STATE v SWAN
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No. 81-268 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1982 STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, vs. GARY JOSEPH SWAN, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and for the County of Missoula Honorable E. Gardner Brownlee, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Ralph T. Randono argued, Great Falls, Montana For Respondent: Hsn. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Mark Murphy, Assistant Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana Robert L. Deschamps 111, County Attorney, argued, Missoula, Montana Submitted: June 22, 1982 Decided: August 19, 1982 Filed: ,A$d613 1 8 92 T kj = "Clerk Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of t h e C o u r t . On a w r i t District Court, of Missoula 1972 c o n v i c t i o n s of R.C.M. h a b e a s c o r p u s from t h e U n i t e d Division, defendant States appeals his second d e g r e e a s s a u l t ( s e c t i o n 94-602, 1 9 4 7 , now r e p e a l e d ) and r a p e ( s e c t i o n 94-4101, R.C.M. 1947, now r e p e a l e d ) . On May 11, 1972, d e f e n d a n t was s e n t e n c e d t o s i x y e a r s y e a r s f o r t h e rape convic- f o r t h e a s s a u l t and n i n e t y - n i n e t i o n by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t of of the S t a t e of Montana, t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Missoula County. According to d e f e n d a n t , h i s c o u n s e l t o l d him t h a t a n o t i c e of a p p e a l had been f i l e d . After t h e t i m e l i m i t f o r a p p e a l had e x p i r e d , d e f e n d a n t d i s c o v e r e d , however, t h a t a n o t i c e had n e v e r been filed. Defendant wrote Chief J u s t i c e Harrison i n November 1972 s e e k i n g a t r a n s c r i p t and a i d i n a p p e a l i n g h i s c o n v i c tion. Chief Justice Harrison wrote back to defendant stating: "You s t a t e d t h a t you r e q u e s t e d your a t t o r n e y t o a p p e a l b u t he d i d n o t do s o ; I am informed t h a t you d i d d i s c u s s an a p p e a l w i t h your c o u n s e l b u t you were a d v i s e d t h e r e was no i s s u e t o a p p e a l on. " I am a l s o a d v i s e d by t h e d i s t r i c t judge t h a t he d i d n o t f e e l t h e r e were any p r o b l e m s upon t h e t r i a l , nor were any r u l i n g s made t h a t c o u l d be an i s s u e on a p p e a l . Also t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e was c l e a r and your c o u n s e l d i d a good j o b on your t r i a l . "You do n o t need a t r a n s c r i p t f o r an a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a w r i t of h a b e a s c o r p u s , j u s t make t h e a p p l i c a t i o n and s e t f o r t h i n i t w h e r e i n you f e e l your r i g h t s were p r e j u d i c e d . If t h i s c o u r t r e q u i r e s some of t h e t e s t i m o n y t o a s c e r t a i n i f what you s a y is t r u e , we w i l l s e c u r e it." Over t h e n e x t few y e a r s , d e f e n d a n t made s e v e r a l pro se - a t t e m p t s t o g e t a t r a n s c r i p t which he b e l i e v e d was n e c e s - s a r y i n o r d e r t o p e r f e c t an appeal. w r i t o f mandamus nied. I n 1973, he f i l e d f o r a i n F e d e r a l District Court, w h i c h was d e - I n S e p t e m b e r 1 9 7 8 , h e f i l e d a n o t h e r w r i t o f mandamus w i t h t h i s C o u r t , s e e k i n g c o u r t r e c o r d s and t r a n s c r i p t , w h i c h was a l s o d e n i e d . Also, i n 1978, d e f e n d a n t began an a c t i o n i n Powell County s e e k i n g a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment tana's former rape s t a t u t e ( s e c t i o n 94-4101, t h a t Mon1947) R.C.M. u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y d i s c r i m i n a t e d a g a i n s t males. Apparently no a c t i o n was t a k e n on t h i s p e t i t i o n . On December 20, 1978, defendant a p r o se filed p e t i t i o n f o r a w r i t of habeas corpus i n t h e United S t a t e s District Court, Missoula Division, claiming, t h i n g s , t h a t h e was d e n i e d a r i g h t o f a p p e a l . d e n i e d f o r want o f St.Rep. e x h a u s t i o n of among other The w r i t was s t a t e remedies. See, 36 746, I n J u l y 1979, t h e c l e r k of c o u r t ' s o f f i c e i n Missoula County d e s t r o y e d t h e p h y s i c a l e v i d e n c e o f t h i s c a s e . On May 2 0 , 1 9 8 0 , d e f e n d a n t f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r w r i t o f h a b e a s c o r p u s w i t h t h i s C o u r t , w h i c h was d e n i e d . (Docket No, 80-184.) Finally, on September another pro se Federal District Court, after petition Court, a for a 1980, writ Missoula telephone conceded c e r t a i n f a c t s , 29, habeas Division. conference issued of defendant in an o r d e r The filed corpus in District which the State on May 13, 1981, h o l d i n g t h a t d e f e n d a n t w a s d e p r i v e d of h i s r i g h t t o a p p e a l because he did n o t have effective a s s i s t a n c e of counsel. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t o r d e r e d t h e S t a t e o f Montana t o f u r n i s h defendant with a review of t a n c e of counsel. h i s c o n v i c t i o n w i t h t h e assis- The D i s t r i c t C o u r t f u r t h e r o r d e r e d t h e S t a t e t o proceed with d i l i g e n c e i n procuring a t r a n s c r i p t and a p p o i n t m e n t of c o u n s e l , and t o r e p o r t back t o t h e c o u r t as t o what h a s been done w i t h i n 120 d a y s . This appeal followed. I n M i s s o u l a , Montana, on t h e e v e n i n g of December 1 3 , 1971, Sharon B r i g g s , a seventeen-year-old drinking with defendant, defendant, Rodger girl, went out d e f e n d a n t ' s w i f e and a f r i e n d of Smalley. Defendant s t a y i n g a t t h e "93 Motel." All and h i s wife were f o u r people drank beer t h e m o t e l room from a b o u t 6:30 t o 9:00 p.m. at They t h e n l e f t t h e m o t e l and went t o a l o c a l b a r , d r i n k i n g and d a n c i n g f o r a b o u t two more h o u r s . About 11:30 p.m., a l l four returned t o t h e m o t e l and B r i g g s a s k e d t o be t a k e n home. The following account was told by Briggs at the trial: A f t e r B r i g g s a s k e d t o be t a k e n home, d e f e n d a n t s t a y e d in the car, apparently willing t o d r i v e h e r home. Defen- d a n t ' s w i f e and Rodger Smalley went back t o t h e m o t e l room. B r i g g s s a t i n t h e f r o n t s e a t of t h e c a r w i t h d e f e n d a n t . When they drove p a s t t h e s t r e e t t o her house, d e f e n d a n t s h e wanted t o go home. Briggs again t o l d Defendant t o l d her t h a t he wanted t o buy some b e e r f i r s t . A f t e r buying t h e b e e r , s o u t h , o u t of M i s s o u l a . defendant continued t o d r i v e When B r i g g s a s k e d where t h e y were g o i n g , d e f e n d a n t s a i d t h a t h e was t a k i n g h e r t h e " l o n g way home." B r i g g s r e p e a t e d l y a s k e d d e f e n d a n t t o t a k e h e r home. Af t e r Mountain Defendant's a Road, car few m i l e s which defendant was turned snow-packed became s t u c k a c o u p l e of onto and times, the Blue slippery. but they were a b l e t o f r e e i t e a c h t i m e u n t i l t h e c a r s l i d p a r t i a l l y o f f t h e road. The d e f e n d a n t t o l d B r i g g s t h e y would have t o walk home, and he o f f e r e d h e r some b e e r . When s h e r e f u s e d , t h e d e f e n d a n t h i t h e r on t h e s i d e of h e r f a c e w i t h h i s f i s t . The d e f e n d a n t o r d e r e d t h e v i c t i m o u t o f t h e c a r and h i t h e r again, breaking her glasses. When s h e threw h e r glasses down, t h e d e f e n d a n t h i t h e r a g a i n and pushed h e r o v e r a snow bank toward t h e r i v e r . After t h e y had reached the river bank, he h i t h e r a g a i n and k i c k e d h e r . this At point, according to Briggs, the defendant t h r e a t e n e d t o make h e r s w i m t h e r i v e r and a l s o a t t e m p t e d t o remove h e r p a n t s . He took h e r p a n t s and p a n t i e s down and t o l d h e r he was g o i n g t o have s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h h e r . She did not resist because she was afraid. Apparently b e c a u s e of t h e c o l d , he c h o s e n o t t o have s e x w i t h h e r . He o r d e r e d h e r t o g e t d r e s s e d and f o l l o w him o r he would b e a t and/or k i l l her. A f t e r w a l k i n g some d i s t a n c e , t h e y s t o p p e d a t a house and a s k e d f o r a r i d e back t o M i s s o u l a . The o c c u p a n t of t h e house later agreed noticed t o give how defendant's badly them Briggs a ride was s t o r y about a bar and beaten brawl. but He testified accepted he the offered t o take B r i g g s t o t h e h o s p i t a l , b u t d e f e n d a n t s a i d s h e was h i s w i f e and he would t a k e c a r e o f h e r . When B r i g g s a r r i v e d back a t t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s motel, s h e a g a i n r e q u e s t e d t o be t a k e n home. The d e f e n d a n t ' s w i f e was awake when t h e y r e t u r n e d and t o l d B r i g g s t h a t s h e c o u l d n o t go home b e c a u s e s h e was t o o c o l d . The d e f e n d a n t and h i s w i f e removed t h e v i c t i m ' s c l o t h i n g and o r d e r e d h e r i n t o bed between them. When t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s w i f e l e f t t o go t o t h e bathroom, B r i g g s t e s t i f i e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t f o r c e d h e r t o have sexual intercourse with him. Defendant's wife later r e t u r n e d from t h e bathroom. When B r i g g s was s u r e t h e y were b o t h a s l e e p , o u t of bed and began l o o k i n g f o r h e r c l o t h e s . she g o t She t h e n , f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e , r e a l i z e d t h a t Rodger S m a l l e y was s l e e p i n g on t h e couch i n t h e room. a.m., When S m a l l e y awoke, a t a b o u t 5:00 B r i g g s was l o o k i n g f o r h e r c l o t h e s and a s k e d S m a l l e y H e r e f u s e d b e c a u s e h e d i d n ' t have a c a r . t o t a k e h e r home. B r i g g s t h e n w a i t e d f o r l i g h t enough t o f i n d h e r s h o e s . Once s h e found h e r s h o e s , s h e went t o a n e a r b y s h o p p i n g m a l l and c a l l e d h e r mother. her condition, Her b r o t h e r p i c k e d h e r up. Upon s e e i n g he s t o p p e d on t h e way home and c a l l e d t h e The p o l i c e m e t B r i g g s a t home and e s c o r t e d h e r t o police. t h e h o s p i t a l where s h e was examined by h e r p h y s i c i a n . A t t r i a l h e r p h y s i c i a n t e s t i f i e d t h a t B r i g g s was " i n a p r e t t y s o r r y s t a t e ' ' when he saw h e r . bruised eye. w i t h hemorrhages She had dried on t h e s u r f a c e and w h i t e of blood s c r a t c h e s on h e r neck. She was b a t t e r e d and in her nose, a cut the lip and T h e r e were b r u i s e s l o c a t e d on h e r lower r i g h t r i b c a g e and on t h e i n s i d e of h e r r i g h t t h i g h . The X-rays the showed t h a t t h e r e was a f r a c t u r e of r i g h t s i d e and the s i n u s i n her t h e jaw on l e f t cheek had been o b l i t e r a t e d by blood and s w e l l i n g . A found pelvic in the e x a m i n a t i o n was vaginal cavity, conducted. but there No were sperm was signs of a narrow g e n i t a l i n j u r y . Before t h e t r i a l , t h e S t a t e moved f o r o r d e r p r o h i b i t i n g r e f e r e n c e t o Br i g g s ' a protective morals o r c h a s t i t y . The r e c o r d shows o n l y t h a t a d i s c u s s i o n was h e l d i n chambers and t h a t t h e motion was t a k e n under a d v i s e m e n t . The r e c o r d does not reflect the District Court's decision on the motion. D e f e n s e c o u n s e l gave n o t i c e t h a t d e f e n d a n t would u s e the defense of insanity and made a motion for an order a l l o w i n g d e f e n d a n t t o be examined by a p s y c h i a t r i s t of h i s own c h o i c e , p a i d by t h e S t a t e . D e f e n d a n t had a l r e a d y been examined by one p s y c h i a t r i s t a t Warm S p r i n g s S t a t e H o s p i t a l . The motion was d e n i e d . A t t r i a l t h e main e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d by t h e S t a t e was t h e t e s t i m o n y of B r i g g s , t h e p o l i c e m a n who accompanied h e r t o t h e h o s p i t a l and h e r p h y s i c i a n . The d e f e n s e c a l l e d o n l y two w i t n e s s e s : previous defendant's a t t o r n e y t o rebut hearsay testimony concerning a conversation between defendant and the attorney, and the p s y c h i a t r i s t who examined d e f e n d a n t a t Warm S p r i n g s S t a t e Hospital. The p s y c h i a t r i s t t e s t i f i e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t had a below normal I .Q. of a p p r o x i m a t e l y 78 and t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s a b i l i t y t o a p p r e c i a t e t h e c r i m i n a l i t y of h i s c o n d u c t c o u l d be i m p a i r e d b e c a u s e of h i s low m e n t a l i t y . Neither defendant nor h i s w i f e t e s t i f i e d a t t r i a l . Defendant's instructions. counsel did I n s t r u c t i o n No. not present any proposed 8 , a Sandstrom-type instruc- t i o n , was g i v e n t o t h e j u r y : " I n e v e r y c r i m e o r p u b l i c o f f e n s e t h e r e must e x i s t a u n i o n o r j o i n t o p e r a t i o n of a c t and i n t e n t , or criminal negligence. The i n t e n t o r i n t e n t i o n i s m a n i f e s t e d by t h e circums t a n c e s c o n n e c t e d w i t h t h e o f f e n s e and t h e sound mind and d i s c r e t i o n of t h e a c c u s e d . " I n order t o c o n s t i t u t e t h e o f f e n s e charged i n t h i s case the i n t e n t alleged i n the Inform a t i o n is n e c e s s a r y t o be p r o v e d , b u t d i r e c t and p o s i t i v e t e s t i m o n y is n o t n e c e s s a r y t o prove t h e i n t e n t . I t may be i n f e r r e d from t h e e v i d e n c e i f t h e r e a r e any f a c t s proved which s a t i s f y t h e j u r y , beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt, of its existence. "The l a w a l s o presumes t h a t a p e r s o n i n t e n d s the ordinary consequences of any voluntary a c t c o m m i t t e d by him. The l a t t e r p r e s u m p t i o n , however, is termed a d i s p u t a b l e p r e s u m p t i o n a n d may b e c o n t r o v e r t e d by o t h e r e v i d e n c e . " (Emphasis added.) was Defendant charged r a p e and kidnapping. with second degree assault, The j u r y r e t u r n e d g u i l t y v e r d i c t s o n o n l y t h e a s s a u l t and r a p e c h a r g e s . D e f e n s e c o u n s e l made a m o t i o n f o r a new t r i a l w h i c h was d e n i e d . The c o n t r o l l i n g i s s u e s on a p p e a l a r e : Whether 1. defendant's rights to counsel, due p r o c e s s a n d e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n w e r e v i o l a t e d by t h e f a i l u r e t o a p p o i n t c o u n s e l and p r o p e r l y h e a r h i s a p p e a l ? 2. Whether t h e d e f e n d a n t was d e n i e d a f a i r t r i a l ? Because both i s s u e s must be answered a f f i r m a t i v e l y , w e r e v e r s e t h e j u d g m e n t o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t and remand f o r a new t r i a l , i f e n o u g h e v i d e n c e s t i l l e x i s t s . The i n i t i a l q u e s t i o n b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t is w h e t h e r o r n o t t o a p p l y c u r r e n t law. The S t a t e a r g u e s t h a t i f w e a p p l y c u r r e n t l a w we m u s t d o s o r e t r o a c t i v e l y . The question of applied whether retroactively "finalized." Cases or not arises are W e do n o t a g r e e . law a rule of only when cases generally considered is to have be been "finalized" o n l y when t h e r e h a s b e e n " a j u d g m e n t o f c o n v i c t i o n , s e n t e n c e and exhaustion ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 93 N.M. of violated counsel, equal of appeal." the v. Rogers i s s u e r a i s e d by d e f e n d a n t i s w h e t h e r his rights protection, to and effective due f a i l u r e of the Montana assistance process preventing h i s i n i t i a l attempt t o appeal. that State 5 1 9 , 602 P.2d 6 1 6 , 618. The f i r s t State rights by the of summarily Defendant a r g u e s c o u r t system t o a p p o i n t c o u n s e l f o r him, when i t was a p p a r e n t he was i n d i g e n t and h i s t r i a l c o u r t c o u n s e l was n o t p u r s u i n g h i s c a s e , f l a g r a n t v i o l a t i o n of h i s r i g h t s . was a The S t a t e c o n t e n d s t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s " t r i a l s and t r i b u l a t i o n s " i n o b t a i n i n g a n a p p e a l a r e i r r e l e v a n t and t h a t t h e o n l y i s s u e s b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t a r e i s s u e s t h a t would have been p r e s e n t e d i n a n immediate a p p e a l of t h i s c a s e . If t h i s C o u r t were t o f o l l o w t h e S t a t e ' s r e a s o n i n g , we would be b l i n d i n g o u r s e l v e s t o t h e f a c t t h a t d u r i n g t h e ten years defendant s a t in prison his rights violated. To s a y t h a t t h o s e t e n y e a r s a r e i r r e l e v a n t t o t h e c a s e b e f o r e us is t o i g n o r e a l o n g l i n e of Supreme cases Court acknowledging that and Federal neither an States Court cases court c o u n s e l may " s a b o t a g e " an a p p e a l by i n a c t i o n , is appeal thought to be without merit. being United District appellate were nor trial even i f See, the Miller v. McCarthy ( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 7 9 ) , 607 F.2d 854, 857, and c a s e s c i t e d therein. I n t h e landmark c a s e of Gideon v. Wainwright ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. concluded that 792, 9 L.Ed.2d appointment of 799, t h e Supreme C o u r t counsel for an indigent c r i m i n a l d e f e n d a n t was a " f u n d a m e n t a l r i g h t , e s s e n t i a l t o a fair trial," and a p p o i n t m e n t of that the Fourteenth Amendment requires counsel i n a s t a t e c o u r t , j u s t a s t h e S i x t h Amendment r e q u i r e s i t i n a f e d e r a l c o u r t . 372 U.S. In a sister ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. Gideon "federal case, holding 814, to Douglas v. 9 L.Ed.2d the California 811, the Court appellate process, c o u r t s must honor h i s a t 340. applied stating the that [the indigent defendant's] r e q u e s t f o r c o u n s e l r e g a r d l e s s of what t h e y t h i n k t h e m e r i t s of the case may be; and 'representation in the role of an advocate is required.' Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 675." rule 372 U . S . to at 357. 674, The Court went on to apply this the California Supreme Court, which had denied appellants' petitions for appeal without a hearing, stating: ". . . The present case, where counsel was denied petitioners on appeal, shows that the discrimination is not between ' possibly good and obviously bad cases,' but between cases where the rich man can require the court to listen to argument of counsel before deciding on the merits, but a poor man cannot. There is lacking that equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment where the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit of counsel's examination into the record, research of the law, and marshalling of arguments on his behalf, while the indigent, already burdened by a preliminary determination that his case is without merit, is forced to shift for himself. The indigent, where the record is unclear or the errors are hidden, has only the right to a meaningless ritual, while the rich man has a meaningful appeal." 372 U.S. at 357. Under such case law, defendant, as an indigent, clearly had the right to have counsel on appeal. Nevertheless, an even more important question before this Court is whether the court system undermined his right to counsel by informally and summarily denying his appeal. Clearly, it has. In Anders v. California S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d (1967), 386 U.S. 738, 87 493, the United States Supreme Court was confronted with a case very similar to the one now before us. In Anders the court-appointed counsel for an indigent defendant thought there was no merit indigent's appeal. to the The appointed counsel wrote a letter to California's District Court of Appeals, expressing his opinion that the indigent's appeal was without merit. The California court affirmed the conviction after examining the record. The Supreme C o u r t of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s s t a t e d t h a t such a procedure . 'I. .smacks of t h e t r e a t m e n t t h a t E s k r i d g e r e c e i v e d , which t h i s C o u r t condemned, t h a t p e r m i t t e d a t r i a l judge t o w i t h h o l d a t r a n s c r i p t i f he found t h a t a d e f e n d a n t ' h a s been a c c o r d e d a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l t r i a l , and i n t h e C o u r t ' s o p i n i o n no g r a v e o r p r e j u d i c i a l E s k r i d g e v. Washe r r o r s occurred ,therein. ' i n g t o n S t a t e Board, 357 U.S. 214, 215 ( 1 9 5 8 ) . Such a p r o c e d u r e , t h i s C o u r t s a i d , ' c a n n o t be an a d e q u a t e s u b s t i t u t e f o r t h e r i g h t t o f u l l , a p p e l l a t e review a v a i l a b l e t o a l l d e f e n d a n t s who may n o t be a b l e t o a f f o r d s u c h a n e x p e n s e 386 U.S. a t 742-743. . . ." The C o u r t t h e n went on t o o u t l i n e what p r o c e d u r e s would be c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n s u c h a c a s e : "The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t of s u b s t a n t i a l e q u a l i t y and f a i r p r o c e s s can o n l y be a t t a i n e d where c o u n s e l a c t s i n t h e r o l e of a n a c t i v e a d v o c a t e i n b e h a l f of h i s c l i e n t , a s opposed t o t h a t of amicus c u r i a e . The nom e r i t l e t t e r and t h e p r o c e d u r e i t t r i g g e r s d o not reach t h a t d i g n i t y . Counsel s h o u l d , and c a n w i t h honor and w i t h o u t c o n f l i c t , be of more a s s i s t a n c e t o h i s c l i e n t and t o t h e c o u r t . H i s r o l e a s a d v o c a t e r e q u i r e s t h a t he s u p p o r t h i s c l i e n t ' s a p p e a l t o t h e b e s t of h i s ability. Of c o u r s e , i f c o u n s e l f i n d s h i s c a s e t o be w h o l l y f r i v o l o u s , a f t e r a cons c i e n t i o u s e x a m i n a t i o n of i t , he s h o u l d s o a d v i s e t h e c o u r t and r e q u e s t p e r m i s s i o n t o withdraw. T h a t r e q u e s t must, however, be accompanied by a b r i e f r e f e r r i n g t o a n y t h i n g i n t h e r e c o r d t h a t might a r g u a b l y s u p p o r t t h e appeal. A copy of c o u n s e l ' s b r i e f s h o u l d be f u r n i s h e d t h e i n d i g e n t and t i m e a l l o w e d him t o r a i s e any p o i n t s t h a t he c h o o s e s ; t h e court--not counsel--then proceeds, a f t e r a f u l l e x a m i n a t i o n of a l l t h e p r o c e e d i n g s , t o d e c i d e whether t h e c a s e is wholly f r i v o l o u s . I f it s o f i n d s i t may g r a n t c o u n s e l ' s r e q u e s t t o withdraw and d i s m i s s t h e a p p e a l i n s o f a r a s f e d e r a l requirements a r e concerned, or proc e e d t o a d e c i s i o n on t h e m e r i t s , i f s t a t e law s o r e q u i r e s . On t h e o t h e r hand, i f i t f i n d s any of t h e l e g a l p o i n t s a r g u a b l e on t h e i r m e r i t s (and t h e r e f o r e not f r i v o l o u s ) it must, p r i o r t o d e c i s i o n , a f f o r d t h e i n d i g e n t t h e a s s i s t a n c e of c o u n s e l t o a r g u e t h e appeal." 386 U.S. a t 744. Here, d e f e n d a n t ' s c o u n s e l n o t o n l y b e l i e v e d d e f e n d a n t had no g r o u n d s f o r a p p e a l , b u t a l s o t o l d d e f e n d a n t he had filed a notice of appeal when, in fact, he had not. More- over , defendantls appeal was prevented by this Court by an informal process condemned by the Anders Court. The State claims that all these errors have been cured because we now grant defendant his right to appeal. We cannot agree in light of the other errors arising out of defendant's trial; errors that include, most blatantly, the issuance of an improper Sandstrom-type instruction, and that cumulatively resulted in an unfair trial of the defendant. In Parker v. Crist (1980), 484, 37 St.Rep. - Mont. -, 621 P.2d 2048, this Court upheld a Sandstrom-type instruction identical to the one in this case. Our reason- ing was based on three grounds: (1) the instruction itself was a permissive inference and not a conclusive presumption; (2) the instructions as a whole made it clear that the State would bear the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every essential element of the crimes charged; and (3) the error, if any, was harmless because the evidence of the requisite intent was overwhelming. 621 P.2d at 486-487. In State v. Lundblade (1981), P.2d 545, 38 St.Rep. Parker, stating 441, we ". . . we limited our . , 625 reasoning in Mont cannot say that the circumstances making the instruction permissible in Parker occurred in the instant case, nor do we know for certain that the United States Supreme Court would find this instruction to be constitutional in this case in light of Sandstrom v. Montana (1979), 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 239." 625 P.2d at 549. Here, two of the alleviating factors listed in Parker do not exist. The instructions, as a whole, fail to place t h e f u l l b u r d e n o f p r o o f o n t h e S t a t e , and t h e e v i d e n c e of S~ i n t e n t is h a r d l y " o ~ e r w h e l m i n g . ~ e e a l s o , S t a t e v . H a m i l t o n , ( 1 9 8 0 ) f - Mont. S t a t e v. Dolan St.Hep. 605 P.2d (1980), 1121, Mont 37 S t . R e p . 70, and . , 355, 37 620 P.2d 1860. Here, 628 P.2d 263, considered viewed as i n S t a t e v. 38 S t . R e p . harmless the 578Q, because instruction Kyle as (1981), the the Mont. I i n s t r u c t i o n cannot be jury mandatory, could and have easily because mental s t a t e was a c r u c i a l f a c t u a l q u e s t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y i n l i g h t o f t h e f a c t t h a t d e f e n d a n t was c l a i m i n g t h e i n s a n i t y d e f e n s e . Such an e r r o r , remand. We in itself, a l s o note, however, is c a u s e f o r r e v e r s a l a n d that the trial itself did n o t meet t h e f a i r n e s s a n d d u e p r o c e s s s t a n d a r d s p r o v i d e d f o r i n Art. 11, S e c t i o n s 1 7 a n d 24, 1 9 7 2 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . T h i s case i s s i m i l a r t o S t a t e v . M i c k e l s o n ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 1 7 2 Mont. 489, 565 P.2d 308, w h e r e w e s t a t e d : ". . . The s e a r c h f o r t r u t h was l e s s t h a n v i g o r o u s b y c o u n s e l i n t h i s m a t t e r and t h i s w r i t e r f e e l s t h a t , p a r t i c u l a r l y on a b e n c h t r i a l , t h e judge h a s t h e i n h e r e n t power, r i g h t a n d y e s , d u t y , t o s u a s p o n t e demand t h a t a s e a r c h f o r t h e t r u t h be exhausted b e f o r e t h e matter b e a c c e p t e d f o r d e c i s i o n . Otherwise, t h e d e f e n d a n t , as h e r e , h a s been d e n i e d a f a i r t r i a l and d u e p r o c e s s u n d e r Art. 11, Section 24, 1972 Montana Constitution." 565 P.2d a t 311. We therefore reverse the judgment of t h e District Court. D e f e n d a n t a r g u e s t h a t a new t r i a l would b e i m p o s s i b l e b e c a u s e t h e p h y s i c a l e v i d e n c e was d e s t r o y e d i n 1 9 7 9 . theless, Never- n o t knowing w h a t e v i d e n c e s t i l l e x i s t s , w e remand t o g i v e t h e S t a t e t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o r e t r y t h e r a p e case if s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e is a v a i l a b l e . T h i s is n o t t r u e o f the a s s a u l t case, a s t h e six-year long s i n c e been s a t i s f i e d . W concur: e ?&T?ji%&d Chief J u s t i c e *a .. sentence i n that cause has
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