STATE v MUSGROVE

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No. 82-101 I N THE SUPREL?IE COURT O THE STATE OF MONTANA F 1983 STATE OF MONTANA, P l a i n t i f f and Cross-Appellant, V S . TIIURl4AN J. M S R V , D e f e n a a n t , UG O E V S . INTERNATIONAL FIDELITY INSURANCE COMPANY, A p p e l l a n t and Cross-Respondent. Appeal f r o n : U i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County o f N i n e r a i , The H o n o r a b l e Douglas H a r k i n , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g . For A p p e i l a n t and Cross-Respondent: a e x t e r L. D e l a n e y ; Mulroney, D e l a n e y , Dalby a n d Mudd, M i s s o u l a , Montana E'or P l a l n t l f f a n d C r o s s - A p p e l l a n t : Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , Helella, Xontana M. Shaun Donovan, County A t t o r n e y , S u p e r i o r , ? ~ I o n t a n a Submitted: Decided: J a n u a r y 1 2 , 1983 F e b r u a r y 24, 1983 M r . J u s t i c e John Court. case This Fourth Conway H a r r i s o n involves Judicial delivered a n o r d e r by the County District, t h e Opinion District the of Court, Mineral , of of the requiring I n t e r n a t i o n a l F i d e l i t y to f o r f e i t $ 5 , 0 0 0 o f a $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 b a i l b o n d . Musgrove was convicted Court required $50,000 bail. bond. This trial. S t a t e v. mitigated d e l i b e r a t e homicide H e a p p e a l e d to t h i s C o u r t . February 7 , 1977. District of the defendant International Court reversed Fidelity the to A t t h a t t i m e the secure conviction and additional the provided an additional a ordered Musgrove ( 1 9 7 8 ) r 1 7 8 Mont. 1 6 2 , 528 P.2d A s e c o n d t r i a l was commenced on new 1246. i n J a n u a r y 1979; d e f e n d a n t being at liberty. H e a t t e n d e d a l l p r o c e e d i n g s t h r o u g h t h e close o f t h e evidence Friday, on January 26, The D i s t r i c t C o u r t had 1979. s c h e d u l e d c l o s i n g a r g u m e n t s f o r t h e f o l l o w i n g Monday, J a n u a r y 2 9 . However, o n Monday m o r n i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t f a i l e d t o a p p e a r . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t t h e n o r d e r e d t o t a l f o r f e i t u r e of t h e $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 b o n d , a r r e s t , and r e c e s s e d t h e i s s u e d a bench w a r r a n t f o r d e f e n d a n t ' s t r i a l f o r t e n d a y s , u n t i l Wednesday, F e b r u a r y 7 , 1 9 7 9 . Defendant According to failed his to appear testimony, he because was was he suffering from in Texas. emotional b r e a k d o w n and w a n t e d t o r e t u r n t o T e x a s to c o m m i t s u i c i d e . i n T e x a s , he a d m i t t e d h i m s e l f While t o V i l l a Rosa H o s p i t a l and s h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r was i n c o n t a c t w i t h a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Fidelity. I n t e r n a t i o n a l F i d e l i t y was a b l e t o p e r s u a d e Musgrove t o r e t u r n to Montana. They p r o v i d e d t r a n s p o r t a t i o n and Musgrove w a s b a c k i n Montana b e f o r e t h e e x p i r a t i o n of Due to Musgrove's absence, the county t h e ten-day incurred recess. expenses in the amount of $1,000. On returned February 6, a v e r d i c t of final arguments were y e a r s i m p r i s o n m e n t on F e b r u a r y 2 1 , 1 9 7 9 . f o r f e i t u r e of the and the jury Musgrove was s e n t e n c e d to t w e n t y guilty. d i s c h a r g e h e a r i n g was h e l d . heard On t h a t same d a y a b a i l The D i s t r i c t C o u r t o r d e r e d t h a t t h e $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 bond be discharged in the amount of $25,000. International challenging the amount Fidelity of because " [ o l u r r e v i e w of $25,000 bond Musgrove St.Rep. (1980), 755, December was Mont 759. imposed This leaves this Court Court remanded no d o u b t that as a p e n a l t y . " the S t a t e v. - 6 1 0 P.2d 7 1 0 , 7 1 3 , 37 - I discharge hearing was h e l d o n j u d g m e n t was e n t e r e d o n J a n u a r y 11, 1 9 8 2 . District the . record Another b a i l 1, 1 9 8 1 , and time This forfeiture forfeiture. the to appealed Court discharged all but $5,000. I n t e r n a t i o n a l F i d e l i t y was s t i l l d i s s a t i s f i e d and t h e i r a p p e a l i s again before t h i s Court. (1) w h e t h e r or n o t t h e Two i s s u e s a r e r a i s e d b y t h e p a r t i e s : D i s t r i c t C o u r t had j u r i s d i c t i o n to d i s c h a r g e a n y p a r t of t h e bond forfeiture; and, ( 2 ) i f t h e c o u r t d i d have j u r i s d i c t i o n , whether t h e o r d e r e d f o r f e i t u r e o f $ 5 , 0 0 0 was e r r o r ? The S t a t e a r g u e s t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i d n o t h a v e j u r i s d i c t i o n t o d i s c h a r g e a n y o f t h e f o r f e i t e d bond w i t h o u t a f i n d i n g o f " s a t i s f a c t o r y e x c u s e " as r e q u i r e d by s e c t i o n 46-9-503 ( 3 ) , MCA. I n o t h e r w o r d s , t h e S t a t e m a i n t a i n s t h a t " s a t i s f a c t o r y e x c u s e " is to d i s c h a r g e of a necessary prerequisite feiture. any p a r t The S t a t e c i t e s s e v e r a l non-Montana t h a t v o l u n t a r y a b s e n c e from a j u r i s d i c t i o n excuse;" also, "Musgrove's failure to p s y c h o l o g i c a l p r o b l e m s is n o t c r e d i b l e . " above jurisdictional Court's prior "satisfactory reply brief argument, opinion excuse that the did ." not State alter the S t a t e has missed "satisfactory on the maintains necessity Fidelity the for argues crucial of states: " I f a t a n y time w i t h i n 30 d a y s a f t e r t h e f o r f e i t u r e t h e d e f e n d a n t o r h i s b a i l a p p e a r and or satisfactorily excuse his negligence f a i l u r e t o comply w i t h t h e c o n d i t i o n s of t h e b a i l , t h e c o u r t , i n i t s d i s c r e t i o n , may d i r e c t t h e f o r f e i t u r e o f t h e b a i l t o be d i s c h a r g e d upon s u c h terms as may be j u s t . " ," this finding in issue. t h e i s s u e is t h e amount o f d i s c h a r g e . MCA, basis that q u e s t i o n is n o t w h e t h e r t h e r e was " s a t i s f a c t o r y e x c u s e S e c t i o n 46-9-503(3), for- I n connection with the the International the cases which h o l d is n o t appear of its The rather, The S t a t e is c o r r e c t i n p o i n t i n g o u t t h e o b v i o u s p r e r e q u i s i t e finding of ordered. "satisfactory However, excuse" before any discharge may be we do n o t a g r e e t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t was t o o r d e r d i s c h a r g e "upon s u c h terms as may without jurisdiction be j u s t . " Concerning the reasons Musgrove left Montana, the Court found : "The D e f e n d a n t ' s d e c i s i o n t o l e a v e Montana was t h e r e s u l t o f h i s b e l i e f t h a t he was b e i n g r a i l r o a d e d a t t h e t r i a l , he would be c o n v i c t e d a n d h e would r e c e i v e a s e n t e n c e of t w e n t y ( 2 0 ) y e a r s imprisonment. "The D e f e n d a n t c l a i m e d t h a t a t t h e t i m e h e l e f t Montana h e s u f f e r e d a ' t o t a l e m o t i o n a l b r e a k d o w n ' and d i d n ' t t h i n k he knew w h a t he was d o i n g . " W h i l e i n T e x a s , t h e D e f e n d a n t was i n t e r v i e w e d b y a S a n A n t o n i o P s y c h i a t r i s t who d i a g n o s e d t h e Defendant a s s u f f e r i n g from p s y c h o t i c d e p r e s s i o n -- s u i c i d e . The Court also made the following conclusions law: of "The D e f e n d a n t l e f t t h e S t a t e of Montana w h i l e u n d e r g r e a t e m o t i o n a l stress r e s u l t i n g from h i s t r i a l and p e r s o n a l p r o b l e m s . "The D e f e n d a n t ' s m e n t a l s t a t e a t t h e t i m e he l e f t Montana o p e r a t e s a s a p a r t i a l e x c u s e f o r h i s unauthorized absence (~mphasis-added. ) ." Although torily the phrased excuse." , a b o v e f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s are not we Court "Sickness hold that . . . the found "satisfactory which makes t h e p r i n c i p a l a p p e a r a t t h e t i m e s e t is o r d i n a r i l y h e l d t o be f i c i e n t f o r t h e v a c a t i o n of a f o r f e i t u r e ." statu- to unable . . . ground 8 Am.Jr.2d suf- Bail and R e c o g n i z a n c e S 184 ( 1 9 8 0 ) . The S t a t e p l a c e s s i g n i f i c a n c e on t h e p h r a s e " p a r t i a l e x c u s e " found in the court's conclusions. In o t h e r words, the State m a i n t a i n s t h a t a l t h o u g h M u s g r o v e ' s a b s e n c e was p a r t i a l l y e x c u s e d , i t d o e s n o t f o l l o w t h a t h i s a b s e n c e was s a t i s f a c t o r i l y e x c u s e d . The State would have us believe that the statute requires a c o m p l e t e e x c u s e as o p p o s e d t o a p a r t i a l e x c u s e . i s n o t i n t h e s t a t u t e and w e w i l l n o t r e a d This distinction it i n t o t h e s t a t u t e . S i n c e w e h o l d t h a t t h e c o u r t d i d h a v e j u r i s d i c t i o n to o r d e r a d i s c h a r g e , w e m u s t now c o n s i d e r w h e t h e r or n o t t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n d i s c h a r g i n g $45,000, i s s u e may be s t a t e d i n s t a t u t o r y terms . . discretion . -- r e q u i r i n g a f o r f e i t u r e of $ 5 , 0 0 0 , direct the -- o r the d i d t h e c o u r t " i n its forfeiture of the bail to be d i s c h a r g e d upon s u c h terms as may be j u s t ? " Initially, c o u r t to u s e we note its " d i s c r e t i o n may be j u s t . " court omitted.) court [ t o d i s c h a r g e ] u p o n s u c h terms as T h u s , t h e g e n e r a l r u l e c o n c e r n i n g s c o p e of r e v i e w is a p p l i c a b l e . trial t h a t the s t a t u t e e x p l i c i t l y d i r e c t s the " T h i s C o u r t w i l l n o t d i s t u r b t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e absent a clear abuse of discretion. The t e s t f o r a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n is w h e t h e r t h e t r i a l acted arbitrarily without the employment Krum v . Krum ( 1 9 8 0 ) , - Mont . - . -- -- I - of conscious (Citations omitted. ) " j u d g m e n t o r e x c e e d e d t h e b o u n d s of r e a s o n . St.Rep. (Citation , 6 1 4 P.2d 5 2 5 , 5 2 7 , 37 1291, 1295. The f o c u s o f a r g u m e n t is t h a t s i n c e t h e c o u n t y appellant's i n c u r r e d o n l y $1,000 i n out-of-pocket absence, and since showing damage, there is no e x p e n s e s d u e to M u s g r o v e l s other evidence in the record a n y f o r f e i t u r e a b o v e $ 1 , 0 0 0 m u s t be r e g a r d e d as e i t h e r a penalty o r revenue. A p p e l l a n t is c o r r e c t o u t f a c t o r s t h a t may n o t be c o n s i d e r e d . In our f i r s t opinion i n t h i s d i s p u t e we d i r e c t e d the District Court amount o f any judgment was discharge, and i n pointing to r e c o n s i d e r not to the "consider as f a c t o r s e i t h e r a p e n a l t y to t h e d e f e n d a n t or t h e i n s u r a n c e comp a n y or r e v e n u e t o t h e s t a t e P.2d a t 7 1 3 , 37 S t . R e p . ." a t 759. Musgrove , -- -- Mont. a t - , 610 However, a p p e l l a n t is m i s t a k e n i n c l a i m i n g t h a t t h e r e c o r d l a c k s e v i d e n c e to s u p p o r t t h e c o u r t ' s order. I n m a k i n g i t s a r g u m e n t , t h a t t h e r e is no e v i d e n c e to s u p p o r t a f o r f e i t u r e beyond $ 1 , 0 0 0 , This f a u l t y assumption a p p e l l a n t makes a f a u l t y a s s u m p t i o n . is e v i d e n t i n t h e following quote from the i n i t i a l brief: ... " i t is r e s p e c t f u l l y s u b m i t t e d t h a t t h e judgment of f o r f e i t u r e . . . should be v a c a t e d b e c a u s e t h e r e was n o e v i d e n c e b e f o r e t h e C o u r t t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t t h e m e a s u r e of damage t o t h e p u b l i c a u t h o r i t y e x c e e d s . . . $1,000." Appellant a s s u m e s t h a t a n o r d e r of f o r f e i t u r e c a n o n l y be s u p p o r t e d by e v i T h i s is n o t s o . d e n c e r e l a t i n g t o damage. The s t a t u t e d i r e c t s t h e c o u r t to o r d e r d i s c h a r g e "upon s u c h terms a s may be j u s t . " I n making t h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h e c o u r t s h o u l d c o n s i d e r n o t o n l y e v i d e n c e r e l a t i n g to damage b u t a l s o t h e o t h e r f a c t o r s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s p e c u l i a r to e a c h c a s e . A s one court stated: " [ n ] o c l e a r r u l e c a n be s e t down which w i l l guide the t r i a l court in every case since the f a c t s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f e a c h i n d i v i d u a l c a s e m u s t be c o n s i d e r e d i n t h e i r t o t a l i t y . N o o n e f a c t o r w i l l be d e t e r m i n a t i v e i n a l l cases." Owens v . P e o p l e ( 1 9 7 7 ) r 1 9 4 Colo. 3 8 9 , 572 P.2d 8 3 7 , 8 3 8 . Here, the court's f i n d i n g s of a d e q u a t e l y c o n s i d e r a l l of We concur: Justices and conclusions the pertinent factors. w e must a f f i r m . Chief ~ u s t i , d fact \ of law Accordingly, Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy, dissenting: When this cause was before us in 1979, we remanded the problem of discharging the forfeiture of defendant's bail to the District Court with the admonition that "[alny judgment reached shall not consider as factors either a penalty to the defendant or the insurance company or revenue to the state." State v. Musgrove v. International Fidelity Insurance Company (1980), - Mont . - 610 P.2d , 710, 713, 37 St.Rep. 755. That admonition to the District Court became the law of the case. Nevertheless, on remand, the District Court found: "The bond forfeiture of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00) is excused except for the sum of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00). Such sum is negligible, if any, revenue to the State, in view of the overall expense resulting from the Defendant's departure, and does not operate as a pena.lty to International after balancing their negligent supervision of the Defendant against their diligent and successful efforts to return him to Montana in time for completion of the trial." When the case was before us in 1979, and when it comes to us again here, it appears that the only costs that have been reported to the District Court in connection with the return of the defendant for trial is the sum of $1,000. The d.ifference, therefore, between $1,000 and $5,000 is $4,000 of revenue, which the District Court terms "negligible". It is also apparent from the conclusion of the District Court that it is imposing a penalty against the bail bond insurer for their "negligent supervision of the Defendant." There is no power or authority in the District Court, particularly under the law of the case which has been established here for either revenue or penalty assessed for negligence. The amount of forfeiture, therefore, should not exceed the sum of $1,000. The county attorney argued in the first case that Mineral County had been put to a good deal of expense in the three trials defendant. which ha.ve occurred with respect to this On oral argument before us in this last case, the county attorney continues to insist that it has cost the county approximately $22,000 to try the defendant and it is on this ground that the county attorney, and apparently the District Court, are striving to make some recoupment from the bail bond. That position ignores the position of the forfeiture statute, which provides as follows: Cond-itions not performed--forfeiture "46-9-503. ... " (3) If at any time within 30 days after the forfeiture the defendant or his bail appear and satisfactorily excuse his negligence or failure to comply with the conditions of the bail, the court, in its discretion, may direct the forfeiture of the bail to be discharged upon such terms as may be just." We have held, and it is now the law of the case that such "terms as may be just" cannot be penalty, or of revenue to the State. composed of either a The terms may logically include the costs incurred by the county in returning the defendant to the court of justice and no more. This position is consonant with the remainder of the statute where the defendant or his bail has shown circumstances which "satisfactorily excuse his negligence or failure to comply with the conditions of the bail." If the defendant does not satisfactorily excuse his negligence or failure to comply, it is the duty of the District Court to forfeit the whole bond, without regard to any partial discharge of the surety. But when the court finds a satisfactory excuse, as It must have here in order to reduce the forfeiture, then the District Court must apply, in the law which we have set forth, the rule that it will not exact a penalty or revenue in determining the amount of the forfeiture. I know of no statute or legal principle in Montana under which a bail bondsman is under duty to the state to "supervise" the defendant for which it posts bail, and for a breach of which it might become liable to the State for "negligent supervision." It is far stretch of law for the District Court to require, or this Court to tolerate, that a bail bondsman becomes a babysitter for the court. I would reverse and remand this case, since satisfactory excuse has been found by the District Court, with instructions to discharge the forfeiture of bail except for the sum of $1,000 to be paid to the county treasurer of Mineral County. ; Justice u Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea, dissenting: In the first case involving the bonding company and the State, we held that whatever the District Court orders, it cannot be done as a source of revenue or as a penalty. v. Musgrove St.Rep. 755. (1980), State , 610 P.2d 710, 713, 37 Mont. The hearing after our remand produced no new evidence as to what costs the State incurred, or what factors should be considered in determining the amount. trial court ordered the bonding company to pay Here the $5,000, without ever stating how or why this figure was chosen. clearly could have been one picked out of the air. It This, in my judgment, constitutes an abuse of discretion. The State had its opportunity to present evidence, - or to present factors - - trial court - considering the amount to the in which be should - forfeited. It did neither. I would, therefore, order that the State must be confined to its out of pocket expenses in this case--$1,000.

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