Woolard v. Robertson
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An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. NO. COA12-384 NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS Filed: 18 December 2012 LARRY PATE WOOLARD, Petitioner, v. Craven County No. 11 CVS 1127 MICHAEL ROBERTSON, COMMISSIONER N.C. DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES, Respondent. Appeal by respondent from an amended order entered 30 December 2011 by Judge Russell J. Lanier, Jr. in Craven County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14 November 2012. Gary H. Clemmons of CHESTNUTT, CLEMMONS & PEACOCK, P.A., attorney for petitioner. Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Christopher W. Brooks, for respondent. ELMORE, Judge. The N.C. Division of Motor Vehicles (respondent) appeals from an amended order finding that a discussion of reasonable grounds for the implied consent offense of driving while intoxicated (DWI) during petitioner s criminal trial, satisfied the elements of collateral estoppel for purposes of the -2companion civil license revocation hearing. After careful consideration, we affirm. I. Background On 27 March 2011, Trooper Michael Riggs was summoned to a single vehicle accident in Craven County. arrived at the scene, he (petitioner) standing nearby. observed When Trooper Riggs Larry Pate Woolard Petitioner acknowledged that the vehicle involved in the accident belonged to him, but he claimed that the vehicle had been stolen, and that someone else had dropped him off at the scene. Trooper Riggs did not observe anyone in the wrecked vehicle. Trooper Riggs then began to question petitioner. During his questioning, Trooper Riggs noticed that petitioner had red, glassy eyes and that his breath smelled of alcohol. Trooper Riggs then informed petitioner of his Miranda rights, and at some Riggs point that during he did the not interrogation, wish to petitioner answer any told more Trooper questions. However, based on the information that petitioner had already given during the interrogation, Trooper Riggs determined that petitioner had in fact driven his car that evening, and that he steered the car off the road and hit a mailbox. -3Trooper Riggs next attempted to administer a field sobriety test to petitioner, but petitioner declined to participate. Subsequently, Trooper Riggs arrested petitioner for the implied consent Police offense of DWI transported him There, Department. and to petitioner refused the New Bern to sign the implied consent rights form or to submit to chemical analysis pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 16.2(a). On 5 April 2011, respondent issued a letter in accordance with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-16.2(d), revoking petitioner s driving privilege for twelve months based on his refusal to submit to chemical analysis. Petitioner then requested an administrative hearing to contest the revocation. That request was granted, and the hearing was set for 6 July 2011. At the hearing, petitioner s counsel objected, under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-166.1(i), to the admission of any statements made by petitioner to Trooper Riggs in response to questions regarding the overruled the details of objection the accident. and affirmed The hearing officer petitioner s license revocation. On 15 July 2011, petitioner filed a petition with the trial court for judicial review of the administrative decision alleging 1) that the charging officer did not have reasonable -4grounds to believe that petitioner had committed the offense, 2) that the hearing officer did not have sufficient evidence to support the relevant findings of fact, and 3) that petitioner s license had therefore been erroneously revoked. The petition sought 1) reversal of the administrative hearing, 2) removal of the respondent s revocation of petitioner s driver s license, 3) and a temporary restraining order, preventing respondent from revoking petitioner s driving privileges pending judicial review. The temporary restraining order was granted by the trial court. Meanwhile, on 4 August 2011, related DWI criminal proceeding. a suppression order, finding the trial court held the There, the trial court entered that there were no reasonable grounds to believe that [petitioner] ha[d] committed an implied consent offense and dismissing the DWI charges against petitioner. Subsequently, petition for the judicial trial review court of the addressed petitioner s administrative decision. Initially, the trial court completed that review, and affirmed the agency s decision in a judgment entered 6 September 2011. Then, upon proper motion by petitioner, the trial court reassessed its decision to affirm the agency ruling, and in its -530 December 2011 amended order, the trial court reversed its 6 September 2011 judgment on the grounds that collateral estoppel prevented relitigation of the issues. Specifically, the amended order concluded that the effect of the September 6, 2011 order is to relitigate findings of law and fact against Petitioner that were finally and conclusively determined in Petitioner s favor in the DWI criminal proceeding by parties that are in privity with those presently before the Court. Respondent now appeals. II. Arguments Respondent presents three arguments on appeal: 1) that the trial court failed to apply the correct standard of review in its amended order, thereby erroneously applying collateral estoppel to reverse the agency s decision; 2) that the trial court erred in barring respondent from litigating on post- Miranda statements made by petitioner; and 3) that the trial court erred in failing to affirm the agency disagree with respondent s first argument. decision. We As such, we decline to address respondent s remaining arguments. III. Analysis Five elements must be shown for a court to invoke the doctrine of collateral estoppel: (1) a prior suit resulting in -6a final judgment or decree; (2) between identical parties or those in privity; (3) involving one or more identical issues; (4) that the specific issue was litigated and necessary to the prior judgment; and (5) that the specific issue was actually determined. Powers v. Tatum, 196 N.C. App. 639, 642, 676 S.E.2d 89, 92 (2009) (citation omitted). At issue here is factor 3, regarding whether one or more identical issues existed in both proceedings. Although a civil license revocation case and a criminal DWI case are independent of each other in terms of outcome . . . it does not prohibit the application provided of collateral that the estoppel requisite between elements are the shown. two cases, State v. Summers, 132 N.C. App. 636, 642, 513 S.E.2d 575, 579 (1999), aff'd, 351 N.C. 620, 528 S.E.2d 17 (2000). Thus, what we must review is whether the issue before the trial court existed to in the believe DWI criminal defendant proceeding, committed the whether grounds offense, would reappear before the trial court upon review of the agency s decision. In essence, what we must determine is if under the appropriate standard of review of an agency s decision by the trial court, would the trial court again be faced with determining whether Trooper Riggs had proper grounds to believe -7that petitioner committed the offense? We conclude that they would. This Court faced the identical question in Brower Killens, 122 N.C. App. 685, 472 S.E.2d 33 (1996). v. There, the trial court was asked to review de novo the petitioner s license revocation based on his refusal to submit to chemical breath analysis. This collaterally probable court estopped cause to held from arrest corresponding criminal trooper petitioner. the respondent, relitigating the insufficient had that petitioner prosecution had probable for was existence the DMV, of DWI, since the determined that the arrest the cause to We determined that the quantum of proof necessary to establish probable cause to arrest in criminal driving while impaired cases and civil license revocation proceedings, notwithstanding the different burdens on the remaining elements, is virtually identical. Id. at 690, 472 S.E.2d at 37. Nonetheless, respondent argues that the standard of review referenced by this Court in Brower, de novo, has changed, and as a result, under the new standard of review prescribed in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-16.2(e), the trial court would not be faced with determining whether committed the offense. grounds existed We disagree. to believe petitioner -8Indeed, the standard of review prescribed in the statute was changed by our General Assembly in 2007. As indicated by Brower, the old standard of review on appeal from a license revocation hearing was de novo. statute, the trial court s However, according to the new review of the agency s decision shall be limited to whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the Commissioner s findings of fact and whether the conclusions of law are supported by the findings of fact and whether the Commissioner committed an error of law in revoking the license. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-16.2 (2012). However, regardless of this change, it is clear from the new standard of review that the trial court would nonetheless be making a determination of the application of the appropriate law. The language whether the commission committed an error of law implies a de novo review of the applicable law and its application to the facts and conclusions made by the reviewing agency. Here, the applicable law to be reviewed was probable cause, or grounds, to believe petitioner committed the offense charged. This is the same issue determined by the trial court, in petitioner s favor, in its 4 August 2011 order. The trial court correctly identified this premise in its 30 December 2011 amended order from which respondent appeals. -9There, the trial court correctly noted that with respect to determining whether the Commissioner committed errors of law the standard of review remains de novo. to agree with respondent that incorrect standard of review. the trial court closely the As such, we are unable trial court applied the It is clear from its order that followed the standard prescribed in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-16.2(e). of review As a result, we conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that collateral estoppel prevented relitigation of the issues. Affirmed. Judges STROUD and BEASLEY concur. Report per Rule 30(e).
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