Ruiz v Franklin Cnty. Animal Control
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An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. NO. COA12-286 NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS Filed: 2 October 2012 JESSICA RUIZ, Plaintiff, v. Franklin County No. 11 CVS 307 FRANKLIN COUNTY ANIMAL CONTROL, and GRAHAM STALLINGS, Defendants. Appeal by defendants from order entered 15 December 2011 by Judge Donald W. Stephens in Franklin County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 30 August 2012. A. Scott Hamilton for plaintiff appellee. Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, LLP, by Robert T. Numbers, II, Julie B. Bradburn, and Kristen Y. Riggs, for defendant appellants. McCULLOUGH, Judge. Franklin Director of County Animal Franklin County Control Animal and Graham Control, in Stallings, his official capacity (collectively, defendants ), appeal from an order of the trial court denying a motion seeking the entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants as to Jessica Ruiz -2( plaintiff ) s argue the claim trial for court negligence. erred by On appeal, declining to defendants enter summary judgment in their favor on the basis of governmental immunity. We reverse and remand for entry of judgment in favor of defendants. I. Background On 21 defendants, March 2011, alleging that certain Animal Control Animal Control resulted plaintiff individual and the Officers impounded and euthanized. whether plaintiff in a complaint negligence employed plaintiff s of by dog against Stallings Franklin being and County improperly Plaintiff s complaint did not specify intended official filed to sue Stallings capacities. in Plaintiff s both his complaint sought both compensatory and punitive damages. On 28 October 2011, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting, inter alia, that summary judgment should be entered in their favor based on the doctrine of governmental immunity. On 15 December 2011, the trial court entered an order granting in part and denying in part defendants motion for summary judgment. The trial court dismissed with prejudice any claim against Stallings in his individual capacity, as well as plaintiff s claim for punitive damages. However, the trial -3court denied defendants motion for summary judgment as plaintiff s remaining negligence claim against defendants. to On 28 December 2011, defendants filed a timely written notice of appeal from the trial court s order. Plaintiff did not likewise file an appeal from the trial court s order. II. Appealability and Standard of Review Defendants argue, and plaintiff concedes, that this Court may immediately review the merits of their appeal from the trial court s interlocutory order denying basis of governmental immunity. summary judgment on the See Estate of Earley v. Haywood Cnty. Dep t of Soc. Servs., 204 N.C. App. 338, 339, 694 S.E.2d 405, 407 (2010) (noting that the denial of a motion for summary judgment is appealable). interlocutory We agree. and ordinarily is not immediately This Court has consistently allowed immediate review of orders denying dispositive motions grounded on the defense of governmental immunity[,] as they affect a substantial right. Hedrick v. Rains, 121 N.C. App. 466, 468, 466 S.E.2d 281, 283, aff'd, 344 N.C. 729, 477 S.E.2d 171 (1996); see also Owen v. Haywood Cnty., 205 N.C. App. 456, 458, 697 S.E.2d 357, 358-59 (denial of motion for summary judgment on grounds of governmental immunity immediately appealable as -4affecting a substantial right), disc. review denied, 364 N.C. 615, 705 S.E.2d 361 (2010). The standard of review for a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment is de novo. Forbis v. Neal, 361 N.C. 519, 524, 649 S.E.2d 382, 385 (2007). Under a de novo standard of review, this Court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes court. S.E.2d its own judgment for that of the trial Reese v. Mecklenburg Cnty., 200 N.C. App. 491, 497, 685 34, whenever 38 the (2009). movant Summary establishes [plaintiff's] claim. a judgment complete is appropriate defense to the Earley, 204 N.C. App. at 340, 694 S.E.2d at 407 (alteration in original) (quoting Overcash v. Statesville City Bd. of Educ., 83 N.C. App. 21, 26, 348 S.E.2d 524, 528 (1986)). III. Application of Governmental Immunity in this Case Defendants first argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in failing to grant summary judgment in their favor based allege on governmental defendants complaint. immunity waiver of because plaintiff governmental failed immunity in to her We agree. Defendants are correct that this Court has expressly held that [w]here a complaint fails to allege that immunity has been -5waived, the complaint fails to state a cause of action. In re Kitchin v. Halifax Cty., 192 N.C. App. 559, 567, 665 S.E.2d 760, 765 (2008) (holding trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of defendants where plaintiffs' failed to allege a waiver of governmental immunity). complaint In order to overcome a defense of governmental immunity, the complaint must specifically allege a waiver of governmental immunity. Absent such an allegation, the complaint fails to state a cause of action. Paquette v. County of Durham, 155 N.C. App. 415, 418, 573 S.E.2d 715, 717 (2002) (citation omitted). has consistently governmental disallowed entities waiver of immunity. no allegation of when Id. waiver claims the based complaint on This Court tort failed to against allege a It is well-established law that with in a plaintiff's complaint, the plaintiff is absolutely barred from suing the state and its public officials in their official capacities in an action for negligence. Vest v. Easley, 145 N.C. App. 70, 74, 549 S.E.2d 568, 573 (2001). Here, plaintiff s complaint states that defendant Stallings, as Director of Animal Control, is employed by the County of Franklin and was so employed on the days in question. Further, it appears from the record there is no dispute among -6the parties that Franklin County Animal Control is an entity operated by the County. there is no dispute Likewise, it appears from the record among the parties activities are governmental functions. that animal control Governmental functions are those which are discretionary, political, legislative, or public in nature and performed for the public good in behalf of the State. Educ., 137 Herring N.C. v. App. Winston-Salem/Forsyth 680, 683, 529 S.E.2d County 458, 461 Bd. of (2000) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The well-settled law in this State is that [g]overnmental immunity shields municipalities and the officers or employees thereof sued in their official capacities from suits based on torts committed while performing a governmental function. Earley, 204 N.C. App. at 340, 694 S.E.2d at 407 (quoting Kephart v. Pendergraph, 131 N.C. App. 559, 563, 507 S.E.2d 915, 918 (1998)); see also Meyer v. Walls, 347 N.C. 97, 104, 489 S.E.2d 880, 884 (1997) ( Under the doctrine of governmental immunity, a county is immune from suit for the negligence of its employees in the exercise immunity. ). of governmental functions absent waiver of Thus, governmental immunity applied to defendants in this case, as plaintiff appears to recognize, and plaintiff -7has failed to allege in her complaint that defendants waived that immunity. Even if Thus, her action was subject to dismissal. plaintiff had alleged in her complaint that defendants had waived governmental immunity by the purchase of liability insurance, a review of the record and this Court s prior case law reveals that her contention that defendants waived their immunity defense is without merit. It is well-established that a county can waive governmental immunity through the participation in purchase such of governmental coverage. a purchase local liability government liability immunity of only risk insurance to the pool; waives extent insurance or however, the the of county s insurance N.C. Gen. Stat. ยง 153A-435(a) (2011); see Dickens v. Thorne, 110 N.C. App. 39, 43, 429 S.E.2d 176, 179 (1993) ( [A] municipality liability in may waive tort for its governmental negligent or immunity intentional for civil damage by purchasing liability insurance, but only to the extent of the insurance coverage. ). A governmental entity does not waive sovereign the immunity if action brought against excluded from coverage under their insurance policy. them is Lunsford v. Renn, 207 N.C. App. 298, 308, 700 S.E.2d 94, 100 (2010) (quoting Patrick v. Wake Cty. Dep't of Human Servs., 188 N.C. -8App. 592, 596, 655 S.E.2d 920, 923 (2008)), disc. review denied, 365 N.C. 193, 707 S.E.2d 244 (2011). Defendants acknowledge the activities of Franklin County Animal Control and its officers are covered under an insurance policy included in the record. The liability insurance policy contains the following provision: The Pool will pay on behalf of the Covered Person all sums which the Covered Person shall become legally obligated to pay as money damages because of a Wrongful Act occurring while a Covered Person is acting within the course and scope of the Covered Person s duties to perform Law Enforcement and Animal Control Activities which results in Personal Injury, Bodily Injury, or Property Damage. In particular, this provision covers Animal Control Officer[s], who are defined as any Participant [here, Franklin County] or those employed by a Participant, regardless of department assigned, who is designated as dog warden, animal control officer, animal control official or other designation that may be used and whose responsibility includes enforcing city, county, and state laws governing the care and keeping of animals, including the impoundment, care and disposal of domestic and wild animals as appropriate. Nonetheless, the insurance policy further provides, in a section denoted Exclusions, that coverage is not provided for any claim, demand, or cause of action against any Covered -9Person as to which the Covered Person is entitled to sovereign immunity or governmental immunity under North Carolina Law[.] Additionally, the policy contains a specific provision, denoted Immunity, that sets forth the intentions of the parties not to waive entitlement to governmental immunity: The parties to this Contract intend for no coverage to exist under Section VI (Law Enforcement Liability Coverage) as to any claim for which the Covered Person is protected by sovereign immunity and/or governmental immunity under North Carolina law. It is the express intention of the parties to this Contract that none of the coverage set out herein be construed as waiving in any respect the entitlement of the Covered Person to sovereign immunity and/or governmental immunity. As defendant properly contends, this Court has previously considered these identical provisions in a county insurance policy, holding that such provisions clearly indicate that the county did not waive governmental immunity from the plaintiff's particular claim through the purchase of the insurance policy. See Earley, 204 N.C. App. at 341-43, 694 S.E.2d at 408-09. In Earley, this Court acknowledged the arguably circular nature of the logic behind the holding: [d]efendant retains immunity because the policy doesn't cover his actions and the policy doesn't cover immunity. his actions because he Id. at 343, 694 S.E.2d at 409. explicitly retains Nonetheless, here, -10as in Earley, [t]he facts are that the legislature explicitly provided that governmental immunity is waived to the extent of insurance coverage, eliminates any claims Because that this governmental but potential would be Court, immunity the waiver barred in subject by Earley, when by the insurance excluding sovereign upheld county s the from contract coverage immunity. application liability Id. of insurance policy contained an express exclusion identical to the one at issue in the present case, we are bound by such precedent. In the Matter of Appeal from Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989) ( Where a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided the same issue, albeit in a different case, a subsequent panel of the same court is bound by that precedent, unless it has been overturned by a higher court. ). Moreover, in addition to Earley, this Court has repeatedly upheld summary judgment in favor of a municipality on the basis of governmental immunity where the subject insurance policy contains such exclusionary provisions. See, e.g., Lunsford, 207 N.C. App. at 308-10, 700 S.E.2d at 100-01; Patrick, 188 N.C. App. at 595-97, 655 S.E.2d at 923-24. Here, as we stated previously, there is no dispute in the record that Franklin County Animal Control and Stallings, in his -11official capacity as an Animal Control Officer, were performing a governmental function in impounding and euthanizing plaintiff s dog, thereby entitling them to governmental immunity from plaintiff s negligence action. Plaintiff failed to allege in her complaint that defendants waived governmental immunity, subjecting her action to dismissal. In addition, here, as in Earley, the language of both the applicable statute and the exclusion clause in the insurance contract is clear. 204 N.C. App. at 343, 694 S.E.2d at 409-10. genuine issue of material fact concerning Earley, There remains no whether defendants have waived governmental immunity as to plaintiff s negligence action. The affirmative defense complete bar to liability. of governmental immunity is a Clayton v. Branson, 170 N.C. App. 438, 449, 613 S.E.2d 259, 268 (2005). Accordingly, we must reverse the trial court s denial of summary judgment and remand for the entry of summary judgment as to plaintiff s remaining negligence claim in favor of defendants Franklin County Animal Control and Graham Stallings, in his official capacity. Vacated and remanded for entry of judgment for defendants. Judges HUNTER, JR., and ERVIN concur. Report per Rule 30(e). -12-
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