ESTATE OF GARLAND
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
No. 96-654 IN THE SUPREMECOURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1996 IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF NINA J. GARLAND, Deceased, Appellant. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District, In and for the County of Lewis & Clark, The Honorable Dorothy McCarter, Judge presiding. COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Dennis G. Loveless, Montana Attorney at Law, Helena, For Respondent: Carl Hatch; Small, Helena, Montana . "'7 Hatch, Submitted Filed: Clerk' Doubek & Pyfer, on Briefs: Decided: October 17, 1996 -November 15, 1996 Justice Karla M. Gray delivered Anson Fredenberg, Nina J. Garland, the First the personal deceased Judicial distributing 1. raises Did the spouse who killed one-half interest which 2. Did distribute in issues err proceeds Court of the Estate's (Nina) in and Larry Garland on October the homicide real of law? to (Larry) Montana, between her two (Anson), was appointed State her one of them, Emily Garland, a will Montana for survive stipulation to a the settle and were married Nina and Larry 22, 1993. in will of the moved to as joint tenants of survivorship. incarcerated Nina's entitled sale failing that assets? a house in Helena, deliberate Nina left concluding the Sometime thereafter, Nina died testate Nina; and remand. spouse is from County, on appeal: in the deceased District 1986. of Clark err the right convicted and the Montana and purchased with of owned as a matter Nina J. Garland in from the order he and the decedent all in Alaska the of We reverse the following surviving property Lewis of the Estate. Court of the Estate appeals Court, District of the Court representative (the Estate), District the assets The Estate the Opinion providing daughters. to between the Estate death Prison. subsequently and is Two minor is also Larry's an equal division Nina's personal was admitted for Larry brother, representative informal and Larry, probate. was presently daughters daughter. of her assets Anson of her Fredenberg Estate Pursuant and to a the house in Helena which Larry and Nina placed owned in in a special joint trust tenancy account was sold and the to be distributed proceeds by the District court. A hearing held in distribution of the proper distribution and Larry's 1995. personal property which property. In its decision the Estate both the proceeds property prior "which to the marriaye[;]" titled Larry the in Nina's 1. Did the is entitled the sale of a matter of Larry tenants cannot the by him the in death to the surviving Estate of Schock and of premarital Court concluded to fifty percent of and any personal exclusively The Estate by him during Saab automobile the real property and, the property. the which was appeals. of one joint joint tenant 229 Mont. Court recognized that, interests in 3 as joint as a result, tenant, the property as a matter (1987), Larry's at issue each of See § 70-l-307, ceases and the jointly-held passes The District his house of items to have been obtained of survivorship Ordinarily, interest disagreed District Court err in concluding that Larry to a one-half interest in the proceeds from the real property which he and Nina owned as law? shares Nina prove the name in the Estate. the right upon of included them owned equal MCA, sale was from the sale the District and used court Larry were each entitled and Nina purchased with ownership are assets and various contended and order, the marriage and of the proceeds Larry and Larry from Estate a Saab automobile house, that of the Estate's The September regarding Nina on the final 259, 263, decedent's immediately Voyele 745 P.2d 1138, under the of law. MCA. v. 1140. § 72-2-813(3)(b), real property were transformed into from Larry's tenancies felonious in act. MCA, Relying 72-2-813(3) (b), 813(3) (b), MCA, as severing and allowing that retaining equal his result, matter only to pass interest under in her no right Court concluded that the Estate the value of in the will, with interest § 72-2- property with Larry of survivorship. As a and Larry property the each as a of law. argues on was erroneous. It Estate conclusion interests were pursuant severed principles, was entitled to result the Estate sale conclusions law of that argues than Larry did, property. a larger if correct. v. 506, 510, 905 P.2d 158, The resolution of this case turns, 5 72-2-813(3) (b), interpretation previously pertinent of construed. Section common tenancy those that Nina the potential a district court's interpretation Dale & Dye, 161 (citation initially, felonious and intentional 4 P.C. on the proper MCA, a statute 72-2-813(3), of omitted). we have MCA, provides, part: The decedent: in under with court's 273 Mont. (1995), that prove Milodragovich, Loney in share of the proceeds We review the and Larry's that, to of law to determine is Nina Court's tenancies attempt would receive the District both into The Estate more to the property the the MCA, and, therefore, contributed that that contends (b), apply. it appeal and transformed to § 72-2-813(3) common principles the interpreted court Nina's resulting Comments to § interest a one-half The from death on the Official the however, interest the District retained common upon Nina's killing of the not in (b) severs the interests of the decedent and killer in property held by them at the time of the killing as joint tenants with the right of survivorship and transforms the interests of the decedent and killer into tenancies in common. Our role declare in interpreting statutes what is in terms or in substance Section MCA. l-2-101, We must See legislature can be determined our role is and we will 271 Mont. clear not plain resort killing of one joint decedent Thus, tenancy--the right In relied on determining the upon the by another, are severed his only criminal conduct." the decedent's is or other intentional itself extrinsic and in and felonious the interests of both into the tenancies of the benefits of a joint of "equal MCA, the shares" District § 72-2-813(3) (b), purpose in enacting killer from gaining basis, the On that interest for MCA. the legislature's the co-tenant's v. Where the speaks and ownership Comments to "was to preclude 1088. and transformed is divested that Clarke unambiguously 5 72-2-813(3)(b), Official the meaning of the words history that See § 70-l-307, interpreting of 897 P.2d at 1088. to survivorship in the property. .'I if intention statute MCA, clearly, the killer . intent is at an end. (b), tenant and the killer in common. the Clarke, mandates the and therein. 897 P.2d 1085, to legislative 72-2-813(3) language the statute and unambiguous, means of interpretation. Section Where 412, 416, ascertain legislative from the plain in interpreting Massey (1995), language § l-2-102, "to contained pursue MCA. possible. used, is simply severed 5 court Court MCA, in the statute benefit concluded and the killer loses from that only his right of 813(3)(b), court's survivorship. MCA, is role Since clear, resort in § ?2-2- however, was at an end and it history See §§ l-2-101, used and plain, the statute to legislative of interpretation. language unambiguous in interpreting not properly the or other l-2-102, the could extrinsic means MCA; Clarke, 897 P.2d at 1088. Moreover, that "the passes in its decision interest of her property as survivorship." the decedent The predecessor and is her District language incorporate and order, the District severed from § so that killer Court's has stated her no statement 72-2-104(2), to 5 72-2-813(3)(b), Court share right of appears MCA to the (1991), MCA, which provided: Any joint tenant who feloniously and intentionally kills another joint tenant thereby effects a severance of the interest of the decedent so that the share of the decedent passes as his property and the killer has no rights by survivorship. [Emphasis added.] Section 72-2-104(2), revised in 1993. of the statute interest, the provides for interests in the property killing. Section severance and Section decedent's 1993 of 72-2-104(2), interest the Thus, for of only severance (b), remains decedent's held as joint the killer's at the time of the MCA. the MCA (1991), was severed while unchanged-- and the tenants of the statutory of and substantially MCA (1993). provided both the effect versions (b), 1993 version--which 72-2-813(3) Furthermore, 1991 was renumbered See 5 72-2-813(3) the 1991 version decedent's MCA (1991), statute differ expressly "so that 6 severances under the significantly. stated that the the share of the decedent passes as his property survivorship." the other the (Emphasis added.) hand, killer's and expressly interests interests of the (Emphasis Section provides are severed decedent killer that has no rights 72-2-813(3) (b), MCA, on both the decedent's and that the killing as is evident statutes, for factual "transforms decedent's the statute, relies MCA, to identical § 72-2-104(2), on In re Estate 955, one-half mandate support of the proceeds of his to that tenants. In Matve, same of a joint incorrectly an effect on the mandated under MCA (1991). of Matye argument (1982), that 198 Mont. he is from the sale of the real owned as joint MCA, on the Court interests 645 P.2d Nina based The District and killer's in results tenant. (b), of the and 72-2-813(3)(b), killing joint common." language and intentional § 72-2-813(3) the predecessor Larry different in felonious by another interpreted tenancies of the plain MCA (19911, substantially situation--the tenant from a review §§ 72-2-104(2), provide into and the added). Thus, and killer by Estate of Matve entitled property is 317, not to he and applicable here. analogous with Estate of to the present we addressed case. whom she owned property 645 P.2d at 956. entitled property to one-half of and the husband's P.2d at 956-57. the wife joint tenancy. court the situation There, in The district a estate from appealed. killed the husband Estate determined proceeds factually that the Estate of Matve, the wife joint was tenancy of Matve, 645 On appeal, remained that, we interpreted unamended by the legislature according decedent's to the interest plain of the decedent the killer. Estate the killer retained property. See Estate her As discussed been 813(3) (b), MCA. inapplicable (b), that the plain severance of transforms both those only the of survivorship The effect in in was that the proceeds fi 72-2-104(2), of the MCA (19811, revised. in has See § 72-2- Estate of case in which we interpret where the in killer a joint decedent's and the estate tenant of 5 72-2-813(3) interests Therefore, courts any right analysis OUT language law. district statute, Matve is and apply § MCA. We conclude tenant, We concluded share must be distributed and substantially Thus, which 645 P.2d at 957. however, to the present 72-2-813(3) the interest of Matve, renumbered 1991. 645 P.2d at 957. one-half above, of and that without of Matve, MCA (1981), through language was severed as property since 5 72-2-104(2), into tenancies the of the decedent must apply (b), and the determining the legal kills another joint MCA, effectuates killer's a interests and in common as a matter respective under rules interests § 72-2-813(3) applicable of of (b), the MCA, to tenancies in common. Section interest 70-l-313, "owned by partnership." Thus, interests, ownership § in MCA, defines several unlike 70-l-313, "equal persons, not § 70-l-307, MCA, shares." tenancy does in joint MCA, which not expressly Nor do tenancies 8 in in common as an ownership or defines joint provide common under for § 70-l-313, MCA, include the ownership of interest the the entire vests in surviving death of the other Tenants joint joint however, Sack v. Tomlin 314, (1947), 120 Mont. 35, grounds). Therefore, co-tenant and the 42, estate and the surviving tenant's maintenance of disparate co-tenants to rebuttal. Lawrence 557; shares See v. Ivins Harvey v. the surviving of to unequal the decedent's depend on the decedent's See, e.q., entitled and the to the acquisition Tomlin, and 871 P.2d at 305. however, to Hardy on other may be entitled contributions, are interests 748 (overruled contributions of the property. proof the co-tenant equal of one co-tenant, estate individual 304; 745, property 745 P.2d at 1140. 607 P.2d 551, 179 P.2d which of law upon the is subject The respective the property. tenancy own undivided 871 P.2d 298, 322-24, under as a matter presumption decedent's in joint See Vosele, on the death shares survivorship the tenant (Nev. 1994), 186 Mont. that in tenant. that (1980), Absent of in common presumptively in property; surviving right the presumption undivided equal interests stands. Here Nina and Larry's into tenancies MCA. in common upon Nina's Presumptively, interests in rebutted. & Larry's the those property; respective proof regarding death. interests & presumption, 557. in the proceeds depend on whether Nina and 9 and transformed § 72-2-813(3) became the shares will were severed 607 P.2d at Lawrence, house ultimately via interests undivided however, Thus, from the the the presumption Larry's (b), disparate equal can Estate sale of be and the is rebutted individual contributions issue. to the acquisition therefore, We hold, concluding percent that of Larry that Estate and Larry the the and maintenance proceeds owned as joint from tenants the the The Estate a matter of law distribution further argues in It relies that assets Court of the at erred each entitled to in fifty property Nina to settle and and of law. in failing assets? to order of the Estate's claims. are as a matter on appeal failing District sale 2. Did the District Court err distribute all of the Estate's of the property the District Court the settlement complete and the discharge on § 72-3-1001(3), erred as and of Anson from MCA, which provides: After notice to all interested persons and hearing, the court may enter an order or orders, on appropriate conditions, determining the persons entitled to distribution of the estate and, as circumstances require, approving settlement and directing or approving distribution of the estate and discharging the personal representative from further claim or demand of any interested person. Anson petitioned for settlement and (2), a proposed objected to the entitled to property he his personal account court and Estate's of MCA. He also Nina held should be distributed premarital immediately to distribute assets. preceding a retirement filed and heirs assets a final of the Estate's final the of testacy of the Estate's distribution one-half automobile determination and distribution 55 72-3-1001(l) contained for account. proceeds as joint the The Estate account 10 account of that various filed he was the real the Saab items were an amended final in which it not listed Larry that sale to which assets. tenants, to him and that the hearing pursuant He argued from and requested in its the original final account In its hearing held. and authorize decision on the It repayment and order, final the District distribution subsequently of a debt against of determined Court the did not address account such as the distribute his personal continue to Finally, the District of representative in 5 72-3-1001(3), distribute an estate unclear in decision this and distribution clear, order to of the Estate is requirements entitled settlement discharging MCA, mandates the the to distribution personal a is and Larry to such property. in making the personal however, a court settle by the parties. Court final settlement Court distribution not and . . distribution 11 MCA. of . . the .'I is its and What meet the by "determining of the estate representative. did and It intended to § 72-3-1001(3), District a final persons; that District constitute contends discharge requested and Anson. that, must Larry of by interested pursuant settle the Estate disposition for a final and directing the leaving claims that it which a court whether was in the amended final Nor did MCA, provides at the time case however, statutory persons from further items did not discharge an estate, assets" property proper Court 72-3-1001(3), distribution nothing personal the "[a] cannot prove to marriage and used is deemed to have the marriage, and Nina's death. account. property, dispute Section is retirement premarital that that the additional the contested stated [Estate's] [a]ny [personal] property which Larry have been obtained by him prior to the by him exclusively during the marriage been held jointly by the parties during as tenants in common from the time of The court the Estate. the approving estate and See § 72-3- 1001(3), District MCA. Court Therefore, for further this proceedings the Estate. Reversed case and remanded. We concur: 12 must be toward final remanded distribution to the of
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
