HOVEY v DEPT OF REVENUE

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NO. 82-194 I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1983 R. PEYTON HOVEY, petitioner and A p p e l l a n t , VS. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, LIQUOR DIVISION, o f t h e S t a t e o f M o n t a n a , a n d LEE WILLIAMS, e t a l . , Respondents. Appeal from: Counsel of D i s t r i c t Court of the F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County o f Lewis and C l a r k H o n o r a b l e Gordon B e n n e t t , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g . Record: For Appellant: J o h n W . Mahan a r g u e d , H e l e n a , M o n t a n a C a r t e r P i c o t t e a r g u e d , H e l e n a , Montana For Respondents: Mike G a r r i t y a r g u e d , Dept. of Revenue, submitted: p- I- Filed: Decides: .-. t8 2 4 1983 - -- C l e r k Helena, Montana January 1 4 , 1983 February 2 4 , 1 9 8 3 Mr. J u s t i c e L . C. G u l b r a n d s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of t h e C o u r t . T h i s case comes t o t h i s C o u r t from t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t of F i r s t J u d i c i a l District, Court denied Lewis appellant's and C l a r k C o u n t y . petition r e q u i r i n g t h e Department of a for the The D i s t r i c t writ of mandate, Revenue ( D O R ) t o allow him to a p p l y f o r o n e o f s i x new l i q u o r l i c e n s e s to be i s s u e d i n t h e B i l l i n g s From t h a t d e n i a l t h i s a p p e a l was t a k e n . area. I n S e p t e m b e r 1 9 8 1 , s i x new f l o a t e r a l l b e v e r a g e l i q u o r l i c e n - ses became a v a i l a b l e i n B i l l i n g s b a s e d on t h e s t a t i s t i c s c o m p i l e d in the 1980 census. On October 1981, 5, appellant, Hovey, a p p l i e d f o r o n e o f t h e s e l i c e n s e s to u s e i n h i s downtown B i l l i n g s restaurant. Appellant's DOR o n O c t o b e r 2 1 , the appellant's 16-3-306, ( h e r e i n a f t e r premises) when on t h e of which MCA, b u s i n e s s was prohibits liquor and t h e DORIS s e c t i o n , s e t o u t i n s e c t i o n 42.12.129, writ native 2, of 1981, mandate by i n v i o l a t i o n of dispensing w i t h i n 600 f e e t o f same s t r e e t , On November rejected the T h i s r e j e c t i o n was on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t 1981. place was application the premises or schools i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of that ARM. Hovey f i l e d in churches section a p e t i t i o n f o r an alterCourt District J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , L e w i s and C l a r k C o u n t y . of the First On t h a t d a t e a n o r d e r was s e c u r e d d i r e c t i n g t h e DOR t o r e v o k e i t s r u l i n g t h a t a p p e l l a n t was i n e l i g i b l e t o a p p l y f o r o n e of t h e s i x new l i c e n s e s o r i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e t o show c a u s e why t h a t r u l i n g had n o t b e e n r e v o k e d . An initial hearing November 9 , 1 9 8 1 . February 4 , 1982, was held on the A subsequent hearing following a ruling A r n o l d O l s e n i n t h e case of F l e t c h e r v. to order show was o r d e r e d issued DOR, by No. the cause on to be h e l d Honorable 47319, ( d e c i d e d March 8 , 1 9 8 2 , L e w i s and C l a r k C o u n t y ) , which p r e s e n t e d a s i m i l a r issue. I n the Court I s i n t e r i m between t h e second h e a r i n g and t h e District f i n a l d e c i s i o n , t h e a p p e l l a n t was a l l o w e d to p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e DOR a d m i n i s t r a t i v e h e a r i n g w i t h o t h e r a p p l i c a n t s . This was o n l y t o e x p e d i t e matters i n case of a n a d v e r s e r u l i n g b y t h e D i s t r i c t Court. The C o u r t ' s f i n a l o r d e r came down i n s u p p o r t of t h e D O R ' s p o s i t i o n and a p p e l l a n t was d e n i e d a l i c e n s e . The appellant the is owner of Cellar 301, a restaurant l o c a t e d i n t h e o l d chamber b u i l d i n g o n t h e c o r n e r o f T h i r d Avenue N o r t h and N o r t h 2 7 t h S t r e e t i n downtown B i l l i n g s . was o p e n e d i n 1977 w i t h Avenue N o r t h . when the its b u s i n e s s The r e s t a u r a n t a d d r e s s being 2615 T h i r d T h e r e a r e no d o o r s o n N o r t h 2 7 t h S t r e e t b e c a u s e was building renovated, the appellant placed the e n t r a n c e o n T h i r d Avenue. The c h u r c h b u i l d i n g C h u r c h o f C h r i s t and i n q u e s t i o n is t h e F i r s t C o n g r e g a t i o n a l i s l o c a t e d a t 310 N o r t h 2 7 t h S t r e e t . The c h u r c h owns a l a r g e t r a c t o f l a n d w h i c h e x t e n d s to t h e i n t e r s e c tion where the appellant's restaurant is located. They have g r a n t e d t h e C i t y o f B i l l i n g s a b u s s t o p a t t h i s i n t e r s e c t i o n , and t h e C i t y h a s e r e c t e d and m a i n t a i n s s h e l t e r s o n t h e p r o p e r t y in c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e bus s t o p . The issue to be determined by this Court is w h e t h e r the D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e n i a l o f a p p e l l a n t ' s a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a w r i t of mandate, on t h e grounds t h a t the b u i l d i n g i n which a p p e l l a n t ' s r e s t a u r a n t is l o c a t e d , v i o l a t e s s e c t i o n 16-3-306, tion 42.12.129, ARM, the DOR's interpretation MCA, of and sec- the statute, constitutes reversible error? The a c t u a l t h r u s t of t h i s c a s e c e n t e r s a r o u n d a q u e s t i o n of s t a t u t o r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and w h e t h e r it was p r o p e r f o r t h e DOR to d e n y t h e a p p e l l a n t t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to a p p l y f o r o n e of t h e new f l o a t e r a l l b e v e r a g e l i q u o r l i c e n s e s to be i s s u e d i n B i l l i n g s , o n t h e g r o u n d s t h a t he is i n v i o l a t i o n o f requirement of s e c t i o n 16-3-306, i n s e c t i o n 42.12.129, ARM. MCA, t h e "on t h e same s t r e e t " as i n t e r p r e t e d b y t h e DOR That regulation states: "(1) I n o r d e r t o determine i f the p r o v i s i o n s o f 16-3-306, MCA, a r e a p p l i c a b l e , t h e d e p a r t (a) determent u t i l i z e s a t w o s t e p t e s t : m i n a t i o n of s t r e e t of location; and (b) d e t e r m i n a t i o n of d i s t a n c e between e n t r a n c e doors. ( 2 ) ( a ) A b u i l d i n g i s c o n s i d e r e d to b e on e a c h s t r e e t t h a t a b u t s t h e b u i l d i n g and appurtenant land. An a l l e y is g e n e r a l l y n o t c o n s i d e r e d to be a s t r e e t u n l e s s it is used by t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c as a p u b l i c t h o r o u g h f a r e f o r vehicular travel. (b) I f t h e proposed p r e m i s e s f o r l i q u o r s a l e s are n o t l o c a t e d o n t h e same s t r e e t a s a p l a c e o f w o r s h i p o r MCA, a r e s c h o o l , t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f 16-3-306, not applicable. I f the proposed premises a r e o n t h e same s t r e e t , t h e n t h e s e c o n d s t e p of t h e t e s t s , p r o v i d e d f o r i n s u b s e c t i o n ( 3 ) r is utilized. ( 3 ) ( a ) I f t h e proposed premises a r e o n t h e same s t r e e t , t h e d i s t a n c e b e t w e e n e n t r a n c e d o o r s is measured by a g e o m e t r i c s t r a i g h t l i n e , r e g a r d l e s s of i n t e r v e n i n g p r o p e r t y and b u i l d i n g s . An e n t r a n c e i s cons i d e r e d t o be a means o f i n g r e s s to t h e (b) p r e m i s e s g e n e r a l l y used b y t h e p u b l i c . I f t h e d i s t a n c e is more t h a n 6 0 0 f e e t , t h e MCA, a r e n o t a p p l i p r o v i s i o n s o f 16-3-306, cable. I f t h e d i s t a n c e is l e s s t h a n or e q u a l t o 600 f e e t , S e c t i o n 16-3-306, MCA a p p l i e s . " T h i s p a r t i c u l a r r e g u l a t i o n p l a c e s a c o r n e r b u i l d i n g on both s t r e e t s on which it a b u t s r a t h e r t h a n o n l y on t h e s t r e e t w h e r e i t s e n t r a n c e and a d d r e s s are l o c a t e d . I n s u c h matters o f first look meaning of for the the statutory interpretation, intention words used, of the and may legislature go no t h e c o u r t must in further the when i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e s t a t u t e c a n be made from i t s w o r d s . v . Anaconda Company ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 1 5 1 Mont. 7 6 , 438 P.2d Hubbard ( 1 9 8 2 ) , 649 P.2d 1 3 3 1 , 39 S t . R e p . 660; plain the Dunphy S t a t e v. 1608. The s t a t u t e i n v o l v e d i n t h e p r e s e n t case is s e c t i o n 16-3-306, MCA, and r e a d s a s f o l l o w s : " ( 1 ) E x c e p t as p r o v i d e d i n s u b s e c t i o n s ( 2 ) a n d ( 3 ) , no r e t a i l l i c e n s e may be i s s u e d p u r suant t o t h i s code to any b u s i n e s s o r e n t e r p r i s e whose p r e m i s e s are w i t h i n 6 0 0 f e e t o f and o n t h e same s t r e e t as a b u i l d i n g u s e d e x c l u s i v e l y a s a church, synagogue, o r o t h e r p l a c e o f w o r s h i p or as a s c h o o l o t h e r t h a n a c o m m e r c i a l l y o p e r a t e d or p o s t s e c o n d a r y s c h o o l . T h i s d i s t a n c e s h a l l be m e a s u r e d i n a s t r a i g h t l i n e f r o m t h e c e n t e r of t h e n e a r e s t e n t r a n c e o f t h e p l a c e o f w o r s h i p o r s c h o o l to t h e n e a r e s t e n t r a n c e of t h e l i c e n s e e ' s p r e m i s e s . This section is a limitation upon the department s licensing authority. " ( 2 ) However, t h e d e p a r t m e n t may r e n e w a license f o r any e s t a b l i s h m e n t l o c a t e d in v i o l a t i o n of t h i s s e c t i o n i f t h e l i c e n s e e d o e s n o t relocate h i s e n t r a n c e s a n y c l o s e r t h a n t h e e x i s t i n g e n t r a n c e s and i f t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t : " ( a ) was l o c a t e d o n t h e s i t e b e f o r e t h e p l a c e o f w o r s h i p or s c h o o l o p e n e d ; o r " ( b ) was l o c a t e d i n a bona f i d e h o t e l , r e s t a u r a n t , or f r a t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n b u i l d i n g a t t h e s i t e s i n c e J a n u a r y 1, 1 9 3 7 . " ( 3 ) S u b s e c t i o n (1) d o e s n o t a p p l y to l i c e n ses f o r t h e s a l e o f b e e r , t a b l e w i n e , or b o t h i n t h e o r i g i n a l p a c k a g e f o r o f f - p r e m i s e s consumption." S e c t i o n 16-3-306, MCA. a r e concerned We The phraseology of that subsection shows the the statute. of intent the Where t h e p h r a s e "on t h e same s t r e e t " is viewed i n legislature. conjunction h e r e w i t h s u b s e c t i o n o n e of with the second s e n t e n c e of subsection one, which r e q u i r e s t h e d i s t a n c e b e t w e e n t h e p r e m i s e s and a c h u r c h or s c h o o l t o be m e a s u r e d is e v i d e n t i n a s t r a i g h t l i n e from e n t r a n c e t o e n t r a n c e , that the l e g i s l a t u r e only intended t h i s s e c t i o n to a p p l y w h e r e t h e e n t r a n c e s were on t h e same s t r e e t . to reference the regulation. plain Thus, and it buildings abutting t h e i m p o r t of can used principal o n l y be out t h e l a n g u a g e of applied as c h u r c h e s set and where the the T h e r e is no in the DOR1s t h e s t a t u t e is entrances are premises it "on to the same the street." F u r t h e r s u p p o r t is l e n t t o o u r c o n s t r u c t i o n of by t h e reenactment d o c t r i n e , this statute as t h e D O R 1 s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the s t a t u t e i s a p p a r e n t l y i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e way t h e s t a t u t e h a s been administered s i n c e i t s i n c e p t i o n i n 1937. The a p p e l l a n t , d u r i n g t h e h e a r i n g s , b r o u g h t i n e x a m p l e s of how e s t a b l i s h m e n t s i n s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n s t o h i s had l i c e n s e s and were o p e r a t i n g . t h e case of F l e t c h e r v. DOR, s u p r a , which p r e s e n t e d Also, almost the i d e n t i c a l i s s u e was b e i n g l i t i g a t e d a t t h e same t i m e as t h i s p r o ceeding. The p a r t i e s t o t h i s a c t i o n s t i p u l a t e d i n t o e v i d e n c e a l l the e x h i b i t s introduced i n the Fletcher case. Contained i n t h o s e e x h i b i t s w a s a l e t t e r d a t e d J u l y 6, 1 9 7 1 , from J o s e p h T. administrator board, manager of of the Bozeman old liquor explaining control that r e q u i r e m e n t o f t h e n s e c t i o n 4-415, the "on RCM, 1 9 4 7 , the to same the Shea, city street" (now 16-3-306, MCA) was i n t e r p r e t e d so t h a t it o n l y came i n t o p l a y when b o t h t h e p r e mises and c h u r c h had t h e i r a d d r e s s e s on t h e same s t r e e t . e x a c t l y how t h e appellant contends t h a t the T h i s is s t a t u t e s h o u l d be applied. The r e e n a c t m e n t d o c t r i n e h a s b e e n r e c o g n i z e d i n Montana i n t h e cases o f S t a t e ex r e l . Lewis and C l a r k County v . of Public Welfare v. ( 1 9 6 2 ) , 1 4 1 Mont. 2 0 9 , 3 7 6 P.2d Montana L i q u o r C o n t r o l Board ( 1 9 4 2 ) , 1 1 3 Mont. S t a t e Board 1002; Vgntura 9 2 6 5 , 1 2 4 P.2d The s t a t u t e i n q u e s t i o n was o r i g i n a l l y e n a c t e d i n 1 9 3 7 . 569. It h a s b e e n amended t w i c e , f i r s t i n 1 9 7 5 , a t w h i c h t i m e i t s number was also 4-4-107, changed RCM, from section 4-415, RCM, 1947, to section 1 9 4 7 , and most r e c e n t l y i n 1 9 8 1 t o i t s p r e s e n t v e r - s i o n , s e c t i o n 16-3-306, Each v e r s i o n of MCA. t h e s t a t u t e main- t a i n e d t h e o p e r a t i v e l a n g u a g e t h a t no l i c e n s e be i s s u e d "on t h e same s t r e e t " and w i t h i n 600 f e e t o f a p l a c e o f w o r s h i p o r s c h o o l , and k e p t the same method of performing t h e m e a s u r e m e n t of the distance. B a s e d o n t h e l e t t e r from t h e a d m i n i s t r a t o r of t h e o l d l i q u o r c o n t r o l board relation to and t h e examples of churches and schools, o t h e r premises introduced at locations trial, it in is a p p a r e n t t h a t p r i o r t o t h e D O R 1 s a t t e m p t to c h a n g e t h e meaning o f " o n t h e same s t r e e t " it was i n t e r p r e t e d and a p p l i e d so t h a t t h e s t a t u t e o n l y came i n t o p l a y when t h e p r e m i s e s ' and t h e c h u r c h e s ' o r s c h o o l s ' s t r e e t a d d r e s s e s were o n t h e same s t r e e t . a p p l y where, as i n t h e p r e s e n t case, t h e r e s t a u r a n t is o n T h i r d Avenue N o r t h and Street It did not t h e church is on t h e cross s t r e e t , N o r t h 2 7 t h . This Court, i n discussing the reenactment doctrine in the past, has s t a t e d : "The r u l e is t h a t i n a d o p t i n g a s t a t u t e t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i s presumed to h a v e a c t e d w i t h knowledge o f t h e p r e v i o u s c o n s t r u c t i o n of similar s t a t u t e s (United S t a t e s v. A l b r i g h t , D . C . , 234 F e d . 2 0 2 ) and t o h a v e a d o p t e d s u c h c o n s t r u c t i o n ( U n i t e d S t a t e s v . Ryan, 284 U. S. 1 6 7 , 5 2 Sup. C t . 6 5 , 76 L. Ed. 2 4 4 . ) This r u l e a p p l i e s n o t o n l y to A c t s p r e v i o u s l y c o n s t r u e d by t h e c o u r t s , b u t h a s e q u a l a p p l i c a t i o n t o s t a t u t e s p r e v i o u s l y c o n s t r u e d by t h e e x e c u t i v e o r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d e p a r t m e a t of t h e government. ( 5 9 C. J. 1 0 6 4 . ) ' ' V&ntura v. Montana L i q u o r C o n t r o l B o a r d , 1 1 3 Mont. a t 270-271. T h i s p o s i t i o n is s t r e n g t h e n e d f u r t h e r by t h e h o l d i n g s o f t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s as e v i d e n c e d b y t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t c a s e of C o m m i s s i o n e r o f I n t e r n a l Revenue S e r v i c e v . Noel I s Estate ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 380 U.S. 678, 85 S.Ct. 1 2 3 8 , \4 L.Ed.2d 159, where the court stated : " [A] l o n g - s t a n d i n g a d m i n i s t r a t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , a p p l y i n g to a s u b s t a n t i a l l y re-enacted is deemed to have received statute, c o n g r e s s i o n a l a p p r o v a l and h a s t h e e f f e c t o f law. See, e.g. N a t i o n a l Lead Co. v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 252 U.S. 1 4 0 , 1 4 6 , 40 S e c t . 237, 2 3 9 , 6 4 L.Ed. 4 9 6 ; U n i t e d S t a t e s v. Dakota-Montana O i l C o . , 288 U.S. 4 5 9 , 4 6 6 , 5 3 S . C t . 4 3 5 , 4 3 8 , 77 L.Ed. 8 9 3 . " 380 U.S. a t 6 8 2 . The opinion Vessel of Lady clarifies the United Arnnette States S.C. (D 1979) c o n c i s e l y states and District the 470 Court i n Newman F.Supp. v. 520, r u l e s governing further the present s i t u a t i o n w h e r e it s t a t e s : "The U.S. Supreme C o u r t h a s s t a t e d a s a general p r i n c i p l e t h a t a long-standing adto a ministrative interpretation applying s u b s t a n t i a l l y r e e n a c t e d s t a t u t e is deemed to h a v e C o n g r e s s i o n a l a p p r o v a l and h e n c e t h e f o r c e and e f f e c t o f law, C. I . R. v . Noel's Estate, 380 U.S. 678, 8 5 S.Ct. 1238, 14 L.Ed .2d 1 5 9 ( 1 9 6 5 ) . Although t h i s p r i n c i p l e i s more p e r s u a s i v e when it c a n be d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t C o n g r e s s was aware of t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o n s t r u c t i o n a t t h e t i m e of t h e r e e n a c t m e n t , M i t c h e l l v. C. I . R . , 300 F.2d 5 3 3 ( 4 t h C i r . 1 9 6 2 ) , C o n g r e s s i o n a l a w a r e n e s s may be presumed w h e r e , as h e r e , t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o n s t r u c tion is consistent and long-standing, L o r i l l a r d v . P o n s , 434 U.S. 5 7 5 , 9 8 S . C t . 8 6 6 , 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978)r p a r t i c u l a r l y when Congress has shown s p e c i f i c and repeated i n t e r e s t i n t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l y cons t r u e d s e c t i o n s p r i o r to t h e reenactment." 470 F.Supp. a t 527. Based o n t h e a b o v e - c i t e d long-standing street" has interpretation the force r e e n a c t m e n t by t h e change. Thus, of and what effect l e g i s l a t u r e , of it cannot i t is e v i d e n t t h a t t h e principles, be constitutes l a w due of therefore hold that changed by a w r i t of of the repeated without administrative ARM, mandate i s s u e d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , a l l o w i n g M r . of the the operative parts, t e r p r e t a t i o n and t h e r e f o r e s e c t i o n 4 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 9 , We to same "on rein- is i n v a l i d . should have been Hovey to a p p l y f o r o n e t h e s i x new l i q u o r l i c e n s e s , b e c a u s e u n d e r t h e p l a i n l a n g u a g e section 16-3-306, MCA, and its legislatively-approved i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , through repeated reenactment, requirements imposed by it. Where such he had m e t a l l t h e requirements are m e t there a clear is appellant proper. legal t o apply, upheld 448, 451, unless its there discretion. language a c c e p t a n c e of showing of duty t h e DOR t o a l l o w s u c h a d u t y e x i s t s , mandamus is 582 P.2d due 332. a showing Cain v. is Environmental S c i e n c e s , supra. the of is t r u e t h a t t h e It a w r i t o f m a n d a t e i s a d i s c r e t i o n a r y a c t which w i l l g r a n t i n g of abused and w h e r e the part C a i n v . D e p a r t m e n t of H e a l t h and E n v i r o n m e n t a l S c i e n c e s , ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 7 Mont. be d u t y on of the that the Department Court District of Health and B u t , b a s e d o n t h e p l a i n i m p o r t of s t a t u t e and the long-standing legislative t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n p l a c e d o n i t , we b e l i e v e s u c h a a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n was made as t h e DOR had a l e g a l to these interpretations to allow Hovey to apply. T h e r e f o r e , t h e j u d g m e n t of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t is r e v e r s e d and this cause remanded for the issuance of ,-/ an.,,:%propriate w r i t . / / Justice, %~Adl* &!ii C h i e f Justice WLQ Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea, concurring: I agree with the result of the majority opinion but not in all that is said. I further emphasize that the handling of the case of Fletcher v. DOR, supra, which case was being processed through the District Court almost simultaneously with this case, is hardly an example of even-handed treatment by the agency. In Fletcher v. DOR, a Bozeman liquor license applicant was faced with virtually the same problem as exists in this However, on March 8, 1982, the District Court for the case. same First Judicial District (Judge Arnold Olsen presiding) held the regulation involved here to be invalid. The agency did not appeal from this ruling, the result being that the applicant received the liquor license. In arguing this appeal, counsel for the agency acknowledged this inconsistency, but properly argued that he, as one of the attorneys, is not responsible for the agency's decisions. Nonetheless, someone in that agency, in deciding not to appeal the Fletcher case, permitted a license to issue by the simple expedient of ordering that the agency not appeal from the District Court's ruling. Yet, in this case, after obtaining a result 180 degrees from the decision in Fletcher, the agency argues that the applicant should not be permitted to apply for a license because of the proximity of his establishment to a church. The agency surely didn't think much of its regulation in the Fletcher case if it decided not to take an appeal. It is now more than a little inconsistent and more than a little unfair for the agency to argue here that the regulation should be given full force and effect. agency How can the agency claim to be effectively enforcing statutes and regulations under the police power of the State when - it took such a - -- diametrically opposed position in the Fletcher case? This Court and most courts have been most reluctant to apply equitable estoppel to a governmental agency, but perhaps the time has come to rigorously apply this doctrine. It may well be time for this Court to breathe more life into this doctrine by rigorously applying it to governmental agencies when grossly inequitable results may be the result of not applying it. I would apply a form of collateral estoppel or waiver in this case. A.R.M., * m In the Fletcher case, the agency 42.12.129 the sa.me rule on which the District Court in this case relied, on in refusing relief to the petitioner here. And now, ' of course, the defending the appeal. so. agency relies on this rule in I would not permit the agency to do Once the 60 days expired for the agency to take its appeal -in the Fletcher case, the agency effectively acquiesced in a ruling that the rule was invalid. The petitioner here had a right to hold the agency to its acquiescence in the Fletcher case that the rule was invalid. If invalid as to the Fletcher application, the rule was also invalid as to the license application in this case.

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