State v. Walton
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An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of A p p e l l a t e P r o c e d u r e . NO. COA13-203 NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS Filed: 15 October 2013 STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. Mecklenburg County Nos. 10 CRS 058159, 240514 17, 240519 LEAH ANNE WALTON, Defendant. Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 15 August 2012 by Judge Eric L. Levinson in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 September 2013. Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Tammera S. Hill, Assistant Attorney General, for the State. Glover & Petersen, P.A., by James R. Glover and Ann B. Petersen, for defendant-appellant. MARTIN, Chief Judge. Defendant, Leah Anne Walton, was charged with assault with a deadly weapon possession of possession of provisions of inflicting marijuana, drug a serious schedule paraphernalia; N.C.G.S. ยง injury; VI controlled violation 20-313; manslaughter; and of substance; registration reckless driving. -2Defendant was found guilty of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury; involuntary manslaughter; misdemeanor possession of marijuana; possession of drug paraphernalia; operating a vehicle with no insurance; and reckless driving. The trial charge. court arrested judgment on the reckless driving She appeals from the judgments entered upon the other verdicts. At trial, evidence tended to show that on 22 August 2010, Susan Karabulut and Lisa McIe were employees of the White Oak Manor nursing home located on the east side of Craig Street in Charlotte. At approximately 7:50 a.m., they outside on the curb taking a break from work. were sitting Defendant was driving her automobile in a southerly direction on Craig Street in the right-hand, or west, lane. Defendant s automobile crossed into the north bound, or east, lane and then onto the sidewalk on the east side of Craig Street, striking both Ms. Karabulut and Ms. McIe and dragging them under the car, which came to rest on the west side of Craig Street. Ms. Karabulut was pronounced dead at the scene; Ms. McIe suffered multiple injuries requiring a lengthy hospitalization and extensive rehabilitation, resulting in permanent disability. Defendant told the investigating officer that she had reached into the floorboard to retrieve her pocketbook to get -3her cigarettes when she ran across the roadway and struck Ms. Karabulut and Ms. McIe. She later gave a taped interview in which she said she was employed at Earth Fare in Charlotte, which was a 25-30 minute drive from her apartment. She was supposed to be at work at 8:00 a.m. on 22 August, and did not wake up until 7:30 a.m. a.m. She left her apartment at about 7:45 Craig Street was a part of her route to work, and she had previously seen nursing home employees, including Ms. Karabulut and Ms. McIe, and others on Craig Street in front of White Oak Manor. After she turned onto Craig Street she reached to pick up her purse and look for a cigarette, taking her eyes off the road. She felt a hard bump and realized that she was on the wrong side of the road. She did not know that she had hit anyone until she regained control of her car and stopped. A consensual blood test showed that defendant had no alcohol in her blood, but did have metabolites of marijuana and cocaine, diazepam and hydrocodone, which are controlled substances, and citalopram, which is an anti-anxiety medication. Evidence showed that she had taken the anti-anxiety medication after the accident. A pill bottle containing marijuana was found car. in defendant s Defendant admitted that she had shared a gram of cocaine with her boyfriend and another person two days prior to the accident and, on the night before the -4accident, had taken a Xanax pill, drank some beers, and smoked some marijuana. testified that The officers defendant did investigating not appear, the however, accident to be impaired. Other evidence tended to show that the posted speed limit on Craig Street was 30 miles per hour and that the speed of defendant s vehicle when she crossed the center of Craig Street and hit the opposite curb was estimated to have been between 41 and 44 miles per hour. _________________________ On appeal, defendant challenges the trial court s denial of her motion to dismiss the charges of involuntary manslaughter and assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury. When a defendant makes a motion to dismiss, the question before a trial court is whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense included therein, and (2) of defendant s being the perpetrator of such offense. State v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373, 378, 526 S.E.2d 451, 455 (quoting State v. Barnes, 334 N.C. 67, 75, 430 S.E.2d 914, 918 (1993)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 890, 148 L. Ed. 2d 150 (2000). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78 79, -5265 S.E.2d substantial 164, 169 evidence, (1980). a trial To determine court considers if there all is admitted evidence in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving any contradictions in its favor. State v. Rose, 339 N.C. 172, 192, 451 S.E.2d 32, 211, 223 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1135, 132 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1995). We review a trial court s denial of a motion to dismiss de novo. State v. Smith, 186 N.C. App. 57, 62, 650 S.E.2d 29, 33 (2007). Defendant first argues that the State failed to provide substantial evidence to support a finding of culpable negligence necessary to convict her of involuntary manslaughter. We find her argument to be without merit. Involuntary manslaughter is an unlawful killing of a person in the absence of malice, premeditation, deliberation, intent to kill, and intent to inflict serious bodily injury. Greene, 314 N.C. 649, 651, 336 S.E.2d 87, 89 (1985). may prove involuntary manslaughter by unlawful killing was the result of: State v. The State establishing that an (1) an unlawful act not amounting to a felony, or (2) culpably negligent conduct. Id. at 651 52, 336 S.E.2d at 89. Culpable negligence is such recklessness or carelessness, proximately resulting in injury or death, as imports a -6thoughtless disregard of consequences or a heedless indifference to the safety and rights of others. State v. Colson, 262 N.C. 506, 519, 138 S.E.2d 121, 130 (1964) (quoting State v. Cope, 204 N.C. 28, 30, 167 S.E. 456, 458 (1933)). culpable negligence if a defendant A court can find willfully, intentionally violates a safety statute. wantonly, or Id. (quoting State v. Hancock, 248 N.C. 432, 435, 103 S.E.2d 491, 494 (1958)). If a defendant inadvertently or unintentionally violates a statute, to constitute accompanied culpable by a negligence, reckless that disregard violation for a must be foreseeable consequence of a dangerous nature, amounting altogether to a thoughtless disregard of consequences indifference to the safety of others. or of heedless Id. (quoting Hancock, 248 N.C. at 435, 103 S.E.2d at 494). When we consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, there is substantial evidence that defendant acted with thoughtless disregard or indifference towards the safety of others. Defendant was driving approximately 41 miles per hour when she knew the speed limit was 30 miles per hour and the suggested speed limit for the area where the accident occurred was 25 miles per hour. Furthermore, she was not paying proper attention to her driving in an area she knew to be frequented by pedestrians, averting her eyes from the road in order to reach -7for her pocketbook and look for a cigarette. She was driving on the wrong side of the street and did not apply her brakes until after she felt a hard bump and struck the victims. We conclude there was sufficient evidence that a reasonable mind could accept to support the conclusion that defendant behaved in a culpably negligent manner, and the motion was properly denied. Next, defendant argues that the trial court should have dismissed the assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury charge because the State failed to prove the element of intent. We likewise find this argument unpersuasive. Assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury requires actual intent to inflict injury; however, intent may be implied through the presence of culpable negligence. State v. Jones, 353 N.C. 159, 164 65, 538 S.E.2d 917, 923 (2000). As discussed above, culpable negligence is present when a defendant s inadvertent or unintentional violation of a statute is accompanied by a amounting altogether consequences or others. of foreseeable to heedless a dangerous thoughtless indifference to consequence disregard the safety of of Colson, 262 N.C. at 519, 138 S.E.2d at 131 (quoting Hancock, 248 N.C. at 435, 103 S.E.2d at 494). As we have already discussed, there is substantial evidence that defendant acted in a culpably negligent manner, from which -8the intent element of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious properly injury denied may be implied. defendant s motion Therefore, to the dismiss trial the assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury. No Error. Judges GEER and STROUD concur. Report per Rule 30(e). court charge of
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