In re M.P

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An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. NO. COA12-363 NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS Filed: 2 October 2012 IN THE MATTER OF: M.P. Durham County No. 09 J 244 Appeal by respondent parents from order entered 31 January 2012 by Judge Nancy E. Gordon in Durham County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 4 September 2012. Deputy County Attorney Cathy L. Moore, for petitionerappellee Durham County Department of Social Services. Associate Counsel Deana K. Fleming, for guardian ad litem. Richard Croutharmel, for respondent-appellant mother. Hunt Law Group, P.C., by James A. Hunt, for respondentappellant father. HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge. Respondents mother and father appeal separately from the trial court s 31 January 2012 permanency planning order changing the juvenile s permanent plan to guardianship and appointing the foster parents as the juvenile s guardians. Respondents each argue that the trial court was not authorized to appoint the -2foster parents as the juvenile s guardians and that it erred by ceasing reunification efforts. Respondent mother additionally argues to the trial court failed find it was not in the juvenile s best interests to be placed with a maternal relative. We affirm. The juvenile M.P. was born in January of 2009. In March 2009, the Durham County Department of Social Services ( DSS ) investigated a report of domestic violence between respondents and found respondents to be in need of in-home services. After DSS intervention, respondents continued to engage in acts of domestic violence and abuse drugs and alcohol. On 10 September 2009, DSS filed a petition alleging the juvenile was neglected and dependent, and the juvenile was placed with the foster parents, K.S. and A.H. On 18 November 2009, Judge James T. Hill entered an order adjudicating the juvenile neglected and dependent pursuant to stipulations by respondents. Judge Hill authorized a trial placement of the juvenile with L.C., the juvenile s maternal great-grandmother, while home. placement The trial respondent-mother with L.C. lived ended on in the same or about 24 November 2009, because respondent-mother was jailed and because L.C. was not able to care for the juvenile without assistance. -3Judge Hill then ordered the juvenile be returned to the foster parents. On 11 August 2010, Judge Hill entered a permanency planning order in which he set a concurrent reunification and guardianship. foster placement. permanency remain in Judge planning the respondents orders care with of permanent plan of The juvenile remained in the Hill entered in which the he foster visitation. Judge subsequent ordered parents Hill review the juvenile and denied and provided the foster parents motions to intervene in the matter. Following a hearing on 7 and 8 December 2011, the trial court entered another permanency planning order. The trial court concluded it was in the juvenile s best interests to be placed in a guardianship with the foster guardianship the juvenile s permanent plan. gave notice of appeal. The trial court parents and made Respondents each entered an amended permanency planning order on 31 January 2012, and respondents again entered notice of appeal. On appeal, respondents each argue the trial court did not have the authority to appoint the foster parents, an unmarried couple, as guardians for the juvenile. argument is that as The crux of respondents two separate individuals with no legal -4relationship to one another, the foster parents are not a single legal entity capable of being appointed to be a guardian for the juvenile. We disagree. Respondents argument is dependent on their own interpretation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-600, which authorizes the trial court to appoint a guardian for a juvenile when the court finds doing so would be in the juvenile s best interests. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-600(a) (2011). Respondents claim the statute s use of the singular guardian, rather than the plural guardians, means it only permits appointment of a person or legal entity, such as a married couple. interpretation, definitions however, section includes the plural, feminine singular and otherwise specified. ignores specifically the the provides masculine masculine fact and that feminine Such an Chapter [t]he singular single singular includes plural 7B s the unless N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101 (2011); see also In re E.X.J., 191 N.C. App. 34, 48, 662 S.E.2d 24, 32 (2008), aff d per curiam, 363 N.C. 9, 672 S.E.2d 19 (2009). Thus, contrary to respondents argument, we attach no significance to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-600 s use of the singular guardian rather than the plural guardians. -5Furthermore, adopting respondents narrow reading of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-600 would frustrate the statute s purpose by substantially limiting a trial court s authority to appoint the guardian or guardians best able to provide for a juvenile s best interests. In this case, the trial court appointed the foster parents as the another case guardians, could also but the require the unique circumstances appointment of of multiple unmarried guardians to protect a juvenile s best interests. As the juvenile s best interests are of paramount importance under Chapter 7B, we decline to adopt respondents restrictive reading of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-600(a). See In re J.H.K., 365 N.C. 171, 176, 711 S.E.2d 118, 121 (2011) (the juvenile s best interests are the polar star in a Chapter 7B proceeding). Finally, respondents also attempt to pick specific language from Chapter 35A of the General Statutes, which addresses appointment of a guardian in cases where an individual is found to be incompetent, to supplement their interpretation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-600. As the proceeding below was conducted pursuant to Chapter 7B, rather than Chapter 35A, and as the creation of the guardianship in this case was unrelated to competency, the provisions of Chapter 35A cited by respondents are not relevant. -6Respondents also each contend the trial court made insufficient findings of fact pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7B507 and 7B-907 (2011) reunification efforts. and abused its discretion by ceasing We disagree. In a permanency planning order: If the juvenile is not returned home, the court shall enter an order consistent with its findings that directs the department of social services to make reasonable efforts to place the juvenile in a timely manner in accordance with the permanent plan, to complete whatever steps are necessary to finalize the permanent placement of the juvenile, and to document such steps in the juvenile s case plan. N.C. Gen. Stat. § court the continues placement 7B-907(c) (2011). juvenile s responsibility of a Furthermore, [i]f placement county in the department custody of the or social services, the provisions of G.S. 7B-507 shall apply to any order entered under this section. Id. In this case, the trial court s order sets a permanent plan of guardianship and accomplishes that permanent plan by placing the juvenile in guardianship with the foster parents. We have previously held that placing a juvenile in a guardianship does not necessarily efforts. 651 obviate the need for further reunification In re E.C., 174 N.C. App. 517, 521, 621 S.E.2d 647, (2005). But findings related to future reunification -7efforts when a necessary when child is placed in a guardianship are only guardianship is not the permanent plan. Id. Thus, because guardianship was the permanent plan in this case, findings related to reunification efforts were because the permanent plan had been accomplished. not necessary In addition, the order does not place the juvenile in DSS custody, so N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-507 does not apply. Consequently, we hold that the trial court was not required to make findings related to further reunification efforts and we do not need to review the sufficiency of any such findings. Finally, respondent mother argues the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact that it was contrary to the juvenile s best interests to be placed with the maternal greatgrandmother. We disagree. In placing a juvenile outside of the home: [T]he court shall first consider whether a relative of the juvenile is willing and able to provide proper care and supervision of the juvenile in a safe home. If the court finds that the relative is willing and able to provide proper care and supervision in a safe home, then the court shall order placement of the juvenile with the relative unless the court finds that the placement is contrary to the best interests of the juvenile. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-903(a)(2)(c) (2011). -8This Court has recognized that Chapter 7B gives a preference, where appropriate, to relative placements over nonrelative, out-of-home placements. 689, 701, 616 S.E.2d 392, 399 In re L.L., 172 N.C. App. (2005), abrogated on other grounds, In re T.H.T., 362 N.C. 446, 665 S.E.2d 54 (2008). L.L., we remanded a permanency planning order for In further findings of fact where the trial court placed a juvenile with a foster family without making any specific finding that placement with [the relative] would not be in [the juvenile s] best interests. Contrary to Id. at 704, 616 S.E.2d at 401. respondent mother s argument, however, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-903(a)(2)(c) did not require the trial court to either place the juvenile with L.C. or to make findings as to why placement with L.C. was interests in this case. contrary to the juvenile s best Instead, the statute first required the court to consider whether a relative is willing and able to provide proper care and supervision of the juvenile in a safe home. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-903(a)(2)(c) (2011) (emphasis added). Here, the trial court made findings demonstrating that it considered whether L.C. was able to provide the juvenile with proper care and a safe home. The trial court s findings -9establish that it considered L.C. s testimony, reviewed the prior orders entered in the matter, and took judicial notice of those orders. In the initial dispositional order in the matter, Judge Hill ordered the juvenile placed in a trial placement with L.C. That placement ended within about a week because L.C. was not able to care for the juvenile. Although L.C. expressed a willingness to attempt to care for the juvenile in her testimony at the permanency planning hearing, nothing in L.C. s testimony contradicted the findings in the inability to care for the juvenile. prior orders about her Thus, the trial court s findings demonstrate that it satisfied N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-903 by first considering whether L.C. was an able relative placement, and the trial court was not required to make further findings of fact. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court s order placing the juvenile in a guardianship with the foster parents. Affirmed. Judge BRYANT and BEASLEY concur. Report per Rule 30(e).

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