In re A.H.L

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An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. NO. COA13-172 NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS Filed: 3 September 2013 IN THE MATTER OF: A.H.L. E.C.L. L.R.L. Juveniles Haywood County No. 07 JA 93-95 Appeal by respondents from orders entered 24 September 2012 and 26 November 2012 by Judge Monica H. Leslie in Haywood County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 June 2013. Rachael J. Hawes for Haywood County Department of Social Services. J. Thomas Diepenbrock for respondent-mother. Michael E. Casterline for respondent-father. Administrative Office of the Courts, by Tawanda N. Foster, for guardian ad litem. ERVIN, Judge. Respondent-Father Scott L. and Respondent-Mother Elizabeth L. appeal from orders adjudicating their minor children, A.H.L., -2E.C.L., L.R.L.,1 and juveniles and involving legal be adopting to determinations a abused, allege hear that for a the trial that were dependent permanent children. petition; children and and the that the the neglected, disposition guardianship Respondent-Parents jurisdiction to plan lacked trial abused, appeal, court the On court s neglected, and dependent juveniles lacked adequate support in the trial court s findings of fact; that the trial court erred by failing to make the findings necessary to support a decision to authorize DSS to cease attempting Parents; and stemming from to that the reunite the trial court the breach of an children with committed alleged Respondent- numerous agreement errors between Respondent-Parents and the Haywood County Department of Social Services. After careful consideration of Respondent-Parents challenges to the trial court s orders in light of the record and the orders applicable should, determination law, with that we the the conclude exception children were that of the the abused trial trial court s court s juveniles, be affirmed. I. Factual Background 1 The pseudonyms Allison, Elsie, and Lucas are used throughout the remainder of this opinion for ease of reading and to protect the juveniles privacy. -3On 14 June 2007, DSS filed juvenile petitions alleging that the children August were 2007, adjudicating dependent neglected Judge Allison, and Bradley B. Elsie, juveniles. On dependent Letts and 22 Lucas October juveniles. entered to 2008, be an On order neglected Judge 2 Richard and K. Walker entered an order relieving DSS of the responsibility for making further efforts to reunify the children with RespondentParents. After obtaining a favorable home study pursuant to the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children, Judge Richlyn D. Holt entered an order on 15 April 2009 awarding legal guardianship to the children s adult half-sister, Beth Nelson, who resided in Texas. The Haywood County District Court held review hearings through 13 October 2009, a period during which Texas Child Protective Services monitored the condition of the children while they lived in Ms. Nelson s home. 2010, the court entered an order waiv[ing] On 22 April further review hearings in this matter, pursuant to N.C. [Gen. Stat. §] 7B906(b), unless a party to this action files a [m]otion for review. On 28 June 2012, DSS filed new petitions alleging that Allison, Elsie, and Lucas were abused, neglected, and dependent juveniles after learning that they were living with their former foster parents in Haywood County. In addition, DSS alleged that -4Texas CPS had failed to inform DSS that Ms. Nelson had returned the children to Respondent-Parents in April 2010; that Texas CPS had obtained custody of the children after filing a juvenile petition in Texas on 9 August 2010; and that a Texas court had appointed Respondent-Parents as the children s Joint Managing Conservators, with all regular rights available to custodial parents, on 3 October 2011. After the children ran away from Respondent-Parents home on 19 April 2012, Texas CPS approached the Haywood County foster parents with a request that they allow the children to live with them while Respondent-Parents sought employment in Florida. Despite the fact that the foster parents understood that this arrangement was a temporary one, the Texas court found that permanency had been achieved by placing the children with their former foster parents. According to DSS, the children had been living with their former foster parents since early May 2012. Although Respondent-Parents agreed to this placement in a meeting with Texas CPS held on 25 April 2012, Texas CPS did not inform ICPC of this plan, did not request ICPC services or approval, and did not inform [DSS]. At the time DSS filed the juvenile petitions, Respondent-Father was staying in a motel in Haywood Mother s whereabouts were unknown. County while Respondent- -5After a hearing held on 4 September 2012, the trial court entered an order on 24 September 2012 adjudicating the children to be abused, neglected, and dependent juveniles. The trial court continued the dispositional hearing until October 2012, at which time hearing planning a was combined to review be dispositional held. order In entered a and permanency disposition 26 November and 2012 planning permanency following a hearing held on 30 October 2012, the trial court concluded that it had continuing jurisdiction in this matter after determining that Respondent-Parents had received custody of the children [in Texas] in violation of valid North Carolina Orders; that, since it had relieved DSS of any obligation to attempt to reunify the children with Respondent-Parents in 2008, guardianship remained the permanent plan for the children; and that the children s Haywood County foster parents should serve as the children s guardians. Respondent-Parents noted appeals to this Court from the trial court s orders. II. Legal Analysis A. Appealability As an initial matter, we must address the adequacy of Respondent-Mother s notice of appeal from the 24 September 2012 adjudication order and the 26 permanency planning review order. November 2012 disposition and Respondent-Mother s notice of -6appeal provided, in relevant part, that she was appealing from the Review Order relieving DSS of further reasonable efforts and changing to a permanent plan of legal guardianship that was filed on November 26, 2012. dismiss Respondent-Mother s DSS has requested that this Court appeal from the adjudication and disposition and permanency planning orders on the ground that her notice of appeal failed to designate either the 24 September 2012 adjudication order or the 26 November 2012 disposition and permanency planning order as orders from which her appeal had been taken. Although we agree with DSS contention, in part, we conclude that we should review the issues raised in RespondentMother s brief. According to N.C.R. App. P. 3(d), a notice of appeal shall designate the judgment or order from which appeal is taken. have previously found that a notice of appeal that We only specified a single order from which an appeal had been noted did not suffice to provide this Court with jurisdiction to review the parent s challenge to a number of different orders. See In re D.R.F., 204 N.C. App. 138, 141, 693 S.E.2d 235, 238 (stating that, [i]n the case sub judice, respondents appeal only the 1 October 2009 disposition order, according to their respective notices of appeal, so that the 7 August 2009 adjudication order remains valid and final, precluding us from address[ing] -7respondents alleged errors as to that order ), disc. review denied, 364 N.C. 616, 705 S.E.2d 358, 359 (2010). given that reference order, Respondent-Mother s whatsoever her notice to the does notice 24 not of September suffice to As a result, appeal 2012 our discretion Respondent-Mother s certiorari in under give N.C.R. App. for the issuance consider her challenge petition order to P. no adjudication this jurisdiction over her challenge to that order. exercise makes Court However, we 21 of to a to allow writ the of trial court s adjudication order. Although she could have designated the 26 November 2012 dispositional and permanency planning order with greater clarity in her notice of appeal, we are able to infer from RespondentMother s notice of appeal that she intended to seek appellate review of that order. Simply put, Respondent-Mother s notice of appeal gives the correct date for the order in question and adequately describes certain of the decisions which are embodied in that order. does not As a result of that fact and the fact that DSS appear to have had any trouble responding to Respondent-Mother s challenges to the 26 November 2012 order, we conclude that Respondent-Mother s notice of appeal was sufficient to give this Court jurisdiction over her challenge to that order. See Chee v. Estes, 117 N.C. App. 450, 452, 451 -8S.E.2d 349, 351 (1994) (holding that, if the appellant made a mistake in designating the judgment intended to be appealed, then the appeal will not be dismissed if the intent to appeal from the judgment can be fairly inferred from the notice and the appellee was not misled by the mistake ). Thus, we will consider Respondent-Mother s challenges to both the 24 September 2012 and 26 November 2012 orders.2 B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 1. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act As an initial matter, Respondent-Parents challenge the trial court s orders on the grounds that the UCCJEA precluded the trial court from modifying the 2011 Texas Respondent-Parents conservators for the children. Respondent-Parents, jurisdiction over the the fact that relationship the between Texas order making According to courts had Respondent-Parents and the children deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to enter the 24 September 2012 adjudication and 26 November 2012 disposition and permanency planning orders. We do not find Respondent-Parents argument persuasive. 2 As DSS notes, however, there is no indication in the record that Respondent-Mother has ever attempted to appeal the original 2008 order allowing DSS to cease making reasonable efforts to reunify the children with Respondent-Parents and changing the permanent plan for the children to guardianship. For that reason, Respondent-Mother has lost the right to challenge the 2008 permanency planning order before this Court. -9 The issue of subject matter jurisdiction may be considered by the court at any time, and may be raised for the first time on appeal. 896-97 In re T.B., 177 N.C. App. 790, 791, 629 S.E.2d 895, (2006). The extent to which a trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of a particular case is a question of law subject to de novo review on appeal. In re K.U.-S.G., 208 N.C. App. 128, 131, 702 S.E.2d 103, 105 (2010). As a result, we will review Respondent-Parents jurisdictional challenge to the trial court s orders using a de novo standard of review. The District Court Division of the General Court of Justice has exclusive, original jurisdiction over any case involving a juvenile who is alleged to be abused, neglected, or dependent. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-200(a). The extent to which a North Carolina court has jurisdiction in an interstate child custody matter is governed by the provisions of the UCCJEA as enacted in North Carolina and the provisions of the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2006), both of which set forth prerequisites. substantially the same jurisdictional Jones v. Whimper, __ N.C. App. __, __, 727 S.E.2d 700, 702 (2012) (quoting Potter v. Potter, 131 N.C. App. 1, 4, 505 S.E.2d 147, 149 (1998)), aff d in part and vacated in part on other grounds, __ N.C. __, 736 S.E.2d 170 (2013). North -10Carolina and Texas have adopted similar versions of the UCCJEA with respect to the matters at issue in this case. Compare N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-101 et seq. with Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 152.101 et seq. (West 2011). The first provision of the UCCJEA, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A201, addresses the jurisdictional child-custody determinations. requirements for initial In re K.U.-S.G., 208 N.C. App. at 132, 702 S.E.2d at 106 (quoting In re J.W.S., 194 N.C. App. 439, 446, 669 S.E.2d 850, 854 (2008)). initial determination determination concerning refers to a the first child-custody particular N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-102(8)). In UCCJEA parlance, the child. Id. (quoting As we read the record, the Haywood County District Court clearly had jurisdiction to make an initial determination regarding the children in 2007. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-201(a). The UCCJEA vests a North Carolina court that has made a valid initial jurisdiction determination until (1) the with North exclusive, Carolina court continuing determines that neither the child, the child s parents, and any person acting as a parent do not [sic] have a significant connection with this State and that substantial evidence is no longer available in this State concerning the child s care, protection, training, and personal relationships, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A- -11202(a)(1); (2) a court in any state determines that the child, the child s parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in this State, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A- 202(a)(2); or (3) a court of another state exercises temporary emergency jurisdiction. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-204. None of the three statutorily specified events have occurred in this case. The record before us clearly indicates that the Haywood County District Court exercised its continuing jurisdiction when it awarded guardianship over the children to Ms. Nelson, who was living in Texas, in April 2009. Although the court waived the necessity for holding further review hearings pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906(b) in its 22 April 2010 order, it retained jurisdiction over this case. and 7B-1000(a). See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-906(b) As a result, the Haywood County District Court never ceded jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-202(a), to Texas or any other jurisdiction. In light of the fact that the Haywood County District Court made an making initial custody determination, Respondent-Parents the conservators 2011 of Texas the order children represented a modification order for purposes of the UCCJEA. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-102(11). Although the relevant provisions of the UCCJEA require North Carolina courts to recognize and enforce a child-custody determination of a court of another -12state if the latter court exercised jurisdiction in substantial conformity with this Article or the determination was made under factual circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards of this Article, and the determination has not been modified in accordance with this Article, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-303(a), an order entered jurisdictional by another standards state of the without UCCJEA adherence is null to and the void. Davis v. Davis, 53 N.C. App. 531, 542, 281 S.E.2d 411, 417 (1981) (applying Jurisdiction official Act, comment section which to 13 was N.C. of the Gen. the Uniform predecessor Stat. § to 50A-303 Child Custody the UCCJEA); (noting that [t]his section is based on Section 13 of the UCCJA [former N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-13] which contained the basic duty to enforce and stating that [t]he language of the original section has been retained and the duty to enforce is generally the same ). Thus, a valid modification order would interrupt the Haywood County District Court s jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, see N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 50A-202(a) and 50A-203, while an invalid one would not. As a result, the key question which must be answered in order to determine whether the Haywood County District Court had jurisdiction to enter the 24 September 2012 and 26 November 2012 orders is whether the Texas order constituted modification of the earlier North Carolina order. a valid -13The trial court answered this question in the negative, determining in both the adjudication and the permanency planning orders that disposition and Respondent Parents have custody, care and control of the children in violation of valid Haywood County District Court Orders. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court noted in the 26 November 2012 order that, although the Texas court had determined that no other [co]urt had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of the case, the Haywood County District Court had retained continuing jurisdiction in these matters, so that [j]urisdiction was not relinquished by this Court when the minor children were placed in Legal Guardianship in Texas pursuant to Court Order. believe that the trial court correctly resolved We this jurisdictional issue. The requirements for modification of an order under the UCCJEA as set out in Texas law are as follows: Except as otherwise provided in Section 152.204, a court of this state may not modify a child custody determination made by a court of another state unless a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial determination under Section 152.201(a)(1) or (2) and: (1) the court of the other state determines it no longer has exclusive continuing jurisdiction under Section 152.202 or that a court of this state would be a more convenient forum under Section 152.207; or -14(2) a court of this state or a court of the other state determines that the child, the child s parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in the other state. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 152.203 (West 2008).3 Respondent-Parents have not suggested that Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 152.204, which governs temporary emergency jurisdiction, courts with jurisdiction over this case. provided the Texas Similarly, Respondent- Parents have not shown that the Texas court had jurisdiction to modify the North Carolina order based on either Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 152.203(1) or § 152.203(2). As a result of the fact that the record on appeal does not contain copies of the 2011 Texas order or any other document filed or entered in the Texas proceedings, we are unable to determine whether the Texas court made the determinations necessary to establish that it had the authority order. to modify the prior Haywood County District Court Our inability to make such a determination is fatal to Respondent-Parents jurisdictional challenge to the issue subject trial court s orders. As the jurisdiction parties on raising appeal, the Respondent-Parents of had the matter duty to ensure that the record contained all the materials necessary for 3 The equivalent provisions in North Carolina law are substantively identical to the Texas statutory language quoted in the text. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-203. -15adequate review of this issue, which, given the content of their arguments, would necessarily include the relevant Texas orders. See Industrotech Constructors, Inc. v. Duke Univ., 67 N.C. App. 741, 743, 314 S.E.2d 272, 274 (1984) (holding that [t]he appellant has the duty of ensuring that the record is properly made up and includes all matters necessary for decision ); N.C.R. App. P. 9(a)(1)(e) (providing that the record on appeal in civil actions and special proceedings shall contain . . . so much of the litigation, set out in the form provided in Rule 9(c)(l), as is necessary for an understanding of presented on appeal ). all issues However, as we have previously noted, the record on appeal presented for our review does not contain the relevant Texas orders. In addition, despite the fact that the trial court made some findings regarding the Texas order, those findings do not establish that the Texas court jurisdiction to modify the prior North Carolina order. had As a result, nothing in the record shows that the Texas court had jurisdiction custody to modify determination, Respondent-Parents erred by have determining the Haywood County necessitating failed that it to show retained a that District Court s conclusion the trial continuing, that court exclusive jurisdiction in this matter and that it was not obligated to enforce the 2011 Texas order. See Davis, 53 N.C. App. at 542, -16281 S.E.2d at 417 (stating that, [s]ince the record does not show that the California court assumed jurisdiction under the standards set forth in [the UCCJEA], its decree is null and void ); see also Industrotech Constructors, 67 N.C. App. at 743, 314 S.E.2d at 274 (rejecting an argument to the effect that the parties to an arbitration proceeding had stipulated that the proceeding would remain confidential since (1) no such stipulation appeared in the record, (2) the appellant had the duty of ensuring information that necessary to the record permit a contained proper all of the review of the challenged order, and (3) such a stipulation was not the type of information which the Court was entitled to judicially notice). In addition to arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case under the UCCJEA, Respondent-Parents also contend that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact to establish that it had the subject matter jurisdiction needed to hear and decide this case. the UCCJEA Contrary to Respondent-Parents argument, however, does not require a trial court to make explicit findings justifying its decision to exercise jurisdiction over a particular case. In re E.X.J., 191 N.C. App. 34, 40, 662 S.E.2d 24, 27 (2008) (rejecting an argument to the effect that the trial court did not make the necessary findings establishing -17its jurisdiction on the grounds that jurisdiction under N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 50A 201, 50A-203, and 50A-204 does not require express findings by the trial court and that the trial court had jurisdiction over the case circumstances statutorily in question required to as support long an as the exercise of jurisdiction existed), aff d, 363 N.C. 9, 672 S.E.2d 19 (2009). In addition, the trial court s 24 September 2012 and 26 November 2012 orders included specific findings of fact stating the basis for the trial court s decision to exercise jurisdiction of this case, including findings that the initial custody determination was made in North Carolina, that the North Carolina courts had retained continuing jurisdiction over this case, and that the North Carolina courts had never relinquished jurisdiction over this case to the courts of any other state. of Respondent-Parents UCCJEA-based As a result, none challenges to the trial to the trial court s orders have merit. 2. Summons In addition to his UCCJEA-based court s jurisdiction, Respondent-Father challenge argues that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this case because no summons was ever issued to or served upon the children s guardian. court s However, as the Supreme Court has stated, [a] trial subject matter jurisdiction over all stages of a -18juvenile case is established when the action is initiated with the filing of a properly verified petition. N.C. 588, 593, 636 S.E.2d 787, 792 In re T.R.P., 360 (2006). As the record clearly reflects, DSS filed verified petitions which complied with the relevant statutory provisions. of the record summonses thereby establishes were issued allowing the over them. to that and Court the served to In addition, a review statutorily upon exercise required Respondent-Parents, personal jurisdiction Thus, any failure to issue or serve a summons upon the children s guardian had no effect on the extent of the trial court s jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case. See In re K.J.L., 363 N.C. 343, 346, 677 S.E.2d 835, 837 (2009) (holding that the summons is not the vehicle by which a court obtains subject matter jurisdiction over a case, and failure to follow the preferred procedures with respect to the summons does not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction ). C. Adequacy of Adjudicatory Findings of Fact Secondly, failed to make determination dependent Respondent-Parents sufficient that the juveniles. argue findings children More were that of the fact abused, specifically, to trial court support its neglected, and Respondent-Parents contend that many of the trial court s findings relate to issues addressed in prior orders of the Haywood County District Court -19or the Texas court, that the trial court s findings did not establish the adjudicatory factual decision, prerequisite and that for the the trial trial court s court s findings overlooked the fact that the children had been placed in safe and stable alternative childcare arrangements as of the date upon which the juvenile petitions had been filed. Respondent- Parents arguments lack merit. 1. Standard of Review In reviewing an abuse, neglect, or dependency adjudication, we examine whether the trials court s findings of fact are supported by competent evidence and whether the trial court s findings, in turn, support its conclusions of law. In re Gleisner, 141 N.C. App. 475, 480, 539 S.E.2d 362, 365 (2000). [W]hen a trial court is required to make findings of fact, it must make the findings of fact specially and may not, for that reason, simply recite allegations, but must through processes of logical reasoning from the evidentiary facts find the ultimate facts essential to support the conclusions of law. In re Z.J.T.B., 183 N.C. App. 380, 387, 645 S.E.2d 206, 211 (2007) (emphasis in original) (quoting In re Weiler, 158 N.C. App. 473, 478, 581 S.E.2d 134, 137 (2003)). As a result of the fact objected that sufficiency Respondent-Parents of the evidentiary have not support for any to the particular -20finding of fact, the trial court s findings of fact are binding for purposes of appellate review. Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991). A trial court s conclusion that a particular juvenile is abused, neglected, or dependent is reviewed de novo. In re N.G., 186 N.C. App. 1, 15, 650 S.E.2d 45, 54 (2007), aff d, 362 N.C. 229, 657 S.E.2d 355 (2008). 2. Adequacy of Trial Court s Adjudicatory Findings of Fact As an initial matter, Parents assertion that the consider events that had we find trial no merit in Respondent- court was not entitled occurred prior to the to children s placement with their Haywood County foster parents in May of 2012. The circumstances surrounding the 2007 determinations that the children were neglected and dependent juveniles coupled with their subsequent experiences in Texas and North Carolina were clearly relevant to a proper evaluation of the extent to which the petitions filed by DSS on 28 June 2012 had merit. In re A.K., 360 N.C. 449, 456, 628 S.E.2d 753, 758 See (2006) (stating that, in determining whether a child is a neglected juvenile under Chapter 7B, it is well within the trial court s discretion to assign more weight to multiple adjudications than it would to just one ). prior neglect Thus, the fact that the trial court based its adjudication decisions on findings relating to events which occurred prior to the date upon which -21the children parents does were returned to not undercut the their Haywood trial County court s foster adjudication decisions in any way. We do, however, agree with Respondent-Parents contention that the trial court s adjudicatory findings fail to support its determination that Allison, Elsie, and Lucas were abused juveniles. An abused juvenile is one whose parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker . . . [i]nflicts or allows to be inflicted upon the juvenile a serious physical injury by other than accidental means[,] . . . [c]reates or allows to be created a substantial risk of serious physical injury to the juvenile by other than accidental means[,] or [c]reates or allows to be created serious emotional damage to the juvenile. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(1). Although the adjudication order contains extensive findings of fact, the trial court never found that any of the children had sustained any physical injury other than a red mark that Elsie observed on Lucas face. In addition, the trial court did not make any findings of fact which tended to show that the children faced a substantial risk of serious harm inflicted by non-accidental contain means. references to Although the fact the that adjudication the order children had does been exposed to domestic violence between Respondent-Parents, each of -22these findings consisted of descriptions of reports received by Texas CPS or of statements made by the children to social workers rather than findings that such incidents had, in fact, occurred. Finally, although the trial court s order includes a finding that Elsie and Lucas had been diagnosed as suffering from anxiety-related disorders in September of 2008, the trial court did not find that the children were suffering from serious emotional harm on any date remotely approximating the date upon which the petitions underlying the adjudication order were filed. In addition to the trial court s failure to find specific facts in support of its determination of abuse, the trial court failed to make findings of ultimate facts that showed basis for the trial court s adjudication decision. Z.J.T.B., 183 N.C. App. at 387, 645 S.E.2d at 211. the See In re Instead, the trial court simply found that Allison, Elsie, and Lucas are Abused juveniles, as defined by N.C.G.S. 7B[-]101(1), for all the reasons stated above. As a result, given these deficiencies in the trial court s findings, we reverse the trial court s adjudication that Allison, Elsie, and Lucas were abused juveniles. A neglected juvenile is one who does not receive proper care, supervision, or discipline . . .; or who is not provided -23necessary remedial care; or who lives in an environment injurious to the juvenile s welfare. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B- 101(15). must An adjudication of neglect rest upon some physical, mental, or emotional impairment of the juvenile or a substantial risk of such impairment as a consequence of the failure to provide proper care, supervision, or discipline. re Stumbo, 357 N.C. 279, 283, 582 S.E.2d 255, 258 In (2003) (quoting In re Safriet, 112 N.C. App. 747, 752, 436 S.E.2d 898, 901-02 (1993)) (additional citations and quotation marks omitted)). In its adjudication order, the trial court noted that the children had previously been determined to be neglected juveniles as a result of having been left unsupervised and as a result of Respondent-Parents unaddressed mental health, and homelessness problems. this adjudication of neglect, the court substance abuse, In the aftermath of authorized DSS to refrain from attempting to reunite the children with RespondentParents and appointed Ms. Nelson to serve as their guardian in 2009. However, Ms. Nelson returned the children to Respondent- Parents care in 2010. After reports of domestic violence led Texas CPS to take the children into its custody, RespondentFather was extradited to North Carolina and Respondent-Mother disappeared for [five] months without contact[ing] her -24children. Although the Texas court awarded primary custody of the children to Respondent-Father in 2011, it also ordered him or Ms. Nelson to supervise any visitation between the children and Respondent-Mother. After the children were returned to the custody of Respondent-Father, the following incident occurred during a time when Respondent-Mother was apparently solely responsible for caring for the children: On April 19, 2012, all three minor children ran away from the home of the Respondent Parents . . . . The children crawled out of a bedroom window and got on a city bus. They were missing for approximately 4 hours . . . . [Elsie] and [Allison] did not have any shoes on when discovered. [Lucas] reported that they ran away because the Respondent Mother gets intoxicated and yells at the children, and they are scared and tired of it. . . . When law enforcement arrived at the home . . ., the Respondent Mother appeared to be intoxicated on prescription drugs. There were several empty pill bottles . . . around the home. The Respondent Mother admitted to drinking two beers, and that she yelled at the children . . . . The Respondent Mother thought the children were playing hide and seek and did not know they were missing. She thought they were only missing for an hour. The trial court s findings amply demonstrate a lack of proper supervision placing the by Respondent-Parents children emotional impairment. at which substantial had risk the of effect of physical or As a result, we affirm the trial court s determination that the children were neglected juveniles. -25Finally, a dependent juvenile is one in need of assistance or placement because the juvenile has no parent, guardian, or custodian responsible for the juvenile s care or supervision or whose parent, guardian, or custodian is unable to provide for the care or supervision and lacks an appropriate alternative child care arrangement. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(9). In determining whether a juvenile is dependent, the trial court must address both (1) the parent s ability to provide care or supervision, and (2) the availability alternative child care arrangements. to the parent of In re P.M., 169 N.C. App. 423, 427, 610 S.E.2d 403, 406 (2005). As was the case with its neglect adjudication, the trial court s order contains sufficient determination of dependency. findings to support a The court had determined in 2008 that the children were dependent and that DSS was authorized to cease attempting to reunify them with Respondent-Parents. In addition, the trial court s findings describe how Ms. Nelson undercut the court s prior custody orders by giving custody of the children to Respondent-Parents after everyone reached Texas. At the time challenged that orders, DSS filed Texas CPS the had petitions removed that the underlay children the from Respondent-Parents home due to a lack of proper supervision. Finally, the trial court found that [r]emoval from the home was -26necessary because there were no appropriate placements for the children at this time. Thus, the trial court s findings provide ample support for its determination that the children were dependent juveniles.4 As a result, although the trial court erred by finding the children to be abused juveniles, it did not err by finding that they were neglected and dependent juveniles. D. Cessation of Reunification Efforts Thirdly, Respondent-Mother challenges the portion of the disposition and permanency planning order that authorized DSS to continue to refrain from attempting to reunify the children with Respondent-Parents. More specifically, Respondent-Mother claims that the trial court erroneously failed to make the findings of fact required in order to authorize the cessation of such reunification efforts pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-507(b). The fundamental problem with Respondent-Mother s argument is the fact that DSS had been relieved of any further responsibility for attempting to reunite the children with Respondent-Parents by means of an order entered on 22 October 2008, in which the 4 We specifically reject Respondent-Parents argument that an adjudication of dependency was precluded by their decision to allow Texas CPS to place the children in the care of their Haywood County foster parents. As we have previously noted, [h]aving an appropriate alternative childcare arrangement means that the parent himself must take some steps to suggest a childcare arrangement-it is not enough that the parent merely goes along with a plan created by DSS. In re L.H., 210 N.C. App. 355, 366, 708 S.E.2d 191, 198 (2011). -27court found that such efforts would clearly be futile or . . . inconsistent with the juveniles health and safety, and need for a safe, permanent home within a reasonable period of time, and the fact terminated that its the Haywood jurisdiction County over this modified the 22 October 2008 order. 1000(b). the trial District case Court or had not subsequently See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B- As a result, contrary to Respondent-Mother s argument, court was not under any obligation to make the findings of fact required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-507(b) in either of the orders which are before us in this case. E. Alleged Agreement Between DSS and Respondent-Parents Finally, Respondent-Parents contend that the trial court erred by failing to enforce an agreement which they entered into with DSS, by granting judgment on the pleadings against them, or by failing to make the findings necessary to support the entry of the adjudication order as either a consent judgment or as reflective of a stipulation between the parties. According to Respondent-Father, Respondent-Parents agreed not to contest the adjudication and didn t offer evidence at the hearing, as part of an agreement with DSS that included a chance to work toward reunification 5 with their children. 5 Similarly, Respondent- Respondent-Father appears to contend, in the heading which accompanied this part of his challenge to the trial court s -28Mother asserts that Respondent-Parents waived their right to an evidentiary hearing on the petition based on an agreement for disposition and permanency planning that the permanent plan would return to reunification and that, in compliance with that agreement, Respondent-Parents allowed the DSS narrative contained in Exhibit A to be admitted into evidence without objection and then allowed the court to find that the children were abused, neglected and dependent. Although Respondent- Parents advance a number of legal arguments based upon this alleged non-compliance conclude that with their Respondent-Parents agreement have failed with to DSS, we preserve the right to assert these arguments on appeal by failing to bring their concerns to the trial court s attention prior to the entry of the dispositional and permanency planning order. N.C.R. App. P. 10(a)(1) states, in pertinent part, that, [i]n order to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely . . . objection, or motion, stating the specific grounds for the ruling the party orders, that the failure to honor this agreement between Respondent-Parents and DSS constituted a due process violation. However, Respondent-Father did not advance any constitutional argument in the relevant portion of his brief. As a result, Respondent-Father has abandoned the right to assert any constitutional challenge to the trial court s handling of the alleged agreement between Respondent-Parents and DSS on appeal. N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (providing that [i]ssues not presented in a party s brief, or in support of which no reason or argument is stated, will be taken as abandoned ). -29desired the court to make . . . [and] obtain a ruling upon the party s request, objection, or motion. Consistently with the basic thrust of N.C.R. App. P. 10(a)(1), this Court has clearly stated that, in the event that a theory argued on a[n] appeal was not raised before the trial court[,] the argument is deemed waived on appeal. State v. Davis, 207 N.C. App. 359, 363, 700 S.E.2d 85, 88 (2010) (citing State v. Augustine, 359 N.C. 709, 721, 616 S.E.2d 515, 525 (2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 925, 126 S. Ct. 2980, 165 L. Ed. 2d 988 (2006)). As the Supreme Court put the same basic proposition in more colorful language almost eighty years ago, the law does not permit parties to swap horses between courts in order to get a better mount on appeal. Weil v. Herring, 207 N.C. 6, 10, 175 S.E.2d 836, 838 (1934). In their briefs, Respondent-Parents argue, for the first time in this proceeding, that the adjudication and dispositional and permanency result of planning legal orders deficiencies should in the relating to their agreement with DSS. be overturned trial court s as the orders It is apparent from the record, however, that neither parent ever complained that any agreement that they might have had with DSS had been violated or requested the trial court to take any action on the basis of this alleged agreement despite the fact that they had numerous opportunities to do so. Given that set of circumstances, we -30believe, in reliance upon the authority cited in the preceding paragraph, that Respondent-Parents have waived the right to assert their agreement-based claims before this Court. The hearing held before the trial court on 4 September 2012 was originally intended to address adjudication, dispositional, and permanency planning issues. At the adjudication hearing, the following proceedings occurred: [DSS]: What I would offer, Your Honor, is the Department s court report. It has--it is--has a different recommendation as far as a permanent plan in it, which I will amend orally but I would like, at least the facts in it to come into the disposition hearing. And I will read into the record what the parties have agreed to. THE COURT: at disposition? Anybody object to DSS 1 [RESPONDENT-MOTHER]: THE COURT: No objection. DSS 1 is admitted. [DSS]: And, Your Honor, what the agreement is is that the permanent plan, which is currently guardianship, be changed back to reunification with the respondent parents; that the children remain in the custody of [DSS], the Department having all placement discretion and medical review; that the Department--that the respondent parents are ordered to complete case plans as worked out with the GAL and [DSS]. As a result, the record indicates that Respondent-Parents had agreed to refrain from contesting the adjudication determination in return for an agreement that the permanent plan for the -31children would be established as reunification with RespondentParents instead arrangement. that a of implementation of another guardianship However, after counsel for DSS orally recommended plan of reunification with Respondent-Parents be established as the permanent plan for the children, the guardian ad litem requested that a bench conference be held. At the conclusion of that bench conference, the trial court stated that there was not a full agreement on disposition, that all of the parties would like to continue the hearing, and that pending disposition, each party shall continue to work their case plans Department. that they ve--that you ve developed with the As a result, although the trial court entered an order adjudicating the children to be abused, neglected, and dependent juveniles on 24 September 2012, the dispositional and permanency planning hearing was continued until a later date, with the children remaining in DSS custody and the permanent plan remaining basis, pending one the of guardianship, completion at of least on an interim the dispositional and reconvened dispositional and permanency planning proceeding. On 30 October 2012, a permanency planning hearing was held. At that time, a court report into prepared by DSS was objection from either parent. introduced evidence without According to the contents of this -32report and the testimony of Rachel Young, the social worker responsible for this case, DSS recommended that the trial court continue to authorize it to refrain from making reasonable efforts to reunite the children with the parents and adopt a permanent plan of guardianship for the children. This recommendation is also reflected in a modification to the family services agreement between DSS and Respondent-Mother attached to the court report, reunification was in which deleted the and original replaced recommendation with a of recommendation that the permanent plan for the children be one of guardianship. Ms. Young did, reunification with however, offer an Respondent-Parents alternative for the trial plan of court s consideration during the course of her testimony. Although Respondent-Parents now claim that their agreement with DSS was violated, neither parent ever argued to the trial court prior to, at, or after the dispositional and permanency planning hearing that any sort of agreement-related violation had occurred. aside the Put another way, neither parent ever moved to set adjudication order as having been obtained in violation of their agreement with DSS or objected to the DSS recommendation that guardianship be established as the permanent plan for the children on the grounds that such a result was contrary to the agreement in question. The closest that either -33parent ever came to challenging the principal DSS dispositional recommendation planning at hearing the reconvened before the the trial grounds came during counsel for Respondent-Mother, disposition court on cross-examination during and permanency agreement-related of Ms. the which Young following proceedings occurred: [RESPONDENT-MOTHER]: Is it your belief that [Respondent-Parents] were aware that the guardianship of foster parents was an outcome? [DSS]: Objection. THE COURT: That is sustained. [RESPONDENT-MOTHER]: At the last court hearing, was guardianship offered as a possible alternative that was going to happen to [Respondent-Parents]? [MS. YOUNG]: Can that just one more time? -- can you I m sorry. repeat [RESPONDENT-MOTHER]: At the last court hearing, was [Respondent-Mother] told that she needed to work this case plan for reunification? [ATTORNEY ADVOCATE]: Objection. [RESPONDENT-MOTHER]: Your Honor, if I may be heard? I think this is a valid question if that was what was presented to [Respondent-Mother]. THE COURT: Well you can ask her if she told her that. She s not responsible for what other people said so. [RESPONDENT-MOTHER]: I understand. by -34After having been allowed to question Ms. Young concerning the extent, if any, to which she had told Respondent-Mother that she needed to work on her case plan in order to be reunited with the children, counsel for Respondent-Mother did not take advantage of this opportunity and moved on to other subjects. inquiry in question had been reiterated, Even if the such renewed questioning would not have constituted any sort of assertion that the trial court had to formally consider the implications of that agreement in any way or that DSS was precluded from recommending the adoption of guardianship as the permanent plan for the children at the dispositional and permanency planning proceeding. As a result, Respondent-Parents simply never argued at any point during the proceedings held in the trial court that either the adjudication or the disposition and permanency planning orders were tainted in any way by a violation of their agreement with DSS. One of the purposes of requiring parties to object and make motions before the trial court is so that the trial court has the opportunity to correct any errors. State v. Dye, 207 N.C. App. 473, 481, 700 S.E.2d 135, 140 (2010). Had either of the parents raised any issue regarding the alleged violation of their agreement with DSS, the trial court could easily have ascertained the nature of the agreement that the parents had -35reached with DSS and taken appropriate action to address any issues arising from the existence of that agreement. Having failed to raise any issue concerning their agreement with DSS before the trial court despite having had ample opportunity to do so arising from the multi-stage nature of the trial court proceedings and then seeking to have the trial court s orders overturned on appeal on agreement-related grounds,6 we believe that Respondent-Parents should be deemed to have waived their right to raise any claim in reliance upon any agreement-related consideration before this Court. As a result, we hold that, given their failure to raise any agreement-related issue before the trial court, Respondent-Parents have waived the right to assert any such issue before this Court on appeal. III. Conclusion 6 Although we acknowledge that, ordinarily, a litigant need not object to the trial court s failure to make specific findings of fact prior to the entry of the challenged order as a prerequisite for challenging the trial court s findings on appeal, we do not believe that this principle has any application in a case of this nature. In most instances, the trial court is on notice that specific issues need to be addressed in its findings and conclusions as a result of the relevant legal requirements or the evidence contained in the record. In this case, however, the trial court had no basis for believing that any agreement-related issue needed to be addressed in its order because Respondent-Parents never alerted the trial court that any agreement-related issue existed. As a result, we do not believe that there is any unfairness involved in holding that Respondent-Parents have waived the right to raise any agreement-related issue before this Court. -36Thus, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that, with the exception of their challenge to the sufficiency of the trial court s Allison, Elsie, findings and to Lucas support were its abused determination juveniles, none that of Respondent-Parents challenges to the trial court s orders have merit. As a result, the trial court s determination that Allison, Elsie, and Lucas are abused juveniles should be, and hereby is, reversed and the remaining provisions of the trial court s orders should be, and hereby are, affirmed. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART. Judge STEPHENS concurs. Judge Geer concurs in the result only. Report per Rule 30(e).

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