SPOKLIE v MT DEPT OF FISH WILDL
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No: 02-462 1% THE SOPREME COURT OF 'THE STATE OF kf0NTANA ')002 - 'MT 238 ROBEKT SPOKLIE and SPOKLiE EXTERPRLSES, LLC, Pla~ntiifs Respondents. and L p*{A $,&I MONTAXA DEPARTMENT OF FISH, WILDLIFE & PARKS, ~* .~..*J*.. ,~ 1L a lij[<jZ Defetidants and Appclla~lts, and SPORTSMEh FOR 1-143, MONTANA WILDLIFE FEDERATlOh, Defe~ldant-lnten enors and Appeiiants. APPEAL. FROM: District Court of the Fifteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Sheridan, The Honorable David Cybuiski, Judge presiding. COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellants: Hon. M ~ k McGrath, Attorney General; Chris D. Tweeten, e ChtefCivrl Counsel, Helena. Montana(Departmcnt ofFish, W~ldlife& Parks) Jack R. Tuliolske, Attorney at Lawl Missoula, hlontaiia (blontaiia LVildlife Federation) Elizabeth A. Brciinan, Rossbach Brennan, P.C., blissoula, Monlana(b1ontaita Wild1 i fc Federation) For Responderits: Loren J. O'Tooie 11, O'Toole & O'Toole, Plenty\vood, I\ilontana Submitted on Briefs: Scpteniber 26, 2002 Decldcd Filed: r # - A October 10, 2002 Just~ce Terry '\;. Trieweiier delivered the Opinion ofthe Court. 71 Thc Plaintiffs. Robert Spuklie and Spoklie Enterprises, I.LC, brougi~i action for this a declaratory judgment against the Defendant, "Vlontatla Department of Fish, W~ldlrfe & I'arks, in the District Court for the Fifteenth Judicial District in Sheridan County, in an effort to enjoin FWP from enforcing its interpretation of Initiative 143's "fee shooting" probisions bvhich are now found at 5 87-4-414(2), MCA. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction which prohibits FWP from interfering with Spoklie's sales of alternative livestock (clk) to tl~~rdpersons, if the third persons subsequently shoot ilte elk at Spokl~e's eten faeil~ty. FWP and Defendant-intervenors Sportsmen for 1-133 and Monrana CVildlife Federat~on (hereinafter "Sports~nen"), moved to dissolve the prelilninary injunction. The District Court denied that motion. FWP and Sportsmen appeal from the order denying the motion to dissolve thc preliminary injunction. We reverse the order of the District Cout-t. 12 The issue on appeal is whether the District Court's preliminary injunction interferes with FCVP's enforcement of $ 87-4-414(2), ILICA, and is therefore prohibited by 3 27-19- 103(4), MCA. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROC'ND 73 Plaintiff Robert Spoklie owns alternative livestock, including elk, located at Spoklie Elk Ranches in Sheridan County. and Spoklie Enterprises, LLC, in Flathead County. Spoklie i s partial obvner ofboth Spoklie Elk Ranches, which owns orre alterr~ative livestock licertsc. 4 0 1Kovernber 7,2000, voters passed 1-143, which "prohibit[s] new game farms, 1 prohibitjs] transfer of existing game hrn3 licenses, and prchibitjs] shooting o f game fann a~rirnals a fee." The proponelits of 1-143 stated in the voter pamphlet that 1-143 ~vould fbr "stop the unethical captive shooting of penned big game animals, also knoan as 'canned hunts."' In addition, the proponents stated that further regulation of the game farm industry was necessary to reduce the health risks game farm livestock pose to other wildlife. 1-143 had a November 7,2000, effective date. 75 FWP drafted new polrcies and procedures retlcct~ngthe 1-143 "fee shoot~i~g" amendments, and on December 28, 2000, FWP sent a letter to all alternative libestock lrcerlsees infornrtng them of the new policies. Enclosed mith that letter were copies of a letter stating FWP's "policy decisions for the shooting and transfer issues," and a letter setting forth FWP's legal analysis in support of the ne\b policy decisions. The "policy decisions" letter %as a December 15, 2000, lctter from Patrick Graham, Director of FWP, to Duane of Douglas, Cha~rn~an the Alteniatibe Llr estock Advisory Council. The letter stated that, kit11 the 1-143 amendments in effect: Persons who acquire ownership in altetnativc livestock after November 7, 2000 are not permitted to dispatch their animals with a high-powered rifle, boiv and arrow or crossbocv. Only the licensee, principle [sic] manager or DVbI (designated agent) is allowed to so dispatch alternative livestock that have had ownership transferred to persons other than an alternative livestock licensee after November 7; 2000. 'I he second letter was dated December 12. 2000, and was from Robert Lane, Chief Legal Counsel for 17WP,to Pat Graham, Director of FWP. It set forth the following rationale: 3 -. ~h t ~hangcs 87-4-414(2) make it clear that a liccnsce is prohibited from -. to permitting the shooting or harvesting of alternative livestock on a licensed facility when it is for a fee. It is the interpretation oftile FWP iegal unit that after the effective datc of the initiative the electorate intended to remove from tlze list of labvful activities that a person other than the licensee could engage in on an alternative livestock facility, the right to shoot or harvest game or alternative livestock with a bow and arrow, cross-bow or high powered riflc for a fee. Because ofthe difficulty in being able to establish whether or not a particular shooting or harvesting was or was not for a fee the only practical means of enforcing the prohibition is to limit the shooting of animals on alternative livestock facilities to the license owner or principal manager. This is in keeping with the policy of the Department established prior to passage of 1-143 that on an alternative livestock facility which was not licensed as a shooter facility that only the owner or principal manager was pern~ittedto dispatch game or alternative livestock on that facility. The following scenario is provided to illustrate the scope of this interpetation. After the effective date of the initiative when a licensee sells an animal to a non-licensee whether or not there was any probision for'boarding'the animal, part of the purchase prlee ts presumed to he the use of the facility to shoot the a111mal. The game farm violating licensee cannot then allow the neb+ ownerto shoot the a11nnal ~vithout the lau. Therefore, restricting the killing of alternative livestock to the manager is a reasonable means of pre~enting posstble a licensee or princ~pal violation of 87-4-414(2). In this way the rights of the new ouner are not impacted since the nen onner of the animal can use the licensee or pr~neipal manager to dlspatch the animal for them if they so desire. The only thing the neu alternative livestock owner is losing is the experience of shooting, for a fee, the alternative livestock which is exactly the activity that persons other than an alternative livestock licensee can no longer engage in as aresult of the initiative. 76 1 Spoklics filed a complatnt in the Disti-tct Court on September 28,2001, rn which they rcy~testeda tcniporary restraining order (TRO), a preliminary injunction, a permanent nijunctton, and declaratory judgment that FWP's new polteies \%ere not e~lforceable. Spoklies did not challenge the constitrttionaiity of 1-143; rather, Spoklies claimed that FWP's policy decisions incorrectly interpreted the 1-143 "fee shooting" and liccnsc transfer provisions. Spoklies aliegcd that FWP's erroneous inte~pretarion 143 "prcvci~is ofiPlaintiffs fiom icgaliy sciiirrg their Iivcstoch to a b m a fide purchaser ivho may desire to dispatch h i s or her newly acquired property at Plaintiffs' ranches." Spoklies complaint, as amended, claimed that their business was cotnpliant with the codification of 1-143 at 5 87-4-414(2); MC'A, because they merely sold elk to third parties and that "[olnce the new owner takes legal possession of the animal, he or she can choose to field slaughter the animal if he or she so desires at the rai~ches arrange for the transport of the live animal offthe premises," but or that "once purchased, it is up to the buyer to arrange for the transportation of that animal from the ranch." 77 1 Spoklies further claimed that FWP's enforcement or threat to enforce its new policy ~vould cause irreparable injury because they would lose at least 13 pending sales, estimated at $71,000; they would lose approximately 70% of the gross revenue from farming and I-anchingoperations; and, they would default on their loans and lose their ranch properties. 78 The District Court granted a TRO on September 28, 2001, and sent notice to FWP. The TRO ordered FLVP to "immediately cease, desist and restrain from initiating enforcement actions against Plaintiffs for selling theirprivately-owned alternative livestock to third parties who then seek to harvest their newly acquired property at Plaintiffs' facility and against the third parties who purchase the livestock . . . ." On October 4.2001, FWP mowd to dissolve the 7'f101 on Octobcr 5,2001, FWP appeared at the show cause hearing and contended and that tj 27-10-103(4), MC:A, prohibited enjoining enforcement of a sralute far the p~rblic hcnefit. 49 1 Orr October- i 5 1 200:; Sportsmen moved to intenene in the proceedings. Spokljes opposed that motion. On October 22, 2001, the District Court granted the prelirninary injunction against FWP, continued the stay imposedby theTRO, and rejected FWP's motion to dissolve the TRO. 110 On h'ovembcr 8,2001, Spoklies moved to amend its complaint and to certify the case as a class action. Spoklies later moved to request oral argument on this motion. 71%1 On November 27, 2001, the District Court denied Sportsn~en's motion to intervene. We accepted supervisory control over the intervention issue, and permitted Sportsmen to intervene on February 19, 2002. That Opinion and Order is found at Sportsnieiz For 1-143 v, Fifieejzth Jtid. Churt, 2002 MT 18. 308 Mont. 189,40 P.3d 400. 1 2 On June 5,2002, Sportsmen and FWP filed ajoint motion to dissolve the preliniinary i~~junetion, contending the injunction was \vrongfully issued as a matter of law in violation of 3 27-19-103(4), MCA. '113 On June 15, 2002, the District Court denied Spoklies' motion for oral argument for being untinicly, grrtntcd Spoklics' motior~for certifying a class action, and denied the joint motion to dissolve tile prelirninary injunction. The court concluded that the injunction did not enjoin FWP's enforcelnent o f $ 87-4-414, MCA. but that FWP's policy was inconsistent with tlic language of 5 57-4-414(2), MCA. Pi14 FWP and Sportsmen appeal that pa12 of the order chat denicd the joint motion to disiolte the prelrm~rrary injunclron STANDARD OF REVlEW :I15 Generally, when reviewing a district court's order granting or denying an injurtction, we apply an abuse of discretion standard. Hc~generv. Wallace, 2002 MT 109?1 12, 309 1 Mont. 473, ./ 12,47 P.3d 8 4 7 , l 12. However, where "the district court bases its decision to grant such relief upon its interpretation of a statute, no discretion is involved and we review the district court's coiiclusion of law to determine whether it is conect." Fiuge~zer, 12 i! (citing M.H. v. Morztana High School Ass?? (1"306), 280 Mont. 123, 130,929 P.2d239,243). 6 Accordingly. we will review the District Court's conclusions of law and interpl-etation of 3 87-4-414(2j, MCA, for correctness. Where those conclusions are correct, "we will not intcrfcre with the court's exercise of discretion unless there is a showing of manifest abuse of such discretion." Mont. Tavern Ass?? v. State, ijept. ofRevetlue, 224 Mont. 258,263,729 P.2d 1310, 1314 (citations omitted). ISSUE 1 : 17 ! Preli~ninarily must decide whether to consider the argument Spoklies raise for the we first time on appeal, that FWP and Sportsmen failed to comply with the affidavit and hearing a requircmcnts for a niotion to dissol~e preliminary injunction? $18 Spoklies contend that the District Court should be affirmed because FWP and Sportsmen failed to support their motion to dissolvc tlrc preliminary injunctiol-i with an affi-fidavitas required by 5 27-19-401, MCA, and that no hearing was held, as required by 3 27-19-304, MCA. Sportsmen respond that Spoiclies did not raise either ofthese issues i n thc District Court. 1 9 We will not consider issues that are raised for the iirst time on appeal. In re,\,i(lrricrge of Binsfiell (l995), 209 Mont. 336, 344, 888 P.2d 88") 894. Spoklies did not raise the affidavit or hearing issues before the District Court. Therefore, we decline to consider them on appeal. DISCUSSION 120 The issue on appeal is whether the District Court's preliminary injunction interferes with FWP's enforcenient of 5 87-4-414(2), MCA, and is therefore prohibited by $; 27-19- 103(4), MCA. 2 1 The District Court concluded that the preliminary injunction did not interfere with the enforcenient of 5 87-4-414(2), MCA (as amended by 1-143). The District Court gave the following explanation: 87-4-414 MCA bans the "...shooting of. ...alternative livestock ....for a fee ..." The Montana Fish, Wildlife, and Parks policy decision and interpretation of this statute goes far beyond the statutory language, saying, among other things, "Persons who acquire ownership in alternative livestock after November 7> 2000 are not permitted to dispatch their aninlals with a high powered rifle, bow and arrow, or crossbow." This interpretation interferes with the ordinary managenlent of domesticated livestock and clearly goes far beyond the statutory prohibitions. If this interpretation were allowed to be used during the pendency ofthis action, the Plaintiffs would be irreparably harmed before the case was resolved . . . When the Intervenors were petitioning the Supreme Court, they themselves argued "a grant of a stay of further proceedings b i l l not prejudice the plaintiffs since the District Court already enjoined thc enforcement of 1-143". The Intervenors were wrong in their siaiemcnr, in tliut the injunction did not restrict enforcement of 1-143 and the related statutes, it restricted "...enforcement actions against Plaintiffs for selling their privatelyowned alternative livestock to thhird parties who then seek to harvest their newly acquired property at Plaintiffs' facility and against third parties who purchase the livestock,.." It is not a restktion to enforcement of Section 87-44 14 MCA and the prohibition of shooting alternative livestock for a fee. '122 On appeal, Spoklics contend that the District Court's reasoning is sound and that the tnjunction does not interfere mith the execution of 5 87-4-414(2), LICA. FWP and Sportsmen, however, contend that the Distnet Court erred as a matter of lau when it refused to dissolbe the preliminary injunction in spite of 3 27-19-103(4), MCA, which prohibits injunctions "to prevent the execution of a public statute by officers of the law for the public benefit. . . ." Sportsmen suggest that Spoklies' planncd sales are schemes to sell a "canned hunti~~g experience," and FWP made slmilar claims before the court during the October 5, 2001, shon cause hearing. itccordingly, it is necessary that we consider the coliduct at issue to collsidcr whether it is prohibited by the language of 5 87-4-414(2), MCA. 1/23 The District Court entered the follov~ing injunction in the TRO: DEFENDANT IS HEREBY ORDERED to immediately cease, desist, and restrain from initiating enforcement actions against Plaintiffs for selling their privately-owned alternative livestock to third parties who then seek to harvest their newly acquired property at Plaintiffs facility and against the third parties who purchase the livestock. . . . 724 To deterniine vhether the Distrtct Court's orders tnterfere w ~ t h enforcement of the 4 87-4-414(2), MCA, or other related statutes. we apply general ~ u i e sof statutory construct~on. Sectton 1-2-101, MCA, provldes that our duty "IS simply to ascecait: and dcclilrc n hat i s in terms or in substance conta~ned thercln, nor to tiisen whdt hds been orn~ited or to omit what has been inserted. Wl~crc there are several provisions or particulars, such - : constructiori is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all." This Court tvill r-j ect : constrtrctlon of a statute that mould lea\ e any part of the statute without effect. hlontto v Sirnonich (1997). 285 Mont. 280,287, 947 P.2d 1047, 1051 (citation omitted) 125 Section 87-4-414(2), MCA, with the 1-143 amendment italicized, pro\:ides as follows: The licensee may acquire, breed, grow, keep, pursue, handle, harvest, use, sell, or dispose of the alternative livestock and their progeny in any quantity and at any time of year as long as the licensee complies with the requirements of this part, e.xcept tilcrt the licerzsee tnuy not allow the shooting of game urzin~als or alternative livestock, u s tiefined in 87-2-101 or 87-4-406, or ofarzy exotic big game species jbr a fee or other ref?zunerationon an alternative livestoclc faci(ity. Absent statutory definitions, the plain meaning of the words used in the statute eoutrols. ??~omasRros. Cnrgill, Inc. (1996), 276 Mont. 105,110,915 P.2d 226,229. An alternative v. licestock "facility" is defined as "perimeter fences and other enclosures that provide for the confinement, handling, and quarantine of altenlative livestock." Seeti01187-4-406(5), MCA. "Fee" is commonly understood as: "[a] fixed sum charged, as by an institution or by law for MEIU' a privilege." AMERICAN Tl\GE 1)IC'TIONARY 01; THE EKGLISfI I.ANC;UA(;E 669 (3d ed. lOO6). " R C I I I L I C I C ~ ~this O ~ I " is co~nrno~ily in ~ ~ contest understood as: "[s lomething, such as a IIERITAGE DIC~.ION,<RYO L ~ T HI;.N(;LISHLANGL:AGE E payment, that remunerates." A~:~EKI(.AK 1527 "Remunerate" IS defined as. "To pay (a person) a suirabie equicaient it1 return for goods provided. services retldercd, or losses incurred; recompense. 2.'1.0 compensate For; makc payrnellt h r . " A>I~:KIc:A\~ ltllRli'h(ii7126 D!(:l'lONAKY OF T i i t I:N(;I.ISil I.4Xc;I;;ic;t: 1527. The language o f 5 87-4-414(2); MCA, as amended, provides a licensee with several clear options: he can sell his livestock; he can harvest (or shootj his own livestock; or he can allot.ii the livestock to be harvested by someone else--so long as it is not done on his premises for a fee. '127 Spoklies argue, and the District Court agreed, that they arc not getting a fee for the right to shoot elk at their facility. However, that contention is belied by the fact that Spoklies havc alleged irreparable h a m if the animals cannot be harvested (shot) by their clients on their premises. If the only charge i s for the value of the animal, then the right to shoot it is inconsequential. If the right to shoot the animal on Spoklies' property is inconsequential, then they cannot rncet the necessary test for a preliminary injunction. See 6 27-1 9-201(2), MCA. 128 From the facts alleged in Spoklies' complaint, it is difficult to understand how FWP's interpretation of 6 87-4-414(2), MCA, would eliminate most or all of their sales irn1e.s.~the fee or other remuneration is related to the privilege to shoot the "newly-purchasedlivestock." If the Spoklies' average elk pricc, $5,462, merely represents the actual market value of the average elk, tllen FWP's interpretation of the "fee shooting" provisions should not cause Spoklies to lose any of their cunent pcrrchasers. Assuming nvg~cetzclo Spoklies' elk price that accurately reflected the true value of the elk and that ir excluded the value of shooting the cik, FWP's interpretatio~~ 9 87-4-414(Zj. MCA, "fee shooting" prohiloition shotrid llave no of impact on its clk sales whatsoever. 12 19 Therefore, we conclude that the activity at issue in this case does constitute the type of activity prohibited by 3 87-4-414(2), MCA, as amended by 1-143. Spoklies clearly consider the right of third persons to harvest elk at their facility an important part of the consideration they receive in exchange for the fees Spoklies are paid. That arrangement is exactly what is rtou7prohibited by statute. Therefore, we concludc that the District Court's preliminary injunction does interfere with FWP's execution of jj 87-4-414(2), MCA-a statute enacted for the public benefit. 7\30 We must next consider Spoklies' argument that the District Cou1-t may grant a preliminary injunction despite 5 27-1 9-1 03(4), MCA, where a party demonstrates irreparable inju~y. 1131 F W P and Sportsmen contend that our holding in State e , rel. Fveehouvrz v. Catroll ~ (1929), 85 Mont. 439, 279 P. 234, expressly precludes il~junctionsagainst public officials executing public statutes for thc public welfare, unless there is a valid claim that the statute enforced was itself unconstitutional or invalid. FMIP and Sportsmen do not challenge Spoklies' claiim of irreparable h a ~ m argue that injunctive relief ~vould but only be arailable if Spoklies claimed and sufficiently proved that $ 87-4-414(2), MCA, as amended is nnconstitutional or invalid. FWP and Sportsmen additionally note that there are sevcral otlier cases pending in other forums, several of which do challenge the constitutionality of 1-143 and i 87-17-414(2), MCA, as amended. EWP and Sportsmen conclude t h a ~ ; Fieeboz~rn cxpressiy coamls this situatioi~; rcqucst that rile o~crruie, and distinguish, or dismiss as dicta language in New Club Cilrliii I:. Cir). (fBilliizgs (l989j, 237 Mont. 194,772 P.2d 303, to the cxtcnt that it suggests that a district court may enjoin the execution of a publrc statute where the plaintiff demonstrates irreparable injury 1132 In ,liL.l~ C?ub Curlin, the plaintiff, a bar operator, sought a preliminary injunction against the City of Billings and its pohce chicf aftcr police arrested several employees of the bar for nude dancing or permitting nude dancing in the bar. The District Court denied the 5 bar's mot~onfor a preliminary injunction. On appeal we ackno~vledged 27-19-103(4), MCA, but also noted ~ L L O ctrclrmstances in u h ~ c h injunctions are permitted pursuant to 5 2719-201, MCA. We then stated that: d To overcome the Montana statute 5 27-1 9- 103(4), MCA, i u ~ well-settled case law that an injunction cannot be granted to prevent the execution of a public statute for the public benefit, [the bar] must show ~rreparableinjury or a v~olationof constitutional rights. New Club Curlitz, 237 Mont. at 196, 772 P.2d at 305 (citing Freehour-n; 2 AniJur.2nd I ~ ~ ~ n i ~5t 243).~After reviewing the bar's clairns, we concluded that thc bar did not have ioi .~ standing for its coi~stitutionalchallenge to the statute and that the bar's monetary damages irreparable injury, and affirmed the District Court. The language claim did not den~onstratc relied on by Spoklies was not necessary to those conclusions and was, at bcst, dicta. However, lest there be future confusion, me take this opportuntty to point out that it uas also partially itlcoilicct. 4133 Despite our citation to I7reebozmi for t l ~ ccited language in i\je~v Club Cadin, F't-i-eeiiorrnzdoes not stand for the proposition that irreparable injury is sufficient to cverciir~~c 5 27-19-103(4), MCA. In Ft-eehozzrn, the plaintiff, a kennel club, sought to enjoin a county attorneq froin thrcatenrng to arrest the officers and agents of the club and scue the club's assets if they conducted races. The county attorney insisted that the races conducted at the club were in violation of Montana law, and that it was his duty to inform those persons of their violations of Montana law. The District Court entered a TKO aga~nstthe county attorney, and on appeal we reversed that order. We recognized that a court of equity has no prosecutions. I.-reebour~z, Mont. at 443,270 P. at 235. We 85 jurisdiction to enjoin crim~nal adoptcd the general principle that: [A] court of equity has no jurisdiction in matters merely criminal or immoral. It leaves the correction of these matters to the criminal courts. The rule which prevents a court of chancery from interfering with the administration of the criminal laws of the state is a wise one, founded upon sound principles of public policy. Any other would result in much confusion and embarrassment, in preserving peace and order and enforcing the police power of the state generally. Freebourn, 85 blont. at444,279 P. at 235 (citing 10 Ruling Case Law 341,342). We further dctem~ined "whether the manner in which the club is conducting its business constitutes that a ctirninal offensc is a question to be determined by the court sitting as a court of lax. in a crrmtnal case, and not as a c o ~ ~oft equity." Freebourn, 85 blont. at 444, 279 P. at 235 r (citatrons om~ttcd) Vlrc quoted Shzimnt~v (iiiber-r (Mass. i918), i IS N.E. 254, 257,as follows: "Simply that one is in business, and may be injured in respect of his busi~lcss by prosecution for an alleged crime, is no sufficient reason for asking a court of equity to ascertain in advance whether the business as conducted is in violation of a penal statute." 734 In Freebozcril, we did recognize an exception to the general rule, however, it did not in+olvc an "irreparable harm." We stated: The courts recognize an exception to the general rule when property rights are invaded by the threatened prosecution under a void statute. Hence equitable jurisdiction exists to restrain criminal prosecutions under unconstitutional or invalid statutes when necessary to safeguard property rights. Freehourir, 85 Mont, at 444,279 P, at 235 (citing 32 C.J. 243,279-280 (1923)). When we harm as an exception to the construed Fi+eebounzin iVew Clzrb Cut-lln to include ~rreparable statute, me ignored our previous citation in Freebourn to 32 C.J. 279-280 which also states, in part: The general rule is that an injunction will not be granted to stay criminal or quasi criminal proceedings, whether the prosecution is for the violation of the common law or the infraction of statutes or municipal ordinances, nor to stay the enforcement of orders of a state commission. If the statute on which the prosecution is based is valid, the fact that the enforcement thereof wotlld materially injure complainant's business or property constitutes no ground for equitable interference. It is o n l ~~.vhei-ethe statute or ordiizarzce is ~ tritcon.stitutioizi~l otizerulise invizlid rirzti ~vlzere the attempt to etforce it or in there is n tiii-ect irzvi~siorz ofproper& rig11 ~%'s~lltifzg fs i~z irrepr~rahle illjury that aiz illjz~nctionwill issue to restrain the enforceitzenf r h e ~ o f :Both ooftizese elei~zents itzdirperzsnble . . . . are 32 C.J. 279-280(emphasis addedj. In i-ieebouriz, we did not conclude that any statutory cxcepriolls exist. W::rnercly ackr~owicdged acourt-recognized cxcepiion to 5 27-i9-1003(4), MCA. 735 Since Spoklies have neither alleged nor demonstrated that 1-143 or 4 57-4-414(2), MCA, as amended is unconstitutional, we conclude that the District Court erred, as amattcr of law, when it enjoined FWP's execution of 3 87-4-414(2), MCA. We reverse the District Court's order that denied FWP's and Sportsmen's motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion
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