Wellons v. White

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NO. COA 12-1205 NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS Filed: 20 August 2013 FRANCES LEANNE WELLONS, Plaintiff, v. New Hanover County No. 06 CVD 357 WILLIAM ZACHARY WHITE, Defendant, v. JOHN F. WELLONS, and wife, BOBBIE B. WELLONS, Intervenors. Appeal by defendant from order entered 5 July 2012 by Judge Jeffrey Evan Noecker in New Hanover County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 27 February 2013. Rice Law, PLLC, by Richard Forest Kern and Mark Spencer Williams, for defendant-appellant. J. Albert Clyburn for intervenors-appellees. HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge. William Zachary White ( Mr. White ) appeals a trial court order: (i) denying his motion to dismiss; (ii) holding him in civil contempt; (iii) granting grandparent visitation; and (iv) -2rejecting his constitutional challenge. Upon review, we affirm in part, dismiss in part, and reverse as to contempt. I. Facts & Procedural History On 24 July 2003, Mr. White and Frances Leanne Wellons ( Ms. Wellons ) married. Corporal. Mr. White served as a Marine Corps Lance On 4 April 2005, the couple had a son ( the child ). Given Mr. White s active military service, the child lived with Ms. Wellons in Alamance County immediately after his birth. In June 2005, Ms. Wellons and the child moved to New Hanover County to live with Ms. Wellons parents, John Wellons and Bobbie Wellons (the Grandparents ).1 On 13 December 2005, Mr. White and Ms. Wellons divorced. Mr. White s mother acted as his attorney-in-fact for the divorce proceedings because Mr. White was serving in Iraq. After the divorce, the child continued to live with Ms. Wellons at the Grandparents New Hanover County home. A. 4 April 2006 Child Custody Order On 27 January 2006, Ms. Wellons filed a complaint against Mr. White in New Hanover County custody and child support. still served in Iraq. 1 District Court seeking sole The complaint noted that Mr. White A few weeks after Ms. Wellons filed the Although the Grandparents primary residence is in New Hanover County, they also own a house in Burlington. Nothing in the record indicates whether Ms. Wellons or the child ever lived at the Grandparents Burlington home. -3complaint, Mr. White returned to the United States and lived at the barracks of Camp Lejeune in Jacksonville. On 4 April 2006, the district court entered an order granting Ms. Wellons and Mr. White joint legal custody of the minor child. Since Mr. White still lived in the Marine Corps barracks, district the court determined he had no residence to have visits with the child overnight. 2 suitable Therefore, the district court gave Ms. Wellons primary custody. Because Mr. White planned to leave the Marine Corps in December 2006, the district court allowed Mr. White to gain increased custody when he has set up a residence suitable to care for the minor child. per The district court also ordered Mr. White to pay $820 month in child support. Lastly, the district court determined the order resolved all pending issues between the parties. After this order, the child continued to live with Ms. Wellons at the Grandparents home in New Hanover County. B. 30 November 2006 Temporary Child Custody Order On 3 August 2006, the Grandparents filed a motion to intervene, seeking temporary custody of the minor child. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.1(a) (2011) ( Any parent, relative, or other person, agency, organization or institution claiming the 2 The district court also expressed concern over Mr. White s driving while impaired ( DWI ) conviction in Virginia. -4right to custody of a minor child may institute an action or proceeding for the custody of such child. ). The Grandparents first argued they already had de facto custody of the child because he had resided at their home since June 2005. The Grandparents further contended neither [Ms. Wellons] nor [Mr. White] are fit and proper persons to have the primary care of the minor child. Specifically, they alleged: (i) Ms. Wellons was currently receiving inpatient treatment for mental illness; visitation (ii) Mr. White ha[d] with the minor child alone not yet without exercised the aid or assistance of either his mother or girlfriend since the entry of the April 2006 Custody Order; (iii) Mr. White cannot provide a stable home environment for the child; and (iv) Mr. White willfully withheld custody from Ms. Wellons. On 9 August 2006, Mr. White moved to dismiss the Grandparents motion because they failed to allege sufficient facts supporting their claim. See N.C. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Mr. White his also argued he never acted inconsistently with constitutionally-protected parental status. Although a hearing was held in August 2006, the district court did not enter a written temporary child custody order until 30 November 2006. The order stated the Grandparents have -5been allowed to intervene in this action pursuant to Rule 24 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. 3 The order also granted Mr. White primary suspended his monthly child support payments. custody and Still, it granted Ms. Wellons visitation every other weekend at the Grandparents New Hanover County home. The order elaborated that if Ms. Wellons did not exercise weekend visitation, the Grandparents could still exercise visitation every other weekend at their home. The order required Mr. White, Ms. Wellons, and the Grandparents to select an exchange point equidistant between the residences of the parties. After this order, the child first lived with Mr. White and his new girlfriend Christina Ross ( Ms. Ross ) in Jacksonville.4 The record does not indicate whether Mr. White still lived in the Marine Corps barracks at this time. Mr. White left the Marine Corps on 9 December 2006 and moved to Greensboro with Ms. Ross and the child. 3 The district court mistakenly failed to actually enter an order allowing intervention. The district court entered an order correcting this oversight on 25 November 2009, nunc pro tunc, 7 August 2006. 4 Based on the trial court s announcement of its decision at the hearing, the child actually resided with Mr. White and Ms. Ross since August 2006. -6C. 15 December 2006 Consent Custody Order On 14 December 2006, Ms. Wellons filed a motion for emergency custody because the previous orders did not establish a holiday visitation schedule. Ms. Wellons argued that given her animosity with Mr. White s girlfriend, the parties would not otherwise agree to a holiday schedule. This hostility arose from an incident on 10 December 2006. Ms. Wellons still lived with her visitation at the Grandparents home. parents and exercised On 10 December 2006, Mr. White sent Ms. Ross to pick up the child at a scheduled custody exchange. Ms. Wellons arrived late to the exchange because the child had napped longer than expected.5 the exchange place, Ms. Ross yelled When Ms. Wellons got to at Ms. Wellons for her tardiness. The conflict escalated, and Ms. Wellons asked a gas station attendant to call 911. On 15 December 2006, the district court granted Ms. Wellons and the Grandparents extended holiday visitation. The district court also required Ms. Ross not to attend any more custody exchanges. Finally, the district court again retained ongoing jurisdiction over the case. 5 Ms. Wellons father drove her to the exchange point. -7D. 28 December 2007 Child Custody Order On 6 March 2007, Mr. White filed a motion in the cause and a showing of changed circumstances child support from Ms. Wellons.6 13.7(a) (2011). seeking sole custody and See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50- On 21 May 2007, Ms. Wellons filed a reply asking the court to: (i) dismiss and deny Mr. White s request; (ii) return primary custody to her; (iii) reinstate Mr. White s child support obligations; and (iv) grant her attorneys fees. The matter came on for hearing during the 13 September, 14 September, and 2 November 2007 Family Court Sessions of New Hanover County District Court. On 28 December 2007, the district court issued a custody order superseding all previous orders. The order made the following factual findings. Since the 30 November 2006 order, Ms. Wellons had lived at her parents home in New Hanover County. or utilities. Ms. Wellons mental 6 She did not pay rent For 26 days from 12 July 2006 to 7 August 2006, was illness at involuntarily The Oaks at committed New by Hanover her parents Regional for Medical Mr. White labeled his motion as Answer and Counterclaim. Since the document was filed more than a year after the complaint, the district court appears to have treated it as a motion in the cause and a showing of changed circumstances. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.7(a) (2011) ( [A]n order of a court of this State for custody of a minor child may be modified or vacated at any time, upon motion in the cause and a showing of changed circumstances by either party or anyone interested. ). Therefore, we treat it as such on appeal. -8Center. After her release, she did not take her medication or comply with recommended follow-up treatment. On 15 August 2006, she also tested positive for marijuana in a drug screen at a follow-up hospital visit. Ms. Wellons was again involuntarily committed for nine days from 22 August 2006 to 31 August 2006 at Cherry Hospital in Goldsboro. During that time, Dr. Jerry Sloan, a psychologist at Cherry Hospital, diagnosed Ms. Wellons with Bipolar 1 Disorder, single manic episode, Personality Disorder, possibly brief severe, [Ms. a Wellons] antisocial psychotic does with not psychotic and features; hysterical disorder. appreciate Dr. the traits; Sloan full Mixed and determined extent of her symptoms that caused her hospitalization. The district court also examined certain photographs Mr. White offered into evidence. These photographs, posted on various websites, showed Ms. Wellons at bars on dates when she had custody of the child. the Grandparents Wellons contended The record does not indicate whether supervised the the child photographs were on these part of dates. her job Ms. in nightlife marketing; however, the district court determined that due to the number of pictures, the various activities that were depicted in the pictures, and the pictures being found at -9websites other than [her company s website], Ms. Wellons explanation was not credible. The district court further noted convicted of DWI on 27 April 2006. driver s license after her DWI that Ms. Wellons was Although the DMV revoked her conviction, she continued to drive with the child as a passenger. The district court then described how Mr. White lived with his girlfriend in a safe neighborhood where the child had his own bedroom. Community Mr. College White and had lived enrolled near his in Guilford extended Technical family. family cared for the child while he was at school and work.7 district court also mentioned that Ms. Ross had His The full-time employment. At the 13 September initial 3 2007 August hearing, 2006 the request Grandparents dismissed their for primary custody. Instead, they told the court they now only sought grandparent visitation privileges with the minor child. At the hearing, Mr. White, Ms. Wellons, and the Grandparents also stipulated that a material change in circumstances had occurred as a result of the Plaintiff s involuntary commitments. Based on its factual findings, the district court determined Mr. White was a fit and proper person to continue to 7 Later, in early 2010, Mr. White became a police officer with the Greensboro Police Department. -10have the primary custody of the minor child, and it [was] in the best interest of the minor child that . . . permanent primary custody remain with [Mr. White]. Still, the district court granted Ms. Wellons: (i) weekend visitation privileges every two weeks during the school year; (ii) alternating week-long visitation during the summer months; and (iii) alternating holiday visitation. It also granted the Grandparents visitation concurrent with Ms. Wellons visitation. The district court stated the Grandparents may exercise their visitation privileges in the event . . . [Ms. Wellons] is not able to be elaborated present that if at Ms. scheduled Wellons visitations. moved from the It further Grandparents home, the Grandparents could file an appropriate Motion for the Court to establish their specific grandparent visitation privileges with the minor child. E. Other Interim Orders and Motions On 22 December 2008, Ms. Wellons filed a motion to show cause why Mr. White was not in contempt. Ms. Wellons alleged Mr. White violated the 28 December 2007 order by refusing to allow her visitation during school holidays. Although a hearing was scheduled for 16 February 2009, the record does not indicate the outcome of this motion. -11On 24 July 2009, Mr. White filed a motion in the cause to modify Ms. Wellons visitation. Ms. Wellons County. was He now argued living the In his motion, Mr. White noted with child a boyfriend in New Hanover should not visit Ms. Wellons because her smoking exacerbated the child s asthma. On 3 March 2010 the parties resolved the issue by entering into a memorandum of consent judgment and order. modified the 28 December parenting guidelines. Burlington exchange for work, schedule to 2007 order to This order incorporate certain Because Ms. Wellons had recently moved to the order require Ms. also modified Wellons and the Mr. custody White to deliver the child directly to each other s residence, rather than meeting halfway between the residences. On 11 May 2010, Ms. Wellons and the Grandparents filed a motion in the cause to change custody plans because Ms. Wellons had moved back to the Grandparents home. On 27 July 2010, the district court modified the 28 December 2007 order and retained ongoing jurisdiction. F. 1 April 2011 Ex Parte Order On 1 April 2011, Mr. White filed: (i) a motion to modify the 28 December 2007 custody order based on a substantial change in circumstances; and (ii) a motion for an emergency ex parte child custody order. Mr. White alleged Ms. Wellons and the -12Grandparents neglected the child by creating an injurious and dangerous environment for the minor child when he visits with his mother. On 4 February 2011, Mr. White s wife (Mrs. White, formerly Ms. Ross) noticed a bruise on the child and reported Ms. Wellons to the Guilford County Department of Social Services ( Guilford County Social Services or Social Services ) for abuse. Social Services met with Ms. Wellons, she said the received the bruise while playing with another child. When child On 6 February 2011, Mr. White s wife reported a new scratch on the child. Ms. Wellons said the child received the scratch while playing with a neighbor s dog. On 8 February 2011, a social worker met with the child and believed Mr. White s wife coached the child on what to say during the interview. On 20 February 2011, Mr. White s wife reported that the child did not appear to have received a bath while visiting Ms. Wellons and the Grandparents. On 7 March 2011, Mr. White reported to Guilford County Social Services that Ms. Wellons had previously been involuntarily committed for mental illness. On 15 March 2011, Social Services received a report alleging Ms. Wellons socialized with heroin users. Throughout all these events, although Ms. Wellons still lived with her parents, the record does not indicate the Grandparents supervisory role over -13the child. Ultimately, Social Services determined neglected, but did not abuse, the child. Ms. Wellons It later specified that: (i) Ms. Wellons did not cooperate with the Social Services investigation; (ii) Ms. Wellons refused to enact a safety plan or follow through Grandparents with refused recommended to enact a services; safety and plan. (iii) the Resultingly, Social Services recommended the child not have visitation with either Ms. Wellons or the Grandparents. Wellons complete a parenting It also recommended Ms. evaluation and substance abuse assessment. On 1 April 2011, the district court entered an ex parte order granting Mr. White temporary sole custody. Until future hearing, the district court granted the Grandparents visitation only as district permitted court by did visitation privileges. Guilford not grant County Social Ms. Wellons Services. any The temporary Lastly, the ex parte order allowed Mr. White to request the Sheriff of New Hanover County or any law enforcement officer into whose hands a copy of this Ex Parte Order of Temporary Custody shall come, . . . to take such steps as may be necessary to physically secure the body of the child, and return that child to the actual custody of [Mr. White]. -14G. 15 August 2011 Custody Order A subsequent hearing occurred during the session of New Hanover County District Court. 15 April 2011 At the end of the hearing, the district court announced it was dissolving the ex parte order as to the Grandparents on the condition that they not allow Ms. Wellons to contact the child. The district court also required that the Grandparents next weekend visit occur in Burlington, but that all other visits occur as outlined in the previous orders. On 19 April 2011, a Guilford County social worker prepared a safety visits to assessment occur in requiring all Burlington to contacting the child. assessment the Grandparents prevent Ms. future Wellons from Because the Grandparents believed this contradicted the district court s 15 April 2011 requirements, they refused to execute it. Over the next several months, the parties disputed how to draft the written order. On 15 August 2011, the trial court resolved the disputes by entering a written order modifying the 1 April 2011 ex parte order. The new order: (i) dissolved the 1 April 2011 ex parte order as to the Grandparents (allowing them full visitation under the 28 December 2007 order); (ii) instructed the Grandparents not to allow Ms. Wellons to have any contact with the child; and (iii) granted the Guilford and New -15Hanover County authority to Departments authorize with the child. and of Social supervise Services Wellons Ms. exclusive visitation The court retained ongoing jurisdiction for future orders. H. 5 July 2012 Contempt Order On 22 September 2011, the Grandparents filed a motion to show cause why Mr. White was not in contempt. They referenced a particular incident that occurred on 27 June 2011. Social On that date, Mr. White met with Guilford County Services for a Child Family Team Meeting. At the meeting, he told Social Services: (i) the child was exposed to drugs and alcohol when he visited the Grandparents; (ii) the Grandparents let Ms. Wellons contact the child; (iii) Ms. Wellons had severe mental problems; and (iv) Ms. Wellons was on a heroin binge. As a result, Guilford County Social Services desired to suspend the Grandparents visitation. That day, Burlington. the child was visiting the Grandparents in After the meeting with Social Services, Mr. White used the 1 April 2011 ex parte order to have police retrieve the child from the Grandparents Burlington residence. The Grandparents alleged Mr. White has not let them see the child since this encounter. -16On 28 October 2011, Mr. White filed a motion to dismiss the Grandparents motion. allegations; instead Mr. White did not deny the Grandparents he argued the Guilford County and New Hanover County Departments of Social Services, as well as the child s therapist, had advised him not to allow the Grandparents to have district visitation. court visitation; Mr. never (ii) the White further actually 28 granted December 2007 contended: the order (i) the Grandparents failed to make specific findings regarding the Grandparents fitness; (iii) the Grandparents fundamental lacked right to standing; make and (iv) decisions Mr. White concerning the had a care, custody, and control of his child. On 30 March 2012, the district court entered an interim order: (i) denying Mr. White s motion to dismiss; (ii) granting the Grandparents motion to show cause; and (iii) declaring Mr. White to be in direct and wilful [sic] civil contempt of the prior Orders of the Court. The court then dissolved the 15 April 2011 order and reinstated the 28 December 2007 order in full. the It also allowed the Grandparents to continue to remain Interveners [in the case], with all of the rights and privileges of visitation given to them by the prior Order of 28 December 2007, without supervision. Lastly, it permitted Ms. -17Wellons to have the visitation privileges outlined in the 28 December 2007 order. The district court allowed Mr. White to purge his contempt by fully complying with the [30 March 2012] order. Additionally, the district court required Mr. White to fully comply[] with each subsequent custody order that s entered. The district court threatened imprisonment if Mr. White did not adhere to these terms. On 5 July 2012, the district court entered a final order containing the same terms as the interim order. On 10 July 2012, Mr. White filed timely notice of appeal from the 5 July 2012 order. II. Jurisdiction & Standard of Review This Court has jurisdiction to review the trial court s contempt ruling pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(c) (2011).8 When appellate reviewing court is a trial limited to court s contempt determining order, whether there the is competent evidence to support the trial court s findings and whether the findings support the conclusions [of law]. Shumaker v. Shumaker, 137 N.C. App. 72, 77, 527 S.E.2d 55, 58 (2000). 8 We note that the last sentence of the 5 July 2012 final order states This Cause is retained for further Final Order of the Court. We believe the district court mistakenly retained this language from the 30 March 2012 interim order. Therefore, we determine this clerical mistake does not divest us of jurisdiction. See N.C. R. Civ. P. 60(a). -18 The trial court s conclusions of law drawn from the findings of fact [in civil contempt proceedings] are reviewable de novo. See Tucker v. Tucker, 197 N.C. App. 592, 594, 679 S.E.2d 141, 143 (2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted). We review questions of standing in child custody actions de novo. See McKoy v. McKoy, 202 N.C. App. 509, 511, 689 S.E.2d 590, 592 (2010) jurisdiction is ( Whether a a question trial of court law, has subject-matter reviewed de novo on appeal. ); Estate of Apple ex rel. Apple v. Commercial Courier Exp., Inc., 168 N.C. App. 175, 177, 607 S.E.2d 14, 16 (2005) ( If a party does not have standing to bring a claim, a court has no subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claim. ). Under a de novo review, the court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the lower tribunal. State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 632-33, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008) (quoting In re Greens of Pine Glen Ltd., 356 N.C. 642, 647, 576 S.E.2d 316, 319 (2003)). III. Analysis On appeal, Mr. White makes four arguments. contends the Grandparents lacked standing. First, he Second, he argues the district court erred by granting the Grandparents visitation when: (i) he is a fit parent; (ii) the Grandparents initially intervened seeking custody, not visitation; and (iii) the -19Grandparents never filed a motion seeking visitation. Alternatively, Mr. White contends N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 50-13.2(b1) and 50-13.5(j) are unconstitutional. Lastly, Mr. White argues the him district court erred by holding in contempt. Upon review, we affirm in part, dismiss in part, and reverse as to contempt. A. Grandparent Visitation Statutes9 At common law, grandparents [have] no standing to sue for visitation of their grandchildren. Montgomery v. Montgomery, 136 N.C. App. 435, 436, 524 S.E.2d 360, 361 (2000). However, our legislature has enacted four statutes providing grandparents statutory standing to seek custody or visitation. Preliminarily, we discuss those four statutes. First, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.1(a) standing to seek custody at any time. grants grandparents See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50- 13.1(a) (2011) (providing standing to any . . . person . . . claiming the right of . . . custody or visitation ). Although this broad statute describes general standing to seek custody or visitation, our Supreme Court has applied canons of statutory construction to determine the statute only grants grandparents 9 For a more detailed discussion of grandparent visitation statutes, see Cheryl Daniels Howell, Third Party Custody and Visitation Actions: 2010 Update to the State of the Law in North Carolina, UNC Sch. of Gov t Family Law Bulletin, Jan. 2011, at 22 29. -20standing for custody, not visitation. See McIntyre v. McIntyre, 341 N.C. 629, 635, 461 S.E.2d 745, 750 (1995);10 see also Sharp v. Sharp, 124 N.C. App. 357, 360, 477 S.E.2d 258, 260 (1996) ( The McIntyre standing] holding was [that narrowly grandparents for the grandparents limited visitation to did suits not have initiated by and does not apply to suits for custody. ). To receive custody grandparents must Eakett, N.C. 157 prove App. under N.C. parental 550, Gen. Stat. unfitness. 553, 579 S.E.2d § 50-13.1(a), See 486, Eakett 489 v. (2003) (holding that grandparents must show that the parent is unfit or has taken action inconsistent with [his or] her parental status in order omitted)). initiates to gain of the child (citations The requirement to show unfitness if a grandparent a custody constitutionally dispute protected control of the child. U.S. 57 (2000)). 10 custody is right consistent to the with care, a parent s custody and Id. (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 However, under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.1(a), Specifically, the McIntyre court held, The legislature s creation of special statutes to provide for grandparents visitation rights suggests that it did not intend N.C. [Gen. Stat.] § 50-13.1(a) as a broad grant to grandparents of the right to visitation. McIntyre, 314 N.C. at 634, 461 S.E.2d at 749. Instead, the legislature intended to grant grandparents a right to visitation only on [the] situations specified in [those] three statutes, not in situations covered by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.1(a). Id. -21 grandparents are not required to prove the grandchild is not living in an intact family in order to gain custody. Id. (citations omitted). Second, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.2(b1) provides grandparents standing to seek visitation during an ongoing parental custody dispute. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.2(b1) (2011) ( An order for custody of a minor child may provide visitation rights for any grandparent of the child as the court, in its discretion, deems appropriate. ); see also Sharp, 124 N.C. App. at 363, 477 S.E.2d at 262 ( [N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.2(b1)] simply makes clear that grandparents have the right to file suit for custody or visitation during an ongoing proceeding. ). Third, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.5(j) provides grandparents standing to seek visitation after a court has entered a final custody order. However, grandparents must meet certain conditions: [i]n any action in which the custody of a minor child has been determined, upon a motion in the cause and a showing of changed circumstances pursuant to G.S. 50-13.7, the grandparents of the child are entitled to such custody or visitation rights as the court, in its discretion, deems appropriate. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.5(j) (2011). Our courts have added an additional requirement: the intact family rule. N.C. App. at 554, 579 S.E.2d at 489. Eakett, 157 -22Under initiate family the intact a lawsuit is already for family rule, visitation undergoing [a] rights some grandparent unless strain on cannot the child s the family relationship, such as an adoption or an ongoing custody battle. Id. The intact family rule is intended to protect parents constitutional right to determine with whom their child shall associate. Sharp, 124 N.C. App. at 360, 477 S.E.2d at 260)(quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Eakett, 157 N.C. App. at 554, 579 S.E.2d at 489. In North Carolina, an intact family is not limited to situations where both natural parents [live] together with their children; instead, it may include a single parent living with his or her child. Fisher v. Fisher, 124 N.C. App. 442, 445, 477 S.E.2d 251, 253 (1996) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Fourth, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.2A provides standing for grandparents to seek visitation when a child is adopted by a stepparent or relative. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.2A (2011) ( A biological grandparent may institute an action or proceeding for visitation rights with a child adopted by a stepparent or a relative of the child where a substantial relationship exists between the grandparent and the child. ). -23B. Standing Mr. White first argues the Grandparents lacked standing to: (i) pursue visitation rights; and (ii) file a subsequent show cause motion. We disagree. In North Carolina, [i]t is well-established that the issue of a court s jurisdiction over a matter may be raised at any time, even for the first time on appeal or by a court sponte. sua State v. Webber, 190 N.C. App. 649, 650, 660 S.E.2d 621, 622 (2008). If a party does not have standing to bring a claim, a court has no subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claim. Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 211 N.C. App. 267, 270, 710 S.E.2d 235, 238 (2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted). When a court decides a matter without the court s having jurisdiction, then the whole proceeding is null and void, i.e., as if it had never happened. Hopkins v. Hopkins, 8 N.C. App. 162, 169, 174 S.E.2d 103, 108 (1970). This Court has previously clarified that [a]lthough it is axiomatic in custody disputes between parents that [v]isitation privileges are but a lesser degree of custody[,] when a grandparent is seeking visitation with grandchildren, a claim for visitation may be distinct from a claim for custody and standing requirements differ for each claim. Rodriguez, 211 -24N.C. App. at 273, 710 S.E.2d at 240 (second and third alteration in original)(quotation marks and internal citation omitted). First, we discuss standing requirements when grandparents seek custody. Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.1(a), grandparents have standing to intervene for custody when they allege acts that would constitute [parental] unfitness, neglect [or] abandonment, or any other type of conduct so egregious as to result in [the parent s] forfeiture of his constitutionally protected status as a parent. [or her] McDuffie v. Mitchell, 155 N.C. App. 587, 591, 573 S.E.2d 606, 608 09 (2002) (second alteration in original). Grandparents do not attain standing under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.1(a) when they merely argue they have been estranged from the children for some time. Instead, they must allege Id. at 591, 573 S.E.2d at 609. specific facts showing parental unfitness, such as: (i) the parents have not provided safe and suitable housing for their children; (ii) the parents have not contributed to child support; (iii) the parents have not been involved in the children s upbringing; and (iv) the children are at substantial risk of harm from the parents. Sharp, 124 N.C. App. at 361, 477 S.E.2d at 260.11 11 In Sharp, the maternal grandparents filed a complaint against their daughter seeking custody of their grandchildren under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.1(a). Id. at 357, 477 S.E.2d at 258. The -25Next, we discuss standing requirements when grandparents seek visitation under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.2(b1) (2011). When the custody of the child [is] still in issue and [is] being litigated by the parents, then [t]he grandparents . . . [have] standing to seek intervention under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 5013.2(b1). Quesinberry v. Quesinberry, 196 N.C. App. 118, 122, 674 S.E.2d 775, 778 (2009) (quoting Smith v. Barbour, 195 N.C. App. 244, 252, 671 S.E.2d 578, 584 omitted)(alterations in original)).12 (2009) (quotation marks Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § grandparents alleged she was unfit because she: had not yet found suitable housing; [] had not provided a safe or stable home for the children; [] had relationships with several men and had moved around in both North Carolina and Pennsylvania; [] since the children resided with plaintiffs, she had not contributed to the support of the children; [] there is a substantial risk of harm to the minor children if in the physical custody of the defendant-mother ; and [] she was not emotionally stable enough to care for the children. Id. at 358, 477 S.E.2d at 258 59. The trial court dismissed the grandparents claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because there was no ongoing custody proceeding and the children s family was intact. Id. at 358, 477 S.E.2d at 259. In Sharp, this Court reversed and remanded because the grandparents alleged sufficient facts regarding parental unfitness to give them standing to intervene for custody. Id. at 363, 477 S.E.2d at 262. 12 In Quesinberry, both the maternal and paternal grandparents sought visitation during an ongoing parental custody dispute. Id. at 119, 574 S.E.2d at 776. The trial court subsequently -2650-13.2(b1), grandparents need not prove lack of intact family since an ongoing parental custody dispute exists. 157 N.C. App. at 554, 579 S.E.2d at 489. See Eakett, The trial court may award grandparent visitation in the subsequent custody order at its discretion. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.2(b1) (2011). In the instant case, Mr. White argues the Grandparents did not have standing to file a show cause motion. We disagree. First, the Grandparents had standing to seek custody when they filed their initial 3 August 2006 motion to intervene. There they alleged, inter alia, that: Mr. White had not yet exercised visitation alone with the child; and (ii) Mr. White is not currently able to provide a stable home environment. These allegations, if proven, could support a finding of conduct inconsistent with parental status. See Sharp, 124 N.C. App. at 361, 477 S.E.2d at 260 (holding that failure to participate in a child s upbringing or provide safe and suitable housing for a child could rise to the level of parental unfitness). they initially had standing to seek custody Thus, under N.C. Gen. entered a consent judgment resolving custody issues between the parents. Id. at 120, 574 S.E.2d at 777. Less than a month later, it awarded visitation to both sets of grandparents. Id. There, we affirmed the trial court s grandparent visitation determination because the grandparents initially sought visitation during an ongoing parental custody dispute. Id. at 123 24, 574 S.E.2d at 779. -27Stat. § 50-13.1(a). See McDuffie, 155 N.C. App. at 591, 573 S.E.2d at 608 09. The trial intervene in court its 30 addressed November the 2006 Grandparent s temporary motion custody to order. There, the district court: (i) temporarily transferred primary custody of the child from Ms. Wellons to Mr. White; and (ii) awarded the Although Grandparents the 4 April visitation 2006 order in had lieu of resolved custody.13 all ongoing parental custody issues at the time, the district court created a new ongoing parental custody dispute temporary primary custody to Mr. White. when it transferred See Quesinberry, 196 N.C. App. at 122, 674 S.E.2d at 778 (holding that grandparents have standing to seek visitation under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 5013.2(b1) during an ongoing custody dispute). 13 September 2007 hearing, the At the subsequent Grandparents dismissed their custody claim and instead sought only visitation under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.2(b1). Since there was a predicate ongoing dispute, the Grandparents had standing to seek visitation at the 13 September 2007 hearing. As a result, the trial court had jurisdiction to award them visitation in its 28 December 2007 custody 13 order, and the Grandparents later had standing to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.2(b1) allows a trial court s custody order to provide visitation rights for any grandparent of the child as the court, in its discretion, deems appropriate. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.2(b1) (2011). -28enforce their visitation rights through their 22 September 2011 show cause motion. Therefore, the trial court did not err by declining to dismiss the Grandparents show cause motion for lack of standing. C. Grandparent Visitation Next, Mr. White argues the trial court erred by granting the Grandparents visitation when: (i) he is a fit parent; (ii) the Grandparents visitation; and initially (iii) seeking visitation. the intervened Grandparents seeking never custody, filed a not motion In the alternative to this argument, Mr. White contends N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 50-13.2(b1) and 50-13.5(j) are unconstitutional. Upon review, we dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. In North Carolina, permanent child visitation and custody orders resolving appealable. all pending issues are generally final and Temporary custody and visitation orders, on the other hand, are interlocutory and not immediately appealable. See Dunlap v. Dunlap, 81 N.C. App. 675, 676, 344 S.E.2d 806, 807 (1986); Berkman v. Berkman, 106 N.C. App. 701, 702, 417 S.E.2d 831, 832 (1992) ( A temporary child custody order is interlocutory and does not affect any substantial right . . . which cannot be protected by timely appeal from the trial court s ultimate disposition . . . on the merits. (quotation -29marks and citation omitted) (first alteration in original)). However, [t]he trial court s mere designation of an order as temporary is not sufficient to make the order interlocutory and nonappealable. Rather, an appeal from a temporary custody order is premature only if the trial court: (1) stated a clear and specific reconvening time in the order; and (2) the time interval between the two hearings was reasonably brief. Brewer v. Brewer, 139 N.C. App. 222, 228, 533 S.E.2d 541, 546 (2000). Thus, when a custody or visitation order resolves all pending issues and does not state a clear and specific reconvening date within a reasonably brief time, the order is final and appealable. See id. Once a trial court issues a final appealable child custody or visitation order, it becomes the law of the case. The law of the case doctrine provides that when a party fails to appeal [that order], the decision below becomes the law of the case and cannot be challenged in subsequent proceedings in the same case. 910, 912 Boie v. D.W.I.T., 195 N.C. App. 118, 122, 670 S.E.2d (2009). Still, when a tribunal is faced with a question of its subject matter jurisdiction, . . . the goals of the law of the case doctrine are outweighed by the overriding importance and value of a correct ruling on this issue. v. N.C. Dep t of Envtl. & Natural Watts Res., No. COA09-1499, 2010 WL -302817055, at *3 (N.C. Ct. App. 20 July 2010); see also Am. Canoe Ass n v. Murphy Farms, Inc., 326 F.3d 505, 515 (4th Cir. 2003); Pub. Int. Res. Grp. of N.J., Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111, 118 (3rd Cir. 1997). The jurisprudential desire for finality giving rise to the law of the prohibition case on doctrine collateral also underlies attacks of North previous Carolina s orders. A collateral attack is one in which a plaintiff is not entitled to the relief demanded in the complaint unless the judgment in another action is adjudicated invalid. Thrasher v. Thrasher, 4 N.C. App. 534, 540, 167 S.E.2d 549, 553 (1969) (quotation marks and citation omitted). North prohibits this type of argument. Carolina case law clearly See Daniels v. Montgomery Mut. Ins. Co., 320 N.C. 669, 676, 360 S.E.2d 772, 777 (1987) (holding that the proper route to remedy erroneous orders is appeal, not collateral attack); In re Wheeler, 87 N.C. App. 189, 193, 360 S.E.2d 458, 461 (1987) (holding that for parties seeking relief from a prior erroneous order, the proper avenues [are] 1) appeal . . ., or 2) a motion for relief pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. Sec. 1A-1, Rule 60. ). defend themselves in contempt underlying For instance, parties may not proceedings judgment or order by collaterally attacking the they allegedly violated. See Wells v. Wells, 92 N.C. App. 226, 229, 373 S.E.2d -31879, 882 (1988) (holding that a plaintiff held in contempt for failure to pay alimony could not collaterally attack the underlying alimony judgment). In the present case, Mr. White argues the trial court erred by granting the Grandparents visitation when: (i) he is a fit parent; (ii) the Grandparents initially intervened seeking custody, not visitation; and (iii) the Grandparents never filed a motion seeking visitation. Alternatively, he contends N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 50-13.2(b1) and 50-13.5(j) are unconstitutional. Upon review, we conclude we do not have jurisdiction to decide these arguments based on the law of the case doctrine and the prohibition on collateral attacks. Here, Mr. White had a right to appeal the 28 December 2007 order granting visitation. him custody and granting the Grandparents Specifically, since the order provided a permanent custody and visitation schedule and did not state a clear and specific reconvening date within a reasonably brief time, the order was final and appealable. 533 S.E.2d at 546. Brewer, 139 N.C. App. at 228, When Mr. White failed to appeal the 28 December 2007 order it became the law of case, only subject to modification in subsequent orders upon a showing of a change of circumstances. See Gower v. Aetna Ins. Co., 281 N.C. 577, 579, 189 S.E.2d 165, 167 (1972) ( Since neither party appealed, the -32judgment entered established action. ); . the . . became respective Premier the rights Plastic law of Surgery of the Ctr., the case to parties PLLC and that v. Bd. of Adjustment for Town of Matthews, __ N.C. App. __, __, 713 S.E.2d 511, 518 (2011). Thus, Mr. White may not now challenge that order in his appeal from a related contempt order several years later. Furthermore, because, about unlike the his grandparent jurisdiction. law of standing visitation the case argument, do not doctrine Mr. applies White s implicate arguments subject See, e.g., In re K.J.L., 363 N.C. 343, 346, 677 S.E.2d 835, 837 (2009). to Mr. matter First, mere procedural deficiencies like the ones Mr. White alleges are not jurisdictional. as here White s constitutional challenge, this Second, Court has previously declined to consider arguments that parties should not have been found in contempt because the statutes on which the underlying judgment was based were unconstitutional. State ex rel. N.C. State Bd. of Registration for See Prof l Engineers & Land Surveyors v. Testing Laboratories, Inc., 52 N.C. App. 344, 347 48, 278 S.E.2d 564, 565 66 (1981). Consequently, we conclude the law of the case doctrine prohibits Mr. White from now challenging the 28 December 2007 visitation order in his appeal of the 5 July 2012 contempt order. -33Additionally, Mr. White s arguments about grandparent visitation constitute impermissible collateral attacks on the 28 December 2007 custody and visitation order. Here, Mr. White argues the trial court erred in its 5 July 2012 contempt order by reinstating the Grandparents visitation schedule from the 28 December 2007 order. Thus, his argument necessarily depends on his challenge to the validity of the 28 December 2007 order. Our case law prohibits this type of collateral attack. See Thrasher, 4 N.C. App. at 540, 167 S.E.2d at 553. In fact, our case in law has expressly prohibited parties contempt proceedings from collateral attacking the underlying orders they allegedly violated. S.E.2d at 882. White s See, e.g., Wells, 92 N.C. App. at 229, 373 In light of this precedent, we dismiss Mr. arguments regarding grandparent visitation as impermissible collateral attacks. Consequently, based on the law of the case doctrine and the prohibition on collateral attacks, we dismiss Mr. White s arguments about grandparent visitation for lack of jurisdiction. D. Contempt Third, Mr. White argues the district court erred by holding him in civil contempt. We agree. The purpose of civil contempt is not to punish but to coerce the defendant to comply with a court order. Cox v. Cox, -34133 N.C. App. 221, 226, 515 S.E.2d 61, 65 (1999); see also Bethea v. McDonald, 70 N.C. App. 566, 570, 320 S.E.2d 690, 693 (1984). This Court has elaborated that: [a] defendant s failure to comply with a court order [must be] willful. Then, following from this concept, for civil contempt to be applicable, the defendant must have the present ability to comply with the court order. Moreover, our Courts have required the trial court to make a specific finding as to the defendant s ability to comply during the period in which he was in default. Scott v. Scott, 157 N.C. App. 382, 393 94, 579 S.E.2d 431, 439 (2003) (internal citations omitted). Furthermore, a contempt order must specify how the person may purge himself of the contempt. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 5A-22(a) (2011); see also Cox, 133 N.C. App. at 226, 515 S.E.2d at 65 (holding that a contempt order must clearly specify what the defendant can and cannot do ); Scott, 157 N.C. App. at 394, 579 S.E.2d at 439 (holding that requirements to purge civil contempt may not be impermissibly vague ). In the instant case, the district court erred by failing to provide Mr. White a method to purge his contempt. On 5 July 2012, the district court declared [Mr. White] to be in direct and wilful [sic] civil contempt of the prior Orders of the Court. It suspended Mr. White s arrest based on the following condition: Defendant can purge his contempt by fully -35complying with the terms of the [30 March 2012] Interim Order, the prior Orders of 28 December 2007 and 27 July 2010 . . . , and this Order. The order did not establish a date after which Mr. White s contempt was purged or provide any other means for Mr. White to purge the contempt. We have previously reversed similar contempt orders. For instance, in Cox a contempt order stated the defendant could purge her contempt by not: plac[ing] either of the minor children in a stressful situation or a situation detrimental to their welfare. Specifically, the defendant is ordered not to punish either of the minor children in any manner that is stressful, abusive, or detrimental to that child. Cox, 133 N.C. App. at 226, 515 S.E.2d at 65. because the trial court failed to There, we reversed clearly specify what the defendant can and cannot do to the minor children in order to purge herself of the civil contempt. Id. Similarly, in Scott a contempt order stated: Defendant may postpone his imprisonment indefinitely by (1) enrolling in a Controlled Anger Program approved by this Court on or before August 1, 2001 and thereafter successfully completing the Program; (2) by not interfering with the Plaintiff s custody of the minor children and (3) by not threatening, abusing, harassing or interfering with the Plaintiff or the Plaintiff s custody of the minor children[.] -36Scott, 157 N.C. App. at 393, 579 S.E.2d at 438 (alteration in original). attend a There, although Controlled Anger we indicated Program may the requirement comport[] with to the ability of civil contemners to purge themselves, we reversed because the other two requirements were impermissibly vague. Id. at 394, 579 S.E.2d at 439. In the case at hand, the district court did not clearly specify what [Mr. White] can and cannot do to purge himself of contempt. Although Cox, the 133 N.C. district App. court at 226, 515 referenced S.E.2d previous at 65. orders containing specific provisions, it did not: (i) establish when Mr. White s compliance purged his contempt; or (ii) provide any other method for Mr. White to purge his contempt. allow the contempt. district court to hold Mr. White We will not indefinitely in Consequently, we reverse the portion of the 5 July 2012 order holding Mr. White in civil contempt. IV. Conclusion In conclusion, standing. Second, we we first dismiss determine Mr. the White s Grandparents arguments grandparent visitation for lack of jurisdiction. had regarding Lastly, the trial court erred by failing to provide Mr. White a method to purge his contempt. -37AFFIRMED in part, DISMISSED in part, and REVERSED as to contempt. Judges STEELMAN and GEER concur.

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