STATE v SIGLER
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
XO. XN THE S~~ 83-138 COURT OF TEE STATE OF WmMA 1984 STATE O MONTANA, F P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vsWILLIAM RUSSELL SIGLER, D e f e n d a n t and A p p e l l a n t . APPEAL FROM: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County o f M i s s o u l a , The H o n o r a b l e J o h n S . E e n s o n , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g . COUNSEL O RECORD: F For Appellant: C a r l E n g l u n d , a r g u e d , M i s s o u l a , Montana F o r Respondent: Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana K i m K r a d o I f e r a r g u e d , A s s t . A t t y . G e n e r a l , Helena R o b e r t L . Deschamps, 111, County A t t o r n e y , M i s s o u l a , Montana: R o b e r t J . S u l l i v a n a r g u e d , Deputy County A t t o r n e y , M i s s o u l a , Montana Submitted: A p r i l 1 6 , 1984 D e ~ i d . ~ d :Jane 4, Filed: - - 13.. Clerk 1984 Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy delivered the Opinion of the Court. William Russell Siqler appeals from a iudgment of conviction in the District Court, Fourth Judicial District, Missoula County, of the deliberate homicj-de of 19-month-old Paul T. Wilkinson. The issues we treat in this opinion are: (1.) the admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts; (2) the admissibility of an inflammatory photograph; and (3) whether the instructions defining deliberate homicide were in error. On February 23, 1982, 19-month-old Paul T. Wilkinson was found dead in the East Missoula trailer occupied by his mother, Kathleen Rachel Wilkinson and her male friend, the appellant William Russell Sigler. Missoula County authorities had responded to a late afternoon call that a child in the residence had stopped breathing. When found, the child was naked and his stomach was noticeably distended and hard. The child was pronounced dead by Missoula County deputy coroner. An autopsy was performed on the child and the examining pathologist found that the cause of death was blunt force trauma to the abdomen which perforated the small bowel in two places, causing peritonitis and acute inflammation eventual death. of The the abdomen, pathologist characterized the force causing the death as severe, and estimated that the injury to the child which resulted in the death occurred within 24 hours before his death and that most likely the cause of injury was a blow by a fist or a foot. He reiected any accidental fall as a cause because the force would n o t be other i n j u r i e s of The other hemorrhage s u f f i c i e n t and b e c a u s e h e varying injuries around a g e s on found the t h e body during adrenal found the glands; a of number the autopsy an old of child. included untreated f r a c t u r e of t h e r i g h t w r i s t ; a c o n t u s i o n s u r r o u n d i n g t h e l e f t t e s t i s ; a hematoma t o t h e head; and numerous o t h e r a b r a s i o n s , c o n t u s i o n s , and s c a r s on t h e head, f a c e , abdomen, h a n d s , back and l e g s . A t l e a s t one of t h e s c a r s c o u l d be a t t r i b u t e d t o a c i g a r e t t e burn. Three a d d i t i o n a l m e d i c a l d o c t o r s c o n c u r r e d w i t h t h e p a t h o l o g i s t ' s o p i n i o n t h a t t h e d e a t h c o u l d n o t have been caused a c c i d e n t a l l y . Evidence was i n t r o d u c e d a t t r i a l o f t h e p a s t h i s t o r y of t h e c h i l d ' s c a r e by h i s mother and S i g l e r . before t h e death, On t h e e v e n i n g n e i g h b o r s Donna C o l l i n s and L a r r y S t r a n g e had been i n t h e t r a i l e r and were t o l d t h e c h i l d was q u i t e ill and v o m i t i n g t h a t e v e n i n g . Collins strongly advised t h a t Ms. t h e c h i l d be t a k e n t o t h e d o c t o r immediately. Strange t e s t i f i e d that he v i s i t e d the trailer almost e v e r y d a y , t h a t h e u s u a l l y o b s e r v e d t h e c h i l d t o be s i t t i n g i n h i s h i g h c h a i r o r h i s p o t t y c h a i r and t h a t t h e c h i l d would get quite t e n s e when Sigler approached him. S t r a n g e saw S i g l - e r g i v e t h e c h i l d h a r d s p a n k i n g s , and once saw him p i c k the child up by t h e hand w h i l e h e was h e i n g spanked. s t a t e d t h a t t h e c h i l d had been spanked f o r merely c r y i n g . He He had s e e n c i g a r e t t e b u r n s on t h e c h i l d ' s hand and had s e e n a b r u i s e u n d e r n e a t h h i s l e f t e y e t e n d a y s t o two weeks p r i o r t o the death. He saw Sigler once f o r e h e a d when he would n o t e a t . "whop" the child the He h e a r d t h e c h i l d v o m i t i n g a b o u t e v e r y 2 0 m i n u t e s t o a h a l f hour from 6:00 p.m. p.m. on on t h e e v e n i n g b e f o r e t h e d e a t h . t o 10:OO Tim Keatron, the 16-year-old son of Donna Collins testified he was in the trailer home about three to four times a v~eek. He had seen Sigler pick the child up by his arm and spank him and testified that the defendant hit the child hard for the child's size. Two days before the death, he had seen Sigler slap the child on the face so hard that it caused his head to nearly touch his shoulder and blood to come from his nose. The reason for that discipline was that the child would not eat his cereal. Keatron also had seen the defendant kick the child during the same period. The mother testified that discipline of the child to Sigler. she had surrendered the None of the witnesses who testified saw the child's mother discipline the child in the manner exhibited by Sigler. The defendant did not testify, but he had made statements to law officers during the early investigation of the incident. In the statements, he hypothesized that the child had been hurt by falling on a footlocker or on a large plastic dump truck. morning of He further told the officers that on the the death, the child appeared to be feeling better, that he had been fed, and that he was blabbering and talking to himself up to ten minutes before he was found not to be breathing. The medical witnesses discounted the possibility that this last testimony was correct. The child's mother, Kathleen Wil-kinson, a codefendant in the original action had entered into a plea bargain with the State in connection with her testimony. She testified that the child was healthy until the day before the death. She had gone to the trailer of Donna Collins at about 3 : 3 0 p.m., and at about 5 : 3 0 p.m. Sigl-er had appeared and ordered her to return to the home. She was told by Sigler that the child had f a l l e n o u t of bed. acting sluggish and She examined t h e c h i l d , and found him tired.. The e v e n i n g and r e f u s e d t o e a t . c h i l d vomited during t h e She d e n i e d e v e r s t r i k i n g t h e c h i l d i n t h e abdomen o r fa.ce h a r d enough t o l e a v e a b r u i s e . The jury found Sigler guilty of d e l i - b e r a t e homicide. T h i s a p p e a l ensued. S i g l e r a t t a c k s t h e testimony of witnesses relating t o o t h e r c r i m e s , wrongs o r a c t s by him toward t h e c h i l d on t h e grounds t h a t t h e e l e m e n t s r e q u i r e d i n S t a t e v . J u s t 184 Mont. 262, (1979) , 602 P.2d 957, and S t a t e v . J e n s e n (19691, 153 Mont. 233, 455 P.2d 631 were n o t m e t ; t h a t t h e a c t s o f S i g l e r a s t e s t i f i e d t o by t h e w i t n e s s e s i n d i c a t e d o n l y t h a t S i g l e r spanked t h e c h i l d , s l a p p e d h i s hands, o r f l i p p e d t h e c h i l d ' s head w i t h h i s finger, none o f which would have caused h i s d e a t h , and s o a r e d i s s i m i l a r t o t h e a c t s which b r o u g h t a b o u t t h e d e a t h of t h e c h i l d ; and t h a t t h e a c t s w e r e no more t h a n normal disciplinary distinctive" so as procedures and were not t o q u a l i f y f o r wrongful. "unusual and a c t s o r crimes under S t a t e v. Hansen (Mont. 1 9 8 0 ) , 608 P.2d 1083, 37 St.Rep. 657. The S t a t e r e p l i e s t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e m e e t s t h e g u i d e l i n e s imposed i n J u s t , supra; t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e o f p r i o r a c t s of d i s c i p l i n e a r e a p a . r t of t h e e n t i r e corpus d . e l i c t i of the charged o f f e n s e , c i t i n g S t a t e v . R i l e y (Mont. 1 9 8 2 ) , 649 P.2d 1-273, 39 St.Rep. victim, the 1491; and t h a t when a b a t t e r e d c h i l d i s t h e pattern defendant-caretaker of toward conduct the child s c o p e of t h e i s s u e s b e f o r e t h e c o u r t . 1 9 8 3 ) , 675 P.2d 539. exhibited victim by is within the the S t a t e v . Tanner (Utah The contention that the acts of discipline reported by the neighbor witnesses used by Sigler on the child are dissimilar to the kind of force required to bring about the child's death is not supportable. The mother testified that Sigler was the sole disciplinarian of the child. Under the evidence, his response to any perceived need for disciplining the child was always intemperate, and slipped into gear on the slightest provocation. His trea-tment of a 19-month-old infant was brutal, heedless and unfeeling. F e cannot agree J that his treatment constituted "normal" discipline. In Just, we set out a four-element test to determine the admissibility of evidence of other crimes or acts in criminal prosecutions. They are (1) similarity of crimes or acts; (2) nearness in time; (3) tendency to establish a common scheme, plan or system; and, (4) the probative value of the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by the prejudice to the defendant. The testimony of the witnesses here meets the Just elements in each particular, and in addition, meets our statement in State v. Brubaker (1979), 184 Mont. 294, 307, 602 P.2d 974, 981, relating to evidence of other crimes or acts: "For evidence of unrelated crimes to be admissible, as an exception to the general rule, it must appear that the evidence of the other crimes tends to establish a common scheme, plan, system, design or course of conduct similar t o or closely connected. . with the one charged and not too remote; and the evidence must tend to establish crimes so related that proof of one tends to establish the other. Within those words must be found the paste and cover for the admissibility of the unrelated acts ... 11 The District Court here had a situation where only circumstantial evidence could bring out the case against the defendant. There were many reasons for a. jury to distrust the defendant's statement of the incident. We stated in Brubaker, that evidence of other crimes or acts should not be admitted if it leads the jury to surmise that the defendant was probably guilty of the offense. But when evidence of unrelated acts tends toward the conclusion that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged with moral certainty and beyond a reasonable Brubaker, supra. doubt, it is certainly admissible. In Tanner, supra, the Utah court pointed out that the only avail-able link between the specific nature of the child's injuries and the caretaker may be the evidence of prior abusive conduct by the caretaker. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or a.cts is an exception to the general rule that evidence of a person's character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted. in conformity therewith on a particular occasion. M.R.Evid.. habit. Ru1.e 404, A trait of character is to be distinguished from "A habit is a person's regular response to a repeated ' specific situation.I Rule 406, M. R.Evid. Habit or routine practice may be proved by testimony in the form of an opinion or by specific instances of conduct sufficient in number to warrant a finding that the habit existed or that the practice was routine. "Character may be thought of as the sum of one's habits though doubtless it is more than this. But unquestionably the uniformity of one's response to habit is far greater than the consistency with which one's cond.uct conforms to character or disposition. Even though character comes in only exceptionally as evidence of an a-ct, surely any sensible man in investigating whether X did a particula-r act would be greatly helped in his inquiry by evidence as to whether he was in the habit of doing it." McCormick on Evidence ยง 162, at 341. Under Rule 406, M.R.Evid., the acts habitually performed by Sigler in response to his perceived need for discipline of the child were admissible. As a matter of habit, his discipline of the child was excessively harsh. We find no error in the admission of the disciplinary acts administered by Sigler to the child. The second principal assignment of error by Sigler is that the District Court abused its discretion in receiving the photograph identified a.s Sta.tels exhibit 18FF into evidence. The pathologist, on autopsy, hematoma beneath the child's scalp. photograph, the only photograph injury. discovered a subdural The pathologist took a taken of that particular The scalp was reflected or drawn back in order to show the injury because of the victim's long hair. Before allowing it into evidence, as the District Court required, the pathologist blocked portions of the slide pictures so that only the injury was shown. Siqler contends that the exhibit was highly prejudicial and inflammatory and did not depict how the child would appear to another person. In effect, he is claiming that the prejudicial effect of the photograph outweighed its probative value. Many of the photographs of the autopsy discoveries were admitted without objection. The subdural hematoma was another of the injuries that the child had received, the source of which was unexplained by his principal ca-retaker, Sigler. We hold that where the purpose of a photographic exhibit is to assist the jury in understanding the case, it is admissible, even though its effect may be prejudicial or inflammatory, if prejudicial effect. its probative value outweighs its See State v. Hoffman (1982), 196 Mont. 268, 272, 639 P.2d Mont. 507, 510; State v. Buckley (1976), 171 238, 245, 557 P.2d 283, 286-287; State v. O'Donnell (1972), 159 Mont. 138, 142, 496 P. 2d 299, 301-302. case we hold that the District Court did In this not abuse its discretion in admitting the photograph into evidence; that its probative value was more important than any prejudicial or inflammatory effect because the jury was entitled to know the nature and extent of the injuries suffered by the child and no other method would have shown it as graphically or as well. This Court has been consistent in holding similarly with respect to photographs. (1982), 197 State v. Austad Mont. 70, 82, 641 P.2d 1373, 1-380; State v. McKenzie (1980), 186 Mont. 481, 505-506, 608 P.2d 428, 443-444, cert.den. 449 U.S. 1050 (1980); State v. Fitzpatrick (1973), 163 Mont. 220, 228-229, 516 P.2d 605, 610-611. 111. Sigler's failed final properly to argument instruct is that the the District Court jury definition of the mental state "purposely." the statutory definition of statutory jury. definition of considering the He contends that purposely, coupled deliberate homicide with the confused the Sigler asserts that under the instructions, the jury could convict if it found that he purposely engaged in the conduct of striking the child and that the jury did not need to find under the instructions that he intended the result, that is the death, or that he purposely caused the result, the death. signed by He supports this contention with several jurors after trial and affidavits filed with his motion for a new trial before the District Court. In resolving this issue, we pay no attention to the affidavits of the jurors signed post-trial. They may not be considered since they do not fit within the exceptions provided in Rule 606(b), M.R.Evid., nor within the purview of section 25-11-102 (2), MCA. The defendant made no objection to the instructi-onswhen they were offered during the trial. He would ordinarily be barred from raising his objections n.ow before this Court. If, however, the District Court had erred in th.e vital definition of "purposely" in this case, we would have to reverse, even without objection raised by counsel at trial, on the grounds of plain error. Therefore, qiving Sigler the benefit of every doubt, we proceed to consider the issue raised by him with respect to these instructions. The court charged. the jury as to the elements of the crime in its instruction no. 15: "To sustain the charge of deliberate homicide, the State must prove the following propositions: "First, that the defendant performed the causing the death of Paul T. Wilkinson, Jr. a.cts '"econd, that when the defenda.nt did so, le acted i purposely or knowingly . . ." The court a.lso ga.ve these instructions defining np~rp~~ely,n "knowingly," and "deliberate homicide:" No. 12. A person acts purposely with "Instruction - respect to a result or to conduct described by statute defining an offense if it is his conscious object to engage in that conduct or to cause that result. No. 1-3. A person acts knowingly with "Instruction - respect to conduct when he is aware of his conduct. "A person acts knowingly with respect to the result of conduct d.escribed by a statute defining an offense when he is aware that it is highly probable that such result will be caused by his conduct. "Instruction - No. 14. A person commits the offense of deliberate homicide if he purposely or knowingly causes the death of another human being." We need always to remind ourselves that in Montana, crimes against the State are defined by statutes. in those statutes we will generally find the provisions that frame the rights of the State to prosecute its defined crimes and that preserve the rights of the defendant to be convicted only of statutorily-defined crimes upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In Montana, a person commits a criminal homicide if he voluntarily causes the death of another purposely, knowingly or negligently. 45-2-202, MCA. human being, Sections 45-5-101 and "Purposely" and "knowingly" have replaced the concepts of malice and intent known to our former law. Sections 45-2-101 (33) and (58), MCA. In short, the voluntary act of a person, if not justifiable (Title 45, Ch. 3, MCA), knowingly, purposely, or negligently done is criminal homicide if it causes the death of another human being. Section 45-5-101. In a criminal homicide prosecution, therefore, the State must prove and the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the voluntary and unjustified act of the defendant, purposely, knowingly or negligently caused the death of the victim. Proof of cause is a primary duty of the State, and a necessary element to be found by the jury for a proper conviction in a criminal homicide case. Montana law defines what constitutes relationship between conduct and result. MCA. a causal Section 45-2-201, Conduct is the cause of a result, a.s applicable to this case, if (a) without the conduct the result would not have occurred; and, (b) if the result was not within the contemplation or purpose of the offender, but the same kind of harm or injury was contemplated by him though the precise harm or injury was different or occurred in a different way. Section 45-2-201, MCA. Applying section 45-2-20]. to this case, the proof is beyond. any doubt that the conduct which brought about the perforations to the child's bowels caused the death of the child, and that without such conduct, the death would not have occurred. In addition, the result involves the same kind of harm or injury as contemplated by the conduct even though the precise ha.rm, the death, was different or occurred in a different way. In other words, if Sigler voluntarily, as the jury found, punched with his fist or kicked with his foot the stomach of the child, even though he may not have intended tha.t death result from the act, he contemplated "the same kind of harm or injury" to the child, that is, harm or injury to the abdominal. area of the child. Moreover, there are two ways in which a person can act "purposely" with respect to a result or conduct described by the statute defining an offense. Section 45-2-101 (58), MCA. He acts purposely if it is his conscious object (1) to engage in that conduct, or (2) to cause that result. Either proposition will sustain the finding of the jury that the \ defendant acted purposely. Section 45-2-101(58), MCA. In this case, there is no claim by the defendant of justification, mitigation or excuse. In his statements he did not admit that he performed any act or acts which brought about the death of the child. In the same way, our statutory definition of "knowingly" cuts two ways. Applied here, Sigler acted knowj-ngly with respect to his conduct if he was aware of his cond-uct. He acted knowingly with respect to the result of his conduct if he was aware that it was highly probable that such a result Section 45-2-101(33), MCA. would be caused by his conduct. It is therefore true that under the instructions given in this case, and under the statutes defining crimes, the State is not required to prove the specific intent of the defendant to cause the death of the child. We have said: "We do not agree with Starr, however, on his contention that it was the duty of the State to prove Starr's specific intent to transfer a danqerous substance then or at a subsequent time. since Montana revamped its criminal statutes in 1973 by adopting in essence the Model Penal Code, specific intent is not an elementa.1 concept, unless the statute defining the offense requires as an element thereof z specific purpose II (Emphasis in original.) State v. Starr (Mont. 1983), 664 P.2d 893, 897, 40 St.Rep. 796, 801. . A few examples of the effect of deletion of specific intent from our statutory scheme will demonstrate the point: proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant consciously shot another with a gun where no circumstances of mitigation, excuse or justification appear, and the other died from the gunshot, will suffice to convict the defendant of deliberate homicide, without proof that death was the intended result by the defendant; proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant consciously decided to drive his automobile against the person of mitiga.tion, pedestrian a excuse died of pedestrian where no or justification the collision with circumstances appear, and of the his person, will suffice to convict the defendant of deliberate homicide, without proof that the death of the pedestrian was the intended result of the defendant. Our criminal law proscribes purposely doing an act which causes the death of another; it also proscribes doing an act with the conscious object of causing the death of another. In the former, death may not be the intended result, but if the act which causes the death is done purposely, deliberate homicide is committed. In the latter, death is the intended result, and any act of the defendant which leads to that intended result is deliberate homicide. In this case, as we have said, there are no issues of mitigation, justification or excuse. The circumstantial evidence here is strong enough to sustain the finding by the jury that the defendant purposely engaged in conduct which resulted in the death of the child. The instructions given to the jury required no more and no less for the prosecution to prove in this case. Therefore, the instructions given properly reflected the applicab1.e law. We find no error in the instructions given. IV. The judgment of conviction of William Russell Sigler for deliberate homicide is affirmed. We Concur: ~4cebR,gd Chief Justice &&q Justices Mr. Jus-tice ~ a n i e lJ. Shea and Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr.., dissent and will file written dissents later. 83-138 NO. I N THE SUPREME COURT O F T H E S T A T E O F MONTANA 1984 S T A T E O F MONTANA, VS. WILLIAM RUSSELL S I G L E R , D e f e n d a n t and A p p e l l a n t . D i s s e n t of M r . J u s t i c e F r a n k B. M o r r i s o n , Jr. ~ a j o r i t y p i n i o n handed d o w n : O D i s s e n t filed: LL! ~ I ,-! 1984 Clerk June 4 , 1 9 8 4 Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr. respectfully dissents as follows: Instruction No. homicide. 14 stated the elements of deliberate The trial court said: "A person commits the offense of deliberate homicide if he purposely or knowingly causes the death of another human being." This instruction is an accurate paraphrase of the elements of deliberate homicide found in sections 45-5-101 and 45-5-102, MCA . An essential element of the offense is that the defendant purposely or knowingly caused the death of another. Trial court's instruction No. 15 was clearly erroneous. That instruction said: "To sustain the charge of deliberate homicide, the State must prove the following propositions: "First, that the defendant performed the acts causing the death of Paul T. Wilkinson, Jr. "Second, that when the defendant did so, he acted purposely or knowingly." The court failed to instruct the jury that they must find the defendant acted with knowledge or purpose in causinq the death as required by section 45-5-101 and 45-5-102, MCA. The trial court told the jury to convict d.efendant if the jury found that defendant acted with purpose or knowledge in performing the acts which resulted in death, irrespective of whether defendant purposely or knowingly caused the death. Under the court's instruction No. 15 the jury was required to convict the defendant of deliberate homicide even though they might find the victim's death was accidental. The majority was unable to reconcile instruction No. 15 with the statutory definition of deliberate homicide and so, to achieve the desired result, simply amended the statute. The majority states: "Our criminal law proscribes purposely doing an act which causes the death of another; it also proscribes doing an act with the conscious object of causing the death of another. In the former, death may not be the intended result, but if the act which caused the death is done purposely, deliberate homicide is committed. * * * " By judicial fiat, the law in Montana is that a defendant who acts with purpose and accidentally causes the death of another, is guilty of deliberate homicide. In other words, if one strikes another on the jaw with his fist, and the one struck falls to curbing, and the death ground striking his head ensues, the offense is upon the deliberate homicide. This case perfectly illustrates the evil inherent in result-oriented decision making. Defend.ant Siglerls conduct may well have resulted in the death of an infant child. If believed, the State's case leaves little room for sympathy for Sigler. These inflamatory factual settings provide the genesis for irra.tiona1 and unworkable legal principles. I would reverse and remand for a new trial for the reason that court's instruction No. 15 failed to include an essential element of the crime of deliberate homicide. DISSENT OF MR. JUSTICE DANIEL J. SHEA No. 83-138 State of Montana VS . William Russell Sigler. Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea dissenting: I agree with the dissent of Mr. Justice Morrison in that I also believe that jury instruction no. 15 misstates Montana law and constitutes reversible error. The erroneous instruction, could easily mislead a jury into thinking that as long as the acts which resulted in death were performed purposely or knowingly, a conviction for deliberate homicide could be sustained, whether or not the defendant purposely or knowingly caused the death. no. 15 is ambiguous and At the very least instruction subject to more tha.n one interpretation. I would hold that jury instruction no. 15 fails to include the necessary causal element of deliberate homicide, and therefore this case should be remanded for a new trial. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATF OF MONTANA STATE OF MONTANA, C Plaintiff and Respondent, VS. ! WILLIMI RI?SSELL SIGLER, . 'i ;.-$3ora~' OF SaPvFz:.$: COLIR% . + &LB/ Defendant and Appellant. STATE 9 w,irt4lAFdA ORDER AND OPINION ON PETITION FOR REHEARING In his petition for rehearing Sj-gler takes issue with this language in our opinion: "Our criminal law proscribes purposely doing an act which causes the death of a-nother; i . t also proscribes doing an act with a conscious object of causing the death of another. In the former, death may not be the intended result, hut if the act which causes the death is done purposely, deliberate homicide is commit-ted." Sigler contends that the above language "broadens the definition of a most serious crime," and eliminates the crime of negligent assessment. homicide. The State agrees with this The Attorney General has thus conceded the major premise of the minority opinion filed with the original in this case. A concession of such broad. dimensions does not wring from the Attorney General an admission that Sigler is entitled to a new trial however. Instead the State continues to contend that the jury in the Sigler case was "adequately instructed." Yet if under the original opinion in this case, Sigler could have been convicted of deliberate homicide for an accidental killing of the child, he would, indeed, as the minority contended, be entitled to a new trial. We reject the contention that our original opinion in this case has eliminated the crime of negligent homicide or broadened the cri.me of deliberate homicide. To show why, we must again discuss the effect of the adoption of the Yodel Penal Code in our criminal statutes in 1973. To begin with, specific intent is not an elemental concept of a crine under the present criminal code unless the statute defining the offense requires as an element thereof a specific purpose. State v. Starr (Mont. 19831, 664 P.2d 893, 897, 40 St.Rep. 796, 801. The State j n this case was not . required to prove a specific intent on the part of Sigler to kill the child when he kicked his stomach. In State v. Gratzer (Mont. 1984), 682 P.2d 141, 145, 41 St.Rep. 727, 731, we said: "The effect of the adoption of the 1973 Criminal Code in Montana was to change radically our legal concepts for proof of homicide. Formerly, the presumption of proof of a killing was that the lesser crj-me had been committed, and the State had the duty of going forward with the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the greater had been committed. Now, the legal effect of proof of a killing i.s that the greater crime h a s been committed, that of deliberate homicide, unless the evidence shows mitigation, excuse, or justification 682 P.2d, at 145. . . ." In this case, the Sigler jury was instructed that the homicide was deliberate if a death of a human being was caused, purposely or knowingly. The jury was al-so instructed that a person acts purpose1.y with respect to a result or to conduct constituting to - crime, is his conscious object engage in the conduct or to cause that result. 45-2-101(58), YCA. Section The court also instructed the Sigler jury on the meaning of "knowingly" which is important here. The jury was told that a person acts knowingly with respect to conduct when he is aware of his conduct, and that he ~ c t s 1 The majority opinion therefore does not abol-ish the crime of negligent homicide. Rather it emphasizes the statutory elements of the crime which the jury found in this case. It should he clear, following our original Sigler opinion, that deliberate homicide is committed when a person purposely or knowingly causes the death of another .human being; and that the word "causes" in the statutory definition of deliberate homicide must be read i n conjunction with . section 45-2-201, MCA, which describes what constitutes a causal relationship between the conduct and the result. original opinion states again what had been The stated in Coleman, supra, that a person acts knowingly when there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that he is aware of the high probability of the result of his conduct. Final-ly, there is a causal relationship though the result is not within the contemplation of or purpose of the defendant, where the same kind of harm or injury is contemplated by him though the precise harm or injury is different or occurred in a different way. Negligent homicide under our statute does not include the mental states of "purposely" or "knowing1.y." 45-5-104, MCA. person acts Section A homicide is committed negligently when the negligently with respect to a result or consciously disregards a risk that the result will occur, or when he disregards a risk of which he should be aware that the result will occur. Section 45-2-101 (37), MCA. The person's negligence must be such that to disregard the risk involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation. Section 45-2-101(37). It is the presence of purposeful or knowing action, as define?, by our statutes, that distinguishes deliberate or mitigated homicide from negligent homicide. IT IS ORDERED: Accordingly, we deny the petition for rehearing and modify the paragraph to which exception was taken by the defendant and the State to insert the worc! "knowingly" as "Our criminal law proscribes purposely doing an act which causes death of another; it also proscribes doing an act with the conscious object of causing a death of another. In the former, death may not be the intended result, but if the act which causes the death is done pu;posely or knowinq1.1 deliberate homicide is committed. In the latter, death is the intended result and any act of the defendant which leads to that intended result is deliberate homicide." We Concur: C a,&9,4&&& Chief Juztice \ Justices Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea and Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr., would grant a rehearing.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
