MALEK v PATTEN
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No. 83-161 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1984 MERTON G. MALEK, and ROBERT L. PATTEN, Plaintiffs and Appellants, DONALD PATTEN, and FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF GREAT FALLS, Defendant and Respondents. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, In and for the County of Cascade, The Honorable Joel G. Roth, Judge presiding. COUIJSEL OF RECORD: For Appellants: Alexander & Baucus; Nancy S. Peterson argued for Robert Patten, Great Falls, Edward Alexander argued in rebuttal for Robert Patten, Great Falls, Montana For Respondents: Jardine, Stephenson, Blewett & Weaver; James E. Aiken argued for First National Bank-Great Falls, Great Falls, Montana Church, Harris, Johnson & Williams; R. Keith Strong argued for Donald Patten, Great Falls, Montana submitted: November 17, 1983 Decided: February 27, 1984 Clerk Mr. Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court. Plaintiffs Judicial appeal District from judgment of Cascade Court, the County, the Eighth which found defendant Donald W. Patten wa.s entitled as joint tenant to three certificates of deposit and joint checking account funds. We affirm the judgment of the District Court. The issue on appeal is whether Ella D. Patten created valid joint tenancies in a joint checking account and certificates of deposit payable to "Ella D. Patten or Donald W. Patten." On December 13, 1965, Ella D. Patten (Ella) purchased with her own funds Certificate of Deposit No. 3379 from defendant First National Bank of Great Falls (First National) in the amount of $10,000. The certificate was issued in the name of "Ella D. Patten or Donald W. Patten . . . payable to said depositor, or, if more than one, to either or any of said depositors or the survivor or survivors . . .. " The signature card executed at the time of purchase was signed only by Ella. appeared In place of the other joint tenant's signature notations stating "refused to obtain other signature" and "make sure of identification." On December 3, 1969, Ella purchased with her own funds two additional certificates of deposit, Certificate No. 12682 and Certificate No. 12683, each in the amount of $10,000. These certificates were also issued payable to Patten or Donald W. Patten" or the survivor. "Ella D. The signature cards were signed only by Ella. From the date of purchase of these three certificates, until her death, Ella received all interest payable on the certificates. None of the certificates was physically delivered to Donald during Ella.'s lifetime and until after Ella's death, Donald had not seen the certificates. However, the certificates were delivered by Ella to a safe deposit box at Northwestern National Bank of Great Falls. Donald was a joint tenant in the box and his signature appears on the signature card. Prior to Ella's death, only Ella had entered the safe deposit box, although Ella had told Donald to enter the box if something should happen to her. The certificates were located in the box at the time of Ella's death. On July 10, 1970, Ella opened 5002-50152-1 at First National. joint tenancy account with checking account No. The account was designated a right of survivorship. The account was in the name of "Patten, Ella D. or Donald W." The joint account signature card was signed only by Ella. This account was still in existence at the time of Ella's death, with a balance of $46,587.16. Only Ella had transacted business on the account prior to her death. Ella died on September 13, 1973. Soon thereafter, Donald went to Northwestern Bank of Great Falls and was granted access to the safe deposit box as one of the two named joint tenants, even though he had no key to the box. Donald removed the three certificates of deposit and later presented them for payment to Washington Federal Savings and Loan Associat.ion in Seattle, Washington. Washington Federal forwarded the certificates to First National for payment. First National remitted the proceeds plus accrued interest to Washington Federal for credit to the account of Donald W. Patten. On Donald's signature, the checking account funds were also withdrawn from First National and received by Donald. After plaintiff two successful challenges Robert Patten, the to District Ella's Court wills found by Ella intestate and appointed a personal representative, plaintiff Merton Malek. 558 P.2d P.2d See Patten v. Patten (1976), 171 Mont. 399, 659; Estate of Patten (1978), 179 Mont. 299, 587 1307. consisting Plaintiffs now of $30,000 from seek to recover the three $76,587.16, certificates $46,587.16 from the joint checking account. and The District Court found that the certificates and checking account were owned by Donald and Ella as joint tenants with right of survivorship and that all funds were properly paid to Donald as survivor. Judgment was entered for defendants and plaintiffs appeal. Appellants argue that Ella did not establish valid joint tenancies in the certificates or checking account. They argue that the absence of Donald's signature on signature cards for the certificates and checking account and his lack of specific knowledge relating to the account and certificates precluded establishment of valid joint tenancies by contract or gift. We disagree. In State Board of Equalization v. Cole (1948), 122 Mont. 9, 195 P.2d 989, and Casagranda v. Donohue (1978), 178 Mont. 479, 585 P.2d 1286, this Court applied a gift analysis to resolve disputes concerning ownership of similar assets. In both cases, we applied the rule that a written agreement controls the issue of intent to make a gift: ~avable of - co-de~ositors the - - to either- question - native survlvor settled t h r od -o or the 7 intent of the donor to make a gift in joint tenancy." Cole, 122 Mont. at 15, 195 P.2d at 992, citing In re Sullivan's Estate (1941), 112 Mont. 519, 118 P.2d 383 (emphasis added). "Cole stood for the proposition that, in Montana, signing a signature card containing an agreement ispayable - either - to of the that - t h e deposit or the co-depositors - - survivor settles the question of - donative intent to make a joint tenancy. Appellant cites an Arizona decision wherein it was held that the mere form of a hank account is not regarded as sufficient to establish the intent of the depositor to give another a joint interest in or ownership of it. We find the Montana rule represents a more reliable manner for determining questions concerning the ownership of joint bank accounts. This should not be mistakenly understood to mean we have no concern for the depositor's intentions. Intention is clearly expressed - on the face of the sicmature caTd. Additional evidence is --unnecessary. " tasagranda, 178 Mont. at 483-84, 5 8 5 P.2d at 1-288 (emphasis added). ... In Anderson v. Baker (1982), 196 Mont. 494, 641 P.2d 1035, we held that where a depositor during her lifetime raised the issue of ownership of funds in a joint account, the statements on the signature card were not conclusive and evidence of admissible. intent to terminate the joint tenancy was The factual basis of the holding in Anderson was the depositor's written demand for the return of passbooks and certificates and a subsequent lawsuit filed by 196 Mont. at 497, 641 P.2d at 1036. depositor. presents no similar facts. the his case Ella did nothing during her lifetime to demonstrate an intent to terminate the joint tenancies. In this regard, appellants place great emphasis on the fact that Donald did not sign the signature cards and that he had no specific knowl-edge of the accounts. They reason that Ella's failure to obtain Donald's signature or tell him of the accounts demonstrates a lack of intent on her part to make a gift. on an However, this approach places greater emphasis omission than expressing her intent. an intent not to upon an unequivocal act clearly These facts are insufficient to show give Donald certifi-cates and account. a joint interest in the These facts are also insufficient to show an intent to terminate existing joint tenancies as in Anderson. We hold that absent evidence of intent to the contrary, the joint account agreements and signature cards signed by Ella Patten establish her intent to make a gift. Appellants further attempt to distinguish Cole and Casagranda with respect to the gift delivery requirement. They contend that because Ella refused to obtain Donald's signature or inform him regarding the account and certificates, she failed to relinquish control over them. However, the delivery requirement is met if the donor creates in the donee a co-equal right to exercise control over the deposits. Cole, 122 Mont. at 16, 195 P.2d at 993. Ella deposited the money under agreement that Donald had a right to withdraw the money or cash the certificates. In Cole, we stated that it is irrelevant that the right might prove to be of no pecuniary value. "'No act of [the donor] could defeat it of no the right, although she might render - - - value. ' " Mont. at 16, 195 P.2d at 993, quoting Burns v. Nolette (1929), 83 N.H. 489, 144 A. 848 (emphasis added). a right to exercise 122 control over the Donald had account and certificates, even though Ella may have rendered it valueless by failing to inform Donald of the details. Most authorities take the position that the opening of a joint account with an agreement such as the one signed by Ella Patten j.s sufficient to satisfy requirement, so long as done with the delivery the requisite intent. Brown on Personal Property 183 (3d ed. 1975) . We recognized that a formal or informal written agreement is sufficient to accomplish delivery, in Faith Lutheran Retirement Home v. Veis (1970), 156 Mont. 38, 473 P.2d 503. There, a valid gift was found where the donor executed an instrument sa-ying he wished to give a certain sum of money to the donee and that it could be collected from his estate if not demanded sooner or paid. 156 Mont. at 39-40, 473 P.2d at 504. We reasoned that writings serve the same purpose as actual delivery in an oral gift: of the gift. preclusion of unfounded claims and authentication 156 Mont. at 44, 473 P.2d at 506. Ella Patten's intent was clearly expressed on the face of the deposit agreements. These agreements are sufficient to accomplish her purpose. Moreover, signature cards are protective devices employed by banks to assure that the person transacting business with the account is actually the person named in the deposit agreement. So long as Donald was designated a joint tenant in the deposit agreement, lack of his signature on the card does not affect his rights as set forth in the deposit agreement. Appellants have presented no authority for the proposition that a donee must sign the document which creates a gift or must know the details of the gift. The general rule is that acceptance of a gift is presumed. See Stagg v. Stagg (1931), 90 Mont. 180, 188, 300 P. 539, 543; 38 Am.Jur. 2d Gifts sections 34 and 35. the gifts. Donald did nothing to repudiate We find no legal significance in the absence of Donald's signature on the signature cards or lack of specific knowledge concerning the account and certificates. Stringent application of gift theory elements as urged by appellants ignores the reality of modern practice relating joint and survivorship bank accounts. Modern commercial practice relies heavily upon contractual theory rather than gift theory. The Legislature has recognized the validity of joint bank accounts and certificates of deposit based upon contractual principles. comment; recognized involved section the in See 32-1-442, validity these of section 72-1-110, MCA MCA. The the contractual transactions by Legislature and has relationship relieving banks of liability for paying the proceeds of such accounts according to the t.erms of the contract: "Joint deposits - survivorship. (1) When a deposit has been made or shall hereafter be made in any bank transacting business in this state in the names of two or more persons, payable to either or payable to either or the survivor, or any survivor, such deposit, or any part thereof, or any interest or dividend thereon, may be paid to any of said persons, whether the other or others be living or not. The receipt or acquittance of the person so paid shall be a valid and sufficient release or discharge to the bank for any payment so made. " (2) The term 'deposit' shall include certificates of deposit heretofore or hereafter iss~zed." Section 32-1-442, MCA. While this statute does not expressly vest title to account proceeds, it a-pproves payment to the surviving joint tenant. This is precisely the position of First National in this case, which has delivered funds to Donald in accordance with the contracts. A case emphasizing this contract relationship is Estate of Panning (Ind. 1975), 333 N.E.2d 80. The depositor, with her own funds, purchased certificates of deposit as joint tenant with another person who signed nothing and knew nothing of the certificates' existence until they were found in a safe deposit box after the depositor's death. The Indiana Court applied the Restatement of Contracts provision: '' ( 1 Where performance of a promise in a contract will benefit a person other than a promissee, that person is ... " ' (a) A donee-beneficia-ry,if it appears from the terms of the promise in view of the accompanying circumstances that the purpose - - promise of the is- to make a gift - - beneficiary - - confer to the or to - upon him a right against the promisor - to some performance neither due nor supposed nor asserted to be due from the promisee to the beneficiary '" Estate of Fanning, 333 N.E.2d at 83, quoting ~estatementofContracts section 133 (1932) (emphasis added) ... . . .. . The Indiana Court expressly found that the donee's lack of knowledge of the certificates did not affect the validity of the gift. 333 N.E.2d at 83-84. The Court concluded that: "We have adopted the contract theory instead of the * gift theory - elemental requirements of The tend of t & the gift theory - -to frustrate the intent - donor. - -of the requirements - in particular Some the delivery requirement - defy the usual donor's inclination. Other jurisdictions have adopted the contract theory. We are impressed with and persuaded by the apparent success of the contract theory in these jurisdictions." 333 N.E.2d at 85-86 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added) . . .. . We note that the Legislature has essentially adopted the contract theory. We approve the contract theory as described of in Estate - Fanninq. This theory provides an additional basis upon which to affirm the District Court's judgment in this case. Further, the certificates of deposit were kept in a safe deposit box in the name of Ella or Donald Patten. Donald had signed the signature card for the safe deposit box. 70-1-308, MCA provides: Section "Safe de~osit box - ioint tenancv. When so . ' specifiedL- - agreement granting for a term 3 in the time the right in two or more persons to use or occupy any safe or box, commonly referred to as a safe deposit vault or box for the safekeeping of valuables, such interest and estate created in the grantees shall - - joint tenancy in such vault or be a box - pass - - survivors and survivor upon the and to the death of one or more of the joint tenants with right in such survivors and survivor - to have access of such vault - - - -the or box and to and - - ~ossession - contents thereof under - terms - - agreement." the of the (emphasis added) 2 This statute ma-kes it clear that the contents of the box are property of the surviving joint tenant. The statute places express reliance on the agreement relating to the box, not upon who has the key. This provision, together with the fact that the certificates were in the name of "Ella D. Patten or Donald W. Patten" establishes Donald's ownership of the certificates. We hold that Ella Patten created joint tenancies in favor of Donald in the checking account and certificates of deposit under gift or contract theory. the judgment of the District Court. We concur: Chief Justice Justices a1 District Judge, sitting in place of Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr. We therefore affirm Mr. J u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n d i s s e n t i n g . I dissent. T h i s Court found v a l i d T o t t e n T r u s t s in S t a t e B o a r d o f E q u a l i z a t i o n v . C o l e ( 1 9 4 8 ) , 1 2 2 Mont. 9 , 1 9 5 P.2d 989. In inheritance Cole, taxes supra, upon the assets state in tried the to impose decedent's joint s a v i n g s a c c o u n t s , and s e r i e s "G" U n i t e d S t a t e s S a v i n g s Bonds held i n j o i n t names. joint bank accounts subject t o tax, The f u n d s T h i s Court found transferred to the assets the in co-depositor the not however t h e b o n d s w e r e s u b j e c t t o t h e t a x . in the joint bank accounts transferred as i n t e r v i v o s g i f t s because d e l i v e r y , i n t e n t and a c c e p t a n c e o c c u r r e d during the signing a decedent's lifetime. is e s t a b l i s h e d b y Intent signature card containing d e p o s i t was p a y a b l e t o e i t h e r o f an agreement that t h e co-depositors. the This C o u r t r e a s o n e d t h a t j o i n t bank a c c o u n t s v e s t a n i n t e r v i v o s g i f t because of the co-depositor's r i g h t t o withdraw funds a t any t i m e . The b o n d s f a i l e d t o t r a n s f e r gifts even because though decedent o r another party, the bonds as inter vivos were p a y a b l e d e l i v e r y never s h e e x e r c i s e d c o m p l e t e c o n t r o l o v e r them. to the occurred because S h e k e p t them i n a s a f e t y d e p o s i t box a n d " n o n e o f t h e a l t e r n a t e p a y e e s e v e r had a c c e s s t o t h i s s a f e t y d e p o s i t box o r e v e n a t t e m p t e d t o e x e r c i s e c o n t r o l o v e r t h e bonds." 1 2 2 Mont. a t 2 1 , 1 9 5 P.2d a t 9 9 5 , 996. I n Casagranda v. P.2d 1 2 8 6 , we f o u n d j o i n t tenancy of the Donahue bank (1978), became individual d e p o s i t o r and a r e n o t p a r t o f 479, 585 accounts a g a i n t o be j o i n t the funds with r i g h t of accounts 1 7 8 Mont. survivorship. property the estate. of Funds i n surviving I n Casagranda, supra, the decedent established joint savings accounts with the respondent. The executrix of the estate sought to quiet title on the joint bank accounts and included those funds in the estate. We cited Cole, supra, saying "the signing of the signature card payable to either of the co-depositors or the survivor, settles the question of donative intent to make a joint tenancy." 178 Mont. at 483, 585 P.2d at 1288. Those to deposits survivorship. co-depositors passed the co-depositor by right of In both Cole and Casagranda, the surviving signed the signature cards along with the decedents. In Anderson v. Baker (1982), 196 Mont. 494, 641 P.2d 1035, this Court again used gift theory analysis to "hold that where, as here, a depositor during his or her lifetime raises the issue of ownership of funds in a joint tenancy account, the conclusive statements and on additional the signature card not evidence may be examined to ascertain the true intent of the parties." 500, 641 P.2d at 1038. are 196 Mont. at Anderson, supra, involved a decedent who during her lifetime established a joint savings account and C.D.s with the respondent. Just prior to her death, she sought to regain exclusive control over the accounts, by commencing action for the return of her passbook on the savings account and the C.D.s for the removal of the respondent's name. We held that the filing of the action to regain control exclusive decedent's lifetime, survivorship. cut of off the the accounts during respondent's right Therefore, the deposits were part of the of the estate. In the instant case, Ella Patten established several j o i n t accounts but refused t o relinquish control over these deposits. She n e v e r s o u g h t s i g n a t u r e s f r o m t h e r e s p o n d e n t , n o r i n f o r m e d him o f t h e existence of these j o i n t accounts. She remained s e c r e t i v e of a l l h e r f i n a n c i a l d e a l i n g s . distinguish I Casagranda for the the instant following case reasons: from in Cole and Cole and both C a s a g r a n d a , a l l p a r t i e s e x e c u t e d s i g n a t u r e s on t h e s i g n a t u r e c a r d s ; and a l l o f t h e d e p o s i t o r s l i s t e d o n t h e a c c o u n t s knew o f t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e a c c o u n t s and c o u l d w i t h d r a w a n y and all of the deposits at any time. In the instant respondent did not sign the signature card. knowledge of these accounts precluded case, The l a c k o f any withdraw1 by I would h o l d r e s p o n d e n t o f any d e p o s i t from t h e a c c o u n t s . t h a t these j o i n t accounts f a i l e d t o c r e a t e a j o i n t tenancy of the funds because Ella Patten failed t o make i n t e r vivos j o i n t tenancy account Totten Trust. the f u n d s w i t h d r a w n by respondent o u t of a valid Therefore, the account a r e p a r t o f t h e e s t a t e and n o t i n d i v i d u a l p r o p e r t y . Respondent bank and Respondent contends that the E l l a P a t t e n made him a cites Ludwig v. agreement third Montana between the party beneficiary. Bank and Trust Co. ( 1 9 3 9 ) , 1 0 9 Mont. 4 7 7 , 98 P.2d 3 7 9 , f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t a c o n t r a c t b e t w e e n t h e bank and j o i n t d e p o s i t o r s c r e a t e s a power t o d r a w upon t h e f u n d s by e i t h e r d e p o s i t o r s and t h a t t h e bank m u s t h o n o r t h i s c o n t r a c t . T h i s power r e m a i n s v a l i d even a f t e r t h e d e a t h of a co-depositor. draw existed in Ludwig, supra, W h i l e t h i s power t o because both depositors s i g n e d t h e s i g n a t u r e c a r d and had a c c e s s t o t h e a c c o u n t , i t did not e x i s t i n t h e i n s t a n t case. R e s p o n d e n t ' s power withdraw during these funds never existed Ella to Patten's She lifetime. information accounts, effectively from precluded respondent about that the by withholding existence of these t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of c o n t r o l can n o t occur w i t h o u t knowledge. Respondent third beneficiary party asserts this is a contract. clear However, c a s e of Ella a Patten never demonstrated o r presented i n t e n t i o n s t o c r e a t e a t h i r d party beneficiary contract for Donald. She d e m o n s t r a t e d o n l y a n i n t e n d e d f u t u r e i n t e r e s t i n t h e a c c o u n t s and n o t a present interest. T h i s makes t h e t r a n s a c t i o n t e s t a m e n t a r y in nature. R e s p o n d e n t c o n t e n d s S e a v e y v. F a n n i n g ( I n d . 1 9 7 5 ) , 3 3 3 N.E.2d 80, a better of T o t t e n T r u s t s . validity valid represents survivorship approach to resolving The I n d i a n a Supreme C o u r t f o u n d rights in that C.D.s, the decedent (Fanning) established i n h e r name and t h e name o f person joint (Seavy), survivorship. without in the tenancy with the Fanning c o n t r o l l e d t h e C.D.s informing Seavey o f another right of i n a l o c k box their existence. The I n d i a n a Court applied t h i r d p a r t y beneficiary theory t o e s t a b l i s h S e a v e y ' s r i g h t t o c o l l e c t t h e p r o c e e d s f r o m t h e C.D.S. theory avoids g i f t theory. delivery joint t h e problem of the delivery This requirement of I t r e t a i n s t h e i n t e n t requirement b u t presumes even if accounts. the beneficiary lacks any knowledge of The c o u r t f o u n d " a g i f t i n p r a e s e n t i o f a contingent contractual right." I reject t h i s r a t i o n a l and b e l i e v e g i f t t h e o r y is t h e proper approach t o take. Respondent asserts under gift theory, Ella Patten p r o p e r l y c r e a t e d j o i n t t e n a n c i e s with r i g h t of s u r v i v o r s h i p . He contends intention. the signature card settled the issue of D e l i v e r y o c c u r r e d by t h e c r e a t i o n o f t h e w r i t t e n agreement presumed to joint accounts, acceptance can be . I agree presumption that, establish in that of intent. Montana, agreement that co-depositors signing a "Cole signing the signature a stood is at to the proposition containing either of an the o r s u r v i v o r s s e t t l e s t h e q u e s t i o n of d o n a t i v e 6 4 1 P.2d P.2d creates the card payable i n t e n t t o make a j o i n t t e n a n c y . " 499, for signature deposit card a t 1038. 1288. A n d e r s o n , 196 Mont. Casagranda, Respondent 1 7 8 Mont. claims d e l i v e r y by t h e w r i t t e n a g r e e m e n t Ella 494 a t a t 483, Patten 585 completed (the signature card). I disagree. I n Anderson t h i s C o u r t s a i d : "We a r e a l s o m i n d f u l t h a t t h e s i g n a t u r e c a r d s a r e forms c o n t a i n i n g language d r a f t e d by t h e d e p o s i t o r y i n s t i t u t i o n . W h i l e t h e l a n g u a g e t h e r e o n may v e r y w e l l d e s c r i b e agreements between t h e d e p o s i t o r i t c a n h a r d l y be and t h e d e p o s i t o r y , expected t o accurately express the i n t e n t i o n s and r e l a t i o n s h i p s b e t w e e n t h e j o i n t t e n a n t s a b o u t which t h e d e p o s i t o r y t y p i c a l l y h a s l i t t l e , i f a n y , knowledge." Anderson, 196 Mont. at 501, 502, 641 P.2d a t 1038. Respondent contends t h e agreement c r e a t e d a co-equal He cites, r i g h t t o c o n t r o l over t h e d e p o s i t . " [tlhe actual g i f t made i s n o t t h e money i n t h e bank b u t t h e g i f t o f t h e co-equal r i g h t w i t h t h e donor depositor." Cole, supra. t o e x e r c i s e c o n t r o l over t h e While it remains t r u e i n s t a n c e s t h a t j o i n t accounts c r e a t e co-equal depositors t o exercise control over not true in the instant case. rights in the the deposits, Ella i n most Patten such is completely p r e c l u d e d Donald P a t t e n f r o m e x e r c i s i n g a n y c o n t r o l o v e r t h e j o i n t accounts, p r i o r t o her death. a signature" of his for the She " r e f u s e d t o o b t a i n signature cards. She n e v e r disclosed to him the existence of these accounts. Without a present right to control the deposit there is no delivery. This right to control must be exercisable and not hypothetical. I would reverse and remand to the District Court for entry of judgment for appellant/plaintiff $76,487.16 plus interest. for the sum of Mr. Chief Justice Frank I. Ha.swel1,dissenting: I join in the dissent of Mr. Justice Harrison. I would emphasize that it is pure fiction to hold that Ella. Patten had any intention during her lifetime to make a gift of any part of the certificates of deposit or the bank account to Donald Patten under the facts of this case. She withheld knowledge of the existence of both from Donald during her lifetime to enable her to retain exclusive control over the same. Likewi-se,the joint tenancies cannot be sustained on a contract theory for the same reasons. Ella had exclusive control over the certificates of deposit and the bank account during her lifetime by the device of withholdins knowledge of the same from Don.a.ld. In my view, the pr0ceed.s thereof are properly a part of her estate. Ella Patten should not be permitted to have her cake a.nd eat it too during her lifetime. % ' J .UM& Chief JustiEe Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea: I join in the dissents of Mr. Justice Harrison and Mr. Chief Justice Haswell.
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