.E.2d 403, 406 (2005). A social worker testified as to respondent s mental health issues and that there was no alternative child care available. -7The district regarding court then respondent s made extensive mental health findings issue of fact rendering respondent incapable of providing care for the minor children and also found that DSS had proven the allegations in Paragraph 11 of the Motion to Terminate Parental Rights[.] Paragraph 11 of the motion to terminate parental rights specifically alleged that that Respondent father lacks an appropriate alternative childcare arrangement. The judgment would be more clear if it addressed this finding directly by simply making the finding of the lack of an alternate child care arrangement instead of referring to the motion, but the judgment did specifically refer to the appropriate allegation in the motion and found that DSS had proven this fact. The finding of fact regarding alternative childcare is supported by the evidence and there is no indication that the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proof on this issue to respondent. We conclude that the evidence supported the findings of fact which in turn supported the conclusion of law that there were grounds respondent s parental rights based on dependency. to terminate This argument is overruled. III. Conclusion As we conclude that the district court could properly -8terminate respondent s parental rights on dependency, we affirm. AFFIRMED. Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge GEER concur. Report per Rule 30(e). the ground of

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