RATHBUN v ROBSON

Annotate this Case
Download PDF
No. 82-222 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NONTANA 1983 LOWELL A. RATHBUN, Plaintiff and Appellant, GARY G. ROBSON, GEORGE A. CALRSON and ELEANOR L. CAXLSON, et al., Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: District Court of the Fourteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Musselshell, The Honorable Nat Allen, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Jon A. Oldenburg, Lewistown, Montana For Respondents: Lynaugh, Fitzgerald Eillings, Montana & Skaggs; William P. Fitzgerald, Submitted on Briefs: Decided: Filed: 4 p 7 - 1385 ~ February 10, 1933 April 7, 1983 M r . J u s t i c e John Court. This Judicial case Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d comes C o u r t of from t h e D i s t r i c t County of District, t h e O p i n i o n of Musselshell. the the Fourteenth Plaintiff commenced t h i s a c t i o n s e e k i n g a judgment d e c l a r i n g him t o be t h e h o l d e r of a n e a s e m e n t a c r o s s p r o p e r t y owned b y d e f e n d a n t s . the trial A t c o u r t , and i n t h i s C o u r t , t w o e a s e m e n t t h e o r i e s were p r e s e n t e d ; easement by prescription, District Court easement plaintiff against by necessity. in both The instances. we a r e asked to d e c i d e w h e t h e r t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n Additionally, verbatim held and adoption, and by photographic reproduction, the d e f e n d a n t ' s f i n d i n g s o f f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n of law. A p p e l l a n t i s t h e owner of a t r a c t of east 1/2 of the west 1/2 of s e c t i o n 34. land d e s c r i b e d a s the The a t t a c h e d map shows a p p e l l a n t s p r o p e r t y and t h e c l a i m e d e a s e m e n t r o u t e . A p p e l l a n t h a s h e l d a n i n t e r e s t i n t h e l a n d s i n c e 1 9 5 7 when h i s mother, Mrs. Rathbun, t r a n s f e r r e d o w n e r s h i p to him and h i s Since t h a t t i m e , brother. a p p e l l a n t h a s become t h e sole o w n e r . There a r e t w o r o u t e s t o t h e property; a western a c c e s s r o u t e over w h i c h a p p e l l a n t c l a i m s a n e a s e m e n t , and a n e a s t e r n r o u t e which is s t e e p and s e a s o n a l l y i m p a s s a b l e . Use of either route requires o n e t o cross p r o p e r t y owned by a t l e a s t o n e of In other words, a p p e l l a n t 1s property The l a n d was i n i t i a l l y p u r c h a s e d 1 9 3 4 b y T.D. west Cox. the respondents. is land-locked from M u s s e l s h e l l County . in The p u r c h a s e by Cox i n c l u d e d t h e west Sr;! o f t h e o f s e c t i o n 34; h o w e v e r , i n 1 9 4 2 t h a t p o r t i o n was s o l d by Cox and was e v e n t u a l l y t r a n s f e r r e d to r e s p o n d e n t s J e r r y C a r l s o n and is Kathleen Beslanowitch. It over this portion that a p p e l l a n t c l a i m s a n e a s e m e n t by n e c e s s i t y . From 1934 t o 1946 Cox l i v e d on s e c t i o n 34. c o n d u c t e d f a r m i n g and l o g g i n g o p e r a t i o n s . used the western access route frequently. land t o Mrs. R a t h b u n , u n t i l 1957. appellant's mother. I n t h e 1 9 3 0 ' s he D u r i n g t h e s e y e a r s he I n 1946 h e s o l d t h e She owned t h e land D u r i n g t h e s e e l e v e n y e a r s t h e l a n d was v a c a n t . Her v i s i t s t o t h e p r o p e r t y were c h a r a c t e r i z e d by t h e c o u r t as s p o r a d i c and i n t e r m i t t e n t . Much of t h e t i m e A p p e l l a n t h a s n e v e r l i v e d on t h e p r o p e r t y . s i n c e 1957, a p p e l l a n t has resided o u t - o f - s t a t e . He has v i s i t e d t h e l a n d o n t h e a v e r a g e o f o n c e or twice a y e a r , and t h e r e w e r e T h e s e v i s i t s were made t o y e a r s i n w h i c h he would make no v i s i t . "check the property." A p p e l l a n t owns o t h e r n o n a d j o i n i n g l a n d i n t h e v i c i n i t y which is l e a s e d f o r a g r i c u l t u r a l p u r p o s e s , h o w e v e r , concerning the land in section 34, neither appellant nor his lessee have used t h e land f o r any p r o d u c t i v e u s e . This dispute a g e n t on b e h a l f arose of in the l a t e 1 9 7 0 ' s when a p p e l l a n t went t o view t h e a real estate property. The a g e n t l e a r n e d t h a t a p p e l l a n t ' s t i t l e d i d n o t include an easement. The testimony indicates sell the parcels. t h a t a p p e l l a n t wished The r e s p o n d e n t s t o s u b d i v i d e and d i d n o t a g r e e w i t h t h i s pro- p o s e d l a n d u s e and made t h e i r f e e l i n g s known. The r e s p o n d e n t ' s p o s i t i o n was t h a t a n y access a c r o s s t h e i r l a n d was p e r m i s s i v e , and t h e r e c o u l d be no access to a n y s u b d i v i s i o n . r e s p o n d e n t s also t e s t i f i e d to land other productive that uses, if However, the t o put the a p p e l l a n t wished such as logging or or mining a g r i c u l t u r a l p u r p o s e s , t h e y would allow access. To e s t a b l i s h a n e a s e m e n t by p r e s c r i p t i o n t h e b u r d e n is on t h e moving p a r t y to show s e v e r a l e l e m e n t s . i n t e r e s t must have sively, adversely, s t a t u t o r y period. P.2d used 91. Once the He o r h i s predecessors route openly, c o n t i n u o u s l y and notoriously, uninterrupted for in exclu- the full S c o t t v. W e i n h e i m e r ( 1 9 6 2 ) , 1 4 0 Mont. 5 5 4 , 3 7 4 the moving party establishes these elements a d v e r s e u s e i s presumed and t h e b u r d e n is t h e n on t h e o w n e r to show t h a t t h e u s e w a s p e r m i s s i v e . Mont. 1 2 9 , 454 P.2d 212 P. 8 5 8 . If 920; O I C o n n o r v. B r o d i e ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 1 5 3 Glantz v. Ga be / Gab&?- ( 1 9 2 3 ) , 6 6 Mont. 134, t h e owner shows p e r m i s s i v e u s e , no e a s e m e n t c a n b e a c q u i r e d s i n c e t h e t h e o r y o f p r e s c r i p t i v e e a s e m e n t is b a s e d o n adverse use. 24. W i l s o n v . C h e s t n u t ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 1 6 4 Mont. 4 8 4 , 5 2 5 P.2d The D i s t r i c t C o u r t c o n c l u d e d t h a t u s e of t h e w e s t e r n access r o u t e f r o m 1 9 3 4 t o t h e p r e s e n t time h a s b e e n p e r m i s s i v e , there- . W e i n d i c a t e p e r m i s s i v e use beginning in f o r e a n y p r e s u m p t i o n o f a d v e r s e u s e was e f f e c t i v e l y r e b u t t e d agree. T h e r e was e v i d e n c e 1934. to S e v e r a l w i t n e s s e s t e s t i f i e d c o n c e r n i n g local customs t h a t b e g a n i n t h e homes t e a d i n g d a y s c o n c e r n i n g access across a n o t h e r ' s land. T h e r e e x i s t e d a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g among l a n d o w n e r s t h a t p e r - m i s s i o n was n o t r e q u i r e d e v e r y time a p e r s o n needed to cross h i s neighbor 's land. closed the Permission gates and was respected automatic the individual neighbor's his if property. " ' * * * A u s e of a n e i g h b o r ' s l a n d b a s e d upon mere n e i g h b o r l y a c c o m m o d a t i o n or c o u r t e s y is n o t a d v e r s e and c a n n o t r i p e n i n t o a p r e s c r i p t i v e e a s e m e n t . T h u s w h e r e t h e u s e of a way by a n e i g h b o r was b y e x p r e s s o r i m p l i e d p e r m i s s i o n o f t h e o w n e r , it was h e l d t h a t t h e c o n t i n u o u s u s e o f t h e way by t h e n e i g h b o r was n o t a d v e r s e and d i d n o t r i p e n i n t o a p r e s c r i p t i v e r i g h t * * * I u Wilson v. C h e s t n u t , 164 Mont. a t 4 9 1 , 5 2 5 P.2d a t 2 7 . (Citing 2 Thompson on Real P r o p e r t y ( 1 9 6 1 R e p l a c e m e n t ) , S e e a l s o Ewan v . S t e n b e r g Easements, 5345). ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 1 6 8 Mont. 6 3 , 5 4 1 P.2d 6 0 . Evidence of t h i s l o c a l custom, t o e s t a b l i s h permissive use. Mont. 4 3 3 , 4 3 8 , 568 P.2d w i t h o u t more, w a s s u f f i c i e n t I n T a y l o r v. Petranek (1977)r 173 120, 123, t h i s Court s t a t e d : "Here t h e r e c o r d is r e p l e t e w i t h t e s t i m o n y f r o m b o t h p l a i n t i f f ' s and d e f e n d a n t ' s w i t n e s s e s t h a t t h e h o m e s t e a d e r s who i n i t i a l l y l i v e d i n t h e a r e a d e v e l o p e d common p r a c t i c e of a l l o w i n g o t h e r s to c r o s s t h e i r l a n d s t o r e a c h Suffolk. T h i s e v i d e n c e is s u f f i c i e n t t o supp o r t a u s e p e r m i s s i v e i n i t s i n c e p t i o n and n o t u n d e r a claim o f r i g h t ." Notwithstanding show that missive. use of local the custom, western there access was began o t h e r evidence and remained to per- T h e r e were s e v e r a l i n s t a n c e s of c o n t r o l e x e r c i s e d by r e s p o n d e n t s and t h e i r predecessors ; the f i r s t occurred i n 1934 when b o t h f o r k s o f t h e w e s t e r n access a t t h e G o u l d i n g C r e e k Road were l o c k e d by t h e R o b s o n s . a n d c a t t l e g o t loose. t h e g a t e s were l e f t o p e n T h e r e w e r e two o t h e r g a t e s e s t a b l i s h e d and m a i n t a i n e d by r e s p o n d e n t s . a n d g-2. Apparently, On t h e map t h e y are d e s i g n a t e d a s g-1 In the early 1960's J.W. Travis, who t h e n owned the west of 1/2 g-2, 1/2 o f s e c t i o n 34 d r o v e a p o s t i n t o t h e m i d d l e with the Also, traffic. chain. the w e s t of intention i n t h e 1 9 6 0 ' s G e o r g e C a r l s o n p a d l o c k e d g-1 w i t h a He retained of preventing t h e o n l y key. further vehicular The g a t e h a s r e m a i n e d locked to the present time. Although the prescriptive missive presence Hayden 6 576 P.2d Mont. 1 gd.tes alone not will defeat a t h e y are s ' t r o n g e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t i n g p e r - easement, use. of H i l l & 1115. w i t h t h e e x i s t e n c e of Snowden & ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 176 Walters The e v i d e n c e o f l o c a l c u s t o m , c o u p l e d gates, c o n c l u s i o n t h a t use of v. c l e a r l y support the trial court's t h e w e s t e r n access h a s a l w a y s b e e n per- missive. Next, over a p p e l l a n t claims t h a t a n e a s e m e n t by n e c e s s i t y e x i s t s the w e s t 42 of t h e west a of s e c t i o n 34. T h i s Court h a s recently stated: " G e n e r a l l y , a way o f n e c e s s i t y i s d e f i n e d as follows: ' [ w l h e r e a n owner of l a n d c o n v e y s a p a r c e l t h e r e o f w h i c h h a s no o u t l e t to a h i g h way e x c e p t o v e r t h e r e m a i n i n g l a n d s o f t h e g r a n t o r or o v e r t h e l a n d o f s t r a n g e r s , a way o f n e c e s s i t y e x i s t s over t h e remaining l a n d s of the grantor.' (citations omitted ) S i m i l a r l y , a way o f n e c e s s i t y is found when t h e owner o f l a n d s r e t a i n s t h e i n n e r p o r t i o n c o n v e y i n g t o a n o t h e r t h e b a l a n c e , across which h e m u s t go f o r e x i t and a c c e s s . " Schmid v. McDowell ( 1 9 8 2 ) , Mont , 649 P.2d 4 3 1 , 4 3 3 , 3 9 - 3 t ; ~ e p . 1 3 1 ~ - - 1 3 i 6 ; - - - . - . Appellant bases d e f i n i t i o n ; where his argument on t h e owner r e t a i n s the second an inner portion. case a p p e l l a n t ' s p r e d e c e s s o r t r a n s f e r r e d t h e west 1/2 % i n 1942, r e t a i n i n g t h e i n n e r p o r t i o n , the east Appellant's same r e a s o n claim must reason for fail for allowing the way of of the In t h i s 1/2 of the w e s t of %. t h e west discussed the exist. The l a n d o v e r w h i c h t h e way o f n e c e s s i t y is c l a i m e d h a s I n o t h e r words, necessity even i f were g r a n t e d a way o f n e c e s s i t y across t h e west t h e r e would be no b e n e f i t ; % of does in Schmid; n o access t o a p u b l i c r o a d . a part not appellant t h e west " t h e b a s i c r e a s o n f o r t h e c r e a t i o n of a way o f n e c e s s i t y , n a m e l y , t o p e r m i t c o m m u n i c a t i o n w i t h t h e o u t s i d e world, i s n o t p r e s e n t ."' Schmid , - . -- -. - Mont. a t - 649 % P.2d at 433, 39 St.Rep. at 1317. ( C i t i n g Daywalt v. Walker F i n a l l y , a p p e l l a n t asserts e r r o r f o r t h e c o u r t s p h o t o g r a p h i c r e p r o d u c t i o n and v e r b a t i m a d o p t i o n of the respondent's f i n d i n g s o f f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s o f l a w . the practice, " [olur ultimate test proposed W h i l e w e d i s a p p r o v e of . . . is w h e t h e r they are s u f f i c i e n t l y c o m p r e h e n s i v e and p e r t i n e n t t o t h e i s s u e s t o p r o v i d e a b a s i s f o r d e c i s i o n , and w h e t h e r t h e y a r e s u p p o r t e d by t h e e v i dence presented." I ---- I I n R e M a r r i a g e of J e n s e n 6 3 1 P.2d 700, 703, c l e a r l y m e t the test. The t r i a l c o u r t is a f f i r m e d . W e concur: 38 S t . R e p . (1981)' - 1109, 1113. Mont . They Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea, concurring: I join the opinion of the majority but merely want to comment on the last issue, that reproducing the proposed of the trial court's findings and conclusions of the prevailing party and adopting them as its own. The judicial trial process is demeaned when the trial courts engage in these practices. It shows that the trial courts have given little or no thought to the decision making process other than to decide who wins. Winning counsel can, of course, be proud that the trial court has conclusions. adopted verbatim their proposed findings and But losing counsel and their clients have a reasonable expectation that the trial court, before deciding the case, carefully considered their case. Verbatim parroting of proposed findings and conclusions can do nothing but deflate these expectations.

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.