MARRIAGE OF BURLEIGH

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No. 81-395 I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O MONTANA F F 1982 I N RE THE MARRIAGE O F MARTHA H. BURLEIGH, P e t i t i o n e r and Respondent, -vs- C. WARD BURLEIGH, Respondent and A p p e l l a n t . Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Tenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County o f F e r g u s , The Honorable N a t A l l e n , Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel o f Record: For A p p e l l a n t : Robert L. Johnson, Lewistown, Montana For Respondent : Anderson, Edwards & blolloy, B i l l i n g s , Montana Amicus C u r i a e : J a r d i n e , S t e p h e n s o n , B l e w e t t & Weaver, G r e a t F a l l s , Montana S u b m i t t e d on B r i e f s : Decided: July 9, 1982 Adgust 1 9 , 1982 Mr. Chief Justice Frank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court. Husband appeals from a judgment entered by the District Court of the Tenth Judicial District, Fergus County, which awarded the wife child support and custody of the children and required the husband to make a lump sum payment plus twenty annual payments of $11,116 to the wife. We aff irm. Husband and wife were married on January 8, 1966, in Fort Collins, Colorado. Husband was completing his studies for a Doctor of Veterinary Medicine degree, and wife was in her senior year of undergraduate school studying history. The couple then made several moves for the husband's employment, first to Utah where the husband was employed at a private veterinary clinic and the wife worked part-time as a receptionist. The parties then moved to Lewistown and, during the first months of 1967, lived with the husband's parents on Burleigh Angus Ranch and shared ranch and household duties. In March 1967 they moved to Miles City, where husband was employed as a deputy state veterinarian and wife attended school, received her bachelor's degree and did some substitute teaching. In September of 1968, husband accepted employment with a private veterinarian in Sidney, and wife taught school from October to the end of the school year. In the summer of 1969 the parties moved back to Lewistown where husband was employed by a private veter inarian and wife taught school. ranch part-time. Both parties helped on the In 1970 and 1971, wife experienced child- bearing problems requiring out-of-state chemotherapy which prevented her from contributing to the home and marriage as much as she previously had. In 1972 the husband gave up his veterinary practice, and the parties moved into the main ranch house on Burleigh Angus Ranch. Part of the wife's duties included keeping records on the Angus cattle and operating a public dumpyard acquired by the ranch. In September 1973, the parties adopted a three-monthold son, Theran. Husband's parents gifted thirty shares of stock to the husband during this year. 1975, all shareholders entered a buy On February 10, and sell agreement which contained provisions which disallowed any encumbering or disposing of the stock without the consent of the remaining shareholders and statements to the effect that a stockholder may not dispose of any shares without first offering them to the corporation. amended. Sarah. This agreement has been twice In July 1975 the parties had a child of their own, During 1975 husband's parents gave him twenty more shares of stock in the corporation and gave wife twenty shares also. On April 1, 1978, husband contracted to buy 274 treasury shares of the corporation and also contracted to buy 230 shares from his parents. six shares prior to marriage. He had been gifted fortyAfter the parties moved to Lewistown, the wife was active in working with horses, in raising and selling dogs and in continuing to take educational courses. In September 1979 the parties separated, and on October 29, 1979, wife filed a complaint seeking dissolution of the marriage. On January 10, 1980, on oral stipulation of the parties, the District Court dissolved the marriage, awarding temporary custody of the children to the wife. Both p a r t i e s s u b s e q u e n t l y r e m a r r i e d . On August 4, 1981, t h e District C o u r t awarded p e r - manent c u s t o d y t o t h e w i f e w i t h r i g h t s of v i s i t a t i o n t o t h e h u s b a n d and g a v e t h e w i f e $400 p e r month i n c h i l d s u p p o r t . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t a l s o f o u n d t h a t t h e w i f e ' s s h a r e o f t h e marital estate was $247,320.26, with $25,000 to be paid w i t h i n s i x t y d a y s o f t h e d a t e of judgment and t h e b a l a n c e t o be paid in twenty annual installments approximately The c o u r t g r a n t e d t h e w i f e a s e c u r i t y i n t e r - $11,116 each. e s t i n t h e husband's s t o c k u n t i l f u l l p a y m e n t was made a t w h i c h t i m e t h e w i f e would c o n v e y h e r husband. of twenty s h a r e s t o t h e Husband a p p e a l s a n d p r e s e n t s s e v e r a l i s s u e s w h i c h c a n b e s t a t e d as f o l l o w s : Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r i n a w a r d i n g c u s t o d y o f 1. the children t o the wife? Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r i n making i t s a w a r d o f 2. child support? Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r 3. in distributing the marital estate? Both Mont. parties cite Corbett v. -, 635 P.2d 1 3 1 9 , 38 S t . R e p . standard of review on the first Corbett (1981), - 1 8 5 2 , as s e t t i n g o u r issue. In Corbett stated: " T h i s C o u r t h a s s a i d many times r e g a r d i n g t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e D i s t r i c t Court i n c h i l d c u s t o d y cases t h a t : " ' I n r e v i e w i n g o r d e r s which a f f e c t t h e cust o d y of t h e c h i l d , t h i s C o u r t i s m i n d f u l t h a t t h e primary d u t y of d e c i d i n g t h e proper cust o d y of c h i l d r e n is a t a s k o f t h e D i s t r i c t Court. T h u s , a l l r e a s o n a b l e p r e s u m p t i o n s as t o c o r r e c t n e s s of t h a t d e t e r m i n a t i o n w i l l be made. No r u l i n g w i l l b e d i s t u r b e d a b s e n t a c l e a r showing t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d i s F o s s v. L e i f e r ( 1 9 7 6 ) , c r e t i o n was a b u s e d . 1 7 0 Mont. 9 7 , 550 P.2d 1 3 0 9 , 1 3 1 1 . " 6 3 5 P.2d we S e c t i o n 40-4-212, MCA, i s t h e c o n t r o l l i n g s t a t u t e h e r e and s t a t e s a s follows: "Best i n t e r e s t of c h i l d . The c o u r t s h a l l determine custody i n accordance with t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t of t h e c h i l d . The c o u r t s h a l l consider a l l relevant factors including: " ( 1 ) t h e w i s h e s of t h e c h i l d ' s parents a s t o h i s custody; " ( 2 ) the wishes custodian; of the child parent as to or his " ( 3 ) t h e i n t e r a c t i o n and i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p o f the child with h i s parent or parents, h i s s i b l i n g s , and a n y o t h e r p e r s o n who may s i g n i ficantly affect the child's best interest; " ( 4 ) the c h i l d ' s adjustment s c h o o l a n d community; and to " ( 5 ) t h e m e n t a l and p h y s i c a l i n d i v i d u a l s i n v o l v e d . I' h e a l t h of The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s i n t h i s regard finding his home, all thus: "The C o u r t f i n d s t h a t b o t h p a r t i e s a r e f i t and p r o p e r p a r e n t s , and f u r t h e r f i n d s t h a t t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s of t h e minor c h i l d r e n r e q u i r e t h a t t h e y be p l a c e d i n t h e c a r e , c u s t o d y and c o n t r o l o f t h e i r m o t h e r . The Court considers the following relevant i n making t h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n : " 1 ) That n e i t h e r c h i l d h a s reached an age where h i s w i s h e s a r e r e l e v a n t i n t h i s d e t e r mination, f u r t h e r , both p a r e n t s expressed a s t r o n g d e s i r e t o a c q u i r e custody; accordi n g l y , t h e d e s i r e s of t h e p a r t i e s and t h e c h i l d r e n do n o t e n t e r i n t o t h i s d e c i s i o n ; " 2 ) The t e s t i m o n y e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t t h e m o t h e r is, and h a s been, t h e p r i m a r y p e r s o n i n v o l v e d i n t h e c a r e , e d u c a t i o n and r e a r i n g of t h e children since their birth. The m o t h e r I s p r e s e n t l i v i n g s i t u a t i o n is s u c h t h a t i t f a c i l i t a t e s t h e k i n d of c a r e and a t t e n t i o n r e q u i r e d by c h i l d r e n o f t h i s a g e . The e v i dence e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t t h e c h i l d r e n a r e w e l l s e t t l e d t o t h e c u r r e n t l i v i n g s i t u a t i o n and t h e i r progress i n school is s a t i s f a c t o r y ; " 3 ) The m e n t a l a n d p h y s i c a l i n d i v i d u a l s is s a t i s f a c t o r y ; health of all stated " 4 ) I n summary, t h e C o u r t f i n d s no e v i d e n c e of p o s i t i v e v a l u e s t o be g a i n e d by c h a n g i n g t h e i r c u s t o d y from t h e c u r r e n t s t a t u s , wherein t h e i r p r i m a r y c u s t o d y and c a r e r e s t s w i t h t h e i r mother. To t h e c o n t r a r y , t h e C o u r t f i n d s t h a t t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s of t h e c h i l d r e n r e q u i r e t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n of t h e c u r r e n t custody s t a t u s w i t h t h e mother." Appellant charges t h a t t h e c o u r t ' s properly people address the children's in husband. have the mother's home findings do not interaction with other including respondent's new A p p e l l a n t a l s o c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e husband s h o u l d been criteria awarded of testimony custody section and that because 40-4-212, of a he MCA, social all the on his visited the fulfilled based worker largely who h u s b a n d ' s home. We disagree. Montana l a w s t a t e s t h a t t h e f i n d i n g s d o n o t n e e d t o be i n a n y p a r t i c u l a r f o r m i f t h e r e i s s u b s t a n - t i a l c r e d i b l e e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e t r i a l j u d g e ' s judgment on t h e m e r i t s . 161, I n Re M a r r i a g e o f B a r r o n ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 7 Mont. 580 P.2d 936. T h e r e is s u b s t a n t i a l evidence in the record t o support t h e c o u r t ' s conclusion here. The two c h i l d r e n h a d l i v e d w i t h t h e m o t h e r s i n c e t h e s e p a r a t i o n i n September 1979, and t h e husband t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e w i f e was a s a t i s f a c t o r y m o t n e r . only worker had wife's, s o c o u l d n o t t e s t i f y t h a t t h e w i f e ' s home was n o t a s u i t a b l e home visited for the the Furthermore, t h e s o c i a l husband's children. home, and not the W h i l e w e may s y m p a t h i z e w i t h t h e h u s b a n d ' s w i s h e s t o h a v e a more d i r e c t i n f l u e n c e o n the r e a r i n g of h i s children, w e do n o t f i n d any abuse o f d i s c r e t i o n w h i c h would w a r r a n t a r e v e r s a l . With that there considered regard is the no to the second finding to statutory issue, suggest criteria set Corbett, supra. appellant argues that forth the in court section 40-4-204, MCA, in awarding the wife child support payments of $200 a month per child. Husband further argues that the requirements of the District Court's judgment obligate him to pay out far more each year than he has ever received in income. Section 40-4-204, MCA, provides: "Child support. In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, legal separation, maintenance, or child support, the court may order either or both parents owing a duty of support to a child to pay an amount reasonable or necessary for his support, without regard to marital misconduct, after considering all relevant factors including: "(1) the financial resources of the child; "(2) the financial resources of the custodial parent; "(3) the standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage not been dissolved ; " (4) the physical and emotional condition of the child and his educational needs; and "(5) the financial resources and needs of the noncustodial parent." Here the District Court judge had wife's testimony before him the regarding the financial needs of her children, which included housing, groceries and transportation. The wife testified that she needed $600 per month for two children, and, in our view, an award of $400 per month is not excessive in any way. Nor are we persuaded that the District Court's judg- ment will so strap the husband that he cannot make the payments. Both the husband and the ranch accountant testified that the corporation pays and provides nearly all the husband's living expenses, including his house, food, utilities and transportation. The corporate salaries are adjusted a c c o r d i n g t o t h e income r e c e i v e d e a c h y e a r . The h u s b a n d ' s s a l a r y i n 1 9 7 8 was $ 2 2 , 8 5 0 a n d i n 1 9 7 9 was $ 2 7 , 8 6 6 . There i s a m p l e e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t a n a w a r d o f $400 p e r month i n c h i l d support. Appellant's Court's third distribution argues t h a t of issue the relates marital to the estate. t h e f i n d i n g s should n o t have District Appellant included in the marital e s t a t e t h e 120 s h a r e s g i f t e d t o t h e husband a f t e r the marriage. should have Appellant been credited paid t o t h e wife a f t e r also contends for the nearly their that the husband $25,000 t h a t he s e p a r a t i o n and p r i o r t o her remarriage. Both appellant's brief and the amicus brief (representing the other shareholders) argue t h a t t h e c o u r t ' s v a l u a t i o n o f t h e s h a r e s was i m p r o p e r a n d t h a t t h e g r a n t i n g of a s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t was c o n t r a r y t o t h e v a r i o u s a g r e e - ments of t h e s h a r e h o l d e r s . I n Montana w e p a y a g r e a t a m o u n t o f d e f e r e n c e t o t h e judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t r e g a r d i n g p r o p e r t y d i v i s i o n s , i.e. , our s t a n d a r d of r e v i e w is w h e t h e r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t a c t e d a r b i t r a r i l y w i t h o u t employment o f c o n s c i e n t i o u s j u d g ment, o r exceeded t h e bounds of circumstances. Zell v . r e a s o n i n view of Z e l l ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 1 7 4 Mont. all the 2 1 6 , 570 P.2d 33. I n I n R e M a r r i a g e o f J o r g e n s e n ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 1 8 0 Mont. 590 P.2d 606, 294, t h i s Court considered t h e v a l u a t i o n of s t o c k of a c l o s e l y h e l d c o r p o r a t i o n where t h e s h a r e s c o u l d o n l y be s o l d t o o t h e r s h a r e h o l d e r s o r t o t h e company. A shareholder agreement set t h e p r i c e o f e a c h s h a r e a t $750, and we found that the District Court did not abuse its d i s c r e t i o n in v a l u i n g t h e s h a r e s a t $750. Here, under t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e buy a n d s e l l a g r e e m e n t a n d amendments t h e r e t o , t h e p r i c e o f e a c h s h a r e s h a l l b e book v a l u e ( a s shown by t h e b a l a n c e s h e e t a t t h e c l o s e of t h e p r e c e d i n g t a x y e a r ) o r a d i f f e r e n t v a l u a t i o n c a n b e e s t a b l i s h e d by a n i n d e p e n d e n t a p p r a i s e r . Under t h e book v a l u e m e t h o d , Angus Ranch would b e w o r t h evidence, $158.37 is u n r e a l i s t i c a l l y which, low. e a c h s h a r e was w o r t h a b o u t $500. each a t $1,009.72, each s h a r e of B u r l e i g h i n view of the Husband e s t i m a t e d t h a t The D i s t r i c t C o u r t v a l u e d a f i g u r e r e a c h e d by d i v i d i n g t h e v a l u e o f t o t a l a s s e t s l e s s l i a b i l i t i e s by t h e number o f o u t s t a n d i n g and i s s u e d s h a r e s . W e cannot say t h a t t h e District Court a c t e d a r b i t r a r i l y o r t h a t t h e method e m p l o y e d e x c e e d e d t h e bounds of r e a s o n i n view of t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , Z e l l , s u p r a , and w e uphold it h e r e . W can s i m i l a r l y dispose of t h e husband's contention e t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t s h o u l d h a v e made a d i s t r i b u t i o n o f the stock i n kind, g i v e n some o f payments. is no the that i.e., shares the wife instead of should have been the right t o annual S i m p l y b e c a u s e t h i s o p t i o n was o p e n t o t h e c o u r t reason that the Under t h e circumscribed Zell a n d numerous o t h e r district judge standard of cases, had to select review e s t a b l i s h e d t h e r e was no e r r o r it. by in the D i s t r i c t Court's f a i l u r e t o d i s t r i b u t e t h e property i n kind. Furthermore, w n o t e t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i d n o t award e t h e w i f e 50 p e r c e n t o f t h e n e t m a r i t a l e s t a t e , b u t o n l y 3 8 p e r c e n t because of t h e g i f t s t h e husband had r e c e i v e d b e f o r e and d u r i n g t h e m a r r i a g e . Nor do we p r e d i c a t e error on the District Court's g r a n t i n g t h e w i f e a s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t i n t h e 720 s h a r e s o f t h e husband's stock. She n e e d s some p r o t e c t i o n t o i n s u r e t h a t t h e a n n u a l p a y m e n t s w i l l b e made, foreclosure on those shares should and t h e p r o s p e c t o f provide a sufficient i n c e n t i v e f o r t h e h u s b a n d t o make t h e i n s t a l l m e n t p a y m e n t s . W e have previously interest for approved the wife's the protection M a r r i a g e o f Brown ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 9 Mont. also note that, under granting the terms of in other 417, of a cases, 587 P.2d the security In Re W e 361. Court District decree, t h e wife cannot unreasonably withhold consent t o t h e husband's encumbering h i s s t o c k o r s e l l i n g c o r p o r a t e l a n d . The p a r t i e s h e r e d i s a g r e e on w h e t h e r t h e h u s b a n d h a s the voting corporation. rights to a majority of the stock in the T h e r e a r e 1 , 4 7 9 o u t s t a n d i n g s h a r e s , a n d i t is u n c o n t e s t e d h e h a s v o t i n g r i g h t s t o 510 s h a r e s . The bone o f c o n t e n t i o n h e r e is whether t h e husband h a s t h e v o t i n g r i g h t s t o t h e 230 s h a r e s b e i n g s o l d t o him by h i s p a r e n t s , w h i c h would make him a m a j o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r . A p p e l l a n t and t h e amicus b r i e f a r g u e t h a t s i n c e t h e c e r t i f i c a t e s a r e s t i l l i n t h e p a r e n t s ' names, t h e y r e t a i n t h e v o t i n g r i g h t s . the record before us, we cannot agree. Based on The c r u c i a l l a n g u a g e i n t h e c o n t r a c t w h e r e i n t h e husband is buying t h e s t o c k from h i s p a r e n t s is a s f o l l o w s : ". . . Purchaser s h a l l have t h e r i g h t t o enjoy a l l r i g h t s and i n c i d e n t s o f o w n e r s h i p o f t h e 230 s h a r e s o f s t o c k , s u b j e c t o n l y t o s u c h r e s t r i c t i o n s a s h a v e b e e n p l a c e d upon t h e P u r c h a s e r by t h e S e l l e r s u n d e r t h e terms of t h i s agreement." (Emphasis added.) Nowhere i n t h e c o n t r a c t d o w e f i n d a n y r e s e r v a t i o n o f v o t i n g r i g h t s by t h e p a r e n t s , and w e t h u s c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e h u s b a n d h a s t h e r i g h t t o v o t e a m a j o r i t y of t h e s t o c k of t h e corporation. The s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t g r a n t e d t o t h e w i f e w i l l h e l p e n s u r e t h a t t h e husband d o e s n o t u s e h i s c o r p o r a t e c o n t r o l t o jeopardize her interest. Finally, credit for the husband argues he should a p p r o x i m a t e l y $25,000 have been t h a t he paid given to the wife after t h e i r s e p a r a t i o n and b e f o r e h e r remarriage. disagree. W have p r e v i o u s l y h e l d t h a t l i v i n g expenses of e We t h e w i f e need n o t be c r e d i t e d t o t h e husband i n t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n and computation of t h e marital estate, I n R e M a r r i a g e o f C a p r i c e ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 8 Mont. 455, 5 8 5 P.2d 641, and w e s o f i n d here. Affirmed. @ . uxag &, Chief J u s t i c e

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