STATE v ISOM

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No. 81-18 I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O M N A A F F OTN 1981 STATE O MONTANA, F P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, HOWARD MICHAEL ISOM, D e f e n d a n t and A p p e l l a n t . Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County o f Lewis and C l a r k Honorable P e t e r Meloy, J u d g e p r e s i d i n g . Counsel o f Record: For Appellant: Leo G a l l a g h e r a r g u e d , H e l e n a , Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana John Maynard a r g u e d , A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana C h a r l e s G r a v e l e y , County A t t o r n e y , H e l e n a , Montana S t e v e G a r r i s o n a r g u e d , Deputy County A t t o r n e y , H e l e n a , Montana Submitted: September 1 7 , 1 9 8 1 Decided : Filed: JAN 2 1 1982 Clerk 21 U)BZ Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B . D a l y d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f t h e C o u r t . D e f e n d a n t was c h a r g e d by i n f o r m a t i o n w i t h p o s s e s s i o n of dangerous drugs 49-9-103(1), section with intent He MCA. to as sell, pleaded not provided guilty. His m o t i o n t o s u p p r e s s was d e n i e d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t o f L e w i s and C l a r k C o u n t y . First Judicial District, j u r y t r i a l d e f e n d a n t was f o u n d g u i l t y o f in the After a felony possession of dang e ro u s d r u g s , a l e s s e r i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e of p o s s e s s i o n with i n t e n t t o s e l l . On O c t o b e r 1 5 , 1 9 8 0 , t h e d e f e n d a n t was sentenced t o f i v e years two y e a r s s u s p e n d e d . i n t h e Montana S t a t e P r i s o n , with Defendant a p p e a l s h i s c o n v i c t i o n . Based on i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m a n i n f o r m a n t , t h e L e w i s and C l a r k County S h e r i f f ' s Department p l a c e d under s u r v e i l l . a n c e t h e r e s i d e n c e l o c a t e d a t 1014 E l m S t r e e t , Helena, Montana. About noon o n J a n u a r y 11, 1 9 8 0 , two d e p u t y s h e r i f f s o b s e r v e d a man later identified a s John Stemple, dealer, leave the Elm S t r e e t residence. a suspected drug H e was c a r r y i n g a l a r g e g r e e n g a r b a g e bag which h e p u t i n t o a t o o l box i n t h e back o f h i s p i c k u p t r u c k pa r k e d i n f r o n t o f t h e r e s i d e n c e . S t e m p l e went back s t a t i o n wagon pulled up. d e f e n d a n t g o t o u t of the into the residence. residence. A man later s t a t i o n wagon A brown F o r d identified and went as the into the S t e m p l e t h e n l e f t t h e r e s i d e n c e and d r o v e away in h i s pickup, f o l l o w e d by t h e two d e p u t i e s i n an unmarked car. According maneuvers by to turning the deputies, Stemple several corners made sharply. evasive They lost s i g h t o f S t e m p l e and c a l l e d f o r t h e a i d o f a t h i r d o f f i c e r . The third minutes. officer stopped Stemple within a matter of The o f f i c e r s s e a r c h e d S t e m p l e ' s t r u c k b u t cou1.d n o t f i n d t h e g r e e n g a r b a g e bag t o o l box. Because of t h a t S t e m p l e had p l a c e d in the a r e c e n t s n o w f a l l t h e o f f i c e r s were a b l e t o r e t r a c e t h e t r a c k s of t h e pickup. The t r a c k s l e d t o a n a l l e y b e h i n d a g a s s t a t i o n where t h e y f o u n d a l a r g e g r e e n g a r b a g e bag which a p p a r e n t l y had b e e n pl.aced t h e r e r e c e n t l y s i n c e i t was n o t c o v e r e d w i t h snow. The d e p u t i e s l o o k e d i n s i d e t h e bag and f o u n d i t f u l l o f m a r i j u a n a c o n t a i n e d i n small p l a s t i c bags. An o f f i c e r w e n t t o g e t a s e a r c h w a r r a n t f o r t h e E l m S t r e e t r e s i d e n c e and f o r a maroon C h r y s l e r Cordoba p a r k e d i n f r o n t o f t h e r e s i d e n c e which t h e o f f i c e r s b e l i e v e d had b e e n used t o t r a n s p o r t n a r c o t i c s . A search warrant f o r both t h e r e s i d e n c e and t h e c a r was i s s u e d by a j u s t i c e of t h e p e a c e . The warrant application contained the above information, e x c e p t t h e r e was no m e n t i o n o f t h e s u r v e i l l a n c e b e i n g b a s e d on an i n f o r m a n t ' s t i p and no m e n t i o n t h a t J o h n S t e m p l e was a suspected drug d e a l e r . At least eight officers executed t h e search warrant. and the they noticed r u n n i n g on t h e C h r y s l e r . A couple of car, while the others went to t h a t t h e motor search the half-dressed shower. because he was residence. The o f f i c e r s h a n d e d him t h e s e a r c h w a r r a n t a s t h e y e n t e r e d . was o n l y w e a r i n g a p a i r of b l u e j e a n s . was o f f i c e r s stayed with Defendant answered t h e d o o r of t h e r e s i d e n c e . was attorney When t h e o f f i c e r s a r r i v e d a t the Elm S t r e e t residence, the county Defendant He t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e getting ready to take a D e f e n d a n t was o r d e r e d t o s i t on t h e c o u c h and n o t t o l e a v e t h e room. D e f e n d a n t was t h e o n l y o c c u p a n t o f t h e r e s i d e n c e when the officers entered. He was rented the residence. a guest of his uncle who He had b e e n s l e e p i n g on t h e c o u c h i n t h e l i v i n g room and had s t o r e d h i s b e l o n g i n g s i n t h e l i v i n g room and i n a bedroom. The marijuana room, officers residue searched and drug the entire house, paraphernalia i n c l u d i n g t h e l i v i n g room, in finding nearly every b a t h r o o m and k i t c h e n . A s m a l l p l a s t i c bag o f m a r i j u a n a was f o u n d i n t h e bedroom o f defendant's uncle. One u n i f o r m e d o f f i c e r was t o l d t o s t a y w i t h d e f e n d a n t and w a t c h him w h i l e search. He a s k e d d e f e n d a n t i f h e owned t h e c a r p a r k e d i n f r o n t o f the residence. t h e o t h e r s completed Defendant said he did response t o f u r t h e r questioning, not the own the car. In defendant s a i d he d i d n o t know who d i d own t h e c a r and d i d n o t know where t h e k e y s t o t h e c a r ' s t r u n k were l o c a t e d . prior D e f e n d a n t was n o t a r r e s t e d t o t h e s e q u e s t i o n s and had n o t been g i v e n a Miranda warning. The glove officers compartment searched and the g l o v e compartment open, open t h e t r u n k . the trunk and i n s i d e car. Upon locked, finding the forced the they i t t h e y f o u n d a key t o I n s i d e t h e t r u n k t h e o f f i c e r s found s e v e r a l l a r g e g r e e n g a r b a g e b a g s which contained e i g h t y t o n i n e t y pounds of m a r i j u a n a . approximately After t h e search of t h e r e s i d e n c e and t h e c a r , d e f e n d a n t was a r r e s t e d . A t evidence the to suppression hearing, show m a r i j u a n a was found that he owned defendant introduced the car in which the . T h i s c a s e may be primary i s s u e s presented: resolved by looking at the three 1. legality Whether t h e d e f e n d a n t h a s s t a n d i n g t o c o n t e s t t h e of the search of the residence where he was an overnight guest; 2. Whether t h e d e f e n d a n t h a s s t a n d i n g t o c o n t e s t t h e s e a r c h o f . h i s c a r and t h e g a r b a g e b a g s f o u n d i n i t s t r u n k when he denied ownership of the car at the time of the s e a r c h ; and Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n i t s d e n i a l o f 3. defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized from the r e s i d e n c e and t h e c a r . With r e s p e c t t o d e f e n d a n t ' s s e a r c h of the t h e house, perspective States t h e S t a t e would h a v e t h i s C o u r t a d o p t and Supreme reasoning Court U.S. 257, S t a t e s v. L.Ed.2d S.Ct. the most recent which have overruled Jones v. 4 725, and R a w l i n g s v . 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d Jones had set down United L.Ed.2d S a l v u c c i ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 448 U.S. 619, 100 S.Ct. 80 of decisions automatic standing r u l e of 362 standing t o contest the 83, Kentucky States 697. United (1960), See, 100 S . C t . the United 2547, ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 448 U.S. 65 98, 633. two alternative holdings: (1) when t h e f r u i t s o f a s e a r c h a r e p r o p o s e d t o b e u s e d a g a i n s t a defendant at the trial, he has "automatic standing" to c o n t e s t t h e l e g a l i t y o f t h e s e a r c h ; and ( 2 ) a n y o n e " l e g i t i m a t e l y on t h e p r e m i s e s where a s e a r c h o c c u r s may c h a l l e n g e i t s l e g a l i t y by way o f a m o t i o n t o s u p p r e s s " . U.S. a t 267. t o quash t h e Jones, 362 The p u r p o s e o f t h e a u t o m a t i c s t a n d i n g r u l e was " v i c e of prosecutorial self-contradiction" in which t h e S t a t e c o u l d c h a r g e a p e r s o n w i t h p o s s e s s i o n a s a crime, and a t t h e same t i m e c l a i m t h a t t h e p o s s e s s i o n was not s u f f i c i e n t t o give t h e person standing t o challenge t h e legality of the search or seizure. See, Brown v. United States (1973), 411 U.S. 223, 93 S.Ct. 1565, 36 L.Ed.2d 208. In overruling the automatic standing rule in Jones, both Salvucci and Rawlings relied heavily upon the earlier case of Rakas v. Illinois (1978), 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387. In Rakas, the Court stated that the Jones test of "legitimately on the premises" cannot be taken in its full sweep beyond the facts of that one case. Rather, said the Court, the true test of whether a Fourth Amendment right has been violated is found in Katz v. United States (1967), 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, in which the Supreme Court said that the capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends not upon a property right in the invaded place but upon whether the person who claims the protection of the Fourth Amendment ---legitimate has a expectation of privacy in the invaded place. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353; Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143. Notwithstanding the limitations placed on Jones, the Court in Rakas, and again in Salvucci, emphasized ownership is not a key element in determining standing. that The test for standing is not to be based on distinctions out of property and tort law: interest, we "In defining the scope of that adhere to the view expressed in Jones and echoed in later cases that arcane distinctions in property and tort law between guests, licensees, invitees, and the like ought not to control." Rakas, 439 U.S. at Rawlinqs, 448 U.S. See Jones, 362 U.S. 143; Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 105. at 266; at 91; and The controlling view, then, seems to be that expressed in Mancusi v. DeForte (1968), 392 U.S. 3 6 4 , 88 S . C t . said that privacy' the 2120, 20 L.Ed.2d it makes protection test Katz of clear the property right of "'legitimate that Fourth 1.154, i n which t h e C o u r t capacity Amendment but claim not of the upon a upon w h e t h e r t h e w h i c h t h e r e was a r e a s o n a b l e e x p e c t a t i o n o f freedom from governmental i n t r u s i o n . " a t 368. to depends i n t h e invaded p l a c e , a r e a- o n e - was- i n expectation S e e M a n c u s i , 392 U.S. (Emphasis added.) Following controlling the rationale factor in the that is ownership determination of not the standing, a l t h o u g h i t i s o n e f a c t o r t o c o n s i d e r , t h e Supreme C o u r t h a s pointed out overruled. that In the actual Rawlings, the holding Court in Jones referred to was not parts of R a k a s which e x p l a i n e d why t h e d e f e n d a n t i n J o n e s would s t i l l have s t a n d i n g under tests for t h e r e c e n t narrow standing. The C o u r t i n Rakas r e a s o n e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t i n J o n e s , who was u s i n g a n a p a r t m e n t w i t h t h e t e n a n t ' s p e r m i s s i o n , would c o n t i n u e t o have s t a n d i n g under t h e r e c e n t t e s t s b e c a u s e t h e defendant apartment U.S. at "had and complete could 149. dominion and exclude others The C o u r t in Rakas control from i t . " also over the Rakas, 439 reasoned that the d e f e n d a n t i n K a t z , who was i n a phone b o o t h , had s t a n d i n g t o c o n t e s t a s e a r c h o f t h e b o o t h b e c a u s e h e had a n e x p e c t a t i o n o f p r i v a c y when h e " s h u t t h e d o o r b e h i n d him t o e x c l u d e a l l o t h e r s and p a i d t h e t o l l . " In 199, Rakas, 37 S t a t e v. St.Rep. Allen 919, R a k a s , 439 U.S. (1980), this Court - a t 149. Mont. quoted -, 612 P.2d extensively acknowledging t h e d i s t i n c t i o n s between Rakas, and K atz . from Jones S e e , A l l e n , 612 P.2d a t 201-202. Here, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t made two f i n d i n g s o f fact t h a t r e l a t e t o d e f e n d a n t ' s s t a n d i n g t o c o n t e s t t h e s e a r c h of the residence: ( 1 ) t h a t d e f e n d a n t was an o v e r n i g h t g u e s t a t t h e r e s i d e n c e which was r e n t e d by h i s u n c l e ; defendant had stored clothing, p r o p e r t y i n l i m i t e d a r e a s of (2) that and o t h e r luggage and personal the residence, none o f w h i c h i n c l u d e d t h e a r e a s where t h e c o n f i s c a t e d e v i d e n c e was f o u n d . Based on the above c o n c l u d e d a s a m a t t e r of findings, the District Court law t h a t " t h e d e f e n d a n t , b e i n g a n o v e r n i g h t g u e s t i n t h e r e s i d e n c e w i t h items s t o r e d o n l y i n a limited area therein, had no reasonable expectation of p r i v a c y i n t h e a r e a s where t h e i t e m s were f o u n d , t h e r e f o r e , h a s no s t a n d i n g t o o b j e c t t o t h e i r a d m i s s i o n . " The f a c t t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was a n o v e r n i g h t g u e s t s h o u l d n o t c o n t r o l t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of it is one f a c t o r discussion, seizures protection does invaded p l a c e , which t o consider. not A s was from depend standing, noted i n t h e above unreasonable upon a although and right property searches the in b u t r a t h e r upon w h e t h e r t h e a r e a was o n e i n t h e r e was a reasonable e x p e c t a t i o n of freedom governmental i n t r u s i o n . S e e , A l l e n , 612 P.2d a t 202. Moreover, of from must Court be presumed (1978), clearly although the order does e v i d e n c e was 176 not not correct Mont. 257, support found upon in the District appeal, P.2d 849, the finding that the areas stored h i s personal belongings. 577 State where v. Court District the record confiscated defendant had Uncontradicted testimony a t t h e s u p p r e s s i o n h e a r i n g showed t h a t d e f e n d a n t s l e p t on t h e l i v i n g room couch w h i l e he was t h e g u e s t o f h i s u n c l e and t h a t h e s t o r e d h i s b e l o n g i n g s i n t h e l i v i n g room and i n h i s nephew's bedroom. Although evidence at the suppression h e a r i n g showed t h a t h i s u n c l e ' s bedroom was t h e o n l y a r e a where a s m a l l bag o f m a r i j u a n a was s e i z e d , i t was made c l e a r a t t h e t r i a l t h a t e v i d e n c e was s e i z e d f r o m t h e l i v i n g room table, from t h e l i v i n g room f i r e p l a c e , b e s i d e a w a l l i n t h e l i v i n g room, and f r o m t h e l i v i n g room c l o s e t . D e f e n d a n t was t h e s o l e o c c u p a n t o f t i m e t h e s e a r c h was made. Katz, defendant could t h e house a t t h e L i k e t h e d e f e n d a n t s i n J o n e s and exclude a l l o t h e r s except h i s uncle and f a m i l y a n d had d o m i n i o n and c o n t r o l o v e r t h e p r e m i s e s a t the t i m e the o f f i c e r s entered the residence. In summary, defendant lacked the District standing to Court's contest conclusion the search p r e m i s e s m u s t be r e v e r s e d on t h e f o l l o w i n g g r o u n d s : that of the (1) t h e f a c t t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was a n o v e r n i g h t g u e s t s h o u l d n o t control a legality determination of a search of of his the standing residence; to contest (2) the the record shows t h a t c o n f i s c a t e d e v i d e n c e was f o u n d i n a r e a s w h e r e t h e d e f e n d a n t s l e p t and where h e s t o r e d h i s b e l o n g i n g s ; the record supports a finding that the and ( 3 ) d e f e n d a n t was the s o l e o c c u p a n t o f t h e r e s i d e n c e a t t h e t i m e o f t h e s e a r c h and had c o n t r o l a n d d o m i n i o n o v e r i t t o t h e e x c l u s i o n o f o t h e r s . The S t a t e u r g e s t h i s C o u r t t h a t t h e n e x t i s s u e w h i c h must be contest is discussed the search whether of his defendant car. The had State standing claims to that b e c a u s e d e f e n d a n t d e n i e d h i s ownership of t h e c a r , he waived h i s F o u r t h Amendment rights i n i t and i n t h e g a r b a g e b a g s found i n i t s t r u n k . The State argues that section 46-5-103(1), MCA, d e p r i v e s t h e d e f e n d a n t of s t a n d i n g t o c o n t e s t t h e s e a r c h o f h i s car and t h e s e a r c h o f t h e garbage bags found in its trunk. S e c t i o n 46-5-103(1), MCA, p r o v i d e s : "No s e a r c h a n d s e i z u r e , w h e t h e r w i t h o r w i t h o u t w a r r a n t , s h a l l be h e l d i l l e g a l a s t o a defendant i f : " ( 1 ) t h e d e f e n d a n t h a s d i s c l a i m e d any r i g h t t o or interest in the place or object searched or the instruments, a r t i c l e s , or things seized;" The State's argument fails for two reasons: the d i s c l a i m e r s t a t u t e m u s t be i n t e r p r e t e d i n l i g h t o f t h e F i f t h Amendment disclaimer privilege of a car against does self-incrimination; not necessarily and, operate as a a disclaimer of the closed containers i n the c a r . A l t h o u g h i t h a s been h e l d t h a t t h e owner o f a c a r o r a container w i l l lose h i s standing t o object t o the search of it if he a b a n d o n s i t p r i o r t o t h e t i m e of United S t a t e s v. Anderson (5th Cir. United S t a t e s v. Colbert (5th Cir. United S t a t e s v. Miller the search, 1 9 7 4 ) , 500 F.2d 1311; 1 9 7 3 ) , 474 F.2d 1 7 4 ; and (1st C i r . 1 9 7 8 ) , 589 F.2d 1117, a mere d i s c l a i m e r o f o w n e r s h i p i n a n e f f o r t t o a v o i d making a n incriminating statement in response to police questioning s h o u l d n o t a l o n e be deemed t o c o n s t i t u t e abandonment. LaFave, S e a r c h and S e i z u r e , position that a defendant Vol. 3 does at not 581. See, Given otherwise have the to i n c r i m i n a t e h i m s e l f t o p r e s e r v e h i s F o u r t h Amendment r i g h t s , as in S.Ct. Simmons v . 967, United 1 9 L.Ed.2d States 1247, ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 390 U.S. 377, 88 it is d i f f i c u l t t o understand how a r e f u s a l t o make i n c r i m i n a t i n g a d m i s s i o n s i n r e s p o n s e t o p o l i c e i n t e r r o g a t i o n c a n be h e l d t o d e p r i v e a p e r s o n o f F o u r t h Amendment s t a n d i n g . To say t h a t there i s no F i f t h Amendment violation b e c a u s e t h e d e f e n d z n t c o u l d have s i m p l y chosen t o be s i l e n t is to ignore the whole line of principles set down in Miranda and its progeny. irliranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. The point of the Miranda warning was to provide a safeguard against the coercive pressures of in-custody interrogation by police, when those pressures are so great as to undermine an individual's will, compelling him to speak when he would not otherwise do so. "Custodial coercive. interrogation" was found 384 U.S. at 467. to be inherently The Miranda Court defined "custodial interroga- tion" as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 384 U.S. at 444. Clearly, the Miranda limitations should apply to disclaimers when the State uses them to deprive a person of Fourth Amendment standing. Here, the totality of the circumstances suggests that the disclaimer resulted from "custodial interrogation." The defendant was told to sit on the couch and not leave. A uniformed officer was ordered to watch the defendant and stay with him while five other officers searched the house. The defendant was not free to walk around the house. disclaimer was elicited questioning. Given from defendant by direct police this coercive atmosphere and questioning, the State cannot be allowed The to use the such statements to deprive defendant of his Fourth Amendment rights. Notwithstanding the Fifth Amendment limitations on section 46-5-103(1), MCA, and assuming that the disclaimer could be construed to deprive the defendant of standing to contest the search of the car, in California L.Ed.2d ( 1981) , 744, the , - U.S. disclaimer could light of Kobbins 101 S.Ct. not be v. 2841, 69 construed to deprive the defendant of standing to contest the search of the garbage bags found in the trunk of the car. In Robbins, the Court held that while police may have conducted a lawful search of an automobile under the automobile exception, they must nevertheless secure a warrant for any container found in the trunk of the car. recognized that the expectation of privacy The Court in a closed container taken from a car is not necessarily less than the privacy expectation in closed pieces of luggage found elsewhere. Following a similar reasoning, it cannot be said that the defendant lost his expectation of privacy in the opaque garbage bags when he disclaimed ownership of the car. While it is arguable that the disclaimer weakened the defendant's expectation of privacy in the car, it cannot be said to have affected his expectation of privacy in the garbage bags. The disclaimer, therefore, in no way affected defendant's standing to contest the search of the garbage bags. The next issue which must be discussed is whether the District Court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress. As many cases in Montana have held, when a search warrant has been issued, the determination of probable cause must be made solely from the information given to the impartial magistrate and from the four corners of the search warrant application. See, Art. 11, Sec. 11, 1972 Mont. Const.; Thomson v. Onstad (1979), 182 Mont. 119, 594 P.2d 1137, 36 St.Rep. 910; State v. Olson (1979), 181 Mont. 323, 589 P.2d 663, 36 St.Rep. 146; State v. Leistiko (1978), 176 Mont. 434, 578 P.2d 1161; State ex rel. Townsend v. District Court (1975), 168 Mont. 357, 543 P.2d 193; Application of Gray (1970), 155 Mont. 510, 473 P.2d 532. Here the evidence is uncontradicted information given to the justice of that the only the peace was the information contained in the search warrant and the search warrant application. Nevertheless, the District Court, in its order denying the motion to suppress, did not 1-ook to the validity of the search warrant and the sufficiency of the information before the neutral magistrate. Rather, the District Court looked to whether the officers had probable cause to search the residence and the vehicle parked front of the residence. The District Court made in the following conclusions of law: "The officer's observation of John Stemple leaving the duplex with a garbage bag later found to contain marijuana,- when joined with the with - r i o rknowledae of his d r u a sale ~ 4 involvement, and the information that-the -----------officers had received regarding the incoming marijuana shipment, gave the officers probable cause to believe that danqerous drugs or evidence of its possession woild be found in the premises searched and in the vehicle searched." Conclusion of Law No. 3. (Emphasis added.) --. .-- -d- - - "The search of the automobile was also justifiable under the automobile exception to the search warrant requirements since there was both probable cause and exigent circumstances. The fact that evidence of dangerous drugs were found in the residence added to and enhanced the probable cause had by the officers for the subsequent Carroll search of the automobile." Conclusion of Law No. 4. From these conclusions District Court, in making of law, it its determination is clear the of probable cause for the searches of the residence and the car, looked beyond the four corners of the search warrant application and was thereby in error. In the above conclusions, the District Court looked to evidence that John Stemple was a known drug dealer and evidence of an informant's tip, neither of which were contained in the search warrant or the warrant's application. Moreover, the information received District Court's from the reliance upon informant was error the since there was nothing in the record to satisfy the two-pronged test of Aguilar v. Texas (1964), 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723, and Spinelli v. United States (1969), 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637. There was nothing in the record which showed "some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were," and there was nothing in the record showing "the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant . . . was 'credible' or his information was 'reliable'." Aquilar, 378 U.S. at 114. See also, Leistiko, 578 P.2d at 1163. The District Court's determination of probable cause must, therefore, be vacated, and a new determination of probable cause must be made by looking to the four corners of the search warrant application itself. It is well established in this state what type of facts must be contained in a search warrant application: . . . Affidavits relied upon for the issuance of search warrants in both federal and state prosecutions must contain sufficient facts to enable an impartial commissioner or magistrate to determine whether probable cause exists under the Fourth Amendment 1 11 State ex rel. Garris v. Wilson (1973), 162 Mont. 256, 511 P.2d 15, 17, quoting Application of Gray (1970), 155 Mont. 510, 473 P.2d 532. I1 1 . . . Probable cause exists when the facts and circum- s t a n c e s p r e s e n t e d t o t h e m a g i s t r a t e would w a r r a n t a n h o n e s t belief i n t h e mind o f a r e a s o n a b l e and p r u d e n t man t h a t t h e offense has been, is or being, committed and property sought e x i s t s a t t h e place desiqnated." v. Robinette words, the (S.D. 1 9 7 8 ) , 270 N.W.2d search warrant 573, "that the See, S t a t e 577. a p p l i c a t i o n must In other recite the u n d e r l y i n g f a c t s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s f r o m which t h e m a g i s t r a t e c a n d e t e r m i n e t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e a f f i a n t ' s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t c e r t a i n evidence e x i s t s a t a p a r t i c u l a r premises. v. U n i t e d S t a t e s ( 1 9 3 3 ) , 290 U.S. 159; see also, 54 S . C t . United S t a t e s v. 85 S . C t . 102, 741, 1 3 L.Ed.2d G i o r d e n e l l o v . U n i t e d S t a t e s ( 1 9 5 8 ) , 357 U.S. 1 2 4 5 , 2 L.Ed.2d Were sufficient residence or Ventresca 684; 480, and 78 S . C t . 1503. the to 11, 78 L.Ed. supra; Aguilar, ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 380 U.S. 41, Nathanson f a c t s given indicate that to the justice marijuana i n t h e c a r parked was of the located i n f r o n t of peace at the the residence? W e think not. S t e m p l e ' s mere t a k i n g o f a n o p a q u e g r e e n g a r b a g e bag out of a residence g a r b a g e bag lost the i n an s i g h t of justice and the a l l e y near connection the of the peace. for the between the Such search bag of a similar s p o t where S t e m p l e ' s t r u c k were cause probable finding the deputies the f a c t s presented facts of found green do the in not to establish residence. The alley the the and r e s i d e n c e is tenuous a t b e s t . Likewise, t h e search warrant a p p l i c a t i o n f a i l s t o s e t out any underlying probable residence. cause The to facts search only or the circumstances car reference to parked the in car that establish front in the of the search w a r r a n t is: ". . . t h a t t h e r e s i d e n t of t h e above d e s c r i b e d d u p l e x u n i t i s t h e owner and was t h e d r i v e r o f t h e d e s c r i b e d c a r when i t arrived a t the described residence e a r l y i n t h e m o r n i n g o f J a n u a r y 11, 1980 and y o u r a f f i a n t b e l i e v e s t h a t s a i d v e h i c l e was u s e d t o convey t h e m a r i j u a n a a n d o t h e r d a n g e r o u s I1 d r u g s t o t h e- i d e n c e d e s c r i b e d . res (Emphasis added.) A mere affirmance of belief or suspicion by a police o f f i c e r , a b s e n t any u n d e r l y i n g f a c t s o r c i r c u m s t a n c e s , d o e s not e s t a b l i s h probable cause for warrant. the i s s u a n c e of a search S e e , A p p l i c a t i o n o f G r a y , s u p r a , 473 P.2d a t 536; Nathanson, s u p r a . A b s e n t p r o b a b l e c a u s e , t h e s e a r c h e s o f t h e h o u s e and car were in evidence violation resulting of from the Fourth these Amendment, is searches against the defendant. Mapp v . 81 S.Ct. not and the admissible Ohio ( 1 9 6 1 ) , 367 U.S. 643, 1081. 1 6 8 4 , 6 L.Ed.2d Clearly, the marijuana seized reversible error c o n v i c t i o n of Mont. , introduction from since the such the defendant. 558, 445 P.2d 617 P.2d 565; 1298, house car of West Langan to the ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 151 (1980), 1772. the constitutes contributed S t a t e v. St.Rep. evidence and evidence S t a t e v. 37 into Since Mont. no other e v i d e n c e i n t r o d u c e d a t t r i a l would s u p p o r t a c o n v i c t i o n , a new t r i a l c a n n o t be g r a n t e d . The judgment o f t h e cause dismissed. t h e D i s t r i c t Court is reversed and W e concur: Chief Justice Mr. Chief Justice Frank I. Haswell concurring: I concur in the result. 4.w-4 7 A - a Chief Justice Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy concurring: I concur in the result. Mr. J u s t i c e Fred J. Weber d i s s e n t s : I would h o l d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t does n o t have s t a n d i n g t o c o n t e s t t h e s e a r c h of h i s c a r and t h e o b j e c t s i n s i d e t h e car. A r e v i e w o f t h e s e a r c h and s e i z u r e p r o v i s i o n s of o u r code i s e n l i g h t e n i n g . S e c t i o n 46-5-101, MCA, describes the b a s i s f o r a s e a r c h and s e i z u r e and a p p l i e s where a s e a r c h i s made i n c i d e n t t o a l a w f u l a r r e s t , by t h e a u t h o r i t y of a v a l i d s e a r c h w a r r a n t , under t h e a u t h o r i t y of a r i g h t of l a w f u l i n s p e c t i o n , and o f p a r t i c u l a r i m p o r t h e r e , " w i t h t h e c o n s e n t of t h e a c c u s e d a p p l i c a b l e i n any way. . . ." Here, s e c t i o n 46-5-101 is not Note t h a t i f t h e d e f e n d a n t had c o n s e n t e d t o t h e s e a r c h of h i s a u t o m o b i l e , t h e code s e c t i o n would have been a p p l i c a b l e . S e c t i o n 46-5-102, MCA, d e s c r i b e s t h e manner i n which a p e a c e o f f i c e r may s e a r c h f o l l o w i n g a l a w f u l a r r e s t , and a g a i n , t h i s s e c t i o n i s n o t d i r e c t l y applicable. Next, s e c t i o n 46-5-103, MCA, t h e s e c t i o n quoted i n t h e majority opinion, provides i n p a r t : -h "No s e a r c h and s e i z u r e , whether w i t-o r w i t h o u t w a r r a n t , s h a l l be h e l d t o be i l l e s a l a s t o a defendant i f : " ( 1 ) t h e d e f e n d a n t h a s d i s c l a i m e d any r i g h t t o o b j e c t searched o r o r interest i n the t h e instruments, a r t i c l e s , o r things seized." (Underscoring added.) . . . S e c t i o n 46-5-103, MCA, i s a c o d i f i c a t i o n of t h e r u l e e s t a b l i s h e d by t h i s C o u r t i n S t a t e v . Nelson ( 1 9 5 6 ) , 130 Mont. 466, 304 P.2d 1 1 1 0 . The C o u r t a f f i r m e d t h e r e f u s a l of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o s u p p r e s s e v i d e n c e s e i z e d i n a s e a r c h of a n a u t o m o b i l e w i t h o u t a s e a r c h w a r r a n t , where t h e d e f e n d a n t Nelson had d i s c l a i m e d any ownership o r r i g h t t o p o s s e s s i o n of t h e c a r o r of any p r o p e r t y t a k e n t h e r e f r o m . a n e a r l i e r Montana c a s e and s t a t e d : T h i s C o u r t q u o t e d from "What w a s s a i d by t h i s c o u r t i n S t a t e ex r e l . Teague v . D i s t r i c t C o u r t [ 1 9 2 5 ] , 73 Mont. 438, 4 4 1 , 236 [ P . ] page 257, 258, r u l e s t h i s c a s e s o f a r a s t h e motion t o s u p p r e s s i s concerned. There t h i s c o u r t s a i d : " ' A l t h o u g h t h e a c t s of t h e o f f i c e r s i n s e a r c h i n g t h i s t u n n e l and s e i z i n g t h e s t i l l and mash found i n i t may have been u n l a w f u l a s t o t h e p o s s e s s o r s of t h e t u n n e l , s i n c e r e l a t o r d i s c l a i m e d t h e r i g h t of p o s s e s s i o n of b o t h t h e t u n n e l and i t s c o n t e n t s , he i s n o t i n a p o s i t i o n t o complain, a s a c c o r d i n g t o h i s own s t a t e ments, h e had no r i g h t i n them and t h e a c t s of t h e o f f i c e r s t h e r e f o r e were n o t u n l a w f u l a s I t i s hardly necessary t o c i t e authorit o him. t i e s t o s u s t a i n t h i s determination, but refere n c e i s made t o D r i s k i l l v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 8 C i r . , 281 F. 146, and K e i t h v . Commonwealth, 197 Ky. 362, 247 S.W. 42. I n e a c h of which a l i k e r e s u l t was r e a c h e d under a n a l o g o u s f a c t s . ' " T h i s i s t h e r u l e t h r o u g h o u t t h e c o u n t r y , see a n n o t a t i o n s i n 24 A . L . R . , page 1425; 32 A . L . R . , page 415; 4 1 A . L . R . , page 1151; 52 A . L . R . , page page 365; e t s e q . ; 134 A.L.R., 487; 88 A . L . R . , page 831; 150 A . L . R . , page 577." S t a t e v. Nelson, 130 Mont. a t 471, 304 P.2d a t 1113. T h i s d e c i s i o n h a s n o t been o v e r r u l e d o r m o d i f i e d . The same view i s e x p r e s s e d in(9th C i r . 1 9 6 6 ) , 359 F2d. E lledy- YL v. United S t a t e s 4 0 4 , i n which t h e C o u r t of Appeals d e n i e d t h e motion t o s u p p r e s s e v i d e n c e , where, i n r e s p o n s e t o a n o f f i c e r ' s q u e s t i o n a s t o what was i n a package, t h e d e f e n d a n t had s a i d , " I d o n ' t know. I t ' s n o t mine." The court stated i n part: "Such d i s c l a i m e r of ownership by t h e a p p e l l a n t i s a n a l o g o u s t o abandonment. Cf. Abel v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 362 U.S. 217, 241, 80 S.Ct. 683, 4 L.Ed.2d 668 ( 1 9 6 0 ) . I n b o t h c a s e s t h e same message, by a c t o r word, i s d e l i v e r e d t o t h e o f f i c e r : t h a t a s t o t h e a c t o r o r speaker t h e r e i s no i n t e r e s t which would be invaded by s e a r c h o r s e i z u r e . Lack of w a r r a n t d o e s n o t under t h e s e circumstances render search o r s e i z u r e unreasonable a s t o t h e a c t o r o r speaker." G e l l e d g e v. U n i t e d S t a t e s , 359 F.2d a t 405. I n a s i m i l a r manner, i n Rakas v . I l l i n o i s ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 439 U.S. 1 2 8 , 134, 99 S.Ct. stated: 421, 425, 58 L.Ed.2d 387, 395, t h e C o u r t "A person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search - -a of third person's premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment riqhts infringed." (Underscoring added.) An extended discussion of cases with similar holdings does not appear appropriate. We do note that Wayne LaFave, a leading authority on search and seizure, distinguishes between abandonment and disclaimer of ownership. LaFave takes the position that disclaimer of ownership should not be held tantamount to a waiver of Fourth Amendment protecc' o n , ~l but notes that a number of courts have so held. W. LaFave, 3 Search and Seizure 511.3 (1978, Supp. 1981). Recent United States Supreme Court cases involving the question of standing to challenge the legality of searches, have emphasized the importance of a defendant's legitimate or reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises or objects searched. Rakas, supra; United States v. Salvucci (1980, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619; Rawlings v. Kentucky (1980), 448 U.S. 98, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed. 2d 633. I am unable to see how the defendant could have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in opaque bags in the trunk of a car, when he had stated he did not own the car, he did not know who did own the car, and he did not know where the keys to the car's trunk were located. The unfortunate result of the majority opinion is that, once again, reliable evidence establishing a clear basis for conviction is suppressed. The majority's broad application of the exclusionary rule has again exacted a substantial social cost. As stated in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 137, 99 S.Ct. at 427, 58 L.Ed.2d at 397: "Each t i m e t h e e x c l u s i o n a r y r u l e i s a p p l i e d it e x a c t s a s u b s t a n t i a l s o c i a l c o s t f o r t h e Relev i n d i c a t i o n of F o u r t h Amendment r i g h t s . v a n t and r e l i a b l e e v i d e n c e i s k e p t from t h e t r i e r of f a c t and t h e s e a r c h f o r t r u t h a t t r i a l is deflected. (Citations omitted)." I would h o l d t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t p r o p e r l y d e n i e d t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s motion t o s u p p r e s s t h e e v i d e n c e o b t a i n e d from t h e s e a r c h of t h e c a r .

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