THROSSELL v BD OF TRUSTEES GALL
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NO. 91-048 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1991 ROWLAND THROSSELL, MAY 3 0 1991 petitioner and Appellant, -vs- BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF GALLATIN COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 7, BOZEMAN, MONTANA, Defendant and Respondent. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Gallatin, The Honorable Larry W. Moran, Judge presiding. COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Gregory 0. Morgan, Bozeman, Montana. For Respondent: Donald E. White; White & Seel, Bozeman, Montana. submitted on briefs : Decided: Filed: Clerk April 18, 1991 May 30, 1991 Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court. A retired school administrator brought this action claiming that he was entitled to benefits under the Bozeman Public Schoolst Voluntary Career Option Plan, offering identical to those afforded teachers. Eighteenth Judicial District, retirement benefits The District Court for the Gallatin County, administrator such benefits and he now appeals. denied the We affirm. The sole issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in holding that Mr. Throssell, as an administrator, was not entitled to Option Plan benefits under his contract? School District No. 7 of Gallatin County hired Mr. Throssell in 1976 as Senior High Vice Principal. His contract provided that he receive fringe benefits the same as Ifall other benefits equal to those offered to other certified employees of the District . unless otherwise addressed . . in this contractn. In 1983, Mr. Throsself gave notice of his intent to r e t i r e at the end of the 1984 academic year. In April 1984, the School District adopted the Bozeman Public Schoolts Voluntary Career Option Plan (Option Plan). The Option Plan speaks of I1out-of- and service. The controversy here involves lldistrict-creditedlr service. The Option Plan provides in part: For the purpose of this program, the term teacher shall be as defined in the Collective ~ a r g a i n i n g Agreement between School Dist. #7 and the Bozeman Education System. ... The amounts of payment involved are strictly dependent upon the number of years of district-credited service. (Emphasis added). The Collective Bargaining Agreement defines "teacherm as follows: Unless otherwise indicated the terms "teachertt or I1teachers," when used in this agreement, refer[s] to . * . . all employees who are certified in Class 1, 2, 4, or 5 as provided in Section 20-4-106, MCA, whose positions require certification and all other employees who are required to be licensed to perform educational services of a professional nature but shall exclude all supervisory employees, e.g.! the superintendent, assistant superintendent, prxncipals and assistant (Emphasis added), principals, . .. Prior to retiring, Mr. Throssell applied for benefits under the Option Plan. The School District trustees denied his application for benefits under the Option Plan upon two grounds: (1) As an administrator in the School District he was specifically excluded from the benefits of the Option Plan; and (2) he would not be entitled to compensation under the Option Plan as he had only eight years of in-district credit with the School District. Thirteen years of district-credited service are needed to qualify for the Option Plan. Mr. Throssefl appealed the case to the Gallatin County Superintendent of Schools. The County Superintendent found that the Option Plan would be a benefit included in Mr. Throsselll last s contract in 1983 but that it was necessary to have at least thirteen years of district-credited service for a teacher to qualify under the Option Plan. She further found that the provisions of the schoollscollective bargaining agreement allowing a maximum number of seven years of district-credited service hired during the term of the collective applies only to "teacherstt bargaining agreement dated July 1, 1983, through June 30, 1984. She concluded that Mr. Throssell had eight years of in-district service but that neither his 1976 nor his 1983 contracts contained any provision granting him credit for any out-of-district service. Thus, his claim was again denied. Mr. Throssell appealed to the State Superintendent of Public Instruction (State Superintendent) who held that Mr. Throssell entitled to benefits if he were qualified. The was State Superintendent affirmed the County Superintendent's decision. Subsequently, Mr. Throssell appealed the decision to the District Court pursuant to 5 2-4-702, MCA. The District Court found that the County Superintendent and the State Superintendent committed an error of law by considering only part of the definition of the term "teacheraf used in the as Option Plan, and failing to consider specific language in the definition: . . . [The Option Plan] shall exclude all supervisory employees, e.g., the Superintendent, Assistant Superintendent, Principals and Assistant Principals, .. . Thus, the District Court held that as an Assistant Principal, Mr. Throssell was not eligible to receive Option Plan benefits because he was specifically excluded by the language of the Option Plan. Mr. Throssell appeals the District Court's decision. Did the District Court err in holding that Mr. Throssell, as an administrator, was not entitled to Option Plan benefits under his contract? Two factors must be met before Mr. Throssell can receive benefits. First, he must be an employee "eligible'l under the Option Plan to receive such benefits. Second, if he is eligible, he must meet a minimum requirement of thirteen years of district- credited service so that he may actually receive the benefits. The District Court concluded that Mr. eligible for coverage. We disagree. Throssell was not Mr. Throssellls contract provided that he receive the following fringe benefits (in part): A. Full family health, dental and vision Insurance. All other benefits equal to those offered to other certified employees of the District which includes but is not limited to Maternity Leave, Emergency Leave, Leave for Civic Duties, Personal Leave and Leaves of Absence, unless otherwise addressed in this contract. (Emphasis added) . Nowhere does the contract otherwise provide that Mr. Throssell should not receive benefits equal to those offered to other certified employees. Collective The District Court's Bargaining Agreement's definition reference to the of teacher was correct. However, it must also consider Mr. Throsselltsindividual contract which allows Itall other equal benef itstt. We therefore reverse the ~istrictCourt's conclusion that Mr. Throssell is not entitled to benefits under the Career Option Plan. Mr. Throsselltsrecord of service card showed the number "11" in the 190utM column. Throssell contends that the School District credited him with eleven years of out-of-district service on the permanent record card and thus, he is entitled to benefits under the Option Plan. The State Superintendent addressed that argument as follows: The maximum number of years out-of-district service a "new teachert1could be credited is seven years. A decision on the actual number of years of out of district service credited to a new teacher is made by the District at the time of hire. The new teacher's placement on the salary matrix requires the District to decide how many years of out-of-district service it will credit to a new teacher. The term "district-credited" requires action on the part of the District. The ~istrictmay credit a new teacher with zero through seven years of out-ofdistrict service. As the County Superintendent concluded, Mr. Throssell was not a "new teacher" when he entered into his final contract in 1983. The 1983 contract does not contain a provision granting credit to Mr. Throssell for any out-of-district service. Therefore, district- credited service for new teachers under the 1983 - 1984 Collective Bargaining Agreement is not a benefit to which Mr. Throssell would be entitled under his 1983 contract because he was not a "new teacher" in 1983. For this reason, the County Superintendent and the State Superintendent concluded that Mr. Throssell did not meet the requirement for a minimum of thirteen years of districtcredited service to qualify for the Option Plan. The scope of review of administrative decisions is somewhat limited. See 5 2- 4-704 ( 2 ) , MCA. Our function as an appellate court reviewing an administrative decision is not to substitute our judgment for that of the County [or State] Superintendent but rather to review the whole record to determine if the administrative findings are clearly erroneous or if the County Superintendent's [or State Superintendent's] conclusions of law constitute an abuse of discretion. Harris v. Cascade County School Dist. No. 6 and F (1990), 241 Mont. 274, 277, 786 P.2d 1164, 1166. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the County and State Superintendents' findings are not clearly erroneous nor were the conclusions of law an abuse of discretion, and affirm their conclusion that Mr. Throssell did not meet the thirteen year minimum requirement. While we affirm the final holding of the District Court that Mr. Throssell will not receive Option Plan benefits, we disagree with the basis for its decision. As previously stated, Mr. Throssell's contract specifically provided that he receive "all other equal benefitsttequal to those offered to other certified employees of the District. Thus, we hold that in this case, under Mr. Throssellts contract he was eligible to receive Option Plan benefits if he satisfied the thirteen year minimum requirement of district-credited service. We agree that the record supports the conclusions of the Superintendents that he did not. We affirm the District Court's denial of benefits to the plaintiff. We Concur: Chief Justice May 30, 1993 CERTf FICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that the following order was sent by United States mail, prepaid, to the following named: Gregory 0. Morgan Attorney at Law P.O. Box 1530 Bozeman, MT 59715 Donald E.White White & See1 1800 W. Koch, Ste. 9 Bozeman, MT 59715 ED SMITH CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF MONTANA
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