Atkinson v. Reikowsy
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An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. NO. COA13-526 NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS Filed: 5 November 2013 JUSTIN ATKINSON, Plaintiff, v. Surry County No. 11 CVS 575 MICHAEL REIKOWSKY, Defendant. Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 20 July 2012 and order entered 21 December 2012 by Judge Ronald E. Spivey in Surry County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 25 September 2013. Campbell Law Group, P.L.L.C., by Susan Curtis Campbell and Hugh B. Campbell, III, for plaintiff. Finger, Roemer, Brown Brown, for defendant. & Mariani, L.L.P., by Andrew G. Elmore, Judge. In December 2008, Michael Reikowsky Atkinson (plaintiff) were involved (defendant) and Justin in the residence at 317 N. Bridge Street in Elkin. poor condition and required extensive purchase of a The house was in repairs. The parties subsequently agreed that plaintiff would live in the house rent -2free in exchange for renovating the residence. Although the agreement was silent as to how the cost of materials needed for the renovations would be paid, defendant reimbursed plaintiff for costs incurred from January 2009 until May 2009 based on receipts submitted by plaintiff to defendant. Thereafter, in October 2009, plaintiff offered to pay for materials if defendant would reimburse him when the house sold. Plaintiff asked defendant to memorialize the agreement in writing, but defendant declined to sign a contract. Instead, defendant agreed to the terms with a handshake. 2009 until November 2010, plaintiff paid out-of-pocket physical materials used to renovate the house. 2010, plaintiff made specific contract, unable money to from Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint dated 4 May of was obtain anything. breach but On 5 November for alleging costs to for defendant 2011, incurred attempts From October quasi-contract, retrieve quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment. The parties waived their rights to a jury trial, and on 18 July 2012, Judge Ronald E. Spivey heard this matter in a bench trial. The trial court denied defendant s motion for a directed verdict at the close of plaintiff s evidence. Defendant renewed his motion at the close of all the evidence, and the trial court -3denied his motion a second time. The trial court entered judgment, awarding plaintiff $9,519.39 for unjust enrichment. On 30 July 2012, defendant filed a post-trial motion to dismiss pursuant to N.C.R. Civ. P. 41(b), which was also denied by the trial court in a final order entered 21 December 2012. I. Analysis a.) Post-Trial Motion to Dismiss Defendant denying his first argues post-trial that motion to the trial dismiss court because erred it in allowed plaintiff to recover under a claim of unjust enrichment even though an defendant. express contract existed between plaintiff and We disagree. The standard of review for a Rule 41(b) dismissal is (1) whether the findings of fact by the trial court are supported by competent evidence, and (2) whether the findings of fact support the trial court s conclusions of law and its judgment. Cohen v. McLawhorn, 208 N.C. App. 492, 498, 704 S.E.2d 519, 524 (2010) (citation and quotation omitted). Where findings of fact are not disputed on appeal, they are deemed to be supported by competent evidence and are binding on appeal. State v. McLamb, 186 N.C. App. 124, 125, 649 S.E.2d 902, 903 (2007), writ denied, review denied, 362 N.C. 368, 663 S.E.2d 433 (2008) (citation and -4quotation omitted). However, [c]onclusions of law are reviewed de novo and are subject to full review. State v. Biber, 365 N.C. 162, 168, 712 S.E.2d 874, 878 (2011); see also Carolina Power & Light Co. v. City of Asheville, 358 N.C. 512, 517, 597 S.E.2d 717, 721 (2004) ( Conclusions of law drawn by the trial court from its findings of fact are reviewable de novo on appeal. ). Unjust enrichment is based upon the equitable principle that a person should not be permitted to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another. Hinson v. United Fin. Servs., Inc., 123 N.C. App. 469, 473, 473 S.E.2d 382, 385 (1996) (citation and quotation omitted). A claim under this theory is not rooted in tort or contract law but is described as a claim in quasi contract or a contract quotation omitted). actual contract in law. Id. (citation and The law will not imply a contract where an exists dispute at issue. implied between parties and it governs the Booe v. Shadrick, 322 N.C. 567, 570, 369 S.E.2d 554, 556 (1988) (citation omitted). Thus, the theory of unjust enrichment does not operate to alter the terms of a enforceable contract. Rongotes v. Pridemore, 88 N.C. App. 363, 368, 363 S.E.2d 221, 224 (1988). However, the existing contract must cover the whole subject matter of the dispute to preclude -5an unjust enrichment claim. Vetco Concrete Co. v. Troy Lumber Co., 256 N.C. 709, 714, 124 S.E.2d 905, 908 (1962). In the case sub judice, the undisputed facts show that the January 2009 oral contract between the parties was valid. The oral contract did not address who was responsible for paying the costs of the physical materials. It merely allowed plaintiff to live in the house rent free in exchange for making repairs and improvements to the property. In October 2009, plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to modify the oral contract, or in the alternative, create a new contract whereby he would bear the cost of materials, and defendant defendant sold the property. would reimburse him once Nevertheless, from October 2009 until November 2010, plaintiff acquired materials with his own funds to renovate the property with defendant s knowledge, and at no time plaintiff did defendant unsuccessfully stop plaintiff s attempted to activity. recoup money When from defendant in November 2010 for costs incurred, defendant refused to pay. Defendant clearly obtained a benefit from plaintiff s purchases of materials due to the renovations of the property, and the oral contract did not address the subject matter of the conflict between the parties regarding how the materials costs would be paid. Thus, the trial court did not err in denying -6defendant s post-trial motion to dismiss plaintiff s claim for unjust enrichment. See Atl. Coast Line R. Co. v. State Highway Comm'n, 268 N.C. 92, 95-96, 150 S.E.2d 70, 73 (1966) (citations omitted) (stating that the doctrine of unjust enrichment is applicable if services are rendered and expenditures made by one party to or for the benefit of another, without an express contract to pay[.] See also Vetco Concrete Co. and Booe, supra. b.) Standard for measuring Damages Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by using an incorrect standard to measure plaintiff s damages. We disagree. The standard of review on appeal from a judgment entered after a non-jury trial is whether there is competent evidence to support the trial court s findings of fact and whether the findings support the conclusions of law and ensuing judgment. Cartin v. Harrison, 151 N.C. App. 697, 699, 567 S.E.2d 174, 176 (quoting Sessler v. Marsh, 144 N.C. App. 623, 628, 551 S.E.2d 160, 163 (2001)), disc. review denied, 356 N.C. 434, 572 S.E.2d 428 (2002). The trial court s award of damages at a bench trial is a matter within its sound discretion, and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Helms v. Schultze, 161 N.C. App. 404, 414, 588 S.E.2d 524, 530 (2003) (citation omitted). Under this standard, a trial court s decision will be upheld -7 unless it is manifestly unsupported by reason. Crutchfield v. Crutchfield, 132 N.C. App. 193, 195, 511 S.E.2d 31, 34 (1999) (quoting White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985)). Under an implied contract, damages are measured by the reasonable value of the services accepted and appropriated by the defendant. Harrell v. W. B. Lloyd Const. Co., 41 N.C. App. 593, 595, 255 S.E.2d 280, 282 (1979) aff'd, 300 N.C. 353, 266 S.E.2d 626 (1980) (citations omitted). The person providing services is entitled to the value of what they are reasonably worth, based on the time and labor expended, skill, knowledge and experience involved, and other attendant circumstances, rather than on the use to be made of the result or the benefit to the person for whom the services are rendered. Turner v. Marsh Furniture Co., 217 N.C. 695, 697, 9 S.E.2d 379, 380 (1940) (citations omitted). While an invoice or bill by itself is not sufficient evidence to support an award for damages as to the reasonable value of services, testimony about what was billed for the materials and labor and the evidence of a payment for a part of it at the billed rate is sufficient. 571, 369 S.E.2d at 556. Booe, 322 N.C. at -8In Booe, the plaintiff incurred expenses materials related to construction projects. initially re-paid subsequently the stopped plaintiff even though for the for Id. those plaintiff labor and The defendant costs, but continued to furnish a substantial quantity of materials and labor after the last payment by the defendants. Id. testified as to the amount of The plaintiff s bookkeeper money paid and owed by the defendants and provided the trial court with the plaintiff's bill and the previous payment to the plaintiff in accordance with the measure bill. the plaintiff. Id. reasonable This evidence value of was held services sufficient provided by to the Id. Similarly, in the case sub judice, plaintiff testified that he paid for materials out-of-pocket to make repairs and defendant initially reimbursed him from the receipts plaintiff provided. The trial court found that [p]laintiff diligently retained the actual receipts for materials and products that were purchased and used in the renovation[.] When defendant stopped making payments in October 2009, plaintiff continued to maintain records to document the amount of money still owed to him by defendant. Plaintiff testified that part of those costs included charges for individuals hired by plaintiff to sand the -9floors, connect the air-conditioning, and perform carpentry work. Thus, measuring amount the trial damages billed to court because the did it not err considered defendant[]. in its more Id. standard than See just also for the Envtl. Landscape Design Specialist v. Shields, 75 N.C. App. 304, 307, 330 S.E.2d 627, 629 (1985) (holding evidence sufficient for the jury to consider damages where, in addition to plaintiff s bill, there was evidence . . . that the landscaper who eventually landscaped defendants property also charged $30.00 per hour. ). c.) Unjust Enrichment in the Amount of $9,519.39 Defendant also avers that the trial court s findings of fact does not support its legal conclusion awarding plaintiff $9,519.39 in damages for unjust enrichment. We agree. Here, the trial court s order was devoid of any findings of fact that supported its unjust enrichment award of $9,519.39. The order found that [p]laintiff commenced purchasing materials used to improve the residence, and the Defendant received the value of these materials. However, the trial court failed to disclose the specific value of the materials. The trial court referenced Plaintiff s Exhibit 1 as support for its award of damages, but the expenditures listed in that exhibit amounted to -10$14,320.87. Plaintiff conceded at trial that not all of Exhibit 1 should be considered in his unjust enrichment claim because the amount of damages he requested was only $11,110.39. These aforementioned dollar trial court s award. At no time did the trial court explain the basis amounts do not comport with the for the amount of damages in its order, and neither can any support be complaint. found from testimony, exhibits, or plaintiff s Thus, the trial court erred because its findings of fact do not support its conclusion of law awarding $9,519.39 to plaintiff. d.) Plaintiff s Expectation to be Reimbursed On his next issue on appeal, defendant argues trial court s conclusion plaintiff findings that of defendant expected to be fact knew repaid do or for that the not support its legal should have known that expenditures. We his disagree. In support of its legal conclusion, the trial court found that: 1.) plaintiff would submit the costs of the acquired items to the Defendant, who would then reimburse the Plaintiff for his expenditures[;] 2.) plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to create an agreement with defendant to pay for physical materials in exchange for reimbursement when defendant sold the -11property; and 3.) on 5 November 2010, plaintiff tried to obtain money from defendant for renovations and costs. Each of these findings shows that defendant was aware of plaintiff s multiple efforts to receive payment over an extended period of time for the cost of materials. The trial court also found that the property needed extensive repairs . . . to make the residence habitable[.] should have Given the poor state of the property, defendant reimbursement known renovation. that plaintiff would expect the extensive cost of for some materials form of during Accordingly, the trial court did not err in its conclusion of law that defendant knew or should have known that plaintiff expected to be re-paid. e.) Dates of Unjust Enrichment Defendant avers that the trial court s findings of fact does not support its conclusion of law that he was unjustly enriched beginning in May 2009. We agree. The trial court concluded that the Defendant ha[d] been unjustly enriched by the expenditures of the Plaintiff to renovate or make repairs to the residence between the dates of May 2009 findings and November provide no 2010[.] support for However, the unreimbursed trial court s expenditures May, June, July, August, or September of 2009. in Rather, the -12trial court s own findings of fact decree [t]hat in October of 2009 . . . Plaintiff commenced purchasing materials used to improve the residence, and the Defendant received the value of these materials. scintilla incurred of in testimony Furthermore, evidence June, focused at July, on plaintiff trial related August, and expenditures agreement in October of 09[.] did to not claimed September made offer after expenses 2009. the one His handshake Importantly, the trial court s findings reflect plaintiff s testimony that he was repaid by defendant for costs incurred from January 2009 through May 2009, and that those costs were not part of his claim. Even plaintiff s Exhibit 1, which was relied upon by the trial court in its award of damages, noted a charge for $130.98 in May 2009 (which is not part of plaintiff s claim), but the next listed expense does not begin until October 2009. Thus, the trial court erred because its findings of fact do not support its conclusion of law that defendant was unjustly enriched between May 2009 and October 2009. II. Conclusion In sum, the trial court did not err in: 1.) denying defendant s post-trial motion to dismiss; 2.) its standard for measuring damages; and 3.) concluding that defendant knew or had -13reason to know that plaintiff would expect repayment. Thus, we affirm those issues on appeal. However, the trial court erred in concluding that defendant was unjustly enriched in the amount of $9,519.39 between May 2009 and supported November by the 2010. trial These court s conclusions findings of of law fact. are not Thus, we reverse and remand for further findings as to the amount of damages and the dates defendant was unjustly enriched. Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part. Judges CALABRIA and STEPHENS concur. Report per Rule 30(e).
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