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No. 83-298 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1984 I N THE MATTER OF C.S., a Youth. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Tenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Fergus, The Honorable Peter Rapkoch, Judge presiding. COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Thomas Meissner argued, Lewistown, Montana For Respondent: Eon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Jim Scheier argued, Asst. Atty. General, Helena John Paulson, Deputy County Attorney, Lewistown, Montana Submitted: Decided: Filed: I ' '984 *,4'4-- ,.-- = . s v/' Y Clerk February 29, 1934 May 24, 1984 Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This case arose out of a series of incidents which led to appellant being adjudged a delinquent youth. From an order of of commitment placing her in the custody the Montana Department of Institutions, this appeal is taken. On March 31, 1983, the Fergus County Attorney filed a petition for a Youth Hearing in the District Court of the Tenth Judicial District of the State of Montana, requesting that appellant be adjudged a delinquent youth. she was fifteen years of age. At the time, The petition alleged that during the month of March, 1983, appellant committed the offense of violation of privacy in communication, a misdemeanor as provided in Section 45-8-213, MCA. The facts underlying separate the offense were that on three occasions, appellant and several minor friends made numerous telephone calls to a Lewistown, Montana residence. The purpose and effect of these calls was to harrass a woman living there. On April 6, 1983, an evidentiary hearing was held, at which the District Court found the allegations of the petition to be true. The dispositional hearing was held on April 13, 1983, and appellant was ordered committed to the Department of Institutions until she reaches the age of twenty-one, unless the Department deems an earlier release appropriate. She was placed in the Mountain View School for Girls in Helena. A notice of appeal was filed with this Court on May 17, 1983, however, jurisdiction was returned to the District Court to allow entry of findings. After the findings were properly entered, this Court resumed jurisdiction for the purpose of this appeal. The sole issue raised on appeal is whether appellant's constitutional right to equal protection has been denied because her term of commitment is potentially longer than the maximum sentence which could have been imposed had the same offense been committed by an adult. of time appellant could spend The maximum amount in the custody of the Department of Institutions is six years, which is much more than the maximum sentence for adults who have committed the offense of violation of privacy in communications. Section 45-8-213, MCA, provides for a fine of $500 or imprisonment of up to six months or both had the same offense been prosecuted in a criminal action. The initial inquiry in any equal protection analysis is whether the identified groups or classes are similarly situated with respect to the challenged statute, ruling or governmental action. Montana Land Title Association v. First American Title (1975), 167 Mont. 471, 539 P.2d 711. We find that adults and minors are not similarly situated with respect to Montana's sentencing laws for three reasons. First, as the State points out, appellant was not convicted of a crime but committed after being delinquent youth under Section 41-5-403, MCA. found a While it is true that both commitment and sentencing are deprivations of physical liberty, the cause and desired result of each is different. A sentence of imprisonment following a criminal conviction is imposed committed, and rehabilitational. triggered because a particular its purpose is both crime was retributional and Though a juvenile commitment is usually by a crime, the commitment is strictly for rehabilitation, not retribution. Court Act is to, ". . . The purpose of the Youth [Plrovide for the care, protection, and wholesome mental and physical development," of youths falling under its jurisdiction, and youth committing violations retribution and to supervision, care 41-5-102, MCA. of ". . . the [T]o remove from element of therefore a program substitute law of [and] rehabilitation. the . . " Section There is more than an artificial distinction between commitment under the Youth Court Act and sentencing under the Montana Criminal Code. for a crime and a juvenile Thus an adult sentenced committed to the youth authorities are not similarly situated with respect to the purpose of their detention. Second, the physical liberty interests of minors and adults are qualitatively different. The liberty interest of a minor is subject to reasonable regulation by the state, to an extent not permissible with adults. of Central Missouri v. S.Ct. 2831, 49 L.Ed.2d Danforth Planned Parenthood (1976), 428 U.S. 52, 96 788 and Carey v. Population Services International (1977) 431 U.S. 678, 97 S.Ct. 2010, 52 L.Ed.2d 675. Danforth, Carey and the cases cited therein make it clear that, contrary to appellant's claim, the doctrine of parens patriae is very viable today. Finally, we have examined those cases cited from other jurisdictions which have addressed this question, and found persuasive those which concluded that adults and juveniles are not similarly situated in these circumstances. Re Eric J. (Cal. 1980), 601 P.2d relied the on reasoning 549. outlined cf. In Those cases have above commitments similar to appellant's here. in upholding Though each s t a t e ' s j u v e n i l e c o r r e c t i o n s a c t is arguably d i f f e r e n t , t h e purpose of each is t h e same; t o provide a mechanism through which t h e s t a t e can a c t a s t h e parens p a t r i a e of i t s youth. Affirmed. W concur: e Chief J u s t i c ' e \
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