STATE v WEINBERGER

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No. 82-180 ( A ) I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O MONTANA F F 1983 STATE O I4OTJTAIJA1 F P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t , -vsARROW WEINBERGER, Defendant and A p p e l l a n t . Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i f t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County o f R o o s e v e l t , The H o n o r a b l e P'I. James S o r t e , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g . C o u n s e l o f Record: For Appellant: Skedd, A s h l e y , McCabe, W e i n g a r t r i e r & N c C a r t e r ; J . C. W e i n g a r t n e r a r g u e d , H e l e n a , &Tontana F o r Respondent: Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , Eel-ena, Montana C h r i s Tweeten a r g u e d , A s s t . A t t y . G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , James McCann, County A t t o r n e y , Wolf P o i n t , blontana Submitted: Decided r Filed: 6 1983 Clerk J a n u a r y 1 0 , 1983 June 6 , 1983 Mr. C h i e f J u s t i c e F r a n k I. H a s w e l l d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f the Court. D e f e n d a n t Arrow W e i n b e r g e r was c o n v i c t e d of d e l i b e r a t e h o m i c i d e by a R o o s e v e l t County j u r y for the shooting death o f F l o y d " S c o t t y " A z u r e a t a C u l b e r t s o n s e r v i c e s t a t i o n on December 5, 1982. Defendant's twenty-year-old son, Adam, was c o n v i c t e d o f f e l o n y m u r d e r f o r h i s p a r t i n t h e i n c i d e n t . Arrow was s e n t e n c e d t o s e r v e s e v e n t y y e a r s State Prison incurred in and was ordered the presentation to of pay the i n t h e Montana certain expenses c h a r g e s a g a i n s t him. H i s motion f o r a judgment n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e v e r d i c t o r f o r a new t r i a l was d e n i e d . The circumstances Culbertson Weinberger, service a H e appeals. leading station resident of up began Fort l i v i n g i n n o r t h e a s t e r n Montana. We affirm. to the sometime Smith, shooting at earlier. Arkansas, a Adam had been Beginning i n June 1981, h e a t t e m p t e d t o e s t a b l i s h a r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Luanne A z u r e , t h e seventeen-year-old daughter A z u r e s were o p p o s e d to an of Scotty and Gloreen involvement between Azure. Luanne and Adam b e c a u s e h e was o l d e r t h a n Luanne and b e c a u s e o f Adam's f a i l u r e t o " a c t l i k e a gentleman." D e s p i t e Azures' opposi- t i o n , Adam and Luanne c o n t i n u e d t o s e e e a c h o t h e r . On November 1 0 , 1 9 8 1 , Luanne r a n away f r o m home w i t h three friends and w e n t t o Havre, Montana. Adam d i d not accompany Luanne t o H a v r e , b u t s h e c a l l e d him f r o m t h e r e a n d made a r r a n g e m e n t s t o meet him i n W i l l i s t o n , North Dakota. A z u r e s s e a r c h e d t h e P o p l a r a r e a f o r Luanne w i t h o u t s u c c e s s . On November 1 2 , t h e y t r a v e l e d t o W i l l i s t o n t o l o o k f o r h e r . They f o u n d Adam W e i n b e r g e r , who f a l s e l y t o l d had not them t h a t h e s e e n Luanne and t h o u g h t s h e was i n H a v r e . Later t h a t d a y A z u r e s d i s c o v e r e d Luanne i n W i l l i s t o n and l e a r n e d t h a t s h e had i n f a c t b e e n w i t h Adam. A z u r e s began t o w a t c h Luanne c l o s e l y t o k e e p h e r away f r o m Adam. They a l s o f i l e c i a complaint i n T r i b a l Court a l l e g i n g t h a t Adam h a d c o n t r i b u t e d t o L u a n n e ' s d e l i n q u e n c y by enticing her out of the family p a r e n t s 1 w i s h e s and a f t e r c u r f e w . residence against her The c o m p l a i n t a s k e d t h a t Adam be r e s t r a i n e d f r o m f u r t h e r c o n t r i b u t i n g t o h e r d e l i n q u e n c y and t h a t h e be k e p t away f r o m A z u r e s ' a l l times. Sometime a f t e r Weinberger came to the residence a t t h e c o m p l a i n t was f i l e d , Poplar area from Fort Arrow Smith, Arkansas. On December Luanne 1, again ran away from home. A z u r e s were c o n v i n c e d t h a t Luanne was w i t h Adam b a s e d upon the Williston incident. of They i m m e d i a t e l y e n l i s t e d t h e h e l p l o c a l law e n f o r c e m e n t o f f i c e r s and b e g a n t o s e a r c h f o r Luanne and f o r W e i n b e r g e r s . A t t h e Azuresl stopped Cadillac Arrow Weinbergerls to request, police look for Luanne. B o t h Adam a n d Arrow l a t e r w e n t t o A z u r e s l home t o r e g i s t e r their displeasure a t being stopped. Arrow was a n g r y a n d t o l d A z u r e s t h a t h e d i d n o t l i k e t o g e t u p s e t " b e c a u s e when I g e t upset, I stay upset . . ." A z u r e s c o n t i n u e d t o s e a r c h t h e P o p l a r a r e a f o r Luanne. On the evening Trottier, help. been of Friday, December t h e y c o n t a c t e d Roy 4, a federal Indian police o f f i c e r , The n e x t m o r n i n g , seen with Adam on and s o u g h t h i s A z u r e s d i s c o v e r e d t h a t Luanne had the immediately contacted T r o t t i e r day she and disappeared. told him that They if they f o u n d Adam t h e y would r e p o r t h i s w h e r e a b o u t s t o t h e p o l i c e and t h a t i f police. t h e y f o u n d Luanne t h e y would b r i n g h e r t o t h e T r o t t i e r approved t h e plan. Luanne h a d , in fact, b e e n i n c o n t a c t w i t h Adam W e i n b e r g e r was i n t h e B i l l i n g s a r e a . and h e knew t h a t s h e She planned t o go t o F o r t Smith, A r k a n s a s , w i t h him. S c o t t y and G l o r e e n A z u r e t h e n b e g a n t o s e a r c h f o r Adam Weinberger's car. They l a t e r e n l i s t e d t h e h e l p o f G l o r e e n ' s s i s t e r , C a r o l Lee A z u r e , Rodney was Azure found and C a r o l L e e ' s Scotty Azure's Adam's car notified the police. cousin. in husband, Carol Brockton Lee that Rodney. and Rodney afternoon and The p o l i c e d i s p a t c h e r s e n t a n o f f i c e r t o B r o c k t o n , b u t h e a p p a r e n t l y was u n a b l e t o l o c a t e t h e c a r . Carol Lee and Rodney Gloreen Azure. then attempted to find Scotty and They e n c o u n t e r e d t h e A z u r e s f o l l o w i n g Adam W e i n b e r g e r ' s c a r on t h e F o r t Kipp Road and t u r n e d a r o u n d t o f o l l o w t h e c a r s toward C u l b e r t s o n . p a s s e d by Arrow W e i n b e r g e r ' s The t h r e e c a r s w e r e t h e n white Cadillac. At a signal f r o m Adam, Adam and Arrow p u l l e d t h e i r c a r s t o t h e s i d e o f the road and stopped. The two A z u r e c a r s p r o c e e d e d i n t o C u l b e r t s o n and s t o p p e d a t t h e S t a n d a r d g a s s t a t i o n . parked a t t h e s i d e of the station. Scotty Rodney p a r k e d s e v e r a l c a r l e n g t h s b e h i n d a r e d p i c k u p t h a t was a l s o p a r k e d a t t h e s i d e of the station. The two A z u r e women w e n t into the s t a t i o n t o ask t h e a t t e n d a n t t o c a l l t h e p o l i c e dispatcher. S c o t t y and Rodney r e m a i n e d o u t s i d e . At the time of the v e h i c l e had two o c c u p a n t s . by h i s b r o t h e r , F r a n k . named Thomas H a n z l i c k . that stop after roadside stop, each Weinberger Arrow W e i n b e r g e r was a c c o m p a n i e d Adam was a c c o m p a n i e d by a h i t c h h i k e r When Adam r e t u r n e d t a l k i n g w i t h Arrow, t o his car a t he t o l d Hanzlick t h a t Arrow was g o i n g t o ''run down1' t h e A z u r e s and t a l k t o them. The W e i n b e r g e r v e h i c l e s c o n t i n u e d i n t o C u l b e r t s o n and a l s o stopped a t t h e Standard s t a t i o n . Arrow p a r k e d h i s c a r almost d i r e c t l y behind S c o t t y Azure's w i t h about s i x f e e t of s p a c e between the vehicles. into the passenger's Adam p a r k e d car angling s i d e of S c o t t y ' s c a r w i t h s e v e r a l f e e t of c l e a r a n c e between t h e v e h i c l e s . parked p a r a l l e l his t o the driver's d i s t a n c e of n i n e and o n e - h a l f The r e d p i c k u p t r u c k was s i d e of S c o t t y ' s c a r a t a f e e t away. S c o t t y A z u r e s t o o d b e t w e e n h i s c a r and t h e r e d p i c k u p n e a r t h e o p e n d r i v e r ' s d o o r of h i s c a r a s W e i n b e r g e r s p u l l e d into the station. Arrow g o t o u t o f h i s c a r and t o l d S c o t t y t o l e a v e h i s son a l o n e . Adam c r o s s e d b e t w e e n S c o t t y ' s c a r and A r r o w ' s C a d i l l a c t o t h e back of t h e r e d p i c k u p , s a y i n g , " g e t your b a t o u t , Azure." H e t h e n began t o d r a g a l o g g i n g c h a i n o u t o f t h e p i c k u p w h i c h h e d o u b l e d o v e r and s t a r t e d t o swing a t S c o t t y . eighteen-£ oot-long Scotty. had Rodney A z u r e g r a b b e d t h e o t h e r e n d o f t h e chain as Adam threw the chain toward Scotty deflected t h e chain with a baseball b a t he r e t r i e v e d from h i s c a r . Arrow W e i n b e r g e r t h e n drew a . 2 5 c a l i b e r p i s t o l and s h o t S c o t t y A z u r e o n c e i n t h e c h e s t , k i l l i n g him i n s t a n t l y . Arrow c l a i m e d t h a t h e a c t e d i n s e l f - d e f e n s e a f t e r S c o t t y had h i t him w i t h t h e b a t o n c e and t r i e d to hit him d i s t a n c e of again. Other witnesses placed fifteen-to-twenty feet apart. the two The j u r y at a found Arrow W e i n b e r g e r g u i l t y o f d e l i b e r a t e h o m i c i d e . Arrow W e i n b e r g e r p r e s e n t s t h i s C o u r t w i t h s i x i s s u e s on a p p e a l : 1. Whether the i n s t r u c t i o n s t a k e n a s a whole c o r - r e c t l y d e f i n e d t h e o f f e n s e of d e l i b e r a t e homicide; 2. Whether c e r t a i n h e a r s a y t e s t i m o n y s h o u l d h a v e b e e n submitted t o the jury; 3. Whether "other c r i m e s " e v i d e n c e was erroneously introduced against defendant; 4. Whether t h e p r o s e c u t i o n ' s t r i a l t a c t i c s deprived d e f e n d a n t of a f a i r t r i a l ; Whether 5. section 46-18-232, MCA, which allows imposition of t r i a l c o s t s a g a i n s t a convicted defendant, is u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ; and 6. Whether d e f e n d a n t was p r o p e r l y s e n t e n c e d . Defendant f i r s t a r g u e s t h a t a j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n d e f i n i n g d e l i b e r a t e homicide o m i t t e d an e s s e n t i a l element of t h e crime. I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 p r o v i d e d : 1 "You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t t o s u s t a i n t h e c h a r g e of D e l i b e r a t e Homicide a g a i n s t Arrow W e i n b e r g e r t h e S t a t e m u s t p r o v e t h a t t h e D e f e n d a n t Arrow W e i n b e r g e r purp o s e l y o r knowingly performed t h e a c t o r a c t s c a u s i n q t h e d e a t h o f Flovd Azure. " I f you f i n d f r o m y o u r c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f a l l the evidence t h a t t h i s proposition h a s been proved beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t , t h e n you s h o u l d f i n d D e f e n d a n t Arrow W e i n b e r g e r g u i l t y of D e l i b e r a t e Homicide." (Emphasis added.) D e f e n d a n t c h a l l e n g e s t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n a s i n c o m p l e t e on t h e b a s i s t h a t i t a l l o w e d t h e j u r y t o c o n v i c t him o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide i f it found he caused death r a t h e r the act. than intending d e a t h a s t h e r e s u l t of W e disagree for several reasons. First, other i n t e n d e d t o p e r f o r m t h e a c t which this instruction, taken i n s t r u c t i o n s and p l a c e d w i t h i n in context with the t h e framework o f the i s s u e s and a r g u m e n t s p r e s e n t e d t h r o u g h o u t t h e t r i a l , d i d n o t a l l o w t h e j u r y t o c o n v i c t Arrow i f i t f o u n d t h a t h e h a d o n l y intended t o p u l l t h e t r i g g e r . This Court has recognized t h a t in the c a s e of deliberate state attaches t o the result: homicide, the requisite mental " I n Montana, a p e r s o n commits t h e o f f e n s e of d e l i b e r a t e homicide i f h e p u r p o s e l y o r k n o w i n g l y c a u s e s t h e d e a t h of a n o t h e r human b e i n g The s t a t u t o r i l y d e f i n e d e l e m e n t s o f t h e o f f e n s e , e a c h of which t h e S t a t e m u s t p r o v e beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t , a r e t h e r e f o r e c a u s i n g t h e d e a t h of a n o t h e r human b e i n g w i t h t h e k n o w l e d g e t h a t you a r e c a u s i n g o r w i t h t h e p u r p o s e t o c a u s e t h e d e a t h o f t h a t human b e i n g . " (Emphasis added.) S t a t e v . McKenzie ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 7 Mont. 2 8 0 , 327-328, 5 8 1 P.2d 1 2 0 5 , 1 2 3 2 , v a c a t e d o n o t h e r g r o u n d s , 443 U.S. 90$$ 99 S . C t . 3 0 9 4 , 6 1 L.Ed.2d 871. ... Here, w e f i n d t h a t t h e j u r y was t h o r o u g h l y i n s t r u c t e d and c o u l d n o t h a v e c o n v i c t e d Arrow u n l e s s i t f o u n d t h a t h e h a d performed the a c t or knowledge that he a c t s causing Azure's was causing or the death purpose with to the cause Azure's death. A t t h e o u t s e t of t r i a l , t h e j u r y was i n f o r m e d t h a t t h e s p e c i f i c c h a r g e a g a i n s t Arrow was t h a t : ". . . Arrow W e i n b e r g e r p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly caused t h e d e a t h of Floyd Azure by s h o o t i n g him i n t h e h e a r t a r e a o f t h e c h e s t w i t h a .25 c a l i b r e a u t o m a t i c p i s t o l c a u s i n g Floyd Azure t o d i e a l m o s t i n s t a n t l y from a s e v e r e d pulmonary a o r t i c artery . . ." From t h a t p o i n t , leading t o Azure's deliberate, presented the t h e f o c u s of death accidental extensive State's direct evidence cross-examination or that and and an t h e t r i a l was on t h e e v e n t s on w h e t h e r act of testimony the s h o o t i n g was self-defense. that he presented supported the Arrow conflicted evidence defense with through theories of a c c i d e n t o r s e l f d e f e n s e . The j u r y was t h o r o u g h l y i n s t r u c t e d on b o t h t h e o r i e s and b o t h were t h o r o u g h l y argued. In fact, no f e w e r t h a n t w e l v e i n s t r u c t i o n s o f t h e f i f t y - f i v e g i v e n t o the jury defined self-defense, may b e u s e d , be u s e d . t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n which it and t h e p e r m i s s i b l e amount o f f o r c e w h i c h may Where " a l l t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s , r e v i e w e d as a w h o l e , f a i r l y a n d a c c u r a t e l y p r e s e n t t h e case t o t h e j u r y , " not Mon t . a overturn , conviction. 649 P.2d State 1273, 1281, S t a t e v. Johnson ( 1 9 8 2 ) , 39 S t . R e p . In Mont 39 . Riley (1982), St.Rep. , 1491, 646 P.2d 1501; 507, 512, 1014, 1020. addition to the j u r o r s were i n s t r u c t e d : tions v. we w i l l a s a whole self-defense instructions, the t h a t t h e y must c o n s i d e r t h e i n s t r u c - (#I);t h a t each material allegation and f a c t c h a r g e d u n d e r t h e s p e c i f i c c h a r g e a g a i n s t Arrow m u s t b e p r o v e d beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t m e n t a l s t a t e was " p u r p o s e l y " o r (#8); that the requisite "knowingly" w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e r e s u l t of t h e c o n d u c t d e s c r i b e d by t h e s t a t u t e d e f i n i n g an offense (#31, #32); the statutory definition of "pur- p o s e l y " and " k n o w i n g l y " ( # 3 1 , # 3 2 ) ; t h e s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n (#lo); of d e l i b e r a t e homicide t h a t b o t h a c t and m e n t a l s t a t e m u s t b e p r o v e d beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t ( # 3 9 ) ; t h a t a p e r son must have the r e q u i s i t e mental s t a t e with respect to each element of t h e o f f e n s e ( # 2 4 ) ; t h a t d e a t h o c c u r r i n g from a c c i d e n t o r m i s f o r t u n e is n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o c o n v i c t o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide ( # 1 5 ) ; t h a t t h e f a c t a d e a t h o c c u r r e d is n o t s u f f i c i e n t p r o o f , s t a n d i n g a l o n e , t h a t a c r i m e was c o m m i t t e d (#16). We reject the tortured g i v e t o I n s t r u c t i o n No. 11. interpretation They a r g u e t h a t I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 is i n c o n f l i c t w i t h t h e o t h e r 1 c o n t e x t of a t trial, t h e f a c t s of and a l l o f the dissenters instructions. t h i s case, Viewed in t h e arguments p r e s e n t e d t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s charged t o t h e jury, we find t h e i r stance untenable. W e hold that the instruc- t i o n s t a k e n a s a whole f a i r l y and a c c u r a t e l y p r e s e n t e d case t o t h e j u r y a n d w e r e s u f f i c i e n t . the The s e c o n d I n s t r u c t i o n No. b a s i s on which w e reject a challenge to 1 is t h a t d e f e n d a n t d i d n o t p r o p e r l y o b j e c t 1 t o it; nor d i d he t a k e t h e o p p o r t u n i t y p r e s e n t e d a t t r i a l t o c u r e any d e f i c i e n c y i n t h e i n s t r u c t i o n . A s i n s t r u c t i o n s were being No. 8, settled, the State offered i t s proposed which was g i v e n a s t h e C o u r t ' s Instruction I n s t r u c t i o n No. The f o l l o w i n g e x c h a n g e t o o k p l a c e : "MR. CHARLES MOSES [ D e f e n s e C o u n s e l ] : W e would o b j e c t t o P l a i n t i f f ' s 8 upon t h e f o l l o w i n g g r o u n d s , upon t h e f o l l o w i n g grounds: t h a t t h i s i s a n e l e m e n t and i s s u e s i n s t r u c t i o n and i t i s i n c o m p l e t e ; t h e S t a t e i s r e q u i r e d t o p r o v e , number 1: t h e S t a t e i s i m p l y i n g t h a t i t was d o n e k n o w i n g l y o r p u r p o s e l y ; number 2 , t h a t i t was done w i t h i n t e n t t o k i l l , which r e q u i r e s under d e l i b e r a t e homicide a s p e c i f i c p u r p o s e t o k i l l under t h e s t a t u t e ; number 3 , t h a t i t h a s t o be c o m m i t t e d w i t h i n t h e c o u n t y ; number 4 , t h e d e a t h m u s t b e a r e s u l t of d e l i b e r a t i o n . "THE COURT: Do you h a v e i n s t r u c t i o n l i k e t h a t i n yours? "MR. CHARLES MOSES: No I d o n ' t h a v e t h a t . "THE COURT: W e l l i f you w i l l p r e p a r e o n e c h a t h a s a l l o f t h o s e t h i -q ---------n s, we w i l l t a k e a look a t it. "MR. MOSES: Okay, Your Honor. "THE COURT: Otherwise, g i v e t h i s one. I believe I w i l l I w i l l g i v e it unless--I "THE COURT: d o n ' t t h i n k we h a v e t o a l l e g e t h a t i t was i n R o o s e v e l t County, t h a t i s a l e g a l question. C u l b e r t s o n is i n R o o s e v e l t C o u n t y , Montana, and t h e a c t was committed i n R o o s e v e l t C o u n t y , Montana and i n a d d i t i o n I would t a k e j u d i c i a l n o t i c e o f t h e f a c t t h a t C u l b e r t s o n is i n Roosevelt I don't think t h a t C o u n t y , Montana. t h e s e i n s t r u c t i o n s have t o have a l l t h a t s t u f f i n it. 8 w i l l be g i v e n . As I u n d e r s t a n d i t y o--------------u ' r e s a y i n g a n d i t i s your p o s i t i o n t h a t you h a v e t o p r o v e ......................... s e c i f i c i n t e n t- t h e - e ----------- i n - s t a t u t o r y l a n g u a g e , p u r p o s e l y , k n o w i n g l y ---------- under t h e 11. U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t r u l i n u s ? Right. " "MR. CHARLES MOSES: added. ) While defendant objected on the (Emphasis ground that the i n s t r u c t i o n was i n c o m p l e t e , i t i s a p p a r e n t f r o m t h e d i s c u s s i o n t h a t then followed t h a t t h e c r u x of that it d i d not require that the t h e o b j e c t i o n was S t a t e prove a specific i n t e n t t o k i l l b u t t h a t it allowed t h e S t a t e t o imply s u c h a s p e c i f i c i n t e n t w i t h i n t h e s t a t u t o r y mental states of purp o s e l y o r knowingly. Defense counsel argued f i r s t t h a t t h e j u r y be i n s t r u c t e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t m u s t h a v e had a s p e c i f i c p u r p o s e t o k i l l and t h a t t h e d e a t h m u s t h a v e b e e n a r e s u l t of d e l i b e r a t i o n . H e a l s o argued t h a t t h e j u r y be i n s t r u c t e d t h a t t h e crime had t o have been committed w i t h i n t h e c o u n t y . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o o k j u d i c i a l n o t i c e o f v e n u e . argument propounded by d e f e n s e c o u n s e l is n o t The f i r s t the law in s p e c i f i c purpose to Montana. The S t a t e n e e d kill. not establish a Nor m u s t i t show t h a t d e a t h was t h e r e s u l t o f d e l i b e r - a t i o n other than t h e d e l i b e r a t i o n i m p l i c i t within t h e s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n s of Sharbono "purposely" ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 1 7 5 Mont. 373, and " k n o w i n g l y . " 392, 5 6 3 P.2d S t a t e v. 61, 72-73. S e e a l s o , C r i m i n a l Law Commission Comments t o s e c t i o n 45-51 0 2 , MCA. Where a person is aware t h a t it is h i g h l y probable t h a t a c e r t a i n r e s u l t w i l l be c a u s e d by h i s c o n d u c t , h e a c t s knowingly w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e r e s u l t of t h a t conduct. t i o n 45-2-101(33), MCA. Where it is a p e r s o n ' s Sec- conscious o b j e c t t o engage i n c e r t a i n conduct o r t o cause a p a r t i c u l a r r e s u l t he acts purposely with r e s p e c t t o t h a t conduct o r its result. S e c t i o n 45-2-101(58), MCA. The C o m p i l e r ' s Comments to section 45-5-102, MCA, at 123, defining deliberate homicide, note that: ... "'Purposely' is the most culpable mental state and implies an objective or design to engage in certain conduct, alt h o u h n o t --__------_---------------g------Earticularly toward some result. 'Knowingly' refers to a state of mind in which a person acts, while not toward a certain objective, at least with full knowledge of relevant ------------facts and circumstances. Toqether these terms replace the concepts of malice and intent premeditation is no longer an element of homicide (Emphasis added. ) . . . . . . We agree. . . ." We have previously recognized the legislative changes in the requirements of mens rea. supra, 175 Mont. at 392-394, 563 P.2d State v. Sharbono, at 72-73; State v. Coleman (1978), 177 Mont. 1, 30-31, 579 P.2d 732, 750, cert. denied, 448 U.S. 914, 101 S.Ct. 34, 65 L.Ed.2d 1177. Here, defendant's objection to Instruction No. 11 on the ground that it was incomplete is founded upon mens rea requirements that are no longer the law in Montana. Defendant also failed to take the opportunity provided by the District Court to draft an alternative instruction. Instead, after instructions had been read to the jury and the State had presented its initial final argument, defense counsel resubmitted its proposed Instruction No. 35: "You are instructed that with respect to the crime alleged of deliberate homicide, a specific purpose to kill is an element of such a charge and must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt." This proposed instruction was properly refused both times. We conclude that defendant's contention that Instruction No. 11 was incomplete is without merit. Defendant next challenges the introduction of certain hearsay statements into evidence. He raises three separate arguments i n a t t a c k i n g admission of t h e hearsay statements. he c o n t e n d s t h a t two p r e s h o o t i n g s t a t e m e n t s were n o t First, a d m i s s i b l e b e c a u s e t h e y were h e a r s a y o r d o u b l e h e a r s a y a n d b e c a u s e t h e y were i r r e l e v a n t . Second, he contends t h a t t h e S t a t e f a i l e d t o g i v e n o t i c e of s e c t i o n 46-15-303, allowed that to MCA, introduce and s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e n o t h a v e b e e n the t h e admission of two a d m i s s i o n s p u r s u a n t t o statements. four Third, he contends i n c u l p a t o r y s t a t e m e n t s made b y Adam, h i s n o n t e s t i f y i n g c o d e f e n d a n t , were B r u t o n i n f r a c t i o n s t h a t v i o l a t e d t h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n c l a u s e of t h e S i x t h Amend- ment t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n . B r u t o n v. S t a t e s ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 3 9 1 U.S. 1 2 3 , 88 S . C t . United 1 6 2 0 , 20 L.Ed.2d 476. The p r e s h o o t i n g h e a r s a y s t a t e m e n t s t h a t were a d m i t t e d and that defendant Luanne A z u r e . examination challenges were made by Gloreen and G l o r e e n A z u r e was q u e s t i o n e d d u r i n g c r o s s - on her basis for believing m i g h t know o f L u a n n e ' s w h e r e a b o u t s . that Weinbergers The S t a t e was a l l o w e d t o d e v e l o p t h o s e r e a s o n s on r e d i r e c t e x a m i n a t i o n and t e s t i mony o n Adam's i n v o l v e m e n t i n L u a n n e ' s t r i p t o W i l l i s t o n was admitted. Gloreen Arrow c o u l d be was a l s o asked why involved with Luanne's she believed disappearance. that She answered : " I was t o l d t h a t h e was on h i s way up h e r e , and h e d i d n ' t c a r e how much money i t c o s t him, and h e was b r i n g i n g a l a w y e r and h e was g o i n g t o p r o v e t h a t h i s s o n was a n a n g e l . . ." Luanne was q u e s t i o n e d o n W e i n b e r g e r s ' knowledge o f h e r w h e r e a b o u t s d u r i n g e a r l y December. and Adam p l a n n e d t o go t o Arkansas; She t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e that t e l l i n g him s h e was g o i n g t o B i l l i n g s ; she l e f t a note t h a t h e showed t h e n o t e t o Arrow; and t h a t Arrow s a i d i t " s o u n d e d good" t o him. B o t h s t a t e m e n t s were o b j e c t e d t o a s h e a r s a y , o r as d o u b l e h e a r s a y , p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 8 0 5 , Mont.R.Evid. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t p r o p e r l y a l l o w e d t h e f i r s t s t a t e ment into evidence with an instruction o f f e r e d t o prove t h e t r u t h of that the matter it was not asserted but was o f f e r e d o n l y t o show why G l o r e e n a c t e d a n d b e l i e v e d a s s h e did. The s t a t e m e n t was r e l e v a n t t o t h e i s s u e o f d e f e n d a n t ' s s t a t e of mind a n d m o t i v e . I n a c a s e where s e l f - d e f e n s e is r a i s e d , t h e s t a t e o f mind a n d i n t e n t o f t h e d e f e n d a n t i s t h e primary issue. is e n t i t l e d The j u r y t o know, so far as e v i d e n c e is a v a i l a b l e , a l l t h e f a c t s a n d c i r c u m s t a n c e s w h i c h t e n d t o t h r o w l i g h t upon t h e p a r t i e s a n d t h e i r r e l a t i o n s a n d f e e l i n g s toward each o t h e r . Mont. 3 4 3 , 356-357, 256 P. S t a t e v. 3 8 0 , 385. Hollowell The j u r y was e n t i t l e d t o view S c o t t y A z u r e ' s d e a t h i n t h e c o n t e x t of events. ( 1 9 2 7 ) , 79 S t a t e v . R i l e y , s u p r a , 649 P.2d these prior a t 1 2 8 0 , 39 S t . R e p . a t 1499. Most of Luanne's s t a t e m e n t was n o n o b j e c t i o n a b l e and was p r o p e r l y a d m i t t e d . O n l y t h e s e c o n d p a r t o f t h e s t a t e m e n t (Arrow's knowledge Billings) should and not approval have been of Luanne's admitted into trip to evidence. Defendant c o n t e n d s t h a t viewed i n t h e c o n t e x t o f G l o r e e n ' s s t a t e m e n t and the f i l e d a g a i n s t Adam, r e f e r e n c e made to the tribal complaint t h e comment was p r e j u d i c i a l . We w i l l a d d r e s s t h i s c o n t e n t i o n w i t h i n t h e framework of d e f e n d a n t ' s argument on " o t h e r c r i m e s " e v i d e n c e . Defendant argues t h a t Luanne's statement constitutes e v i d e n c e o f o t h e r c r i m e s and t h a t i t d o e s n o t meet t h e f o u r prong test S t a t e v. of Just a d m i s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h i s Court s e t f o r t h (1979), Mont. in , 6 0 2 P.2d 9 5 7 , 36 St.Rep. 1649. It need We agree that it does not meet the Just test. not. We reject defendant's contention that it constitutes evidence of other crimes. object to admission of the statement at trial on . , these State v. Campbell (1981), grounds and may not do so now. Mont Defendant failed to 622 P.2d 200, 202, 38 St.Rep. 19, 22. Nor has Arrow convinced us that the jury would recognize as "another crime" the tenuous connection he attempts to draw between: (1) a complaint filed against Adam in Tribal Court; (2) Adam's plan knowledge that to take Luanne to Arkansas; Luanne left a note saying (3) Arrow's she went to Billings; and, (4) Arrow's statement that "it sound[ed] good . to [him] " The connection appears to be too flimsy to merit serious consideration. In a criminal case where prejudice is alleged, it must be established from the record that a substantial right was denied. Mon t . , 650 P.2d State v. Dupre (1982), 1381, 1386, 39 St.Rep. section 46-20-701, MCA. 1660, 1666; Defendant has failed to demonstrate such prejudice. Defendant next challenges the introduction of several statements which were not included within the "Notice of Confessions and/or Admissions" filed by the State in response to defendant's motion requesting production of such statements. Defendant contends that the District Court erred in ruling that the motion was moot as a result of the notice filed. We agree. Section 46-15-303, MCA, provides: "Motion to produce confession or admission. (1) On motion of a defendant in any criminal case made prior to trial, the court shall order the state to furnish the defendant with a copy of any written confession or admission and a list of the witnesses to its making. If the defendant has made an oral confession or admission, a l i s t of t h e w i t n e s s e s s h a l l be f u r n i s h e d . to i t s making " ( 2 ) The l i s t o f w i t n e s s e s may, upon n o t i c e and m o t i o n , b e amended by t h e state prior to trial. "(3) No s u c h c o n f e s s i o n o r a d m i s s i o n s h a l l be r e c e i v e d i n e v i d e n c e which h a s not been fur ------------n i s h e d i n c o m p l i a n c e w i t h s u b s e c t i o n (1) u n l e s s t h e c o u r t i s s a t i s f i e d t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t o r was unaware o f t h e existence o f s u c h c o n f e s s i o n o r adm i s s i o n ~ r i o rt o t r i a l and t h a t h e c o u l d n o t h a v e become a w a r e o f s u c h i n t h e e x e r c i s e of d u e d i l i g e n c e . " (Emphasis added. ) The r e c o r d d o e s n o t s u p p o r t a f i n d i n g by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t o r was unaware o f the statements. the existence of The D i s t r i c t C o u r t t h e r e f o r e had no d i s c r e - t i o n t o allow t h e statements i n t o evidence. The f i r s t s t a t e m e n t was made by Adam i n t h e s e r v i c e s t a t i o n a f t e r the shooting. t h e y were t a i l g a t i n g u s . " He said, "What d o you e x p e c t , The p r o s e c u t o r f a i l e d t o p r o v i d e t h i s s t a t e m e n t t o d e f e n d a n t s i n c e h e f i r s t became a w a r e o f it a f t e r t h e "Notice of C o n f e s s i o n s and/or filed. A d m i s s i o n s " was The D i s t r i c t C o u r t p r o p e r l y p r o v i d e d d e f e n s e c o u n s e l the opportunity t o interview a l l possible witnesses t o t h e making o f t h e s t a t e m e n t b e f o r e i t was a l l o w e d i n t o e v i d e n c e . The s e c o n d s t a t e m e n t was made by Adam Hanzlick. the hitchhiker, A s Adam s t o p p e d a t t h e s e r v i c e s t a t i o n , h e a s k e d : "Are you r e a d y t o f i g h t ? " State's to attempt t o Defense c o u n s e l o b j e c t e d t o t h e introduce t h i s statement i n its cross- examination of Hanzlick. p r e s e n c e of the jury, After discussion outside the t h e District Court struck t h e s t a t e - m e n t and u s e d a n a d m o n i s h m e n t f r a m e d by d e f e n s e c o u n s e l t o i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y t o d i s r e g a r d it. was made. No m o t i o n f o r m i s t r i a l The e x i s t e n c e o f a s i m i l a r s t a t e m e n t ("we m i g h t see a f i g h t " ) had b e e n p r o v i d e d i n a n a f f i d a v i t s u p p o r t i n g the amended complaint and its admission had been argued earlier in the t r i a l . Defendant h a s f a i l e d t o demonstrate p r e j u d i c e a r i s i n g from t h e f a i l u r e t o p r o v i d e n o t i c e of these statements a s distinguished of themselves. from the introduction the statements The p u r p o s e o f t h e s t a t u t e r e q u i r i n g p r o d u c t i o n of c o n f e s s i o n s and a d m i s s i o n s i s t o a l l o w t h e d e f e n d a n t t o prepare a defense t o the statements. Here, d e f e n d a n t was g i v e n t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o i n t e r v i e w any p o s s i b l e w i t n e s s e s t o t h e making of t h e f i r s t s t a t e m e n t b e f o r e i t was i n t r o d u c e d . The second s t a t e m e n t was not admitted, and the jury was a d m o n i s h e d w i t h a n i n s t r u c t i o n p r e p a r e d by d e f e n s e c o u n s e l . While t h e s u b s t a n c e of t h e s t a t e m e n t s may h a v e b e e n d e t r i - mental he to defendant, has not demonstrated prejudice stemming f r o m t h e S t a t e ' s f a i l u r e t o p r o d u c e t h e s t a t e m e n t s prior to trial. Defendant f i n a l l y argues t h a t f o u r s t a t e m e n t s a t t r i buted to his nontestifying codefendant v i o l a t i o n of t h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n c l a u s e of Constitution. The f o u r o u t - o f - c o u r t were admitted in t h e United S t a t e s s t a t e m e n t s were i n t r o - duced through f o u r w i t n e s s e s . G l o r e e n Azure t e s t i f i e d t h a t a f t e r said t o her, " I h o p e you t h i s trouble." a r e s a t i s f i e d , you c a u s e d a l l o f Rodney A z u r e t e s t i f i e d t h a t a f t e r t h e s h o o t - i n g Adam s a i d t o him, g a t i n g us." t h e s h o o t i n g Adam "What d i d you e x p e c t , t h e y w e r e t a i l - The t h i r d s t a t e m e n t was i n t r o d u c e d t h r o u g h t h e t e s t i m o n y of A r t h u r Sarnow, who t r a n s p o r t e d t h e W e i n b e r g e r s a n d Tom H a n z l i c k f r o m t h e s c e n e o f t h e s h o o t i n g . H e testi- f i e d t h a t Adam t u r n e d t o w a r d Arrow W e i n b e r g e r , F r a n k Wein- b e r g e r , and H a n z l i c k and s a i d , " T h a t ' s one and f o u r t o go." t h e s t a t e m e n t s was H a n z l i c k l s s t r i c k e n s t a t e - The l a s t o f ment. Adam a s k e d , " [ a ] r e you r e a d y t o f i g h t ? " drove i n t o the s e r v i c e s t a t i o n . as t h e y Arrow c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e s e s t a t e m e n t s v i o l a t e t h e r u l e announced i n Bruton. I n Bruton t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t h e l d that "where t h e p o w e r f u l l y i n c r i m i n a t i n g e x t r a j u d i c i a l s t a t e m e n t s of a c o d e f e n d a n t who s t a n d s a c c u s e d s i d e - b y - s i d e defendant, are deliberately spread before the with the jury in a joint t r i a l , " limiting instructions t o the jury t o disregard the statements inculpating 391 U.S. the defendant a t 135-136, are 88 S.Ct. inadequate. Bruton, supra, a t 1628, 20 L.Ed.2d a t 485. The f a c t s i n B r u t o n a r e c l e a r l y d i s t i n g u i s h - a b l e from t h e c a s e b e f o r e us. I n Bruton t h e n o n t e s t i f y i n g codefendant, Evans, con- f e s s e d o r a l l y t h a t h e and B r u t o n committed a r o b b e r y . The c o n f e s s i o n was a d m i t t e d , a n d t h e j u r y w a s i n s t r u c t e d t h a t i t was c o m p e t e n t o n l y a g a i n s t E v a n s . upon, The C o u r t r e v e r s e d b a s e d f i r s t , t h e f a c t t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t s were " p o w e r f u l l y i n c r i m i n a t i n g " and " d e v a s t a t i n g " t o B r u t o n a n d , s e c o n d , upon t h e r e c o g n i z e d m o t i v a t i o n t o s h i f t blame o n t o o t h e r s . It concluded t h a t : "The u n r e l i a b i l i t y o f s u c h e v i d e n c e is i n t o l e r a b l y compounded when t h e a l l e g e d accomplice, a s h e r e , d o e s n o t t e s t i f y and c a n n o t be t e s t e d by c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n . I t was a g a i n s t s u c h t h r e a t s t o a f a i r t r i a l t h a t t h e C o n f r o n t a t i o n C l a u s e was B r u t o n , s u p r a , 3 9 1 U.S. a t directed." 1 3 6 , 8 8 S . C t . a t 1 6 2 8 , 20 L.Ed.2d a t 485. Extrajudicial statements of a n o n t e s t i f y i n g codefen- d a n t do n o t always r e q u i r e r e v e r s a l . Mon t . Harrington , v. 6 4 5 P.2d California S t a t e v. Powers ( 1 9 8 2 ) , 1 3 5 7 , 1 3 6 3 , 39 S t . R e p . (1969), 395 U.S. 250, 989, 89 996; S.Ct. 1 7 2 6 , 23 L.Ed.2d 427, 92 S . C t . 284; 1 0 5 6 , 3 1 L.,Ed.2d to a fair entitled Schneble v. Florida A c r i m i n a l d e f e n d a n t is 340. t r i a l . b u t n o t a p e r f e c t one. Powers, s u p r a ; Bruton v. United S t a t e s , .i.~r,z.~)< -I&hmirv. U n i t e d S t a t e s ( 1 9 5 3 ) , 3 4 4 U.S. 97 L.Ed. 593; 93 S.Ct. 1565, 417 U.S. ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 4 0 5 U.S. supra. In accord, 6 0 4 , 73 S.Ct. 481, U n i t e d S t a t e s ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 4 1 1 U.S. Brown v . 223, 36 L.Ed.2d 4 3 3 , 94 S . C t . S t a t e v. 208; Michigan v. 2 3 5 7 , 4 1 L.Ed.2d Tucker (1974), 182. Where a s t a t e m e n t h a s b e e n e d i t e d t o remove s p e c i f i c to references trial. United S t a t e s v. 356, cert. 332; United States 139; United S t a t e s v. denied, Stewart 439 U.S. v. 309, L.Ed.2d F.2d cert. Holleman 84; United 1052, L.Ed.2d 143;. 430 F.2d L.Ed.2d F.2d cert. 613, 423 S t a t e s v. denied, United 1074, U.S. denied, Similarly, 395 a where 96 Panepinto Lipowitz U.S. statement 9 1 S.Ct. 89 is 47 221, 46 1970), 258, 27 1 9 6 9 ) , 407 S.Ct. not 675 1 9 7 5 ) , 519 S.Ct. (3rd C i r . 946, 858, (3rd C i r . 949, F.2d 1 9 7 5 ) , 520 S.Ct. (3rd Cir. 914, c e r t . d e n i e d , 400 U.S. cert. 96 575 536 F.2d (2nd C i r . Alvarez S t a t e s v. 256; U n i t e d S t a t e s v. 597, U.S. joint 58 L.Ed.2d 1978), 1976), Wingate 423 332, (7th C i r . a in 1 9 7 8 ) , 579 F.2d 99 S . C t . (6th Cir. Dady denied, (5th Cir. 936, ( p e r c u r i a m ) ; United S t a t e s v. F.2d is a d m i s s i b l e it codefendants, 2026, 23 powerfully i n c r i m i n a t i n g b u t i m p l i c a t e s t h e complaining defendant "only to the other extent the jury may make c l e a r l y admissible evidence," Bruton r u l e . F.2d that 487, U n i t e d S t a t e s v. 495 (en banc), cert. inferences based on it does n o t v i o l a t e t h e Belle (3rd Cir. denied, 442 1979), U.S. 911, 593 99 277 S.Ct. 2825, 61 L.Ed.2d 4343; c f . , U n i t e d S t a t e s v. Winograd (7th Cir. 989; 1 9 8 1 ) , 656 F.2d United S t a t e s v. 1184, 1190, c e r t . L.Ed.2d 279, 283, DiGregorio denied, 197; E n g l i s h v. cert. (1st C i r . 444 U.S. 937, whether 455 U.S. 1 9 7 9 ) , 605 F.2d 100 S.Ct. United S t a t e s ( 7 t h C i r . F.2d 1 5 0 , 1 5 3 , c e r t . d e n i e d , 449 U.S. L.Ed. 2d 75. denied, 287, 62 1 9 8 0 ) , 620 859, 1 0 1 S.Ct. 1 6 0 , 66 W i n o g r a d , D i G r e g o r i o and E n g l i s h e a c h a n a l y z e d t h e s t a t e m e n t was v i t a l l y i m p o r t a n t t o t h e g o v e r n - m e n t ' s case o r w h e t h e r i t was s i m p l y l i n k a g e t e s t i m o n y t h a t was i n c r i m i n a t i n g o n l y i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h o t h e r f a c t s . a l s o , S t i n s o n v. S t a t e ( A 1 a . C r i m . A ~ ~ .1 9 8 1 ) , 4 0 1 So.2d 261; Commonwealth v . A.2d 257, 1 0 9 , 111-112. Here, Rawls See ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 276 P a . S u p e r . 89, 419 we m u s t e x a m i n e t h e f o u r c h a l l e n g e d s t a t e m e n t s i n t h e c o n t e x t of the entire trial. Defendant a r g u e s t h a t h e was d e n i e d h i s r i g h t t o c o n f r o n t h i s a c c u s o r s a s g u a r a n t e e u by t h e S i x t h Amendment o f t h e United S t a t e s Constitu- We disagree. tion. s t a t e m e n t s were The f o u r twenty-three presented Defense introduced witnesses presented seven counsel examine a l l of witnesses, was by the State. including af forded through four full his own opportunity the S t a t e ' s witnesses. of Defendant testimony. to cross- The s t a t e m e n t s w e r e n o t c r i t i c a l t o t h e S t a t e ' s case a g a i n s t Arrow i n l i g h t o f eyewitness testimony describing the f i n a l confrontation b e t w e e n Arrow and incriminating" the victim. t o Arrow. i m p l i c a t e d Arrow by name. A z u r e ' s murder. None Nor of were t h e y " p o w e r f u l l y the statements directly None d i r e c t l y c o n n e c t e d him w i t h None o f t h e f o u r s t a t e m e n t s was c h a l l e n g e d on t h e b a s i s o f a d e n i a l o f c o n f r o n t a t i o n . W e w i l l examine e a c h s t a t e m e n t and i t s a d m i s s i o n i n t o e v i d e n c e i n t u r n . The duced first s t a t e m e n t d e f e n d a n t c h a l l e n g e s was intro- t h r o u g h G l o r e e n A z u r e on r e d i r e c t e x a m i n a t i o n . The p r o s e c u t o r asked Gloreen: "Q. Do you r e c a l l t a l k i n g t o Adam Weinberger, the defendant, a t t h a t time, s t a t i n g t o him t h a t ' y o u h a d k i l l e d h i m ' ? A. H e s a i d I h o p e you a r e s a t i s f i e d , you caused a l l of t h i s trouble." No o b j e c t i o n was r a i s e d a t t r i a l t o t h e a d m i s s i o n o f t h i s statement. On a p p e a l , d e f e n d a n t f a i l s t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t its admission c o n s t i t u t e s p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r . A t most, t h i s s t a t e m e n t c a n b e v i e w e d a s l i n k a g e t e s t i m o n y t h a t is incriminating only i n conjunction with other facts. not demonstrate a codefendant's s h i f t blame o n t o o t h e r s . " a t 136, 88 S.Ct. It does "recognized motivation to B r u t o n v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 3 9 1 U.S. a t 1 6 2 8 , 20 L.Ed.2d a t 485. I f anything, t h e s t a t e m e n t s e r v e s as a n admission a g a i n s t i n t e r e s t t h a t tends to incriminate Mont.R.Evid. Adam himself. Rule 801(d)(2)(A), T h i s s t a t e m e n t was n o t v i t a l t o t h e S t a t e ' s case a g a i n s t Arrow. W f i n d no p r e j u d i c e . e Nor d o w e f i n d t h a t a d m i s s i o n o f t h e s e c o n d s t a t e m e n t was prejudicial. It was e x a m i n a t i o n o f Rodney A z u r e . introduced through the direct Defense c o u n s e l f i r s t o b j e c t e d t o i t s i n t r o d u c t i o n on t h e b a s i s t h a t no n o t i c e was p r o v i d e d to the defendants remedied that of the omission by statement. allowing The D i s t r i c t defense Court counsel to s u b p o e n a and i n t e r v i e w a n y p o s s i b l e w i t n e s s e s t o t h e m a k i n g of the statement. l a c k of foundation. the time, Counsel next o b j e c t e d on t h e b a s i s o f The w i t n e s s t h e n p r o v i d e d t e s t i m o n y o n p l a c e and p e o p l e p r e s e n t . Finally, the witness, Rodney A z u r e , t e s t i f i e d a s f o l l o w s : "Q. And d i d you h e a r him make a n y s t a t e m e n t s a t t h a t t i m e , Adam W e i n b e r g e r ? A. I heard it yes. You d i d h e a r him make a s t a t e m e n t ? "Q. A. Yes. "Q. And t o whom w e r e t h e y d i r e c t e d ? I d o n ' t know who t h e y w e r e d i r e c t e d i t seems l i k e h e was j u s t g l a r i n g . A. to, And what d i d h e s a y ? A. He said 'What do you e x p e c t , t h e y were t a i l g a t i n g us'." "Q. No f u r t h e r o b j e c t i o n was r a i s e d . been demonstrated. Nor has prejudice T h i s s t a t e m e n t a g a i n can s e r v e a t most a s l i n k a g e testimony. Without t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of facts, Adam's is Arrow. Nor, trial, comment in light of not the powerfully other other incriminating to evidence produced at i s i t v i t a l t o t h e S t a t e ' s c a s e a g a i n s t Arrow. d o e s n o t s h i f t blame f r o m Adam t o Arrow. It W f i n d no B r u t o n e violation. The four, third statement, the most incriminating of the is s t i l l i n c r i m i n a t i n g o n l y i n l i g h t of o t h e r c l e a r l y a d m i s s i b l e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d a t t r i a l and i s t h e r e f o r e mere linkage testimony. I t was i n t r o d u c e d t h r o u g h t h e t e s t i m o n y o f A r t h u r Sarnow, a G.V.W. o f f i c e r f o r t h e Montana Highway D e p a r t m e n t . Sarnow was a s k e d by a s h e r i f f ' s d e p u t y t o a s s i s t i n moving t h e t h r e e W e i n b e r g e r s and Tom H a n z l i c k f r o m t h e s c e n e of t h e s h o o t i n g . The o n l y o b j e c t i o n r a i s e d by d e f e n - d a n t a s t o S a r n o w ' s t e s t i m o n y was t h e f o l l o w i n g o b j e c t i o n o n t h e b a s i s of f o u n d a t i o n : "Q. Okay, a n d w h i l e you w e r e i n t h e p a t r o l c a r , d i d you h e a r o n e o f t h e s e two d e f e n d a n t s s a y anything t o t h e o t h e r one? A. Y e s s i r I did. "Q. A. And who d i d you h e a r s a y s o m e t h i n g ? The young boy i n t h e p i n k t h e r e . "Q. And who d i d h e s a y i t t o ? A. To t h e back s e a t where the o t h e r t h r e e peop l e were s i t t i n g . "Q. And t h a t i s where t h e o t h e r d e f e n d a n t was s e a t e d ? A. Y e s , i n t h e m i d d l e i n t h e back, yes. "Q. And d o you r e c a l l w h a t h e s a i d ? "MR. S. MOSES: Your Honor, I am g o i n g t o a s k f o r a f u r t h e r f o u n d a t i o n a s t o who was s i t t i n g i n t h e c a r . "MR. W e have a l r e a d y d i d t h a t , RACICOT: Your Honor. "MR. S. MOSES: You o n l y t a l k e d a b o u t t h e d e f e n d a n t s though. "THE COURT: on. Okay, who was t h e d r i v e r and SO "A. Duane Rasmussen, R o o s e v e l t d e p u t y s h e r i f f was d r i v i n g . County "Q. And you w e r e s i t t i n g w h e r e ? A. On t h e p a s s e n g e r s i d e , a g a i n s t t h e window. "Q. And where was t h e d e f e n d a n t Adam A. W e i n b e r g e r , t h e young s o n s i t t i n g ? The young o n e was b e t w e e n Duane a n d I i n the front seat. "Q. And w h a t d i d h e s a y when h e t u r n e d a r o u n d t o t h e back s e a t ? A. H e turned t o w a r d s m e t o t h e back s e a t a n d h e s a i d ' T h a t ' s o n e and f o u r t o g o ' . " Again, t h i s testimony i n c r i m i n a t e s Arrow o n l y when linked with other f a c t s introduced a t t r i a l . I t does n o t attempt to It s h i f t blame f r o m Adam i n c r i m i n a t e Adam h i m s e l f . to Arrow. rather tends to No B r u t o n o b j e c t i o n was r a i s e d . W e f i n d no v i o l a t i o n . The l a s t s t a t e m e n t d e f e n d a n t c h a l l e n g e s was i n t r o d u c e d t h r o u g h t h e f o l l o w i n g r e c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e h i t c h h i k e r , Tom H a n z l i c k : "Q. Do you r e c a l l when you p u l l e d up w i t h Adam W e i n b e r g e r i n t h e c a r a n d t e l l i n g m e t h a t Adam W e i n b e r g e r s a i d , when you p u l l e d up i n t h e c a r a n d p a r k e d Y e s , do I a t t h e C u l b e r t s o n s t a t i o n ? A. r e c a l l it, yes s i r . "Q. What d i d h e s a y t o y o u ? S. MOSES: Adam s a i d ? "MR. "MR. RACICOT: Your Honor, was i t w h a t R i g h t , w h a t Adam W e i n b e r g e r said. "THE COURT: It doesn't r e f e r t o someone else? "MR. RACICOT: I t d o e s n ' t r e f e r t o a n y b o d y e l s e , i t i s w h a t Adam W e i n b e r g e r s a i d t o H e a s k e d you ' A r e you r e a d y t o you. f i g h t ? ' d i d n ' t h e ? A. Y e s s i r , he did." Defense Adam, counsel clarified that the s t a t e m e n t was made p o t e n t i a l l y a nontestifying codefendant, the question to be asked Then o b j e c t i o n was r a i s e d . and by and a l l o w e d answered w i t h o u t o b j e c t i o n . I t was d i r e c t e d o n l y t o l a c k o f n o t i c e , however. After lengthy discussion and consultation of legal t e x t b o o k s i n chambers, t h e D i s t r i c t Court gave t h e f o l l o w i n g i n s t r u c t i o n , which was f o r m u l a t e d by d e f e n s e c o u n s e l : "THE COURT: A l l r i g h t , I am g o i n g t o instruct the Jury that the l a t e s t statement t h a t was t e s t i f i e d t o c o n c e r n i n g - made by Adam W e i n b e r g e r t o t h i s w i t n e s s s h o u l d b e d i s r e g a r d e d by t h e J u r y . You may p r o c e e d . " T h i s f o u r t h s t a t e m e n t ("Are you r e a d y t o f i g h t ? " ) d o e s no more t h a n s e r v e t o l i n k Arrow w i t h t h e o t h e r e v i d e n c e , i f that. I t c e r t a i n l y d o e s n o t s h i f t blame f r o m Adam t o Arrow. Nor i s i t p o w e r f u l l y i n c r i m i n a t i n g . I t i s damaging p r i m a r i l y t o Adam h i m s e l f . W e h o l d t h a t d e f e n d a n t h a s f a i l e d t o demons t r a t e p r e j u d i c e i n t h e admission of t h e s e f o u r s t a t e m e n t s . I n D u t t o n v. 27 L.Ed.2d Evans ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 400 U.S. 74, 91 S.Ct. 210, 213, t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t a d d r e s s e d a t l e n g t h t h e c o n f l i c t b e t w e e n t h e r i g h t o f c o n f r o n t a t i o n and evidence admitted under a h e a r s a y e x c e p t i o n . The s a f e g u a r d s t h e Court recognized a s present i n t h e statement admitted i n E v a n s a r e s i m i l a r t o t h o s e w e see h e r e . The d e f e n d a n t i n D u t t o n v . s u p r a , was c h a r g e d Evans, w i t h two o t h e r men, Wade T r u e t t a n d Venson W i l l i a m s , f o r t h e execution-style tried murder o f t h r e e p o l i c e o f f i c e r s . separately. W i l l i a m s d i d not. was an inmate Georgia. Truett One o f from a testified at E v a n s was Evans' trial. t h e twenty p r o s e c u t i o n w i t n e s s e s federal penitentiary in Atlanta, The i n m a t e t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e a n d W i l l i a m s h a d b e e n f e l l o w p r i s o n e r s a t t h e p e n i t e n t i a r y when W i l l i a m s was t a k e n t o Gwinnett County f o r a r r a i g n m e n t Upon W i l l i a m s 1 r e t u r n , out i n court?" t h e inmate asked: W i l l i a m s responded, t h a t d i r t y son-of-a-bitch now." 400 U.S. i n t h e murder "If charges. "How d i d you make it h a d n ' t been f o r Alex Evans, w e w o u l d n ' t be i n t h i s a t 77, 9 1 S.Ct. a t 2 1 4 , 27 L.Ed.2d a t 220. Defense c o u n s e l o b j e c t e d t o t h i s s t a t e m e n t on t h e b a s i s t h a t i t was h e a r s a y a n d t h u s v i o l a t e d E v a n s ' r i g h t of confronta- tion. The U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t u p h e l d t i o n of the s t a t e m e n t on a number o f f i r s t distinguished a l i n e of the introduc- grounds. c a s e s i n which The C o u r t state court c o n v i c t i o n s were r e v e r s e d b e c a u s e of a d e n i a l of t h e r i g h t of confrontation. Bruton and The enunciated Court then particularly the differences between it examined and the I n Bruton an e n t i r e c o n f e s s i o n of t h e n o n t e s t i - E v a n s case. f y i n g c o d e f e n d a n t was a d m i t t e d w i t h o u t o p p o r t u n i t y t o e f f e c t i v e l y cross-examine f o r the t r u t h of the matters contained within the confession. there was no "recognized b e f o r e it i n B r u t o n . L.Ed.2d The C o u r t i n E v a n s e m p h a s i z e d t h a t exception 400 U.S. to a t 86, the hearsay 9 1 S.Ct. rule" a t 2 1 8 , 27 a t 225, and t h e n r e f u s e d t o e q u a t e t h e S i x t h Arnend- ment C o n f r o n t a t i o n C l a u s e a n d t h e e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r s a y r u l e , a l t h o u g h i t acknowledged t h a t b o t h s t e m from t h e same r o o t s . In clause distinguishing cases, Evans from o t h e r confrontation t h e Court noted t h a t t h e inmate's testimony was n o t ' ' c r u c i a l " or "devastating1'; it d i d not involve t h e u s e o r m i s u s e o f a c o n f e s s i o n made i n t h e c o e r c i v e atmosp h e r e of o f f i c i a l i n t e r r o g a t i o n ; g e s t i o n of i t d i d n o t i n v o l v e a sug- p r o s e c u t o r i a l misconduct n o t i n v o l v e a d m i s s i o n of a p a p e r i n which and, cross-examination finally, examination. Evans Bruton. or negligence; it did t r a n s c r i p t of p r o c e e d i n g s was n o n e x i s t e n t or inadequate; it d i d n o t i n v o l v e w h o l e s a l e d e n i a l of c r o s s - Evans, also However, did 4 0 0 U.S. not a t 87, involve a 91 S.Ct. joint a t 219, trial, as 27 had t h e n a t u r e of t h e s t a t e m e n t and t h e s a f e - guards recognized a s present berger's statements. i n Evans a p p l y t o Adam Wein- The C o u r t n o t e d t h a t : "Evans was n o t d e p r i v e d of any r i g h t of c o n f r o n t a t i o n on t h e i s s u e of whether W i l l i a m s a c t u a l l y made t h e s t a t e m e n t r e l a t e d by Shaw. N e i t h e r a h e a r s a y n o r a c o n f r o n t a t i o n q u e s t i o n would a r i s e had Shawls t e s t i m o n y been used t o p r o v e merel y t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t had b e e n made. T h e hearsay r u l e does n o t prevent a witness from t e s t i f y i n g a s t o what h e h a s h e a r d ; i t i s r a t h e r a r e s t r i c t i o n on t h e p r o o f of f a c t through e x t r a j u d i c i a l statements. From t h e v i e w p o i n t o f t h e C o n f r o n t a t i o n C l a u s e , a w i t n e s s , under o a t h , s u b j e c t t o c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n , and whose demeanor c a n be o b s e r v e d by t h e t r i e r o f f a c t , i s a r e l i a b l e i n f o r m a n t n o t o n l y a s t o what h e has seen but a ...................................l s o a s t o w h a t h e h a s heard." (Emphasis a d d e d . ) Evans, 4 0 0 U.S. a t 88, 91 S.Ct. a t 219, 27 L.Ed.2d a t 226. S i m i l a r l y , Arrow Weinberger was n o t d e n i e d any r i g h t of c o n f r o n t a t i o n on t h e i s s u e of whether o r n o t t h e s t a t e ments were made by Adam and o v e r h e a r d by e a c h of witnesses. the four While none of t h e s t a t e m e n t s were c h a l l e n g e d on t h e b a s i s of Bruton o r a s h e a r s a y , ception t o the t h e "state-of-mind" h e a r s a y r u l e o r Montana's ex- transaction rule would h a v e p r o v i d e d t h e " r e c o g n i z e d e x c e p t i o n t o t h e h e a r s a y r u l e " t h a t was n o t p r e s e n t i n B r u t o n . B r u t o n , n. a t 128, 88 S.Ct. S t a t e v. a t 1623-1624; (1936), Clark 3 , 3 9 1 U.S. R u l e 8 0 3 ( 3 ) , M0nt.R.Evid.i 1 0 2 Mont. 432, 58 P.2d 276; In Re P e t i t i o n o f P e t e r s o n ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 1 5 5 Mont. 2 3 9 , 467 P.2d 281. I n Evans, t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t s t a t e d t h a t jury was b e i n g implicitly identified t h e confrontation i s s u e a r o s e "because t h e invited to infer that Williams had E v a n s a s t h e p e r p e t r a t o r o f t h e m u r d e r when h e blamed E v a n s f o r h i s predicament." 219, 27 L.Ed.2d d e n i a l of several Evans, 400 U.S. t h e r i g h t of c o n f r o n t a t i o n , It 9 1 S.Ct. at I n c o n c l u d i n g t h a t t h e r e was no a t 227. factors. a t 88, noted that t h e Court considered the statement did not c o n t a i n an e x p r e s s a s s e r t i o n a b o u t p a s t f a c t ; t h a t W i l l i a m s ' p e r s o n a l knowledge o f t h e i d e n t i t i e s a n d r o l e s o f t h e o t h e r m u r d e r p a r t i c i p a n t s had b e e n a b u n d a n t l y e s t a b l i s h e d b y o t h e r e v i d e n c e ; a n d , t h a t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y Williams' s t a t e m e n t was f o u n d e d on f a u l t y r e c o l l e c t i o n was r e m o t e i n t h e e x t r e m e . Finally, the circumstances provided widely recognized in- d i c i a o f r e l i a b i l i t y w h e r e , as h e r e , t h e s t a t e m e n t was s p o n t a n e o u s and where it w a s a g a i n s t W i l l i a m s ' p e n a l i n t e r e s t t o make i t . T h o s e same f a c t o r s a p p l y h e r e . contained an express assertion None o f t h e s t a t e m e n t s about past fact. Adam's k n o w l e d g e o f A r r o w ' s r o l e i n t h e s h o o t i n g was s o l i d l y e s t a b l i s h e d t h r o u g h o t h e r e v i d e n c e . The c h a n c e t h a t Adam's s t a t e m e n t s were f o u n d e d upon f a u l t y r e c o l l e c t i o n i s r e m o t e i n t h e extreme. The statements were spontaneous and were made a g a i n s t Adam's p e n a l i n t e r e s t . The C o u r t e n d e d by s t a t i n g : "The d e c i s i o n s o f t h i s C o u r t m a k e i t c l e a r t h a t t h e mission of t h e Confrontat i o n Clause is t o advance a p r a c t i c a l concern f o r t h e accuracy of t h e t r u t h d e t e r m i n i n g p r o c e s s i n c r i m i n a l t r i a l s by assuring t h a t ' t h e t r i e r of f a c t [has] a satisfactory basis for evaluating the t r u t h of t h e p r i o r s t a t e m e n t . ' C a l i f o r n i a v . G r e e n , 399 U.S. a t 1 6 1 ... " A l m o s t 40 y e a r s a g o , i n S n y d e r v . Massachusetts, 2 9 1 U.S. 9 7 , Mr. Justice Cardozo w r o t e an o p i n i o n f o r t h i s C o u r t refusing t o set aside a state criminal c o n v i c t i o n b e c a u s e of t h e c l a i m e d d e n i a l of t h e r i g h t of confrontation. The c l o s i n g w o r d s of t h a t o p i n i o n a r e w o r t h repeating here: "'There is danger t h a t t h e c r i m i n a l law w i l l be b r o u g h t i n t o c o n t e m p t - - t h a t d i s c r e d i t w i l l e v e n t o u c h t h e g r e a t immuni- t i e s a s s u r e d by t h e F o u r t e e n t h Amendment --if gossamer p o s s i b i l i t i e s of p r e j u d i c e t o a defendant a r e t o n u l l i f y a sentence p r o n o u n c e d by a c o u r t o f c o m p e t e n t j u r i s d i c t i o n i n o b e d i e n c e t o l o c a l law, and set t h e g u i l t y free.' [ C i t a t i o n omitt e d . ] " 400 U.S. a t 89-90, 9 1 S.Ct. a t 220, 27 L.Ed.2d a t 227. W e agree. Arrow W e i n b e r g e r h a s f a i l e d t o d e m o n s t r a t e p r e j u - d i c e i n t h e admission of these statements. We hold t h a t h i s r i g h t t o c o n f r o n t a t i o n was n o t v i o l a t e d . Defendant a l s o argues t h a t t h i s Court should recognize as plain error any alleged Bruton violation and should t h e r e f o r e c o n s i d e r t h e s e a l l e g e d v i o l a t i o n s even where n o t p r e s e r v e d by c o n t e m p o r a n e o u s o b j e c t i o n . W e d e c l i n e t o d o s o . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t was n e v e r g i v e n a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o r u l e on a d m i s s i o n of t h e s t a t e m e n t s o r t o c o r r e c t i t s e l f if admission w a s not proper. We w i l l not put the t r i a l court i n e r r o r w h e r e it h a s n o t b e e n g i v e n s u c h a c h a n c e . State v . W a l k e r ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 1 4 8 Mont. 216, 2 2 3 , 419 P.2d 3 0 0 , 304. Here, defense counsel was familiar with t h e Bruton o b j e c t i o n and u s e d i t s u c c e s s f u l l y t o p r e v e n t a d m i s s i o n o f another statement. four No s u c h o b j e c t i o n was r a i s e d statements. Defendant's contention to t o these the contrary notwithstanding, w e a l s o n o t e t h a t both d e f e n s e counsel were present at trial when three of the four s t a t e m e n t s were admitted. W e r e j e c t h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t h a t less experienced trial counsel f a i l e d t o make o b j e c t i o n s w h i c h would b e e n made had b o t h c o u n s e l b e e n p r e s e n t . have W also refuse t o e a d o p t a p l a i n e r r o r r u l e t h a t would a l l o w d e f e n d a n t s t o l a y in the grass and create Bruton violations by failing to o b j e c t and t h e n w i t h h o l d i n g o n e c o d e f e n d a n t f r o m t h e w i t n e s s stand. D e f e n d a n t ' s f o u r t h a r g u m e n t is t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t i o n ' s t r i a l t a c t i c s d e p r i v e d him o f a f a i r t r i a l . the State should not have introduced He a r g u e s t h a t evidence v i c t i m ' s good c h a r a c t e r i n i t s c a s e - i n - c h i e f ; of defendants' character of the t h a t evidence and t h e i r p l a n t o t a k e Luanne t o Arkansas should n o t have been a d m i t t e d ; t h a t evidence of t h e reasonableness should not tailored" of have its the case and his admitted; been victim's that the to avoid calling family's State actions "carefully witnesses who t e s t i f y t h a t t h e v i c t i m was t h e f i r s t a g g r e s s o r ; would and t h a t t h e S t a t e i m p r o p e r l y e l i c i t e d t e s t i m o n y d u r i n g i t s c a s e on the condition s h o o t i n g and of a defense at improperly sympathized o r m e n t s made by w i t n e s s e s . hand. No o b j e c t i o n s w e r e points defendant these witness the time agreed with of the state- W r e j e c t t h e s e arguments o u t of e raised now c h a l l e n g e s . at trial Nor, on a n y o f taken in toto, the do i n c i d e n t s evidence misconduct t h a t p r e j u d i c e d defen- d a n t . Most of t h e e v i d e n c e d e f e n d a n t c h a l l e n g e s was p r o p e r l y a d m i t t e d t o p r o v i d e t h e j u r y w i t h a l l of t h e f a c t s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s n e c e s s a r y t o s h e d l i g h t upon t h i s c a s e . C h a r a c t e r e v i d e n c e o f a v i c t i m ' s p e a c e f u l n a t u r e may be a d m i t t e d by t h e p r o s e c u t i o n t o rebut evidence t h a t t h e v i c t i m was t h e f i r s t a g g r e s s o r . R u l e 4 0 4 ( a ) ( 2 ) , Mont.R.Evid. the prosecution Here, introduced f i r s t witness i n its case-in-chief t h e evidence through t h e b e f o r e t h e d e f e n d a n t had i n t r o d u c e d e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e v i c t i m was t h e f i r s t a g g r e s s o r . Where t h e d e f e n s e r a i s e s t h e i s s u e o f s e l f - d e f e n s e cross-examination t h a t tends t o demonstrate t h a t the victim was t h e f i r s t a g g r e s s o r , rebutting t h a t argument nothing precludes i n t r o d u c e evidence of a n t i c i p a t i o n of raised at trial with evidence However, t h e S t a t e s h o u l d the victim's such a n argument. and t h e S t a t e from i n its case-in-chief of t h e v i c t i m ' s p e a c e f u l n a t u r e . not through peaceful nature i n Here, the defendant's no o b j e c t i o n was c l a i m of was c l e a r l y a t i s s u e t h r o u g h o u t t h e t r i a l . self-defense Defendant h a s again f a i l e d t o demonstrate prejudice. In his l a s t two a r g u m e n t s , defendant challenges im- p o s i t i o n o f t r i a l c o s t s and e x p e n s e s a s p a r t of h i s s e n t e n c e a s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and r e q u e s t s t h a t h i s s e n t e n c e b e v a c a t ed s i n c e i t was b a s e d upon e r r o n e o u s i n f o r m a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n s . H e a r g u e s , f i r s t , t h a t s e c t i o n 46-18-232, MCA, is p a t e n t l y u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s i n c e i t e n h a n c e s p u n i s h - ment i n r e t r i b u t i o n f o r a d e f e n d a n t ' s e x e r c i s e o f a f u n d a mental c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t . S e c t i o n 46-18-232, MCA, We r e j e c t t h i s contention. prohibits recoupment a g a i n s t a n i n d i g e n t d e f e n d a n t and a l l o w s a d e f e n d a n t t o b e r e l i e v e d f r o m payment o f s u c h c o s t s upon p e t i t i o n t o t h e s e n t e n c i n g c o u r t " [ i l f it a p p e a r s t o t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n of t h e c o u r t t h a t payment of the amount due will impose manifest hardship on the defendant or his immediate family . . ." Statutes that allow such a discretionary imposition of costs have been upheld against the due process argument marshalled by defendant. Fuller v. Oregon (1974), 417 U.S. 40, 51-54, 94 S.Ct. 2116, 2123-2125, 40 L.Ed.2d 647, 653-655; United States v. Glover (2nd Cir. 1978), 588 F.2d 876, 878-879; People v. Estate of Scott (1977), 66 111.2d 522, 363 N.E.2d cf., Olson v. James (10th Cir. 1979), 603 F.2d 823, 825; 150 (invali- dating a Kansas statute imposing obligation to repay costs of appointed counsel regardless of defendant's ability to pay). Montana's statute does no more than deprive "a finan- cially able defendant of available funds which, in fairness, should be remitted to the public coffers." Glover, 588 F.2d at 879, quoting United States v. Bracewell (2nd Cir. 1978), 569 F.2d 1194, 1197. Nor do we accept defendant's argument that his sentence should be vacated based upon inaccurate information in his sentencing report. A defendant's right to be sentenced on the basis of accurate information is protected where he is represented by counsel at sentencing and is given the opportunity to rebut any inaccuracies. Trangsrud St.Rep. (1982), 1765, 1768. Mont. , 651 P.2d 2347. Mont . 37, 40, 39 He then has an affirmative duty to present evidence to show such inaccuracies. (19791, State v. , State v. Radi 604 P.2d 318, 320, 36 St.Rep. 2345, Here, defendant was represented by counsel and was presented with an opportunity to rebut the report. not do so. He did Rather, defense counsel reviewed the report and deemed it "appropriate." Defendant should address any chal- l e n g e t o t h e e q u i t y o f t h e s e n t e n c e t o t h e S e n t e n c e Review Division. This Court w i l l consider only l e g a l i s s u e s raised by t h e s e n t e n c e . I n conclusion we a l s o address t h e d i s s e n t e r s ' concern with a potential defendants being t h e i r argument. to joint conflict represented i n t e r e s t stemming by o n e l a w f i r m . from b o t h reject We W e note, f i r s t , t h a t both defendants agreed representation firm a s p r i v a t e counsel. trial. of and, in fact, hired the same l a w Both d e f e n d a n t s waived a s e p a r a t e Both d e f e n d a n t s r e c o n s i d e r e d their d e c i s i o n t o be j o i n t l y r e p r e s e n t e d d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e of t h e t r i a l and r e a f firmed t h a t decision. N e i t h e r t h e d e f e n d a n t nor an a c t u a l c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t . t h e d i s s e n t e r s demonstrate A defendant h a s t h e burden of e s t a b l i s h i n g t h a t such r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n f a c t c r e a t e d a n a c t u a l c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t t h a t prejudiced the defendant. The law d o e s n o t r e q u i r e a n a f f i r m a t i v e i n q u i r y i n t o w h e t h e r codefendants agree t o j o i n t representation. ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 7 Mont. 4 2 6 , 4 3 1 , 582 P.2d S t a t e v. 3 2 1 , 323-324. Henry A defen- d a n t may w a i v e t h e r i g h t t o demand r e t r i a l o n t h e i s s u e o f c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t of counsel. 1 6 2 Mont. 1 5 5 , 1 6 1 , 509 P.2d S t a t e v. G a l l a g h e r ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 8 5 2 , 855. Where, a s h e r e , t h e d e f e n s e s p u t f o r t h by t h e two d e f e n d a n t s a r e n o t flict, i n con- a d e f e n d a n t is n o t d e p r i v e d o f e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e o f c o u n s e l by j o i n t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . S t a t e v. Henry, s u p r a , 1 7 7 Mont. a t 4 3 1 , 582 P.2d a t 324. W e r e j e c t t h e d i s s e n t e r s ' o b j e c t i o n s a s mere s p e c u l a t i o n . Affirmed. Chief J u s t i c e W e concur: Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea dissenting: My dissent is a long one, and I do not apologize for the delay. It will be filed when it is ready. Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy concurring with the dissent of Justice Daniel J. Shea, and stating further in dissent: I would reverse the conviction of Arrow Weinberger. The instructions in relation to him were in hopeless conflict. Under section 45-5-101, MCA, a person commits the offense of criminal homicide if he purposely, knowingly, or negligently "causes the death of another human being." A person commits deliberate homicide under section 45-5-102, MCA, if the criminal homicide is committed "purposely" or "knowingly". The District Court, in instructing the jury with respect to deliberate homicide, followed the statutes when it instructed the jury in instruction no. 10: "A person commits homicide if: the offense of deliberate "(1) He purposely or knowingly causes the death of (Emphasis added.) another human being . . ." Under the statutory definition, and the portion of instruction no. 10 which we have quoted, the inquiry for the jury was, who caused the death of Azure? Obviously if Azure caused his own death, as in the case of Arrow Weinberger acting in committed. self defense, then the crime has not been It is the statutory scheme that the jury search for the cause of the death in homicide cases. In this case the statutory definition. District Court elaborated on the In instruction no. 11, it instructed the jury: "You are instructed that to sustain the charge of deliberate homicide against Arrow Weinberger, the State must prove that the defendant Arrow Weinberger purposely or knowingly performed the act or acts causing the death of Floyd Azure (Emphasis added.) . . ." Thus the District Court, by giving instruction no. 11 changed the nature of the inquiry for the jury. Instead of searching for the cause of Azure's dea-th, the jury was instructed to find who performed the acts causing the death of Azure. Instruction no. 11 created a crime not defined in the Montana statutes, and for Arrow Weinberger, wiped out any self defense. Under instruction no. 11, since Arrow Weinherger performed the acts (even though he may have been acting in self defense) which caused Azure's death, he was guilty of homicide. Under instruction no. 11, the mere performance of the acts causing Azure's death constitutes a forcible felony. Instruction no. 47 then wiped away completely any self defense available to Arrow Weinberger: "You are instructed that the defense of self defense or justifiable use of force is not available to a person who is attempting to commit or committing a forcible felony. A forcible felony is any felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual." The State admits in its brief that court's instruction no. 11 "failed to define completely the crime charged," but the State contends that the failure of definition of court's instruction no. 10 was cured by other instructions given in the case. Our annals are full of cases in which we have said that if an instruction is "not as full as it might have been," but the instructions taken as a whole fairly present the case to a jury, we will not reverse the conviction because of an incomplete instruction. However, this rule applies only to incomplete instructions, not to erroneous instructions or those which are at cross purposes with each other. The cases relied upon by the State and by the majority in this case do not meet the situation here where the court erroneously defined the elements of the crime in instruction no. 11. If there is any single item of instruction that needs to be straight-forwardedly presented in the criminal case, it must be the elements of the crime. (19811, Mont . , We said in State v. Lundblade 625 P.2d 545, 548,38 St.Rep. 441: "At a minimum, the District Court must explain or for the (Citing a case.) define the crime - - jury, In determining whether the instructions did this, we are guided by certain settled principles. First, we must view the instructions as a whole (citing a case) and we will find no error if the instructions as a whole fully and fairly instruct on the law applicable to the case (citing cases) " . Here there is a hopeless conflict in the instructions concerning deliberate homicide in Arrow Weinberger's case. The instructions as a whole do not fully and fairly instruct on the applicable law but confuse the elements of deliberate homicide and strip any meaning from the self defense instructions. I could cite other instructional conflict, but it would serve no purpose here and would only take up space. It is enough to say that court's instructions no. 24, 31, and 32 do not cure the instructional failure, as the majority contends or the State argues, because in each of those instructions, there is a phrase used "described by a statute defining an offense" to inform the jury how to apply purposely knowingly as a requisite for mental state. or Nowhere in the instructions in this case did the court specifically tell the jury a particular statute that defined the offense. In other words, under instructions 24, 31 and 32, the jury was told to look to a statute for the elements, but the statute was not given to them. F o r t h e s e and t h o s e r e a s o n s s e t f o r t h by J u s t i c e S h e a , I dissent. Q .& Justice I concur i n t h e foregoing d i s s e n t of M r . J u s t i c e Sheehy.

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