FARMERS ALLIANCE MUTUAL INS CO v

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NO. IN THE SUPREME COURT 95-425 OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1996 FARMERS ALLIfiATCE MUTITAL INSUR&TCE: a Kansas Insurance corporation, COMP.LVY, Plaintiff and Appellant, KRISTI H O L E W , Personal Representative of the Estate of Gary Lee Leonard, Deceased, Defendant and Respondent CERTIFZED QUESTION FROM: The United States District Court for the District of Montana, Billings Division, The Honorable Jack D. Shanstrom presiding COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Robert Savage; Habedank, Cumming, Best & Savage, Sidney, Montana (argued for Farmers Alliance) For Respondent: Donald D. Sommerfeld; Towe, Ball, Enright, Mackey & Sommerfeld, Billings, Montana (argued for Kristi Holeman, Personal Representative) For Amicus: Peter F. Habein; Crowley, Haughey, Hanson, Toole & Dietrich, Billings, Montana (argued for Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company) Susan P. Eoy, Garlington, Lohn &Robinson, Missouia, Montana (argued for Alliance of American Insurers) Gene R. Jarussi; Jarussi &Bishop, Billings, Montana (argued for Montana Trial Lawyers Association) ..-:,..* # sf-: , . ** ... ;- ./ r"" '@*,& .9 f ? . < q ; :~. A k d .LA , Heard: May 2 0 , 1996 Submitted: June 25, 1 9 2 6 ~ ~ ~ i d ~ d : 12, aeptamber Justice W. VJilliam Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court The United States District Court for the District of Montana, .- Bliiings Division, bas zertified the folLowing question to this Court pursuant to Rule 44, M.R.Appp.F. We answer the certified question "no." The certified question is: Section 33-23-203, MCA, prohibits the stacking of the uninsured motorist coverage available under a policy of motor vehicle liability insurance. Does Section 3 3 23 -203, MCA, prohibit the stacking of the medical payment coverage and the -insuredmotorist coverage available under a policy of motor vehicle liability insurance where a premium is charged for coverage of each motor vehicle listed within that policy? In the insurance policy at issue, a premium is charged on each motor vehicle listed within the policy for medical payment co*Jerage and a premium is charged on each motor vehicle listed within the policy for -insurance coverage. The premium for the -insured motorist coverage is included as part of the premium for the uninsured motorist coverage. In its Order Certifying Question to the Supreme Court of Montana, the District Court submitted a statement of agreed facts The facts that this Court finds dispositive of the question are as follows : 4. That, at approximately 0450 hours, on November 9 , 1991, a vehicle insured by the Plaintiff under the policy issued to Wade and Diana Brown, namely a 1971 Ford pickup with VIN FlOGKL66406, being driven by Lori Watson, in which Scott Hankel and Gary Lee Leonard were passengers, was involved in a one-vehicle accident in Jefferson County, Montana, on Interstate 90 at milepost 233.4, 15.6 miles west of Whitehall, Montana. 5. Subsequent thereto, at approximately 0510 hours, at [sic] 1983 Ford pickup truck, V1N 1FTHF26LSDPA15458, owned by Darrel. M. Storey and driven by Darrel Maynard Storey, Jr., was traveling east on Interstate 90 when the driver lost control of the vehicle as he attempted to slow for the accident scene and went into a sideskid. The Storey vehicle struck the right roar corner of the trailer attached ts the subject 1971 Ford pickup, VIN F30GRL66406. Such contact pushed the trailer into the ditch and onto its Left side. The Storey vehicle then rapidly rotated. Mr. Leonard's coat became entangled on the bitch of the Storey pickup which caw-sed Mr. Leonard to be dragged under the Storey vehicle until after it went backwards into the ditch on the south side of the road. 1 . Leonard died as a result o f the injuries sustained. 6. The Storey vehicle was insured by State Farm A u t o Insurance Company under Pnli.cy PJo 1.3E 5 2 2 . 2 - 4 9 5 - 2 2 5 add State Farm subsequently paid out its policy limits under the liability portion of its policy limits in the amount of $25,000. 7. Prior to signing a Release, the Estate of Gary Lee Leonard made demand upon Plaintiff for the uninsured (underinsured)motorist coverage and auto medical payment coverage provided for in the Business Auto Policy of Wade and Diana Brown. 8. Plaintiff has refused to make any payments of uninsured (underinsured! motorist coverage and auto medical payment coverage to the heirs and/or Estate of Gary Lee Leonard, deceased. Answering the question certified by the United States District Court requires this Court to construe § 33-23-203, MCA. In construing a statute, "the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted or to omit what has been inserted." Section 1-2-101, MCA. The rules of statutory construction require the language to be construed according to its plain meaning. Stratemeyer v. L~ncolnCounty (Flont. 1996), 915 P.2d 175, 178, 53 St.Rep. 245, 250 (citing Clarke v. Massey (19951, 271 Mont. 412, 416, 897 P.2d 1085, 1088). If the language is clear and unambiguous, then no further interpretation is required; we will resort to legislative history only if the intent cannot be determined f r o m t h e plain wording of the statute. Clarke, 847 F.id at 1088. Where the intention of the legislature can be determined from che piain meaning of the words used in a statute, the courts may not go further and apply other rneans of interpretation. Clarke, 897 P.2d at 1088 (citing Tongue River Glec. Coop. v. Montana Power Co. (1981), 191 Mont. 511, 515, 636 P.2d 862, 864). The question certified is a narrow one. We are asked only determine whether § trj 33-.23-203, MCA, prohibits the stacking of woptional" coverages--here, the medical payments and underinsurance coverages. We do not consider whether the terms of the insurance contract prohibit stacking. Rather, our analysis is confined to an interpretation of § 33-23-203, MCA. Accordingly, this Court's recent decision in Chilberg v. Rose (1995), 273 Mont . 414, 903 P.2d 1377, is not controlling in this case as Chilberq is a multiple policy case and does not interpret we note that Sayers 'J. § 33-23-203,MCA. In addition, Safeco Ins. Co. of America i1981), 192 Mont. 336, 628 P.2d 659, cited with approval in Chilberq, is contrary to § 33-23-203, MCA, as Savers approved the stacking of uninsured motorist coverage under a single policy. Thus, under § 33-23-203, MCA, Savers is no longer good law because under the terms of S 3323-203, MCA, stacking of uninsured motorist coverage for multiple vehicles lnsured under a single policy is expressly prohibited unless the policy specifically provides otherwise. Section 33-23203, MCA, provides: (1) Unless a motor vehicle liab~lity policy specifically provides otherwise, the limits of insurance coverage available under any such policy, including the limits of liability under uninsured motorist coverage, 4 n m s t be determined as follows, regardless of the number of motor vehicles ' insured under the policy: . (a) the l~rnltof insurance coverage available for any one accident is the Limit specified for the motor vehicle involved in the accident; if no motor vehicle insured under the policy is (bj involved in the scciclent, the limitof insurance coverage available for any one accidest is the highest limit of coverage specified for any one motor vehicle insured under the policy; and (c) the limits of coverage specified for each motor vehicle insured under the policy may not be added together to determine the limit of insurance coverage available under the policy for any one accident. (2) A motor vehicle liability policy may also provide for other reasonable limitations, exclusions, or reductions of coverage which are designed to prevent duplicate payments for the same element of loss. From the language of the statute, it is clear that "stacking" is not allowed "unless a motor vehicle liability policy specifically provides otherwise." It is equally clear that the "anti-stacking" provisions of the statute apply to a "motor vehicle liability policy" (MVLP). The term MVLP is defined in § 33-23-204(2), MCA, as "any policy of automobile or motor vehicle insurance against liability now or hereafter required under Title 61, chapter 6, parts 1 and 3." (Emphasis added.) The dissenters argue that 9: 33-23-204(2), MCA, refers to rather than required "co~erages.'~ makes no It required "policiesti sense, however, to discuss "policies" in a vacuum. A policy of insurance is nothing more than the coverages which are provided within the policy. In 9: 33-23-204(2), MCA, the legislature was obviously correlating the anti-stacking stiitutes with the fact that policies with specific types of coverage are required by Title 61, chapter 6, parts 1 and 3. In particular, the per person, per vehicle and property damage coverages mandated by 5 § 61-6-103(2), FICA. In interpreting 33-23-204(2), I K A , three points are apparent; it is directed at insurance against iiabiiity. Secondly, it is directed at insurance coverage which is "required" by law: and finally, it is concerned with liability icsuraace which is not only required, but is required by both part 1 and part 3. There are only three v a r i a t i r j l ? ~of insurance coverage whiilh meet the above criteria; that is, liability coverage which is required by both the MVSRA and the Motor Vehicle Liability Act. Those three coverages are the per person, per vehicle and property damage coverages which are required by S 61-6-103(2),MCA, and which are incorporated into the Motor Vehicle Liability Act by MCA. § 61-6-301, Unlilce the third-party coverage mandated by MVSRA and the Motor Vehicle Liability Act, underinsurance and medical payment do not qualify as insurance against liability. Rather, underinsurance and medical pay coverage are designed to protect the first party insured. Furthermore, there is nothing in MIJSRA, the Motor Vehicle Liability Act or Title 33, chapter 23, MCA, which would "require" underinsurance and medical pay coverage. To the contrary, the MVSRh specifically excludes coverages which are in excess of the required per person, per vehicle and property damage coverage. The MVSRA, § 61-6-103(8),provides as follows: Any policy which grants the coverage required for a motor vehicle liability policy may also grant any lawful coverage in excess of or in addition to the coverage specified for a motor vehicle liability policy, and the excess or additional coverage is not subject to the provisions of thls part, With respect to a policy which grants the excess or addlti~nal coverage, the term "motor vehicle liability policy" applies only to that part of the coverage which is required by this section. As Justice Erdrnann's dissent points cut, the above pro-,?ision specifically refers to coverage which is required "by this secticlr." Although '*thissection" refers to the MVSRA, the Motor Vehicle Liability Act has a l s o incorporated those same "c~verage'~ requirements; $25,000 because of bodily injury to any one person, $50,000 for bodily injury in any one accident* and $10,000 fcr property damage. There is nothing in the Motor Vehicle Liability Act which would suggest that the liability coverage requirements incorporated from MVSRA are any broader than those required under MVSRA. Since MVSRA specifically does not require any excess or additional coverage such as underinsurance, it is reasonable to conclude that the Motor Vehicle Liability Act likewise treats medical pay coverage and underinsurance as in 'IexcessN or in addition to the coverages which are specifically required by both Acts in question. Title 61, chapter 6 , parts 1 and 3. As medical payment coverage and underinsured motorist coverage are "excess or additional coverage" which are not required under either the MVSRA or the Motor Vehicle Liability Act, we determine that these coverages are not part of the MVLP under MCA . § 33-23-204 2 ) , ! Accordingly, the prohibition against stacking required coverages in § 33-23-203,MCA, does not apply to underinsurance and medical payment coverage. This Court has recognized that "Montana has no statutory insurance requirement concerning underinsured motorists." Grier v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. !1931), 248 Mont. 457, 4 5 5 - 5 9 , 812 P.2d While coverage in excess of the minimum amounts mandated 347, 3 4 9 . by 51-6-103(2), MC<A, and additional coverages such as comprehensive, underinsured, medical payments, or towing may be purchased by the insured, the mandate of Title 61, chapter 6, part I, MCA, and the term MTiLP apply only to the third-party liability coverage required by § 61-5-10312) (b), MCA. Section 33-23-201,MCA, requires thak the insurer offer f i s s t party, uninsured motorist coverage in the same amounts as required § 61-6-103, MCA. the uninsured motorist coverage and for third-party coverage under between The distinction the third-party coverage is that by rejecting the uninsured coverage the insured may waive the first-party uninsured coverage benefitting himself, but he cannot waive the minimum liability coverages benefitting the third-party. Importantly, however, in the absence of the insured affirmatively rejecting the coverage, the policy is issued with the uninsured motorist coverage. Accordingly, under Montana's statutory scheme the minimum third-party liability coverages under § 61-6-103(2)(b), MCA, and the minimum first-party, uninsured motorist coverage under § 33-23-201. MCA, are required coverages. Section 33-23-203, MCA, initially references the MVLP and coverage available under "including the limits of coverage." such a MVLP policy and continues: liability under uninsured motorist This latter inclusion of uninsured motorist coverage was necessary because uninsured motorist coverage is not required as part of the MVLP. Uninsured motorist coverage is, nonetheless, a coverage which is required by s 33-23-201, MCA, subject to rejection by the insured. "anci-stac1ci~g'"provision Accordirigly, we determine that the of S 3 1 - 2 3 - 2 0 3 , MCA, applies onllr to tnose coverages required under the MVLP or B 33-23-201, MCA. E'arnrers Aiiianee argues tha.t the "available coverageii language in S 3 3 - 2 3 - 2 0 3 , MCA, is broader than the required coverages and that the statute includes underinsurance coverage. We reject this argument. The only insurance coverags a~ailable under both part 1 and part 3, as the MVLP has been restrictively defined by the legislature, is the minimum third-party coverage required by § 61- 6-103(2)(b), MCA. This definition of "available coverage" follows because the term MVLP does not encompass any other "excess1'or additional coverage. Section 61-6-103(8), MCA. The limits of coverage available under any such policy must refer to the required third-party minimum coverages, required under both parts 1 and 3 of Title 61, chapter 6. defined in § Furthermore, "uninsured motor vehicle" is 33-23-201,MCA, which provides that "[aln uninsured motor vehicle is a land motor vehicle, the ownership, the maintenance, or the use of which is not insured or bonded for bodily injury liability at the time of the accident." This definition does not include "underinsured motor vehicle" within its terms. Although Farmers Alliance asserts that this Court's opinion in Grier holds that underinsured coverage is part of the uninsured motor vehicle coverage, we determine that Our holdings in is distinguishable. were based upon an interpretation of the policy language and are not controlling as a matter of statutory construction. In e, t i k t we stated "under these circumstances, the "underinsured" coverage is part of the uninsured motor vehicle coverage." Our hoidins, hwdever, was prefaced with the caveat Itunder these circumstances." We recognized that the *'unique fashion" of the Grier policy was determinative. W e noted that "the insurance policy in this case fashion. , 1 - is set up in a unique . the "underinsured" motorist provision is part of the section on uninsured motorist coverage. . . there is no separate policy section providing for underinsured motor vehicle coverage." , 812 P.2d at 349. In addition, we noted that "the declarations page makes no mention whatsoever of underinsured motor vehicle coverage." Grier 812 P.2d at 349. Most importantly, we interpreting the language of the Grier policy--not the were statute. MCA. Here, however, our conclusion is based on § 33-23-203, Further, unlike the policy at issue in Grier, the instant policy sets forth the underinsurance coverage on the declarations page. We determine that Grier is not determinative on this issue as it interpreted the insurance contract, not 5 33-23-203, MCA. The legislature has mandated that motor vehicle liability policies provide two types of coverage: coverage for injury to third-parties, Title 61, chapter 6, parts 1 and 3, and first party coverage for uninsured motorists, § 33-23-201,MCA. Likewise, the legislature has provided that, absent contractual language to the contrary, such required coverages cannot be "stacked" when numerous vehicles are insured under one policy. Section 33-23-203, MCA. The question of whether excess or additional coverages, such as uiidericsurance coverage, can be stacked was left as a matter of pclicy interpret-"; aLAon. -Accordingly,we answer t n certified question in the negative. ie Section 33-23-203, MCA, does not prohibit the stacking of the medical pa-pent cosrerage and the -insured motorist coverage available under a poliq of motor vehicle liability insurance where a premium is charged for coverage of each motor vehicle listed within that policy. We concur: Justices jrrstioeCames C. Nelson specially concurs, I Co?-. ,..-dr in oar a g s w e r co t-?e certified qfiestion. In doing so, I aiso agree with Justice Gray that tne statutes at issue are neitkLer a rtodel of clar-2~ nor do they t r a c k well. ~f zn-fb\'-ri LiiCt, that is an understatenl~ent. As demonstrate6 by the Court's opinion and by the dissents, reasonable interpretations lead to diametrically opposed results. Whether one interpretation is more "absurd" rhan the sther is aore a funccion of perception than it is logic. One thing, however, is obvious: if the legislature wanted to prohibit the stacking of underinsured and med-pay coverage, it could have simply said so in S 33-23-203, MCA. It had no trouble sa-yingthat with respect to uninsured coverage. It could have used an equally simple, clear and unambiguous approach to underinsured and med-pay coverage, The fact is it did not, and we are, thus, left with the task of trying to make sense out of a mishmash of overlapping statutes, adopted and amended at different times and, with one possible exception, absent any clear unifying rationale. That possible exception is, as our opinion points out, where the legislature has explicitiy or implicitly mandated third-party or first-party coverage, it has clearly prohibited stacking, absent agreement between the insurer and the insured. Where, on the other hand, it has not statutorily mandated coverage in one fashion or another, the legislature has not clearly prohibited stacking. Finally, ; note that; if in discharging our task of statutory interpretation, the majority has erred on the side of the insured, L2 . . thzri, c:Jr OFLnion is at least consistent with this Cocrt's histcrical approac!? i n numerous other J ~ s u r a ~ c e cases wherein we have enforced Montana's strong pu.biic policy favoring co:reraTe where either the pollcy 1.apguage or rhe Law was not clear. - , k%~hrai?d -J. X a t . F a r m e r s Union ( 1 3 9 5 1 , 2 7 2 ' i l o ~ t . 1, 6 , See 998 P . 2 6 122C, 1223; Wellcome v . Home Ins. Co. (1993i, 257 Monc. 354, 358, 849 P.2d 19C. 192-93: Head. v. Central Reserve Life Kont. 188, 200, 845 P.2d 735, 742. (1993), 256 J u s t i c e C h a r l e s 4 . E r d m a n ~d i s s e n t i c a . I respoctfvlly dissanr, I r i t i a l i y , i t i s i m p c r c a r r t o n o t e t h a t i n ics d l s c x s s i . c n of ?he c e r t i f i e d q d e s t i c i l , m a j o r i c y h a s c m i t t e d Agrsed Facz Nr;. 3 i+- ~~~c c c n t a i n e d i n t h e Order Certifying Q u e s t i o r , wnich p r o v i d e s : That on o r a b o u t Kay 3 1 , 1931, * i a i n t i f f i s s u e d co Wade r and Diana Brown, t h e named i n s u r e d and p a r e e t s of S c o t r Hankel, a p o l i c y of a u t o i n s u r a n c e , a t r u e , c o r r e c t , and c o m p l e t e copy of which i s marked " E x h i b i t A" a t t a c h e d h e r e t o and i n c o r p o r a t e d h e r e i n by r - T e r e n c e . lThus, al~hough the certified question from xhe Federal D i s t r i c t Court i s somewhat narrow, i t i s a l s o c l e a r t h a t b c t n t h e p a r t i e s and t h e F e d e r a l D i s t r i c t C c u r t c o n t e m p l a t e d t h a t t h i s C n c r t a d d r e s s t h e c e r t i f i e d q u e s t i o n w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o and i n t h e c o n t e x t of t h e p r o v i s i o n s of r h e s p e c i f i c i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y i n t h i s c a s e . While r e s o l u t i o n of t h e c e r t i f i e d q u e s t i o n r e q u i r e s a n a n a l y s i s of ;he l a n g u a g e of S 3 3 - 2 3 - 2 0 3 , MCA, s u c h an a n a l y s i s s h o u l d n o t be i n a vacuum s e p a r a t e and a p a r t from t h e p o l i c y i n v o l v e d i n t h e c a s e . After narrowing an a l r e a d y narrow c e r t i f i e d question, the m a j o r i t y embarks on a s t r a i n e d statutory c o n s t r u c t i o n a n a l y s i s t o reach its ultimate r e s u l t . The m a j o r i t y c o r r e c t l y s e z s f o r t h t h e r s l e s apon which t h i s Courc r e l i e s when c o n s t r u i n g a s t a c u t e . t h e s t a t u t o r y l a n g c a g e i s c l e a r and unambiguous, i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s required. 412, 416, 8 5 7 C13rke P.2d 1.085, 1088. .J; Massep Where the If t h e n ro f u r r h e r :I9351 , 2 7 1 K a n t . intention of the S e g i s l a t s r e can be d r r e r m i n e d f r c x t h e p l a i f i meaning of t h e words ased i n a scatuce, -,he ccurEs r~ay n o t go f z r t k e r and a p p l y ariy other mears of interpretatior. C l a r ~ e ,e97 P.2d at 1CEE (srcinc - 511; 515, 636 2 ~ 2 a 352, 664;. -. under this fra??ewcukj I w o c i ~ s -d. n i of underinsured votorise and medical payment coverages Unless a motor vehicle liability policy specifically provides :herwise, fhe limits of insurance coverage any such policy, including the Limits of available ~ n d e r Liability under ani~sured motsrist coverage, nuat be determined as foliows, regardless of the number of xotor vehi.cles insnred under the policy: (a) the limit cf insuranze coverage available for any one accideric is the limit specified for rhe motor vehicle involved in the accident; . . . . (cj the limits of coverage specified for each motor vehicle insured under the policy may n : o be added together eo determine the limit of insurance coverage available under the policy far any one accident. The majority cpinior focuses on che term liability policy" (MVLF) as ic is used ir S; "motor vehicle 33-23-233(li, PSCA As noted by the msjority, MVL? is deficed in 5 33-23-234(2),MCA, as any policy required under Title 61, Chapter 6 , Parts 1 & 3. -he majority o p i n i ~ nigr'cres the refererice to Part 3 and improperly - ~t 1s important to understand the different p u r ~ o s e s of 33-23-204i2!, , PICA. Responsibility Act . . ar:vers Part iMWRAj 1 is the Motor Vehicle Safety- which was enacted to require that wno nave had an accidenn involving a w.otor vekiicle, =r d r i v e r s who have a n o u t s t a n d i n g u n s a t i s f i e d judgment L~nanckalrsspcnsihlii, LY. F 2 pr-- - ,~r v , S t a r e Farm W ~ t u a lAuto i n s . Co. Section 61-6-103, and y r c v r d e s , of ~ a ~ g a i n s tinem - flnagc~a; responsibility ;196Rj, i5i Piocc. i i 7 ? 4 4 3 P.2d MCA, d e f i n e s WVLP f o r p u r p c s e s of t h e bIVSRA r r pertznent p a r t , a s foilows: (1) A "motor v e h i c l e l i a b i l i t y p o l i c y " , a s t h e term i s used i n t h i s p a r t , Eeans an o w n e r ' s o r o p e r a t o r ' s p o l i c y of l i a b i l i t y i n s ~ l r a n c e ,c e r t i f i e d a s p r o v i d e d i n 6 1 - 6 - 1 3 3 o r 6 1 - 6 - 1 3 4 a s c r o o f of f i n a n c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and o i s s u e d , e x c e- t a s o t h e r w i s e p r o v i d e d i n 6 1 - 5 - 1 3 4 , bv a n insurance c a r r i e r duly axthorized t o transact business i n t h i s s t a t e , t o o r f o r t h e b e n e f i t of t h e p e r s o n named therein a s insured. (2! Tne o w n e r ' s po:.icy of l i a b i l i t y i n s u r a n c e must : . . . . :bi i n s u r e t h e p e r s o n named t h e r e i n and any o t h e r p e r s o n , ;;s i n s u r e d , uzi.ng ar,y motor v e h i c l e c r z o c o r v e h i c l e s w i t h t h e express o r implied permission s f t h e named i n s u r e d , a g a i n s t l o s s from t h e l i a b i l i t y i n p o s e d by law for damages a r i s i ~ g cut of the ownership, x a i n t e n a n c e , o r u s e cf t h e motor v e h i c l e o r motor - ~ e h i c l e sw i t h i n t h e C'nited S t a t e s of A x e r i c a o r che Dominion of Canada, s u b j e c t t o l i m i t s e x c l u s i v e of i ~ z e r e s tand c o s t s , w i t h r e s p e c t t o s a c h s o t o r v e h i c l e , a s fclicws: t ( i ) $ 2 5 , 0 6 0 b e c a u s e of b o d i l y i ~ j u r y o o r ;path of one p e r s o n i n any one a c c i d e n t and s u b j e c t t o s a i d "s i t d f o r one p e r s o n ; i i i j $ 5 0 , 0 3 6 because of b o d i l y i n j u r y t o o r d e a r h of twc o r Rore p e r s o n s i n any Dne a - c c i d e n t ; and ( i i i ) $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 because of i n j u r y t o o r d e s t r u c i i o n of p r o p e r t y c f o t h e r s i n any one a c c i d e c t . : 8 ) ArLy p c l i c y which g r a n t s t h e c o v e r a q e r e q u i r e d f o r a motor v e h i c l e l i a b i l i t y p o l i c y nay a l s a g r a n t any i a w f x l c o v e r a g e i n e x c e s s of o r - n - a d d i t i c n t o t h e i c o v e r a g e s p e c i f i e d f o r a motor -.&iicle L i a b i l i t y p o l i c y , and r k o e x c e s s o r a d d i c i c ~ a lcoverage i s noc s u b j e c t t o t h e ~ r o v i s i o n sof c h i s p a r t . N i t k r e s p e c t t o a p o i i c y which g r a n t s t h e e x c e s s o r a d d i r i o n a l c o v e r a g e , t h e ~ e r m ; "motor vehicle ? i z bilzry policy" ap~l~ies Z' cnly tc tkat . r the Co""-eI-.-,, ae \qh$ch 5s rcquirea .- r r this sect$sn, pzrt :E-.phasis added.j 'rho rfiajority rei.les or: s:~bsfctiicii(8) to coccluae that ucderinsured motorist a ~ dmedical payment are coverages sir!:^ not included in saksecticn i 2 ! (bi, tk-ey are not part of an ?4VL>~rder 33-23-203(I;, MCA. 5 61-6-103, MCP., -i , the majority was only construing they wosld be ccrrect in their i.r.ter;recazion. However, in the present case the Fecieral Giscrict requested our interpretaticc of § 33-23-203, MCA. Court has When several statutes apply to a given sitnarion, this Cocrt's '-i t? adopt J ~ ; is a construction that will qive effect to all. Section ;-2-L01, NCA; See also - - Schuman v. Besrrom (1Y85), 214 Mcnt. 410, 693 P.26 536. The aefinition of NVLP in S 61-6-103!13, MCA, applied by tne majority to g 33-23-203, MCA, is restricted by its own terms to Part 1 of Chapter 6 and to only those pclicies certified under SS. 61-6-133 or -i34, MCA, for individuals who are required zo provide proof of financial responsibi.lity.' The Language of S 61-5-:03 (8:, A § 01-6-131, YCA. , reas~nakly constraed, means T h e cajority relies on S 1-2-107,M3A, as authcriry to apply definition of IWLP in the MVSRA in Title 61 to rhe + slcii: lng statute in, Title 33. Secti2;r i - 2 - 1 Q 7 , MCA, prcviees, +--I< . however, that the defirrclon of a phrase in cne part of the co5e may be applied to the same phrase - -q ansther i uerceu7 wkLert.i ccntrary intention plaizly appears," Here, the plair language of 5 6;-5-133 ( i ) , restzict-s the defi~ittonof W J L P "as tl?e tern MCA, is used in :his part" ard then cnLy for policies certifie" under S § 61-5-133, -- - , XCA. 4 -C w3.cld be difficult to enyw~isicn z clearer expression of legislative ictenz. T h e 1,egislzture inten6ed that the defifiitlon of MVLP in S 51-6-103(1), MCA, be restricted to the MVSEA. the A A % . - that the strict require~orrsof the MVSRA apply to the 1iabil;ty c s ~ ~ c r zrea;ired g~ by scbser--icn ( 2 ) (b:, but not t- the adjitic-al L ~r excess cs:-eraqes - , avziLaE;li; in a x;n_:c;r ertified f , z r z~ :'>,,a? +.".: ". , e y ,18,' GL " , i n ~ cons~ruction: further supported by reviewing Fart 3 sf s s -? Chapter 5 which contains the mandatory liability limizs far a l l Montana d r i ~ ~ e r s . As noted, S 33-23-204 (2:, MCA, defines KVLF as any policy required uncer Title 61, Chapcer 5, Parts 1 & 3 . Policies can be lssued under either Par- 1 or Part 3 and the two parts are independent. Transamerica Ins. Co. v . Xoyle i 1 3 5 3 1 , 202 Mont. 173, 656 P.2d 920. Part 3 of Chapter 6 references and incorporates only the liability limits ccctaiced in S 61-6-103, FICA, and the remaining provisio~s of the MVSRA are not incorporated into Part 3 . -herefore, a policy is issaed under Part 3 , it . . _he prcnlslons L of Part I. ,at ' - r-' subjecr - See Boldr, 443 P.23 at Tra~sanerica, 6 5 5 P.2d at e22-23. If, + uL~ 35-36; ?he facts incll~ied with the certified question do not reflect that the policy was issued under Zart 1 , and it is apparerit frcn the policy Lrself that it w a s issued under Par: 3. I therefore believe the majority's conciusion that the definitioc of MVLP in the MVSBA apclies in its entirety tc ' Fclicies issuec under the ?4VSnnA (Part 1: contain a cumber of restricti.orrs not fcun5 in joiizies issued ucder the mandatcry liakility provisions (Part 3). For instance, ~ n d e r the NVSRA the liability of tne insurer is absolute afser an accident occurs and there are restrictions as cc cancellation and increasing premiums. & § 61-5-103(6)- 7 1 , MCA. ( g 33-23-203?PICA, is in error and ignores the refsrecce r c Part 3 only to policies issued under the MVSRA: (1; This pr:, :&art 1; Other policies not affected. shall not be held to apply -tc or affecr. poiicies f . a,~torr.obile insarance a~ga~irst ~1abilit-ywhich rtay now or r hereafter be r e p i r e 5 by a2y ccher L a w c ' LI1:is srate . . . . 'iere .the policy was issaed u:ider Parc 3 ar,d the rescricti-,-e definitiofi of MVLF in Part I clearly was cot ictecded ro apply to policies issued under the part repiri-g mandatory liability limits for a11 drivers. - if an Even TMVLP ander 5 33-23-263,KCA, was as limited as chc majcrity holds, the clear language of S 32-23-2833,K ? , still leads C. to the conciusion underinsured char mccorist the and szacite medicai pay that stacking 33-23-203(13, MCA, provides insurance "available under coverage :Znphasis aicied.: ~rohibics any . coverages. is such . SSaCKIrig of ectisn prohibited f ~ r [KJL?] policy." The Legislarcre dic! r?ot grohibis stacking for in~urar~ce caverage "required" by the policy, whicil according to cke - . r2aJ o : 'ty is ocly the iiaciii~,ylizitc f o ~ r din 5 5I-0--lC3:2, ) r I, ~3 " P2A, t-at r a t , ~r3hibited sca~king for -_.oi;erages "availablev under the colicy. Under tne plain ianjliage of D 33-22-263,MCA, s t a c k k g cf b.oci.. - mea;ca~ payaent and undericsured mctorist ccvsraqes is prohibited . . since both were "available' under the policy. -G wnere the languaue . , el..-7, and .---'--a stat-;te is ;;lair,, l~r.avpm7 i.-il.l-U~, , ~ r ~ e furcti-,r: cf L. Eke c0c-Z is s l n ~ i yto ascertain and S e c i s r ? :what is i n ?.errns c r ~ L Is I,U~t3n~e c~ntained ~, . -, -i 3.2 -.--3'- 5s , i~serc h;is I- --vs ~dez.. omitted or orrit what has been inserted. Secitisn 1 - 2 - X i , NCA. Xeese v. Iieese ii381), 136 Mont. 1a1, E 3 7 P.2d ii63. Further, : e h is used in § =ajority1s conclusion thac an XVLF policy, as it 33-23-203, MCA, is limiied to the $25,000/$50,090,' $10,000 requirements of § 61-6-163( 2 : (b), MCA, is simply not consisterc with the other language of 33-23-203(1), insurance MCA, coverage provides that "available § 33-23-203, XCA. stacking under any is Becrion prohibited su-oh LMVLP; for policy Ly includinq limirs c E liabiii" under uninsured mctorist coverage." (Emphasis added.) Znzer ~ h e ma?orityls interpretation, an MVL? found in S 6 1 - 6 - 1 C 3 ( 2 ~ (b), ii~cluder; only the MCA. Clea--I uninsured r c o i r ,ly, n:rs coverage is not repired by that provision, b~: is specifically recognized by the Legislature 2s being available ur.der an MVLF. Lr, an effort to a v ~ i d this clear statctory language, tne xajority coccLudes chat ucinsured coverage is required ccverage. cnics-cred c-xjeraqe, La c h ~ dearee it is required, is not recuirei d kv - Fart I of Chapter 6 , Title 61, MCA, but rather by 5 33-23-20? MCA.' I The language ir S 6 1 - 5 - ? . 0 3 i 8 i C MCA, relied upon by the Ir? Yemp 7.r. Allstate 1 ~ s . CC. (1975), 193 Mcnt. 5 2 6 , 531, 6CI P.2d 20, 2 5 , this Cc~Jrt,i n a stacking case predating 5 33-23-203, MCA, neld that: 'vru;oncana's urinsured motorist statute is coc ., 9r;;ncs cc7~eracre in 3ajorit-y, cirarly states thar when a p i c ; c:) e iiir~r c=uerz.ge i-q?aired by ----c the mF c ~ L ycs thzic sectl37. L' 22 cf , h e co~j-ra~f, , zdjej,: term ~ ~ V L vapplies P :,?VLP, . Is rt.q,jire+ . I , sirice ..i.-'7s-.-1: 1s u . ,_c_c. c.ul,_ qe A not . required by 5 6i-6-103, MCA, che najority's Logic breaks dcwn. Finally, the phrase "inciuding the ].inits of liability under uni~sured motor-isr co-reraqe"in S 33-23-233, C also de~onstrates that the ieoislature inter.ded that the stacking prohibition a p p l y to coverages other than those required by 5 6i-6-i03!,2 1 (b'j , MCA, an6 uninsured motorist coverase. ?he rerm "including" is rct a limii;izg ce-m, but instead is used as an illiistratii~edevice. A cumber of courts have neld that the term "includir,g" used ir, similar contexts is not all-inclusive. i?h;llps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations Bd. (lY41), 313 U . S . 85 1. Ed. 1271; Federai ' n ad Cic. i13411, 314 Z . S . 95, Bank of Sc, 177, 51 S. Ct. 845, Pa~i v. Bismarck iumber 62 S. Ct. 1 86, 1,. Ed. 65; S c h a b v. Ariyoshi [Eaw. I977), 564 P.26 1 3 5 ; Ccfinerty v. Mecrcpclitan Disc. Comm'n ;Mass. 1986), 495 N.E.2d 84C; Cumberland Reclamatior, v. Secretarq. Dep't of interior (6cn Cfr. I991), 925 "2d 161. SEf: also 2A C. Sands, Sutkerland Statutorv Ccnstruition S 47.23 at 114 (4th e e . 19ec: . - - , - - :r zandatory, 1~ the sense that the , insured has the right tc -~-je,-+ w r i c i n ~ si;c?: ccverage i n pollcies issiled in Nontana." he ~ a j o r i c holding in chis r a s e tha.t uni~suredmstorist coverage is ~'~ ri.quire6 col-erage is in dil-ect conflict with c u r holding in m. . . irr Tnis Court's prior cleclsion; ~23j~rity ad& ccnf;~i~crar.3 a , . , ~istir.j216;~-~13c2 . , c-zfasigr, by t h a t clear>; apply tr tkis slt~~ation. ! , ~7.<ii <,?-; v ,. 4 . sev-rai s;ses -.A- atte-rprs -,o 3isripqd-s? :?is Insurance Co. 5 that zr, this area are ad-itredly LC . . -as; --rnm :"?'---, 1 : t . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ L C i e , , A,cl_ -7 ia: r"I;itci,a; L , ~ , 248 P%ont. 457, 2 we 3'7, on tile basis 2 interpreted rhe policy, while restri.ct;?d tc intsrpreticg the statute. beii.eve the ::ajorizy - L C . : - 7 k r e we are As noted earlier, -. i has ixproperiy r,arroweci rhe issue presented by the Federal District Cocrt fo exclude acy copsideration of the policy language. By referencing the policy ~rovisions in the certified question and by attaching a copy of the policy to tie certified question, both the Federal Distrlct Conrc and the parties intended tnar we consider the provisicns of the poljcy in responding to the questicc. ifi m,the underinscred mc-,orist coverage was par-; c,f c! re pel-icy secti.i;~ cn u~insured motorist coverage and there was no separace policy section for underinsured coverage. We ilsc noted chat the coverage. declarations page We made conc1.uded that no mention ~inder those of anderinsured circuxstances, the unaeri~sur.ed caverzge was part cf t l uninsured ccverage. In this ie case, icwevor, : e h u~derinsured coverage is also UZVT .. uninsured e-veraoe orovisioc and tiers is no separat:e - tee policy for underinsured ccverage. . ) the rf sezcicn i~ While the declaration page does reference -~r~derinsi;red ccverage, it s~ecifies that there is fio , , separate premiun for underinsured coverage as it is lccluded in the aninsured co-verage premium, which was the racicnale relied upon in crier, T!:erefrc: arder t h e raci.cn2;e 0 : -, C.~E co~.~eiagei~ ~o;icy irL a;r_yicn i ~ l p h r !czirt_ 1 ' -1,. : . - ~ f;, i-5" - & ~~rL~eri~~;~:~ i i ~ ~ l l s 7 ; l . ~ ~ coxjerage and stacking is specifically prchibited bv S 3 3 - 2 3 - i C 3 , DICA . The majority 3150 distinguishes chis Court's recenr decision in Cnilberg grounds tna: intersret S V. Rose i 1 9 9 5 ; , 273 Nont. 414, 9 0 3 F.2d 1 3 7 7 , on the Chilberq was a xuitiple poiicy case and did nor 3 3 - 2 3 - 2 0 3 , IvTCA. In Chilberq there were zultiole policies since rhe same insurance company issued separate policies vehicles i for each vehicle rather than insaring all ~ h e palicy, as was done in this :as". one The decision in Chilbnrg was not dependent on the fact that multiple policies were involved, bat rather on izne fact that Ck:xiberg, iike Leonard in tnis case, was a strznger to ths inscra~cepclicies, n o being the na:ned insured or ~ a fanily merber. Having never paid any ~ r e m i u a so! rhe policies, r nor having any knowledge the policies even existed prior co the 't accidect, this Ccurt riled that Chiiberq shodld r o be able zc stack the separate underinsured coverage limits, P.Zd at L38C. ~ i k , ~ chi1be-< , q expectation" of covezags and, under Leocard t k had ChiIberc, c"j3 nc "reasonable eattir:aie cf Chilberc, , , n:s estate should not be allowed to stack underinsured coverage. n T summary, the majority's strained and :restrictisre consrracrisn of M V L h s used in S 3 3 - 2 3 - 2 0 3 , ?4CA, is contrary tc c . the clear language cr ine statute and dces ncr take into acccnnt - -; , csfitext in , : , :e h szatlte .?.;is "A?rittfn. Tnjfr the_ . , the zrly stac;k~cg rrc;i-i;,ite.53 g c - e ~9 - 2 . - - 3 fax- rple liab5>4-. - .~ r, n ~ tfar . ~.. i s poi;cies Lie; iss~j~ei under "ha3 drivers" an6 unirisured motorist coverage. n ; x - : been appiieci to - , --,e;:ability coverage in Monrana for which -aj-ri--r ?4Clj --- iLrMT,7SX.EA f 1.s 0; Since sta-ckinghas cc-jera~es," the only type cf sracking is prchibired is ncw cninsurea motorist coverage. The plain language of the statute is simply not that narrow. The practical result of tne majority's decisisn is absurd. Since the majority opinion recognizes che prohibition against che stacking crf ~ninsuredcoverage limits, if Leonard had been struck and killed by a driver with no liability insurance a all, stacking , wozld not be allowed and ~ h ex a x i n ~ m his recovered under rhe poiicy would be $ S C , O O C . esrate could have . under ;he aajority's interpretation, however, since the driver who strack Leonard had iimics, the vehicles ucder the policy can be stacked the r~ini~urn and Leonard's estate is entitled to $350,0CO. Statutes should be read and eonstr~ied so as tc avoid absurd resul-rs if a reascnable constructign can avoid it. Christenot v . State (I995j, 2 7 2 ' See Ailstate Lnsurapce ConpaiLy v . Skor;pa (1533), 1 3 Norit. ., Fed. Rep. 355, which addressed the issue of stackicg -iability. , pc;licies and concluded t h a t tnls _oar: 5 ~ s s a r i y reccgrizc;d a l - , . , - , distirrc:isn betweerr i;abL~.lty cc7.rerage and r e rnotcri.sc csverage cizing Jacobson -J. Implement Dealers W2t. Ins. Co. ; 1982;, . . 196 M o n t . 542, 644 P.2d 908, and Cnaffee v . Lynited States Fid. & -. -dar. Co. '19'793, 191 Nonc. 1 , i9i F.8d i102. - Mcnc . 3 9 5 , 9 C 1 T 2.5 541 - Darby S ~ a r , Lzd. v . Cepartment of Reven*~e 8 (1195), T 3 , 376, -,G5 p ~ z d .11:~ would t h e r e f o r ? ans:~Jer this T c a r t in ~1.- affirrxarL\-o a d i certified q u e s h ~ c r e s e g r e d ic o ksid L ^ , " .. 3,;.~2;2C3i 'J-" Il - n i prohibits t h e stacki~g medical payment coverage and uncierir.sured cf mctcrist coverage Justice Kar1.a P . Gray, dissenting. I I respectfully dissent from the Court's opinion. While I think the Court does a relatively creditable job of attsmpting to mesh statxtes which simply do not track well, I am uzabie to join : in its analysis. Plainly stated, the question before us is whether the antistacking provision contai~~eci 5 33-23-2C3(i!, XCA, is limited to in liability coverages required by law or applies to all coverages contained in a vehicle insurance policy. The Court concludes that the statute prohibits only the stacking of required liability coverages, as the Court creatively defines such coverages. It is my view that, while the statute is not a model of clarity, the legislature's intent to more broadly prohibit stacking is apparent therein, On that basis, I would answer the certified question in the affirmative. The Court begins with the "motor vehicle liability policy" (MVLP) language contained in § 33-23-203,MCA, and looks first to 5 33-23-204,MCA, for a definition of that term; that detinition is stated as "any policy of automobile or motor vehicle insurance against liability now or hereafter required under Title 51, chapter 6 ; parts i and 3 . ' ! 1 agree that chis appears co be a rational starting point. Moreover, I generally agree with the Court's interpretation that the definition of MVLP contained in § 33-23-204, MCA, addresses the third-party per person, per vehicle and property damage liability coverages required by Title 61, chapter 6, parts 1 and 3. Finally, I agree that the first-party med pay and underinsuraace coverages at issue in this case are not liability coverages within the definitional parameters of W7LE contained in S 33-23-204, MCA. Tnat saic?, it is important to recall that our resolutiori of the certified question before us turns on the proper interpretation of 5 33-23-203, MCA, rather than is the Court's § 33-23-204,MCA. attempt to force feed the S definition of MVLP into § 33-23-203(1), MCA, In my view, it 33-23-204, MCA, that results in a legally flawed and logically inconsistent analysis which disregards the actual language used by the legislature in 5 33-23-203(I), MCA. Inserting the 5 33-23-204,MCA, definition of MVLP into § 33- 23-203(1), MCA, produces the following rough reading of the first pertinent portion of that statute: "the limits of liability coverage required by Title 61, chapter 6, parts 1 and 3 . . . cannot be stacked." The problem I have with such a reading is that the legislature did not use language even approximating such a reading; it clearly used different words, and words clearly at odds with the Court's interpretation, in 5 33-23-203(1),MCA. legislature said is available" cannot be that the stacked. iimits of What the "insurance coverage It is my view that, if the legislature had intended to limit the anti-staclcing provision to "liability coverage required by law," it could and would have done so. It did not. A more reasonable interpretation of 5 33-23-203(1), MCA, is that the legislature intended precisely what it said: to prohibit stacking of any and all "insurance coverage available" in an automobiie insurance poiicy, inciuding the med pay and underfnsiirznce coverages a issue here. i n tl: regard, 1 ccjnclude : : ia: that neither the definition contained in 33-23-204,MCA; nor that 61-6-103, MCA, is logically transferable to the contained in t, § 1in; s of insurance coverage availablei' language contaiaed in , , B 33-23-203;l), MCA. in § Therefore, while the geaeral ruie contained 1-2-107,MCA, is that definitions contained in one part of the ?~?ontana Code Annotated are applicable to the s a w ? wor4 or phrase wherever it occurs, I would apply the exception to that rule also contained in 5 1-2-107, MCA, and conclude in this case that "a contrary intention plainly appears" with regard to inserting definitions of MVLP into § 33-23-203(1),MCA. This conclusion is further buttressed by the remaining--and, in my view, largest--barrierto the Court's interpretation of 23-203(I), MCA. § 33- The critical portion of the statute reads "the limits of insurance coverage available under any such policy, including the limits coverage. . . . " of liability under uninsured motorist With the Court's definition of "such policy" inserted, the statute reads "the limits of coverage required under Title 61, chapter 6, parts 1 and 3 [the $25,000/$50,000/$10,000 amounts of third-party liability coverage! including the limits of liability under uninsured motorist coverage." Whether or not one agrees motorLst the Court's coverage is creative actually interpretation that reauired by 33-23-201, MCA, and 1 do not, an inconsistency § uninsured with results on the face of § 33-23-203(1),MCA, when both the Court's definitron of MVLP and the "includingn clause are considered. It is ciear that notblng ~n 'i'ltie 61, chapter 6, parts 1 and 3, requires uninsured motorist coverage; the Court's own anaiy-'b i P % makes that clear in pointing out that the ii 33-23-204, E4CA/Title 61 required coverages are third-party per person, per vehicle and Froperty damage liability ccverage. it 5s equally clear that t h e "including" clause refers back to what preceded it in the statute-ie "such policy"--defined by the Court as t l definitior sf MVL9. § 33-23-204, MCA, The "inciudingN clause simply cannot broaden, by any rule of logic, grammar or law of which I am aware, the statutory definition of MVLP which the Court has inserted into the statute. For these reasons, it is my view that the Court's analysis is flawed. A more reasonable reading of § 33 -23-203(1), MCA, requires a conclusion that the legislature intended to prohibit the stacking of all coverages contained in an automobile insurance policy insuring more than one vehicle. I invite the legislature to revisit the statutes addressed in this case by both the Court and the dissenting opinions with an eye toward clarifying statutes which simply do not mesh well under any analysis. I dissent.

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