GOODNOUGH v STATE

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No. 81-195 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1982 GREGORY K. GOODNOUGH and COREY McMILLAN , Plaintiffs and Appellants, VS . STATE OF MONTANA, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, In and for the County of Flathead Honorable Robert Sykes, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: William A. Rossbach argued, Missoula, Montana Hoyt and Trieweiler, Whitefish, Montana For Respondent: Murphy, Robinson, Heckathorn & Phillips, Kalispell, Montana I. James Heckathorn argued, Kalispell, Montana Submitted: February 23, 1982 Filed: JuL I- 1982 Decided: J u s t i c e Gene B . Mr. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f t h e C o u r t . T h i s i s an a p p e a l o f an a c t i o n i n n e g l i g e n c e a g a i n s t t h e S t a t e o f Montana, a r i s i n g o u t o f a c a r a c c i d e n t i n w h i c h plaintiffs' a left c a r was s t r u c k by a p a s s i n g v e h i c l e w h i l e making turn. Plaintiffs brought this action against the d r i v e r of t h e p a s s i n g v e h i c l e , Rodney K l u d a s h , and t h e S t a t e of The p l a i n t i f f s Montana. sett-led with ceeded t o t r i a l a g a i n s t t h e S t a t e . Kludash b u t pro- The j u r y r e t u r n e d a v e r - d i c t f o r t h e S t a t - e , and a judgment b a s e d on t h i s v e r d i c t was i s s u e d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t o f t r i c t , F l a t h e a d Count-y. On November 9, The p l a i n t i f f s a p p e a l . 1 9 7 6 , a t about. 4:30 l a n t . ~ ,t w o high school boys, 93 from W h i t e f i s h , Happy V a l l e y . the highway As into Mont-ana, appellant the t h e Eleventh J u d i c i a l D i s - p.m., w e r e d r i v i n g s o u t h on Highway to a rural subdivision called McMillan was t u r n i n g subdivision, semi-comatose pelvis, state off Both a p p e l l a n t s Goodnough had a b a d l y b r o k e n McMillan was femur which r e q u i r e d n e a r l y a f u l l body c a s t . . in a left h i s c a r was s t r u c k by a p a s s i n g v e h i c l e d r i v e n by Rodney K l u d a s h . incurred substant-ial i n juries. the appel- f o r s e v e r a l weeks, had a crushed and i n c u r r e d many p r o b l e m s wit.h h i s t r a c h e a when a t r a c h e o s t o m y was p e r f o r m e d i n t h e h o s p i t a l . Happy V a l l e y s u b d i v i s i o n i s a b o u t s i x m i l e s sout-h o f Whitefish. The i n t e r s e c t ion between t.he road leading t-o Happy V a l l e y and Highway 93 i s 1 , 0 5 1 f e e t f r o m t h e c r e s t o f a h i l l . The r o a d i s s t r a i g h t , and on t.he d a y o f t h e a c c i d e n t i t was c l e a r and d r y . Double y e l l o w , no p a s s i n g s t r i p e s yo u p t h e h i l l p r e c e d i n g t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n and c o n t i n u e p a s t . t h e intersect-ion. Seven h u n d r e d feet before the intersection t h e r e is a t r a f f i c s i g n warning of a p e d e s t r i a n c r o s s i n g . Tne p l a l n t i f f s c o n t e n d by using only double d r i v e r s of passing. hazardous nature that yellow, no the S t a t e was negligent passing stripes to warn They c l a i m t h e S t a t e had n o t i c e o f t h e of the Happy Valley intersection and, t h e r e f o r e , was u n d e r a d u t y t o p u t up a no p a s s i n g s i g n , a n i n t e r s e c t i o n s i g n , o r a t u r n bay f o r l e f t - t u r n i n g cars. expert f o r the p l a i n t i f f s t e s t i f i e d the State was a w a r e of t h e h i g h number of intersection, passing it stripes effective. should have commanded t h a t because An accidents reported a t t h i s known little that the respect The p l a i n t i f f s c l a i m t h a t the yellow, and were no not State created a " t r a p " f o r unwary d r i v e r s . The accident State itself, emphasizes claiming t h a t the facts surrounding any l i a b i l i t y of the the State, i f a n y , was cut. o f f by t h e s u p e r s e d i n g c a u s e o f t h e p a s s i n g vehicle. The S t a t e p r e s e n t e d the passing vehicle, 100 m i l e s l e v e l of trict per hour evidence that. the d r i v e r of K l u d a s h , was t r a v e l i n g b e t w e e n 7 5 and and that Kludash .08 p e r c e n t a t t h e time of Court allowed had a blood the accident. i n t o evidence testimony t h a t alcohol The D i s - Kludash' s c a r was s e e n p a r k e d a l o n g s i d e t h e r o a d o u t s i d e o f W h i t e f i s h , and s e v e r a l of the car's o c c u p a n t s were o u t s i d e r e l i e v i n g themselves. At the t r i a l , the District i n s t r u c t i o n on s u p e r s e d i n g , Court gave t h e following intervening cause: "The l a w r e c o g n i z e s what i s c a l l e d a s u p e r A s u p e r s e d i n g c a u s e is a n seding cause. intervening cause not reasonably f o r e s e e a b l e t h a t c u t s o f f t h e c a u s a l c o n n e c t i o n between t h e a l l e g e d o r i g i n a l n e g l i g e n c e and t h e i n j u r y c o m p l a i n e d o f and t h e r e b y p r e v e n t s t h e a l l e g e d o r i g i n a l n e g l i g e n c e from being a As applied t o t h i s proximate cause t h e r e o f . c a s e , t h e l a w p r o v i d e s t h a t i f you s h o u l d f i n d t h a t t h e S t a t e o f Montana was n e g l i g e n t and t h e S t a t e ' s n e y l i g e n c e was a c o n t r i b u t i n g f a c t o r t o t h e p l a i n t . i f f s l i n j u r i e s , but that. t h e n e g l i g e n c e o f Rodney ~ l u d a s hwas a s u p e r seding cause, then such superseding cause p r e v e n t s any n e g l i g e n c e of t h e S t a t e o f Montana from b e i n g a p r o x i m a t e c a u s e o f claimants' injuries." J u r y I n s t r u c t i o n No. 14. After beginning deliberation, the jury evidently became c o n f u s e d a s t o t h e meaning o f " s u p e r s e d i n g " and w r o t e t h e t r i a l ludge t h i s note: i n I n s t r u c t i o n No. "We d o n o t u n d e r s t a n d s u p e r s e d i n g 1 4 . " The j u d g e r e f u s e d t o g i v e t h e j u r o r s a d i c t i o n a r y and a d v i s e d t h e j u r o r s t o e x a m i n e and c o n s i d e r all of the other instructions along with No. 14 and, in d o i n g s o , a p p l y t h e i r judgment t o t h e f a c t s . After deliberation, which included a n o v e r n i g h t re- c e s s , t h e j u r y s e n t down a v e r d i c t f o r t h e S t a t e . 'l'he appellants present basically four issues on review: Whether t h e j u r y was so c o n f u s e d by t h e i n s t r u c - 1. t i o n s on p r o x i m a t e c a u s e t h a t a v e r d i c t f o r a p p e 1 l a n t . s was impossible. 2. evidence Whether that the District occupants of Court the erred Kludash by car admitting were seen r e l i e v i n g themselves. 3. Whether a highway patrolman was compet.ent t.o e s t i m a t e t h e s p e e d o f t.he Kludash v e h i c l e . 4. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d in prohibiting counsel f o r appellant-s to q u e s t ion p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s about their beliefs, as taxpayers, concerning their financial i n t e r e s t . i n t h e outcome o f t.he c a s e . Appellants' jury major contention of error is that the was so c o n f u s e d by t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s t h a t a v e r d i c t f o r them was made i m p o s s i b l e . S p e c i f i c a l l y , a p p e l l a n t s contend t h a t . Instruction No. 1 4 was incomplete, c a u s e was n o t p r o p e r l y d e f i n e d , i n t h a t superseding and c a u s e d p r e j u d i c i a l con- fusion i n the jury. A p p e l l a n t s contend t h a t t h e c o n f u s i o n of t h i s incom- p l e t e d e f i n i t i o n was compounded by t h e g i v i n g of I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 2 which p r o v i d e s : " A p l a i n t i f f who i s i n j u r e d a s a p r o x i m a t e r e s u l t o f some n e g l i g e n t c o n d u c t on t h e p a r t o f a d e f e n d a n t i s e n t i t l e d t o r e c o v e r compens a t i o n f o r s u c h i n j u r y from t h a t d e f e n d a n t . "Thus, P l a i n t i f f s a r e e n t i t l e d t o a v e r d i c t i n t h i s c a s e i f you f i n d , i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h my i n s t r u c t i o n s : "1. T h a t D e f e n d a n t was n e g l i g e n t , and "2. T h a t s u c h n e g l i g e n c e was a p r o x i m a t e c a u s e o f i n j u r y t o t h e p l a i n t i f f s , and "3. T h a t s u c h n e g l i g e n c e was n o t s u p e r s e d e d by t h e n e g l i g e n c e o f o t h e r s a s d e f i n e d i n these instructions." A p p e l l a n t s c l a i m t h a t t h i s c o n f u s i o n could have been a l l e v i a t e d by t h e g i v i n g o f t h e i r proposed i n s t r u c t i o n no. " I f you f i n d t h a t t h e D e f e n d a n t S t a t e o f Montana was n e g l i g e n t and t h a t i t s n e g l i g e n c e was a s u b s t a n t i a l f a c t o r i n b r i n g i n g a b o u t a n i n j u r y t o t h e P l a i n t i f f s b u t t h a t t h e immedia t e c a u s e o f t h e i n j u r y was t h e n e g l i g e n t conduct of a t h i r d person t h e Defendant is n o t r e l i e v e d of l i a b i l i t y f o r such i n j u r y i f : I t i . A t t h e t i m e of its conduct Defendant r e a l i z e d o r reasonably should have r e a l i z e d t h a t a t h i r d p e r s o n m i g h t a c t a s he d i d ; "2. A r e a s o n a b l e p e r s o n knowing t.he s i t u a t i o n e x i s t i n g a t t h e t i m e of t h e conduct o f t.he t h i r d p e r s o n would n o t h a v e r e g a r d e d i t a s highly extraordinary t h a t t h e t h i r d person had s o a c t e d . ' I It i s w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d i n Montana t h a t when i n s t r u c - tions are inconsistent would confuse the or average contradictory juror, to reversal a degree is that required. Brothers v. Surplus Mont.. 412, 506 also ruled that whole, Tractor P.2d 1362, where Parts 1364. the Corporation However, jury (1973), this instructions, 161 Court has taken as a s t a t e t h e law a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e c a s e , a p a r t y c a n n o t claim reversible e r r o r a s t o the giving of c e r t a i n instruct ions. , our Kock S p r i n g s C o r p o r a t i o n v. 615 P.2d 2 0 6 , 211, sister court. i n 37 S t . K e p . Idaho, 1378, 1383. - Mon t.. A s not-ed by when c o n s i d e r i n g j u r y i t m u s t b e remembered tions, Pierre ( 1980), that often a jury instruc- is deluged wit-h numerous i n s t r u c t i o n s , many o f w h i c h a t t e m p t t o e x p l a i n complex q u e s t i o n s o f l a w . The c o u r t . o n r e v i e w m u s t t h e r e f o r e t.he p o s s i b l e c o n £ u s i o n c r e a t e d by l a y e r upon l a y e r balance o f i n s t r u c t - i o n s and t h e n e c e s s i t y o f p r o v i d i n g t h e a p p r o p r i ate legal theories. Ker ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 96 I d a h o 75, Messmer v. 524 B e c a u s e t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s g i v e n by t h e D i s t r l c t C o u r t are not inconsistent or contradictory, and because they r e f l e c t , i n s u b s t a n c e , t h e a p p l i c a b l e Montana l a w , we c a n n o t say that the a p p e l l a n t s were prejudiced by the giving of these instructions. In Halsey v. 686, we discussed Uithof the superseding-intervening ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 1 6 6 Mont. rules cause of and 319, concurrent. how they 532 P.2d cause and to the relate d e t e r m i n a t i o n of p r o x i m a t e c a u s e : "We a g r e e w i t h t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t w h e r e o n e has n e g l i g e n t l y caused a c o n d i t i o n of danger, h e is n o t r e l i e v e d o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r damage c a u s e d t o a n o t h e r m e r e l y b e c a u s e t h e i n j u r y a l s o involved t h e l a t e r misconduct of But, t h i s is t r u e o n l y i f both someone e l s e . negligent a c t s a r e i n f a c t concurring proxim a t e c a u s e s o f t h e i n j u r y ; and i t i s n o t t r u e i f t h e l a t e r n e g l i g e n c e is a n independent, intervening s o l e cause of t h e incident. [Citation omitted. 1 " I n determining whether t h e negligence i n c r e a t i n g a h a z a r d ( t h e t r u c k s t a l l e d on t h e h i g h w a y ) was a p r o x i m a t e c a u s e o f t h e a c c i Did t h e d e n t , t h i s t e s t i s t o be a p p l i e d : w r o n g f u l a c t , i n a n a t u r a l c o n t i n u o u s sequence of event-s, which m i g h t r e a s o n a b l y b e expected t o follow, produce t h e i n j u r y ? If s o , it is a c o n c u r r i n g proximate c a u s e o f t h e i n j u r y even though t h e l a t e r n e g l i g e n t a c t o f another cooperated t o cause it. On t h e o t h e r hand, i f t h e l a t t e r ' s act of n e g l i g e n c e i n causing t h e accident w a s of such a charact e r a s not reasonably t o be e x p e c t e d t o happen i n t h e n a t u r a l sequence of events, then such later a c t of nealiaence is t h e i n d e ~ e n d ----- t e r v e n i n g -c a u s e a n d t h e r e f o - t h e r e-e n t , i n -s o l e proximate cause of t h e iniury. [Citat . i o n s A o m i t t e d . ] " 532 P.2d at. 6901691. ... Here, is an cause that I n s t r u c t i o n No. "intervening cuts off the 14 p r o v i d e s t h a t a superseding cause causal not. r e a s o n a b l y connection foreseeable between the alleged o r i g i n a l n e g l i g e n c e and t h e i n j u r y c o m p l a i n e d o f and t h e r e b y prevents the alleged original proximate cause t h e r e o f est nor best t.hat t h e language possible, intervening cause injury Montana sized if case the was it law h a s not being of it. s t a t e s the essentially the In Halsey we s t a t e d , in effect, is t h e s o l e proximate cause o f reasonably followed importance from While t h i s i s n e i t h e r t h e c l e a r - s e t down i n H a l s e y . rules the ." negligence this foreseeable. Other p r o p o s i t - i o n and foreseeabi1it.y in empha- determining whether an i n t e r v e n i n g cause is t h e s o l e proximate cause o f injury. 1 8 1 Mont. v. 1 0 2 , 592 P.2d 493, 36 S t .Rep. Eby ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 1 5 9 Mont.. 1 4 6 , 496 P.2d We no. S t a t e , Dept.. o f S e e S c h a f e r v. 12 cannot would applicat-ion of t h i s case. see have how p l a i n t i f f s ' a l l e v i a t - e d any t-hese complex Plaintiffs' legal proposed Institutions (1979), 560; and D e V e r n i e r o 290. proposed instruction confusion arising rules the to i n s t r u c t i o n no. from facts of 12 merely p a r a p h r a s e s t h e Restatement on T o r t s , w h i l e I n s t r u c t i o n N o . 14 r e f l e c t s p r i o r Montana l a w . t i o n of s u p e r s e d i n g c a u s e . It did not contain a defini- The D i s t r i c t C o u r t was t h e r e f o r e n o t i n e r r o r by r e f u s i n g t h i s p r o p o s e d i n s t r u c t i o n . B e c a u s e a p p e l l a n t s w e r e n o t p r e j u d i c e d by I n s t r u c t i o n No. 14 and the other inst-ructions given to t.he jury, we c a n n o t s a y t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d by g i v i n g I n s t r u c t i o n Nos. 1 2 and 1 4 . I t s h o u l d be n o t e d here t h a t the appellants did not put i n t h e i r b r i e f s a verbatim t e x t of t h e j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s In t h e f u t u r e , w e r e q u e s t which t h e y c l a i m e d were i n e r r o r . that when an a p p e l l a n t r e l i e s on e r r o r a r i s i n g o u t o f the issuance of jury i n s t r u c t i o n s , he should set f o r t h t h e t e x t the oi instructions in the brief, as well as the c o u r t ' s r u l i n g on t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s and a n y r e l a t e d trial instruc- t i o n s t h e a p p e l l a n t . c l a i m s s h o u l d have been g i v e n . The a p p e l l a n t s next. cant-end t - h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d by a d m i t t i n g t h e t e s t i m o n y o f a p p e l l a n t Goodnough t h a t he had seen the Kludash car parked south of W h i t e f i s h on Highway 93 with persons o u t s i d e t h e c a r going t o t h e bath- roolu. Appellants claim probative value because that t o o remote also claim that its the probative is t h e c a r and b e c a u s e t h e from t h e s c e n e o f that testimony without i t is i m p o s s i b l e t o i d e n t i f y which o c c u p a n t s were o u t s i d e o f was such testimony value, if the accident. was so highly any, was incident Appellants inflammatory outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Dist-rict The because i t was the driver . . Under Court relevant . and Rule admitted ". . . Goodnough's testimony t o t h e mental condition of a l s o a s t o speed of t h e v e h i c l e 401, Mont .R. E v i d . , relevant. . . ." evidence is " e v i d e n c e h a v i n g a n y t e n d e n c y t o make fact is that of consequence to a c t i o n more o r l e s s p r o b a b l e evidence ." relevant t h e exis-kence of determination of the than any the i t would be w i t h o u t the The s p e e d o f t h e K l u d a s h v e h i c l e was d e f i n i t e l y t o showing whether the appellants' it w a s a superseding cause of T h a t t h e c a r w a s p a r k e d a number injuries. o f m i l e s away f r o m t h e a c c l d e n t a n d t h a t i t c a u g h t up w i t h t h e McMillan v e h i c l e i s t h e r e f o r e r e l e v a n t and p r o b a t i v e t o an issue i n t h i s case. Under be e x c l u d e d Rule 403, if Mont . K . E v i d . , its probative value prejudice o r confusion of S t a t e v. support Bischert their the relevant i s o u t w e i g h e d by u n f a i r issues. ( 1 9 5 7 ) , 1 3 1 Mont. argument that e v i d e n c e may The a p p e l l a n t s c i t e 152, 969, to testimony Goodnough's 308 P.2d was so i n f l a m m a t o r y t h a t it s h o u l d h a v e b e e n e x c l u d e d . In Bischert thls of Court the discussed photographs of a prejudicial five-month-old baby nature who had , gruesome starved to B i s c h e r t is n o t a p p l i c a b l e h e r e . death. The t e s t i m o n y o f appellants; While it it may Goodnough i s n o t p r e j u d i c i a l t o t h e i s no r e f l e c t i o n o n them o r t h e i r be considered somewhat actions. prejudicial toward K l u d a s h and t h e o c c u p a n t s o f h i s c a r , w e a r e n o t c o n c e r n e d with them testimony, value here. The i f any, prejudicial nature of Goodnoughls i s t h e r e f o r e outweighed by ~ t probative s . 'The appellants1 third issue 1s whether Highway P a t r o l m a n J a c o b s e n was c o m p e t e n t t o t e s t i f y a s t o t h e s p e e d of the Court Kludash vehicle. recognizes the A p p e l l a n t s acknowledge competency of that this a highway p a t r o l m a n to y l v e h i s c a l c u l a t i o n s o f t h e speed o f a v e h i c l e b a s e d o n t h e v e h i c l e ' s s k i d marks. A p p e l l a n t s c l a i m , however, t h a t e s t i - mating speed i n a complicat-ed c o l l i s i o n r e q u i r e s t r a i n i n g i n p h y s i c s and mechanics which highway p a t r o l m e n d o n o t h a v e . See, D e a v e r v. Hickox ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 8 1 Ill.App.2d 79, 224 N.E.2d 4611. T h i s Court h a s long held t h e st-andard t h a t t h e d e t e r mination of t h e q u a l i f i c a t i o n of a s k i l l e d o r e x p e r t w i t n e s s is a m a t t e r l a r g e l y w i t h i n t h e d i s c r e t i o n o f t h e t r i a l judge and, not i n t h e a b s e n c e o f a showing o f be 270, Graham v. disturbed. 435 P.2d ( 1 9 8 0 )I 263; Workman Mont. Rolandson v. ordinarily w i l l abuse, (1967), McIntyre 1 5 0 Mont. Construction 617 P . 2 d 1 2 8 1 , 37 St..Rep. more e x t e n s i v e d i s c u s s i o n see 29 ALR3d 248. Co. 1637; f o r More i m p o r t - a n t - l y , i n a v e r y s i m i l a r c a s e i n v o l v i n g t h e same t y p e o f c o l l i sion, w e s p e c i f i c a l l y a l l o w e d e x p e r t . t-estimony o f a h i g h w a y p a t - r o l m a n c o n c e r n i n g t h e c a u s e o f t h e a c c i d e n t . and v e h i c u l a r speed. ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 1 6 5 Mont. See, Rude v . Neal Here, Highway Patrolman 520, 530 P.2d 428. Jacobsen testified had b e e n a h i g h w a y p a t r o l m a n f o r t w e l v e y e a r s , gated about 1,500 investigation, length of skid accidents, including marks - Mont.. the 612 P.2d cross-examiner how and r e c o g n i z e d i n W o l l a s t o n v. and to damage had speed 1277, accident from automobiles. Burlington Northern, 37 S t . R e p . he had i n v e s t i - t~raining in estimate to that Inc. As the we ( 1980) , 1015, a s long a s is g i v e n a d e q u a t e o p p o r t u n i t y t o e l i c i t any assumptions o r f a c t s underlying an e x p e r t ' s o p i n i o n , t h e w e i g h t to be g i v e n t h e e x p e r t ' s t e s t i m o n y is f o r t h e j u r y t o det-ermine. A s not.ed by t.he D i s t r i c t C o u r t , not a d m i s s i b i l i t y of one of t h e q u e s t i o n is t h e pat.rolmanls test-imony, b u t t h e welcjht ~t 1s g l v e n . not The D i s t r l c t C o u r t , therefore, dld e r r by a l l o w i n g t h e hlghway p a t r o l m a n t o t e s t i f y a s t o t h e speed of t h e Kludash v e h i c l e . Finally, a p p e l l a n t s contend that the District Court e r r e d i n not allowing counsel f o r t h e a p p e l l a n t s to q u e s t i o n prospective jurors about as t a x p a y e r s , their beliefs, c e r n i n g t h e financial o u t c o m e o f t h e c a s e . Yost ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 1 8 2 Mont. 28, 594 P.2d 688, con- In Borkoski v. 809, w e 36 St.Rep. h e l d t h a t t h e £ a l l u r e t o p e r m i t v o i r d i r e on i s s u e s r e l a t i n g is h a r m l e s s e r r o r where t h e j u r y t o damages the plaintiff however, on the issue of finds against W e liability. did not, r u l e t h a t i t was n o t e r r o r . I n K e l t h v . L i b e r t y C o u n t y Hosp. Mont . , 598 P.2d 203, N u r s . Home ( 1 9 7 9 ) , & St.Kep. 36 1378, the jury d e c i d e d a g a i n s t t h e p l a i n t i f f o n t h e i s s u e o f l i a b i l i t y , and the plaintiff c o n t e n d e d on a p p e a l t h a t s h e s h o u l d h a v e b e e n g r a n t e d a c h a n g e o f v e n u e b e c a u s e m o s t o f t h e members o f t h e lury panel interest hospital. in were the We county outcome held that taxpayers of the who action plaintiff's a had pecuniary against motion the for county change of v e n u e was u n t i m e l y b u t s t a t e d t h a t t h i s C o u r t h a s p r e v i o u s l y held that taxpayer status appears qualification. It ~ n t e r p r e t i n g our holdings dlre on this subject is n o t a that ground the a s messages should not be for juror courts trial that disare think voir we permitted. To the c o n t r a r y , we t h i n k t h e t r i a l c o u r t s s h o u l d p e r m i t t h i s t y p e of v o i r d i r e i f e i t h e r p a r t y requests it. A l t h o u g h t h e s i t u a t i o n may n o t o f t e n o c c u r , we c a n n o t overlook the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t prospective jurors, their i n t e r e s t s as t a x p a y e r s , might not want because of t o reach the issue of ddrnayes and therefore on t-he i s s u e o f plaintiff might liability. decide against the W e c a n s e e no harm i n p e r m i t t i n g v o i r d i r e on t h e i s s u e o f d a m a g e s , and p e r m i s s i o n by t h e t r i a l c o u r t s w i l l d i s p o s e o f t h e r e c u r r i n g p r o b l e m o f whether the failure to since the permit t.he voir dire is harmless error. Here, defendant error and must reversal. be did not jury reach considered ret-urned the a verdict q u e s t i o n of harmless and not for the damages, the grounds for S e e , B o r k o s k i , s u p r a ; R u l e 6 1 , M. R. C i v . P . Having found no prejudicial error, t h e D l s t r i c t Court is a £ f irmed. the judgment 2 ' ,' I d w concur : e District. Judge, s i t t i n g i n p l a c e o f M r . J u s t i c e F r a n k B. M o r r i s o n , Jr . of

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