ROBERT T. GOLDMAN v. GAIL H. MAUTNER

 
(NOTE: The status of this decision is Published.)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

ROBERT T. GOLDMAN,

Plaintiff-Respondent/

Cross-Appellant,

v.

GAIL H. MAUTNER,

Defendant-Appellant/

Cross-Respondent.

_______________________________

ArguedMarch 24, 2015 Decided April13, 2015

Before Judges Reisner, Haas and Higbee.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, Docket No. FM-07-1478-03.

Eric S. Solotoff argued the cause for appellant/cross-respondent (Fox Rothschild, LLP, attorneys; Mr. Solotoff, of counsel and on the brief).

Stephen P. Haller argued the cause for respondent/cross-appellant (Einhorn, Harris, Ascher, Barbarito & Frost, attorneys; Mr. Haller and Jennie L. Osborne, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

This case returns to us after remand proceedings directed by our previous opinion. Goldman v. Mautner, No. A-0620-09 (App. Div. April 17, 2012). In a March 1, 2013 order, the trial judge modified certain paragraphs of the December 11, 2009 order for Amended Final Judgment of Divorce. Among other things, the judge imputed income of $414,000 per year to defendant; awarded defendant alimony of $9500 per month for four years; required plaintiff to pay child support of $1453 per week with extracurricular expenses to be shared seventy-five percent by plaintiff and twenty-five percent by defendant; and allowed each party to claim one child as a tax deduction. The judge also valued defendant's fifty percent share of the marital portion of plaintiff's 401(k) and the Fidelity Investment account as of the date of distribution, and vacated the paragraph in the December 11, 2009 order finding that defendant received $10,000 more than plaintiff during the pendente lite period.

In addition, the parties were ordered to distribute assets on or before April 12, 2013, and provide updated statements as to the balance of all accounts subject to equitable distribution by the same date. Plaintiff was required to "obtain and maintain" $110,000 in life insurance with defendant as beneficiary to cover his alimony obligation and $1,000,000 in life insurance with the children as beneficiaries to cover his child support obligations.

Finally, the judge ordered defendant to pay fifty percent of plaintiff's counsel fees and costs incurred during an earlier custody trial, and the two appeals filed concerning the issue of custody. The judge ordered plaintiff to pay one-third of defendant's counsel fees and costs "incurred prior to the economic trial and post-custody trial." The specific time period covered by this ruling was not identified. Otherwise, the judge ruled that the parties were each responsible for their own counsel fees and costs. The judge also required each party to pay half of the fees of a court-appointed expert, Rubin. The judge made no findings concerning the reasonableness of any of these fees and did not quantify the amounts involved.

Defendant filed a notice of appeal from the March 1, 2013 order, and plaintiff followed with a cross-appeal. Because portions of the order, particularly those involving counsel fees, appeared to be interlocutory, we temporarily remanded the matter to the trial judge. The judge then issued additional orders dated May 8, 2013, June 3, 2013, and August 14, 2013.1

In the June 3, 2013 order, the judge stated that "the calculation of each party's contribution to the other party's legal fees," could not be determined until after the judge conducted plenary hearings concerning "petitions for attorney charging liens that were filed by two of defendant's former attorneys." The judge stated that "[u]pon conclusion of said hearings, the court shall then order the specific amount that each party is to pay the other party." The judge made no further findings or rulings concerning the subject of counsel and expert fees relating to the custody and economic trials in the August 14, 2013 order.

Thereafter, the parties filed amended notices of appeal to include the March 1, May 8, June 3, and August 14, 2013 orders. On appeal, the parties claim numerous errors implicating most of the court's rulings regarding alimony, child support, and counsel fees and allocation, as well as other rulings made during the course of the remand. We dismiss, as interlocutory, the parties' challenges to the allocation of counsel fees, costs, and expert fees for the custody and economic trials. In all other respects, we affirm the trial court's March 1, May 8, June 3, and August 14, 2013 orders.

I.

The parties are fully familiar with the procedural history and facts of this case and, therefore, they will not be repeated in detail in this opinion. The parties were married in September 1993, and commenced their divorce proceedings in January 2003. Therefore, they have already been litigating the terms of their divorce for almost three years longer than the duration of their marriage. The parties have two children, a son born in 1996 and a daughter born in 1998. All members of the family are healthy, and none have special needs.

Before proceeding to discuss the specific arguments the parties raise on appeal, we set forth our standard of review. The scope of our review of the Family Part's order is limited. We owe substantial deference to the Family Part's findings of fact because of that court's special expertise in family matters. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998). Thus, "'[a] reviewing court should uphold the factual findings undergirding the trial court's decision if they are supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence on the record.'" MacKinnon v. MacKinnon, 191 N.J. 240, 253-54 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007)).

While we owe no special deference to the judge's legal conclusions, Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995), "we 'should not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless . . . convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice' or when we determine the court has palpably abused its discretion." Parish v. Parish, 412 N.J. Super. 39, 47 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting Cesare, supra, 154 N.J. at 412). We will only reverse the judge's decision when it is necessary to "'ensure that there is not a denial of justice' because the family court's 'conclusions are [] "clearly mistaken" or "wide of the mark."'" Id. at 48 (alteration in original) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008)).

II.

We will now address the issues raised by the parties in the present appeal.

A. ALIMONY

On remand, the trial judge ordered plaintiff to pay defendant $9500 per month in limited duration alimony for a period of four years. Defendant challenges this figure. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that defendant's contentions lack merit.

Defendant first argues that the judge "never appropriately fixed plaintiff's income for support purposes or conducted any analysis of it" and that this failure caused errors in both the alimony and child support obligations. We disagree. While it is true that the judge did not set a dollar amount on plaintiff's annual income, she found that he was "a significant wage earner" with income in excess of $1,000,000 annually. Thus, the judge concluded that plaintiff could afford whatever support obligations were ordered. Under these circumstances, the judge's findings concerning plaintiff's income were sufficient and we defer to them.

Defendant next asserts that the judge "once again, grossly, if not contradictorily overstated defendant's income." In the last appeal, we reversed the trial court's initial imputed income figure of $450,000 to $500,000 per year, finding that defendant could not have earned more than $414,000 using her highest earnings from 2008.

On remand, the judge followed our direction and fully addressed this issue. Based on her testimony at trial, the judge found that defendant had been working twenty hours a week since 2006, except for the first half of 2007 when her hours were even less because of the divorce litigation. Using defendant's 2008 income of $207,000 as "the most recent," the court found that defendant "could easily increase her work hours from 20 hours/week to a full-time schedule of 40 hours/week" and that if her hours doubled, "her annual income would likewise double." Therefore, the court imputed income of $414,000 per year. Contrary to defendant's contention, this finding is amply supported by the record.

In her present appeal, defendant continues to argue that the judge erred in finding she was underemployed and, therefore, it was inappropriate to impute income to her. However, we affirmed the judge's prior findings on this point in our prior opinion, where we stated

Substantially for the reasons stated by the trial court, we affirm the determination that imputation of earnings for full-time work is appropriate because [defendant] could be but is not working full-time. It is well-supported by the record. [Defendant] is in her forties, healthy, educated and experienced in her field and has continuously practiced dermatology. The parties share residential custody of their children, who were of school age at the time of trial. In short, there is nothing in this record that indicates that [defendant] cannot work full-time or that such work in her field is unavailable.

[Goldman, supra, slip op. at 32-33.]

Thus, the only issue the trial judge was required to address on this subject was the amount of income to be imputed to defendant. We therefore decline to consider defendant's contention that no income should be imputed to her.

Defendant next argues that the judge erred in calculating the marital lifestyle. Again, the record does not support this contention. In our prior decision, we directed the judge to "clarify [her] findings with respect to the marital standard of living . . . ." Id. at 40. The judge fully complied with this directive and conducted a thorough and extensive review of the evidence presented.

Defendant's expert opined that the parties' marital lifestyle was $32,154 per month, while plaintiff's expert pegged this figure at $20,144 per month. The judge determined that the "parties' marital lifestyle" approximated $25,000 per month, and thoroughly explained how she arrived at that figure. The judge did not use the Case Information Statements submitted by the parties, because they were not supported by adequate documentation, and the parties had relied upon the expert reports for their respective positions. Instead, the judge used defendant's expert's analysis "as a starting base" and "made certain adjustments to the amounts calculated by the expert to more accurately determine the parties' marital lifestyle."

The judge reduced a number of the expenses defendant claimed, finding that they were artificially inflated by the inclusion of expenses that were non-recurring. The judge also noted that the parties' "expenses spiked in 2002-03 when the divorce proceedings were contemplated and commenced" and, therefore, she averaged the expenses for 1999 to 2001 in order to "carve out any aberrant increases caused by the parties' divorce-driven incremental spending." In her written decision, the judge included a chart showing all of her calculations. Based upon her reasoned analysis of the record, the judge determined that the parties' marital lifestyle was $304,217 per year, or $25,351 per month. We discern no basis to disturb the judge's determination. Cesare, supra, 154 N.J. at 412.

Contrary to defendant's contention on appeal, the judge's decision to grant defendant $9500 per month in alimony included "a savings component." As noted, the judge correctly imputed $414,000 annual income to defendant, which was $34,500 per month. After adding in the $9500 per month alimony award, defendant would have $44,000 per month to meet the marital lifestyle of $25,351 per month, and ample funds left over to put toward savings. Therefore, we reject defendant's contention on this point.

B. CHILD SUPPORT

On remand, the judge determined that plaintiff should pay defendant $1453 per week in child support for the parties' two children. Defendant claims the judge did not adequately explain the basis for this ruling, but that contention is not supported by the record.

The parties' combined income levels exceed the maximum child support guidelines and, therefore, "the maximum amount provided for in the guidelines should be 'supplemented' by an additional award determined through application of the statutory factors in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a)" in the court's discretion. Isaacson v. Isaacson, 348 N.J. Super. 560, 581 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 174 N.J. 364 (2002). "In the context of high-income parents whose ability to pay is not an issue, 'the dominant guideline for consideration is the reasonable needs of the children, which must be addressed in the context of the standard of living of the parties.'" Strahan v. Strahan, 402 N.J. Super. 298, 307 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting Isaacson, supra, 348 N.J. Super. at 581). To determine the needs of a child in a high-income family,

a balance must be struck between reasonable needs, which reflect lifestyle opportunities, while at the same time precluding an inappropriate windfall to the child or even in some cases infringing on the legitimate right of either parent to determine the appropriate lifestyle of a child. This latter consideration involves a careful balancing of interests reflecting that a child's entitlement to share in a parent's good fortune does not deprive either parent of the right to participate in the development of an appropriate value system for a child. This is a critical tension that may develop between competing parents. Ultimately, the needs of a child in such circumstances also calls to the fore the best interests of a child.

[Isaacson, supra, 348 N.J. Super. at 582 (citations omitted).]

Here, the judge applied these principles in determining the amount of child support due the children. The judge first completed a standard child support worksheet, which set plaintiff's initial obligation at $253 per week. She then considered each of the statutory criteria for determining child support as set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, and made detailed findings concerning the reasonable needs of the children. After carefully considering these criteria, the judge determined that each child should receive an additional $600 per week in child support, which would include $50 per week in spending money, a $212 weekly clothing allowance, and additional money for "activities, food and other miscellaneous expenses." The court recognized that the $1453 per week total support would "sound excessive to the average person," but found that the figure "reasonably reflect[ed]" the marital lifestyle.

When determining child support awards, "the trial court has substantial discretion." Gotlib v. Gotlib, 399 N.J. Super. 295, 308 (App. Div. 2008); see also Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 594 (1995). A child support award that is consistent with the applicable law "'will not be disturbed unless it is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary, or clearly contrary to reason or to other evidence, or the result of whim or caprice.'" Gotlib, supra, 399 N.J. Super. at 309 (quoting Foust v. Glaser, 340 N.J. Super. 312, 315-16 (App. Div. 2001)). Applying that standard to the judge's detailed findings, there is no basis for disturbing the judge's child support determination.

The judge also ruled that plaintiff was responsible for paying seventy-five percent of the children's unreimbursed medical, extracurricular activity, and summer camp expenses. Defendant asserts the judge should have ordered plaintiff to pay one hundred percent of these costs. We disagree.

Both parents have an obligation to support their children. Koelble v. Koelble, 261 N.J. Super. 190, 194 (App. Div. 1992). Here, the parties share parenting time with the children, with defendant having the children eight days out of every fourteen. Under those circumstances, it was certainly reasonable for the judge to require defendant to contribute a fair share of these expenses. Moreover, the only two expenses that defendant specifically identifies in her brief as being problematical, the cost of the parties' daughter's dance lessons and their son's soccer equipment, are already covered in the $1453 weekly child support payment. See Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, Appendix IX-A to R.5:6A at 2632 (2015).

C. ARREARS

In her March 1, 2013 order, the judge modified the four-year alimony award from $8500 per month to $9500 per month, effective August 21, 2009. Thus, plaintiff retroactively owed defendant the difference. When the parties could not agree on the amount due, they each filed motions to set the amount of the arrears. Defendant also sought an order requiring plaintiff to immediately pay the arrears in full and granting her interest on the amount due.

In her August 14, 2013 order, the judge determined that plaintiff was $32,564.82 in arrears for child support and alimony, and modified the effective date of the support provisions to September 1, 2009. On August 31, 2013, plaintiff's obligation to pay $9500 per month in alimony to defendant terminated. However, the judge ordered that he continue to pay her $9500 per month until the arrears were paid in full. The judge denied defendant's request for interest on the amount due.

On appeal, defendant contends the judge should have ordered that plaintiff pay the entire arrears in one lump sum. This issue is now moot because the parties agree that plaintiff has paid the arrears. We also reject defendant's argument that the judge erred by declining to impose interest on the arrears. Rule 5:7-5(a) provides that "[f]or past-due alimony . . . payments . . ., the court may . . . assess a late interest charge against the adverse party at the rate prescribed by Rule 4:42-11(a)." However, the award of interest is discretionary. Clark v. Clark ex rel. Costine, 359 N.J. Super. 562, 571-78 (App. Div. 2003). Thus, it was within the judge's discretion to reject defendant's request for interest because the arrears were caused by the court's change in the alimony amount, rather than by any recalcitrance on plaintiff's part.

We also reject defendant's contention that the judge miscalculated the amount of the arrears. The judge fully explained her calculations and her determination is amply supported by the record. Cesare, supra, 154 N.J. at 412.

Finally on this point, we reject defendant's contention that the judge erred by denying her request for counsel fees concerning the motions filed on the arrears issue. The judge explained that she denied defendant's motion because the only reason that motion practice was required to resolve this issue was because of "defendant's unwillingness to resolve the issue outside the motion venue" and because "a substantial portion of the relief that she sought in her cross-motion was not granted by the court." These findings are fully supported by the record and we perceive no basis for disturbing the judge's decision denying defendant's request for counsel fees on this motion.

D. DEPENDENCY DEDUCTIONS

In our prior decision, we directed the trial judge to "provide findings and conclusions of law relevant to the sharing of tax exemptions stated in the judgment" on remand. Goldman, supra, slip op. at 41-42. The judge had previously ordered that each party could claim one of the children as a dependent, and she reiterated this conclusion on the remand. In response to our directive, the judge explained in her March 1, 2013 decision that she ordered that each party shall claim one child as a tax deduction "because the parties have shared physical custody and because plaintiff is making significant financial contributions to the children's support and expenses."

Defendant's argument that the judge erred by splitting the dependency deductions between the parties is not persuasive. It is well settled that the Family Division has "the power to exercise authority to effectively allocate exemptions through use of its equitable power." Gwodz v. Gwodz, 234 N.J. Super. 56, 62 (App. Div. 1989). We review the judge's decision using an abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 63. We discern no abuse of discretion here. Despite the parties' disparity in income, the judge correctly noted that plaintiff is paying substantial child support and has parenting time six out of every fourteen days. Thus, the judge acted equitably in splitting the exemptions between the parties.

E. LIFE INSURANCE

On remand, the trial judge ordered plaintiff to obtain $110,000 in life insurance to secure his alimony obligation. Defendant argues that this figure was inadequate. Because plaintiff has paid all the alimony due defendant, and his obligation to pay alimony has ended, defendant's argument on this point is moot.

The judge also ordered plaintiff to "obtain and maintain life insurance in the amount of $1,000,000 naming the parties' children as beneficiaries to cover his child support obligation." This figure was clearly adequate given the age of the children, the fact that plaintiff has remained current in his obligation, and the decreasing total amount of any child support that will have to be paid prior to the children's emancipation.

F. "STANDARD LANGUAGE"

In our prior opinion, we commented on the trial judge's decision directing the parties to prepare a final judgment of divorce incorporating undefined "standard language" concerning such topics as "emancipation, cohabitation, etc." that were not otherwise specifically ordered or addressed by the judge. We directed the judge not to include such a provision in any order issued on remand. The judge complied with this directive.

In spite of this, defendant now argues that the judge failed to "eliminate the language from [her] prior decision that the 'standard language' be included in the judgment." Because none of the orders issued on remand include such a provision, defendant's argument on this point lacks merit.

G. EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION

Defendant argues that the trial judge erred in requiring the parties to provide updated statements from all accounts subject to equitable distribution and reallocating those funds even though that issue was affirmed in the prior appeal and not part of the remand. We disagree.

The judge had previously determined that certain funds subject to equitable distribution were to be divided equally between the parties with certain exceptions for pre-marital or otherwise exempt assets. In our prior decision, we found no error in the judge's determination to exempt the initial balances in certain accounts, and the increases in their value, from equitable distribution. Goldman, supra, slip op. at 28. However, we found no justification for treating plaintiff's 401(k) and his Fidelity Investment account differently from other assets that were directed to be valued as of the time of distribution. Therefore, we directed the judge on remand to fix the value of defendant's share of the plaintiff's two retirement accounts at the time of distribution. Id. at 28-29.

In accordance with that directive, and to effectuate distribution of all subject accounts, the judge directed the parties to provide updated account statements within thirty days of the March 1, 2013 order. In the June 3, 2013 order, and based on the documentation provided by the parties, the court found the following balances on plaintiff's account to be subject to equitable distribution: (1) Fidelity Investment - $553,060 as of February 28, 2013; (2) Merrill Lynch - $130,115.27 as of December 31, 2012; and (3) 401(k) - $238,801.81 as of March 22, 2013. Each party's share would be fifty percent of the total, or $460,998.54 using the figures provided, but the figures were to be updated to reflect the amounts on the date of distribution which was to be on or before August 1, 2013.

The judge also found defendant's Fidelity Account (No. 1717) to be subject to equitable distribution and the February 28, 2013 balance of $161,263.98 was to be divided equally. The $26,897.07 that defendant withdrew to pay her attorney and the $5000 she withdrew to pay an expert were to be added back for purposes of equitable distribution unless defendant could produce an order authorizing those withdrawals within thirty days.

On appeal, defendant does not specify what specific assets were "re-allocate[d]" and she does not challenge the determination that the funds were to be valued as of the date of distribution. With the exception of the provision adding back funds that the judge found defendant used to pay her attorney and expert before calculating the parties' shares, the judge did not alter the equal division of those funds subject to equitable distribution. Defendant was given time to submit an order authorizing the withdrawals, and she did not do so. She makes no specific allegation that the withdrawals were otherwise justified or inaccurate. Given the lengthy time between the amended judgment in 2009, and the remand order in 2013, it was reasonable for the court to request updated documentation of the assets that had not yet been distributed. Therefore, we reject defendant's arguments concerning equitable distribution.

Defendant also contends the judge erred in appointing an expert, Fernandez, to assist with the recalculation of defendant's share of plaintiff's retirement accounts and the exempt portion of plaintiff's Merrill Lynch account. She also asserts she should not have been required to equally share the cost of this expert. This argument lacks merit.

In the June 3, 2013 order, the judge found that because the parties were not able to agree on the growth and exempt amount in the Merrill Lynch/Smith Barney account, an expert was required. Contrary to defendant's contention, the judge did not exceed the scope of our remand by appointing an expert to calculate the amount to be distributed as part of equitable distribution. The court did not alter the provision equally dividing the marital portion of the account, but merely crafted a means to effectuate the distribution of the assets in light of the parties' failure to comply with an earlier order directing them to calculate the growth. Under these circumstances, the judge's order requiring both parties to equally contribute to this expense was clearly reasonable.

Plaintiff argues that the March 1, 2013 and May 8, 2013 orders should be amended to establish the marital portion of his 401(k) and Fidelity account "as of the date of the complaint for divorce plus investment experience to date of distribution." He also argues that the trial court "should be directed to modify paragraph 11 of these orders" to address financial statements defendant did not provide and "how the value of these accounts plus growth will be determined." These arguments lack merit.

In our prior opinion, we noted that the final judgment divided all but two of the banking and investment accounts as of the date of distribution; the exceptions were plaintiff's 401(k), which was valued as of December 31, 2007, and the Fidelity Investment Account, which was valued as of "the time of trial." Goldman, supra, slip op. at 28-29. "Consequently, [plaintiff] will receive the benefit of any increased value attributable to [defendant]'s share between the date used for valuation and the date of distribution." Id. at 29. Finding "no justification for treating these like assets differently," the court directed the trial court "to amend the judgment to correct this disparity." Ibid.

The March 1, 2013 and May 8, 2013 orders comply with this directive and modify the judgment to provide that defendant's share of plaintiff's 401(k) and Fidelity Investment account shall be valued at the time of distribution. In the June 3, 2013 order, the judge calculated the marital portion of plaintiff's accounts but indicated that the figures were "stale and need to be updated to reflect the amounts on the date of distribution" that the court set as August 1, 2013.

Thus, the judge complied with our directive to change the valuation date to the date of distribution in order to be in line with the valuation date of the other like assets. Plaintiff offers no legal basis to change that determination.

Plaintiff also argues that the judge erred by failing to address "how the equity in the former marital home to be equally divided between the parties is to be calculated." He claims he is entitled to a credit for the pay down of principal between the date of the trial and the date of the first opinion because he had continued to pay the mortgage pursuant to the pendente lite order.

However, we decided this issue in our prior opinion. In the December 11, 2009 amended final judgment that was the subject of that opinion, the judge ruled that each party was entitled to one half of the net equity in the former marital home. Using the stipulated value of $1,541,500, and the $227,325 mortgage existing at the time of the trial, the judge calculated that the net equity was $1,314,175. We affirmed the equal division of marital assets. Goldman, supra, slip op. at 3-4. Thus, we reject plaintiff's contention.

Finally, in the December 11, 2009 judgment that we reviewed in our prior opinion, the judge included a provision that stated that "[i]n the event that defendant received $10,000.00 more of advance equitable distribution from marital assets pendente lite, the distribution shall be equalized and plaintiff shall receive the additional funds prior to division of assets ordered pursuant hereto." On appeal, we found that "[t]here is no explanation in the court's opinion for this provision of the judgment" and "[t]he court abused its discretion in leaving the parties to resolve a question that the court apparently concluded could not be resolved on the record." Id. at 31. Accordingly, we directed that plaintiff, "as the party apparently seeking this credit, had the burden of establishing his entitlement to it" and "on remand, if the court cannot resolve the issue on the record as it stands, this provision must be eliminated from the judgment." Ibid.

In the March 1, 2013 order, the trial judge vacated that provision from the judgment because "plaintiff failed to establish that defendant received $10,000 more than plaintiff during the pendente lite withdrawal of marital assets." Plaintiff contends the judge erred in reaching this conclusion, but the record fully supports her decision.

In arguing that defendant received $10,000 more in equitable distribution than he did, plaintiff points to correspondence that shows that he paid $10,000 to cover defendant's share of deposition costs. He asserts that he was never repaid for that amount and, therefore, defendant received a $10,000 windfall. However, in order to fully prove that claim, plaintiff would have had to provide the judge with a complete accounting of all of the funds paid by each party during the lengthy pendency of this litigation so that a determination could be made whether plaintiff's payment of the deposition costs was not offset by some other payment or distribution of the parties' assets. Plaintiff did not provide that information on the remand and, accordingly, we see no reason to disturb the judge's conclusion that plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof on this issue.

H. ATTORNEY'S FEES, COSTS, AND EXPERT FEES

On appeal, defendant contends the judge abused her discretion in awarding legal fees to plaintiff for the custody trial and the two interlocutory appeals concerning custody. Defendant also argues the judge erred in denying her request for counsel fees and costs, and she asserts the judge incorrectly ordered the parties to equally share the $125,000 cost of a court-appointed expert, Rubin. Plaintiff does not dispute the judge's orders concerning counsel fees, including the requirement that he pay one-third of defendant's counsel fees and costs "incurred prior to the economic trial and post-custody trial." However, because the specific time period covered by this ruling was not identified, plaintiff asks that the judge "be required to define the period of 'prior to the economic trial and post-custody trial' so that the parties can properly comply with the trial court's directive to provide a breakdown of fees incurred during this delineated portion of the trial . . . ."

Unfortunately, we are constrained to once again remand the issue of counsel fees, costs, and expert fees. In our prior opinion, we directed the judge to "state findings" on all of the factors set forth in Rule 5:3-5(c). Goldman, supra, slip op. at 44. We noted that the judge "did not quantify the fees the parties incurred, paid and owed" and had not "discussed the reasonableness of legal fees awarded to [plaintiff] or fixed the amount." Id. at 44-45.

In the March 1, 2013 order, the judge addressed the Rule 5:3-5(c) factors, and established the percentages of the fees the parties would have to pay. However, the judge failed to "quantify the fees the parties incurred, paid, or owed"; "discuss[] the reasonableness" of the fees awarded; or "fix[] the amount" of the fees each party was required to pay. Ibid. Therefore, we remanded this issue to enable the judge to more fully address the issue.

In the June 3, 2013 order, the judge responded by determining to conduct plenary hearings concerning the claims of two of defendant's former attorneys for fees. The judge stated that, after those hearings were completed, she would then "order the specific amount that each party is to pay the other party." That has not yet been accomplished.

It is "well settled that a judgment, in order to be eligible for appeal as a final judgment, must be final as to all parties and all issues." Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 2 on R. 2:2-3 (2013); see Smith v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 421 N.J. Super. 374, 383 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 209 N.J. 96 (2011) (holding that in order for a "judgment to be final and therefore appealable as of right, it must dispose of all claims against all parties") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, the March 1, 2013 and June 3, 2013 orders are plainly interlocutory because the question of attorney's fees, costs, and expert fees for the custody and economic trials remain unresolved. The parties should not have filed their present appeals until that question was fully settled by the trial judge.

"Ordinarily, appellate courts seek to avoid 'piecemeal litigation' and the 'premature review of matters.'" House of Fire v. Zoning Bd., 379 N.J. Super. 526, 531 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting Moon v. Warren Haven Nursing Home, 182 N.J. 507, 513 (2005). Thus, both parties' appeals are subject to dismissal. Nevertheless, in an effort to facilitate a fair and final resolution of the disputed issue, we have resolved the bulk of the issues raised by the parties. See R. 2:4-4(b)(2) (permitting us to grant leave to appeal as within time).

However, because we still have no final decision by the trial judge as to the amount of the fees due, or findings as to the reasonableness of the fees, we must dismiss this portion of the appeals as interlocutory, and remand to the trial court for a full and complete determination of the fee issues. On remand, the court must comply with our prior directive to address the parties' respective financial circumstances, including income and assets, as they relate to the determination of the fee issues, and to quantify the reasonableness of the fees incurred by each party.

The court must also determine the exact amount of fees attributable to each stage of the litigation. The court must define what period of time is covered by the court's award of one-third of defendant's fees "incurred prior to the economic trial and post-custody trial" as well as determine the reasonableness and specific amounts due thereon. The court must also make similar findings concerning the $125,000 expert fee due Rubin. The parties may not file an appeal as of right concerning counsel fees, costs, or expert fees relating to the custody or economic trials prior to a final decision by the trial court on these issues. To recap, so that there is no confusion on this point, as with any final money judgment, a final order must include the exact numerical amounts of the fees and costs that each party is obligated to pay to the other party or to an expert.

Finally, defendant's argument that, if this matter is remanded, a new judge should be assigned is without sufficient merit to require discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed in part; dismissed in part and remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

1 As they pertain to the present appeals, the pertinent provisions of these orders will be addressed in detail below.