STATE v THOMPSON
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
No. 83-134 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MOEJTANA 1984 STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, STEVEN T. THOMPSON, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and for the County of Missoula, The Honorable Jack L. Green, Judge presiding. COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Goldman & Goldman; Bernard J. Goldman argued, Missoula, Montana For Respondent: Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Chris Tweeten aruged, Asst. Atty. General, Helena Robert L. Deschamps, 111, County Attorney, Missoula Montana Submitted: Decided: Filed: October 24, 1983 January 12, 1984 JA/l1X 1984 Clerk Mr. Justice L.C. Court. Gulbrandson delivered the Opinion of the Appellant was convicted of negligent homicide after a jury trial held before the Honorable Jack L. Green. From this verdict, appeal is taken. On March 6, 1982, appellant interstate 90 near was driving west on East Missoula, Montana, when he was involved in a collision. Appellant's vehicle struck the rear end of a vehicle driven by Noah Hatton in which his wife, Sylvia Hatton, was the passenger. At the scene of the accident, appellant was arrest for driving under the placed influence of alcohol 61-8-401, MCA. He was then under in violation transported of Section to Missoula Community Hospital for treatment of minor injuries suffered in the accident. While appellant was receiving treatment, a Montana Highway Patrol officer solicited and received permission from the attending physician to talk with appellant. The officer informed appellant of his Miranda rights and his rights under Montana's "imp1 ied consent" law, Section 51-8-402, MCA. The officer then requested appellant to allow the medical staff to draw appellant refused. a blood sample, and Section 61-8-402(3), MCA, provides that, "If a resident driver under arrest, refuses upon the request of a peace officer to submit to a chemical test designated by the arresting officer as wrovided in subsection (1) of this Gection, none shall be given, but the officer shall, on behalf of the division, immediately seize his driver's license." (emphasis supplied) The officer did not seize appellant's driver's license. Confronted contacted advice. the with this o f f i c e of refusal, the t h e Missoula officer instead County A t t o r n e y for He was i n f o r m e d t h a t S y l v i a H a t t o n , who had b e e n t a k e n t o a n o t h e r h o s p i t a l , had d i e d a s a r e s u l t o f i n j u r i e s received in appellant the collision. now was He a suspect was advised died, that homicide, blood not room and since he now a the The o f f i c e r r e t u r n e d i n f o r m e d him t h a t Mrs. was since i n a n e g l i g e n t homicide, i m p l i e d c o n s e n t l a w was i n a p p l i c a b l e . to appellant's that suspect in H a t t o n had a negligent t h e i m p l i e d c o n s e n t law d i d n o t a p p l y and t h a t a s a m p l e was n e e d e d . "consent," a Though a p p e l l a n t blood sample was apparently did drawn and analyzed. A p p e l l a n t ' s b l o o d a l c o h o l l e v e l was . 1 2 % . On S e p t e m b e r 1 0 , Court to grounds will suppress that 1982, the a p p e l l a n t moved results t h e blood of the the District blood test and the the s a m p l e h a d b e e n drawn a g a i n s t h i s i n v i o l a t i o n of t h e i m p l i e d c o n s e n t law. submitted on motion H o n o r a b l e J a c k L. G r e e n . was argued B r i e f s were orally before the The c o u r t f o u n d t h a t o n t h e f a c t s o u t l i n e d above t h e implied c o n s e n t law d i d n o t a p p l y because a p p e l l a n t was a s u s p e c t i n a n e g l i g e n t h o m i c i d e . The c o u r t f u r t h e r f o u n d t h a t t h e b l o o d s a m p l e was t a k e n i n c o m p l i a n c e with the States Fourth and Constitution, Montana Constitution. Fourteenth and Amendments Article Since it 11, was of the section not an United 11 o f the unreasonable s e a r c h and s e i z u r e , t h e m o t i o n t o s u p p r e s s was d e n i e d . A j u r y t r i a l was h e l d , blood test appellant follows. were guilty admitted of d u r i n g which t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e into negligent evidence. homicide. The jury This found appeal The sole issue raised on appeal prohibition against non consensual is whether extractions of the blood samples in Section 61-8-402, MCA, applies to prosecutions for negligent Appellant homicide, has not and this challenged constitutional grounds. issue the action is dispositive. taken below on We have previously held that blood samples drawn in violation of the statute are inadmissable in prosecutions for intoxicating liquor. driving under the State v. Mangels 190, 531 P.2d 1313. influence of (1975), 166 Mont. Therefore if Section 61-8-402 applies to negligent homicide prosecutions, the results of the blood test should not have been admitted into evidence and the motion to suppress should have been granted. graciously conceded this point. The State has It is urged by appellant that Section 61-8-402, MCA, be applied to persons arrested for negligent homicide, despite the operative language of the statute that engages its provisions, "[I]£ (the suspect is) arrested by a peace officer for driving or in actual physical control of influence of alcohol." a motor vehicle while under the The District Court relied on this language in holding that the statute did not apply here. Appellant contends that this Court previously ruled that the statute does apply to negligent homicide prosecutions in State v. Morgan (Mont. 1982), 646 P.2d 1177, 39 St.Rep. 1072. an In Morgan, the defendant was involved in automobile accident where two people died instantly. When the investigating officer interviewed the defendant at the hospital it was his opinion that the defendant was incoherent and could not have communicated a wish that a blood sample not be drawn. The officer concluded that since the defendant 61-8-402(2), was in such a state, pursuant to Section i t was u n n e c e s s a r y t o o b t a i n c o n s e n t b e f o r e t h e b l o o d was e x t r a c t e d . The q u e s t i o n p r e s e n t e d t o t h i s c o u r t was w h e t h e r d e f e n d a n t was i n s u c h a n i n c o h e r e n t s t a t e a s t o be u n a b l e t o r e s p o n d t o a r e q u e s t f o r a b l o o d s a m p l e , engaging the provisions of subsection ( 2 ) of the thus implied W e d i d not expressly r u l e t h a t t h e implied consent s t a t u t e . c o n s e n t law a p p l i e d t h e r e a s t h a t q u e s t i o n w a s n o t r a i s e d by W e d i d r u l e t h a t i t s p r o v i s i o n s had been defense counsel. complied with. In s p i t e of appellant's assertions t o the contrary, t h e Morgan c a s e i s n o t d i s p o s i t i v e o f t h e c a s e a t b a r . The i s s u e p r e s e n t e d t h e r e i s n o t t h e same a s i s p r e s e n t e d h e r e , even though t h i s C o u r t s e e m i n g l y presumed t h a t t h e s t a t u t e applied. of the Morgan d e a l t s t r i c t l y w i t h t h e i n t e r n a l w o r k i n g s statute, and d i d "What i s n o t i n i s s u e i s n o t d e c i d e d . " Mining Corp. e t . a l . ( 1 9 2 8 ) , 82 Mont. a t 5 0 0 , c i t i n g Pue v. W h e e l e r 1043. the As authority for issue its applicability. not deal with was appellant's S u l l i v a n v. 5 4 3 a t 5 5 5 , 268 P. 4 9 5 ( 1 9 2 7 ) , 78 Mont. not Anselmo decided, position. the 516, case Martien v. 255 P. is not Porter ( 1 9 2 3 ) , 68 Mont. 4 5 8 , 219 P. 817. W e find that Section 61-8-402 n e g l i g e n t homicide p r o s e c u t i o n s . on t h r e e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . intent. "Legislative does not apply to This conclusion is based F i r s t we consider the legislative i n t e n t must f i r s t be determined from t h e p l a i n meaning of t h e words u s e d ; and i f t h e l a n g u a g e is plain, unambiguous, for itself." d i r e c t and c e r t a i n , C r i s t v. 1 0 2 9 , 38 S t . R e p . t h e s t a t u t e speaks S e g n a (Mont. 1 9 8 1 ) , 622 P.2d 1 5 0 a t 1 5 2 , c i t i n g Dunphy v . 1028 a t Anaconda Co. (1968), 151 Mont. 76, 438 P.2d 660. The language of the statute and an examination of the statutory scheme of Title 61, Chapter 8, part 4 plainly show that application of the implied consent law to negligent homicide cases was not within the legislature's contemplation. The operative language of Section 61-8-402 reads, "Any person who operates a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this state shall be deemed to have given consent, subject to the provisions of 61-8-401, to a chemical test of his blood, breath, or urine for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood if arrested by a peace officer for driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of ......................... alcohol." (emphasis supplied) The underlined passage above makes it clear that the protections afforded there are not engaged until there is an arrest for driving under the influence. (But, see State v. Campbell (Mont. 1980), 615 P.2d 190, 37 St.Rep. 1337, where we held that an arrest is not always a prerequisite administration of a blood alcohol test.) to Not only is the section specifically premised on such an arrest, but it is made subject to the section of the code which outlines the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Appellant has characterized this language as extra verbage which this Court could ignore should it choose to apply the statutory protections to appellant. However, "All provisions of a statute shall be given effect, if possible." Crist, supra, 622 P.2d at 1029 38 St.Rep. at 152, citing Corwin v. Bieswanger (1952), 126 Mont. 337, 251 P.2d 252. This Court does not have the power to remove or ignore language in a statute. The second consideration is how similar implied consent laws have been interpreted in other jurisdictions. The implied consent laws of several jurisdictions expressly state that they apply to persons arrested for "any offense" arising out of influence, and operating a motor vehicle under the their courts have applied the statute to negligent homicide cases. 1977), 348 So.2d 1209. See State v. Riggins (Fla.App. However among the jurisdictions which have interpreted implied consent laws with operative language similar to Montana's, there has been a split of opinion. Some jurisdictions hold that their statutes do apply to negligent homicide prosecutions. Hitchens (Iowa 1980), 294 N.W.2d See State v. 686; and State v. Annen (1973), 12 0r.App. 1203, 504 P.2d 1400. However we feel the better reasoned cases hold that the statute does not apply to negligent homicide cases. See People v. Sanchez (1970), 173 Colo. 188, 476 P.2d 980; Van Order v. State (Wyo. 1979), 600 P.2d 1056; and State v. Robarge (1977), 35 Conn.Supp. 511, 391 A.2d 184. Relying on the plain wording of the statute, these cases held that applying the implied consent laws to negligent homicide prosecutions was not what the legislature had intended. The third consideration also weighed heavily on the courts deciding the cases cited immediately above; suspension of the driver's license is simply an insufficient penalty for refusing to submit to a chemical analysis when there has been a death caused by the drinking driver. The gravity of the crime heightens the importance of the blood sample, and administrative it appears remedy was the legislature simply felt this inappropriate. The decision to modify the scope of the implied consent law properly rests within the legislature's power. It is not within our power to read into a statute more than is found there, as appellant would have us do. that Section 61-8-402 does not apply Therefore we hold to suspects negligent homicide prosecutions. The District Court's judgment is I We concur: 3h-t ,p, Chief Justice & in
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
