MARRIAGE OF LAWRENCE
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No. 81-356 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1982 IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF JOHN CARLYLE LAWRENCE, Petitioner and Respondent, and SHARON M. LAWRENCE, Respondent and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and for the County of Missoula, Honorable Jack L. Green, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Ferguson & Mitchell, Missoula, Montana Kinsey & Lashlee, Long Beach, California For Respondent: Datsopoulos, MacDonald & Lind, Missoula, Montana Submitted on briefs: February 2, 1982 Decided : Filed: MAR 2 2 1982 Clerk Ivlr. J u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n the Court. This appeal trict, County o f a r i s e s o u t of Missoula, directing the wife to agreement that had been 1 9 7 6 and incorporated delivered the the Fourth Judicial S t a t e of Montana, specifically entered with of Dis- from a n o r d e r perform into Opinion a the separation husband i n t o t h e d i s s o l u t i o n decree of in April S p e c i f i c performance c o n s i s t e d of w i f e ' s e x e c u t- 27, 1976. ing quitclaim deeds which a c l o u d t o for certain mining properties, upon t i t l e a p p a r e n t l y e x i s t e d b e c a u s e t h e y had a t o n e t i m e b e e n h e l d by t h e p a r t i e s a s h u s b a n d and w i f e . The w i f e responded t o her husband's f i c p e r f o r m a n c e by r e q u e s t i n g , among o t h e r suit for speci- things, that the 1976 p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t be s e t a s i d e a s u n c o n s c i o n a b l e and a f r a u d on July and the court. August, Two l e n g t h y h e a r i n g s were 1980, followed by the held court's in order d i r e c t i n g t h e w i f e t o s i g n t h e d e e d s and d e n y i n g h e r m o t i o n to s e t aside the property settlement. The w i f e s e t s f o r t h o n l y two i s s u e s t o be c o n s i d e r e d . The husband sets forth five g e s t e d two, which we f i n d more p r o p e r d i s c u s s i o n of t h e c a s e . 1. i s s u e s o u t of the wife's i n c l u s i v e and useful sugfor a Those i s s u e s a r e : Should t h e t r i a l c o u r t have s e t a s i d e t h e d e c r e e of d i s s o l u t i o n e n t e r e d i n t h i s m a t t e r on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t i t was o b t a i n e d by a f r a u d on t h e c o u r t ? 2. Is t h e s e p a r a t i o n a g r e e m e n t e n t e r e d i n t o by t h e p a r t i e s unconscionable? 3. Is t h e separation agreement c o n t r a r y t o public pol icy? 4. I s t h e w i f e ' s a t t a c k on t h e d e c r e e o f d i s s o l u t i o n b a r r e d by l a c h e s ? Should 5. t h e d e c r e e of the trial c o u r t have refused to d i s s o l u t i o n on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t enforce t h e husband came b e f o r e i t w i t h u n c l e a n h a n d s ? The Mackey, married on t o t h e Thompson F a l l s , Antimony C o r p o r a t i o n . t h e U.S. corporation lurgy. were I d a h o , a n d h a v e two c h i l d r e n . t h e y moved the parties as manager March a t Early in the marriage Montana, headquarters of The h u s b a n d of 1968, 27, mining, is e m p l o y e d b y geology and metal- H e is a l s o t h e l a r g e s t s t o c k h o l d e r w i t h a p p r o x i m a t e l y 1 4 p e r c e n t of the issued shares. At t h e time of the dis- s o l u t i o n , t h e husband had between 660,000 and 800,000 s h a r e s v a l u e d by v a r i o u s p a r t i e s from $.50 t o $1.50. The m a r r i a g e was n o t o n e made i n h e a v e n . counsel and describes violence. it a s mercurial, 1974, adultery. alleging In The b r i e f e d him on h e r nuptial agreement ciliation Both were husband wife ." retained Thereafter, for a agree prepare the wife the children. reasons During divorce Missoula counsel, a returned and t h e p a r t i e s a t t e m p t e d parties the by d i s a g r e e m e n t filed c a s e a n d a s k e d him t o home i n Thompson F a l l s , ciliation. the marked The w i f e ' s for this "postto the a recon- the recon- period, the husband d i s m i s s e d t h e o r i g i n a l d i s s o l u t i o n p r o c e e d i n g s . I n 1976, cause, the marriage. another f o r t h e same r e a s o n s g i v e n husband This attorney reinstituted time, the who wife served d i s s o l u t i o n proceedings. the dissolution obtained her in his original the throughout services the f u l l disclosure of the the of second Numerous m e e t i n g s w e r e h e l d b y t h e new c o u n s e l w i t h t h e w i f e and t h e h u s b a n d ' s c o u n s e l . a of property involved was Again, discussed, a n d t h e w i f e was a d v i s e d by c o u n s e l a s t o h e r r i g h t s t o t h e p r o p e r t y of the wife, the couple. the In f a c t , both counsel f i r s t who a d v i s e d h e r employed by i n 1974 on t h e " p o s t - n u p t i a l a g r e e m e n t " and t h e s e c o n d who r e p r e s e n t e d h e r on t h e "property settlement, advised tion, her "get that more s u p p o r t and c u s t o d i a l a y r e e m e n t , " she could, if property." she contested The trial court the dissolunoted in its C o n c l u s i o n o f Law XIII: "The C o u r t w o u l d , u n d e r t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h i s case, o r d i n a r i l y consider the Marital and P r o p e r t y S e t t l e m e n t u n c o n s c i o n a b l e . Howe v e r , t h e R e s p o n d e n t was r e p r e s e n t e d by a v e r y c o m p e t e n t and k n o w l e d g e a b l e a t t o r n e y . She e n t e r e d i n t o t h e P r o p e r t y S e t t l e m e n t Agreement w i t h a f a i r l y c o m p l e t e knowledge o f t h e m a r i t a l a s s e t s and d e s p i t e t h e p r o t e s t a t i o n s o f h e r c o u n s e l t h a t h e f e l t t h e prope r t y s e t t l e m e n t was n e i t h e r f a i r n o r e q u i t a b l e and h i s a d v i c e t h a t i f s h e went t o C o u r t on t h e p r o p e r t y a s p e c t s of t h e c a s e s h e c o u l d p r o b a b l y g e t more." However, t h e husband, signature a s i d e on n e a r l y two y e a r s a f t e r t h e wife d i r e c t e d her the the separation basis of attorney to prepare for agreement fraud upon t h e f i r s t f i l i n g by she the now court, wants to set coercion and unconscionabil i t y . The s e p a r a t i o n a y r e e m e n t g a v e t h e w i f e f o u r Mackey, w i t h improvements t h e r e o n , i n c l u d i n g a house f r e e and c l e a r o f l i e n s and e n c u m b r a n c e s , a l l the furniture in Idaho, lots in the house in expenses, $2,500, years. The Thompson Falls, attorney total amount t o her i n money and p r o p e r t y was He r e c e i v e d t h e f a m i l y horne i n Thompson F a l l s and t h e n i n e t y - n i n e was l o c a t e d , a l l t h e s t o c k i n U.S. a moving and m a i n t e n a n c e o f $200 p e r month f o r f o u r The husband f a r e d much b e t t e r . airplane, fees, pickup truck, and a c r e s on which i t Antimony C o r p o r a t i o n , a n bank accounts amounting to a p p r o x i m a t e l y $5,800. between $227,000 The t o t a l v a l u e o f to $422,500 depending t h e p r o p e r t y was on t h e v a l u e g i v e n the stock. Of s p e c i a l n o t e i n a r r i v i n g a t t h e v a l u e o f t h e s t o c k that, is at restricted resulted the time of the dissolution, the stock was by S e c u r i t y and Exchange r u l e s which c o u l d h a v e in the husband receiving a price discount of as rnuch a s 50 p e r c e n t i f h e had s o l d o r t r a n s f e r r e d a s u b s t a n t i a l p o r t i o n of t h e same. The husband t e s t i f i e d t h a t a t t h e t i m e o f d i s s o l u t i o n he had 6 6 0 , 0 0 0 s h a r e s . t r a d i n g q u a r t e r of $.a875 t o $1.00 quarter of f r e e t r a d i n g s t o c k had a v a l u e o f share. the In addition, c o r p o r a t i o n was the The m a r k e t automobile battery. Due to for this industry the switch, during in collapsed to corporate a in 1975 calcium lead profits $200,000 i n 1 9 7 5 t o a l o s s o f $ 2 1 3 , 0 0 0 i n 1976. l o s s e s occurred 1976, the in company subsequent was barely Shortly after the dissolution, guarantee a small operations. business Since 1976 t h e to make went from Substantial years a s w e l l . able first was b a t t e r y g r a d e product switched the serious financial The c o m p a n y ' s p r i m a r y p r o d u c t antimony. when per 1976, trouble. 1976, During t h e f i r s t On A p r i l 1, its payroll. t h e husband had t o p e r s o n a l l y loan of $300,000 company has to save to get had the into e x t e n s i v e r e s e a r c h o p e r a t i o n s t o f i n d a use f o r a p r e v i o u s l y salable product. A l l of t h e s e f a c t s were known t o t h e w i f e and h e r a t t o r n e y i n d e c i d i n g w h e t h e r t o t r y t o o b t a i n some of the stock in the property settlement. The d e c i s i o n o f t h e w i f e was n o t t o do s o . The attempted wife to now persuade alleges or that coerce the her husband into taking personally the one- sided the property agreement children. In ~y threatening addition, the to wife get custody of alleges that the s e p a r a t i o n a g r e e m e n t a p p r o v e d by t h e c o u r t is f a u l t y b e c a u s e i t d o e s n o t c o n t a i n an i n v e n t o r y o f the marital a s s e t s but m e r e l y l i s t s what t h e w i f e i s t o r e c e i v e and l e a v e s t h e r e s t t o t h e husband. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t was a l s o c o n s i d e r i n g t h e h u s b a n d ' s petition The U . S. f o r s p e c i f i c performance. Antimony Cor- p o r a t i o n owned m i n i n g c l a i m s i n b o t h Montana and I d a h o . 1979, three years after the dissolution, the In corporation s o u g h t t o s e l l t h e I d a h o p r o p e r t i e s and t o g r a n t a n e a s e m e n t to the Forest A title Service over some of t h e Montana p r o p e r t i e s . s e a r c h r e v e a l e d a c l o u d on t h e t i t l e involvii~g the w i f e ' s name. A t t h e time of i t s a c q u i s i t i o n , t h e husband t o o k t h e I d a h o p r o p e r t y i n h i s own name. to a predecessor corporation He l a t e r a s s i g n e d a l l r i g h t s of U.S. Antimony and was r e i m b u r s e d by t h e c o r p o r a t i o n for Corporation t h e downpayment. The c o r p o r a t i o n p a i d a l l sums r e m a i n i n g on c o n t r a c t . he was m a r r i e d t o t h e w i f e a t t h e t i m e o f q u e s t i o n of an inchoate right in her Since acquisition, arose, based on the the marital relationship. The a c q u i s i t i o n o f t h e Montana p r o p e r t i e s was h a n d l e d i n much t h e same f a s h i o n , e x c e p t b o t h t h e w i f e and h u s b a n d signed the papers acquiring the property, the corporation's counsel, a n d , on a d v i s e o f t h e y signed o n l y a m i n e r a l deed i n t r a n s f e r r i n g t h e c l a i m s t o t h e company. t h e Idaho p r o p e r t y , A s was done t h e husband was f u l l y r e i m b u r s e d f o r h i s downpayment, and t h e company p a i d t h e r e m a i n d e r . indicates neither on of the parties intended The r e c o r d to keep any interest in the clairns o r s u r f a c e r i g h t s and that p a i d money f o r w h i c h t h e y w e r e n o t r e i m b u r s e d . used in acquiring the properties by the neither The m e t h o d s corporation is common i n t h e i n d u s t r y . The f i r s t i s s u e i s w h e t h e r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t s h o u l d h a v e s e t a s i d e t h e d e c r e e o f d i s s o l u t i o n on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t i t was o b t a i n e d by a fraud upon t h e c o u r t . n o t one of f i r s t i m p r e s s i o n i n Montana. c o l ~ s i d e r e dt h e i s s u e i n P i l a t i v . , - 5 9 2 P.2d before Mont. 36 1374, t h e Court. See, 9; 1 0 7 , 509 P.2d 429 P.2d 640. St.Rep. ( 1 9 7 9 ) , - Mont. and in earlier cases I n R e Bad Y e l l o w H a i r Selway v. is This Court r e c e n t l y Pilati 619, This issue (1973), 162 B u r n s ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 1 5 0 Mont. 1, However, t h e f a c t s i t u a t i o n h e r e d i f f e r s f r o m t h a t of P i l a t i . I n P i l a t i t h e p a r t i e s were m a r r i e d when t h e w i f e was s i x t e e n y e a r s of a g e a n d t h e h u s b a n d was t h i r t y - e i g h t . The marriage thirteen lasted children. The wife years, had a and ninth the grade parties had two education and had n e v e r been employed p r i o r t o t h e m a r r i a g e . both a Ph.D. Bachelor's and, o n l y was and a P l a s t e r ' s according both a to the briefs, rancher cor~siderable experience record in finances of thing, nothing Pilati the including of the degree, and a h i g h in family t o parties' estate the husband and He not appraisals. handled status The The all purchasing clothing. financial a J.D. s c h o o l t e a c h e r b u t had the extent of groceries was w o r k i n g o n a h e had real indicated The h u s b a n d h e l d every- wife which, the it knew was a l l e g e d , was d e l i b e r a t e l y k e p t s e c r e t f r o m h e r . In t h e i n s t a n t c a s e t h e r e c o r d d o e s n o t i n d i c a t e how much e d u c a t i o n t h e w i f e h a d . I t would a p p e a r s h e d i d h a v e a job of some married. status a t the time the c o u p l e met and were The c o u r t i n i t s C o n c l u s i o n of Law V I I I n o t e d t h a t t h e m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t a g r e e m e n t was e n t e r e d into by t h e w i f e w i t h f u l l knowledge o f t h e p r o p e r t y owned by t h e p a r t i e s and i t s v a l u e . C o n c l u s i o n o f Law I X i n d i c a t e d t h a t s h e was r e p r e s e n t e d by c o m p e t e n t c o u n s e l i n n e g o t i a t i o n s o f the property settlement agreement. Conclusion of Law X i n d i c a t e d t h a t s h e c o n s e n t e d t o t h e p r o p e r t y a g r e e m e n t , and the property agreement was given freely and voluntarily w i t h o u t f r a u d , o v e r r e a c h i n g o r undue i n f l u e n c e . I n a d d i t i o n , a t t h e two h e a r i n g s t h e r e was c o n s i d e r a b l e t e s t i m o n y i n d i c a t i n g t h a t b o t h c o u n s e l who r e p r e s e n t e d t h e w i f e , t h e a t t o r n e y o r i g i n a l l y h i r e d by h e r i n 1974 and t h e a t t o r n e y who drew up t h e p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t a g r e e m e n t f o r her i n 1976, advised h e r f u l l y a s t o t h e f a c t t h a t s h e probably could get more property if C l e a r l y , we do n o t h a v e a p e t i t i o n e r she went to trial. i n t h e same s t a t u s a s t h e p e t i t i o n e r i n P i l a t i v. P i l a t i , s u p r a . At the hearings both testified. counsel for husband and wife Their testimony indicated t h a t , during the time o f d r a f t i n g t h e p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t a g r e e m e n t and t h e d i s s o l u t i o n of eilces, the marriage, either personal t h e r e were a t l e a s t t e n c o n f e r - or by t e l e p h o n e , of some e x t e n d e d l e n g t h , where c o u n s e l l a i d f o r t h a l l of t h e f a c t s c o n c e r n i n g the property table at addition, the it involved. time the is t o be T h e r e was n o t h i n g parties signed remembered the left under agreement. the In that the facts indicated t h a t the wife brought the proposal f o r t h e property s e t t l e ment t o h e r c o u n s e l and d i r e c t e d him t o p u t it into legal form and o b t a i n t h e d i s s o l u t i o n a s s o o n a s p o s s i b l e . At that time, counsel advised her a s t o her p r e v i o u s l y done, rights, a s h e had and i n d i c a t e d t h a t he d i d n o t t h i n k i t was a good a g r e e m e n t . However, the wife f i n a l i z e d and, a t t h a t time, i n s i s t e d on h a v i n g it i n d i c a t e d none o f t h e p r e s s u r e s t h a t h a v e been c a l l e d t o a t t e n t i o n i n o t h e r c a s e s where s u c h a g r e e m e n t s have been s e t a s i d e . The w i f e u r g e s t h i s C o u r t t o a d o p t I n Re M a r r i a g e o f (1976), Gonzalez 57 is u n i q u e Gorlzalez Cal.App.3d in that 736, the 129 Cal.Rptr. husband's mere 566. threat to, i n t e r a l i a , t a k e i l l e g a l c u s t o d y of t h e c h i l d r e n c o n s t i t u t e d duress But, sufficient Gonzalez husband filed enough is n o t for rescission applicable here the petition alleging of for the contract. in t h i s case the adultery, a fact that a p p a r e n t l y t h e w i f e d i d n o t want t o be made p u b l i c by g o i n g to trial because children. it might prevent I n Gonzalez t h e wife, her from getting n o t t h e husband, p e t i t i o n f o r a p p a r e n t l y good r e a s o n s . her filed the I n Gonzalez t h e w i f e t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e was s o " d i s t r a u g h t and w o r r i e d a b o u t t h e cl~ildren"that That is n o t she did not the case here. remember signing the petition. previously noted, As the wife b r o u g h t t h e s e t t l e m e n t s h e wanted t o h e r a t t o r n e y t o p u t legal form. Certainly she knew what it contained. in In G o n z a l e z t h e c o u r t f o u n d t h a t t h e w i f e was t h r e a t e n e d t h a t , i f s h e d i d n o t s i g n when s h e d i d , s h e would l o s e e v e r y t h i n g . Here, t h e w i f e knew what s h e was g e t t i n g and knew what h e r husband was g e t t i n g . F u r t h e r , s h e knew o f h e r r i g h t t o s e e k more i n c o u r t . The w i f e contain a full parties in order argues that inventory of the separation all for the court to the agreement a s s e t s owned p a s s upon by must the its conscion- ability. Further, i n v e n t o r y is a she contends t h e f a i l u r e t o include such f r a u d upon t h e c o u r t u n d e r P i l a t i . Indeed, t h i s Court h a s i n d i c a t e d t h a t a f u l l i n v e n t o r y of t h e a s s e t s However, w e have n o t h e l d t h a t a l a c k o f a n s h o u l d be made. i n v e n t o r y i s f r a u d upon t h e c o u r t . W noted in P i l a t i t h a t e t h e f r a u d was t h e f a i l u r e t o d i s c l o s e a l l t h e a s s e t s t o t h e wife, not court. the failure to while the Here, disclose court all may the not assets have to been a d v i s e d a s t o a l l p r o p e r t y owned by t h e p a r t i e s , the fully the record shows t h e c o u r t was n o t c o n f u s e d by t h e o m i s s i o n o f a f u l l i n v e n t o r y from t h e s e p a r a t i o n a g r e e m e n t . The w i f e c i t e s H a m i l t o n v. -, 607 P.2d ment that owned by the the 1 0 2 , 37 S t . R e p . separation parties. H a m i l t o n ( 1 9 8 0 ) , - Mont. i n s u p p o r t of 247, agreement must is Hamilton her list a l l not argu- property applicable here. H a m i l t o n i n v o l v e d a c o n t e s t e d p r o p e r t y d i s t r i b u t i o n , and t h e p r o b l e m i n t h a t c a s e was t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t make findings sufficient to allow this Court to review its decision. Where, as here, the totality of the circumstances s u p p o r t t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s t h a t t h e r e was no d u r e s s o r c o e r c i o n , t h i s Court w i l l not r e v e r s e t h e d e c i s i o n u n l e s s it is c l e a r l y e r r o n e o u s . substantially. raise the W e issue of The f a c t s o f recognize child custody marriage dissolution actions. encourage agreements a challenge where of custody arm's l e n g t h b a s i s a s here. a is it By in this negotiated rights have each case w i l l v a r y common many, practice if opinion property been not we to most, do not settlement settled on an I t would o n l y be an e x c e p t i o n a l c a s e where we would c o n s i d e r t h e f a c t o r s c o n s i d e r e d by t h e C a l i f o r n i a c o u r t i n Gonzalez, supra. W e Winters note further (1980), that Ivlont in . the , case 61fl P.2d of Winters 1165, v. 37 S t . R e p . we h e l d t h a t a t h r e a t t o r e p u t a t i o n d o e s n o t v i t i a t e a 847, party's consent. There, the wife discovered that her husband had engaged i n a d u l t e r o u s r e l a t i o n s h i p s and demanded t h a t h e pay a c e r t a i n sum o f money p e r month a s p a r t o f t h e property settlement agreement or she would drag her hus- I n a s u b s e q u e n t pro- b a n d ' s l o v e r ' s name t h r o u g h t h e mud. c e e d i n g , t h e husband a l l e g e d t h a t t h i s was f r a u d and d u r e s s , but the court held i t was n o t . While W i n t e r s is d i f f e r e n t from t h e p r e s e n t c a s e b e c a u s e t h e t h r e a t was t o a p e r s o n who was n o t a party, that difference is n o t significant. In W i n t e r s t h e husband s o u g h t t o a v o i d an e m b a r r a s s i n g h e a r i n g , and t h a t i s a c o n c e r n t h a t e x i s t s whenever t h e r e i s a t h r e a t to a reputation. The second issue for s e p a r a t i o n agreement e n t e r e d scionable. ability", has a W think not. e as a far t e r m of broader is whether the i n t o by t h e p a r t i e s i s uncon- The wife n o t e s t h a t "unconscion- art reach consideration referring than the to unfair classical contracts, circumstances which were s u f f i c i e n t t o v o i d c o n t r a c t s ( l a c k of c o n s i d e r a tion, course, fraud, duress, includes and them. undue influence), Unconscionability, Uriiform M a r r i a g e and D i v o r c e A c t , though it, of a s used in the is d i s c u s s e d C o m m i s s i o n e r ' s comments on s e c t i o n 40-4-201, i n t h e Code MCA. The w i f e a r g u e s t h a t t h e a g r e e m e n t was u n c o n s c i o n a b l e i n a number of r e s p e c t s . F i r s t , without s u f f i c i e n t j u s t i f i - c a t i o n i t e s t a b l i s h e d a g r o s s l y d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e d i v i s i o n of m a r i t a l a s s e t s , a w a r d i n g o n l y $50,000 o f t h e p r o p e r t y t o t h e w i f e and $9,600 i n a l i m o n y o u t o f a $422,008 m a r i t a l e s t a t e , The wife argues that the fact she received the advice of competent c o u n s e l b e f o r e s h e s i g n e d t h e s e p a r a t i o n agreement did not i n any manner d i l u t e o r m i t i g a t e t h e u n f a i r n e s s o f t h e terms o f t h e a g r e e m e n t o r , isolate her from the fear a s the testimony indicates, and anxiety h u s b a n d ' s t h r e a t s and i m p o r t u n i t i e s . created by her The w i f e would r e q u i r e t h a t b e f o r e t h e a g r e e m e n t was a c c e p t e d b y t h e c o u r t i n 1 9 7 6 , t h e c o u r t should have been informed o f a l l t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s and o n l y t h e n would i t n o t b e u n c o n s c i o n a b l e . It is a p p a r e n t from the above that the wife would have t h e c o u r t l o o k o n l y a t t h e numbers and c o n c l u d e w i t h o u t further analysis that the distribution grossly disproportionate However, with respect to certain kinds of and of therefore the estate was unconscionable. property, courts i n determining value. T h i s is e s p e c i a l l y t r u e i n t h e c a s e o f s t o c k v a l u e s . In In must exercise substantial discretion R e M a r r i a g e of L i p p e r t ( 1 9 8 1 ) , 38 St.Rep. - Mont. , 627 P.2d 1206, 625, t h i s Court h e l d : "The e x e r c i s e o f d i s c r e t i o n b y t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i s n e c e s s a r y when d e t e r m i n i n g t h e worth of m a r i t a l a s s e t s which f l u c t u a t e i n value. For example, t h e v a l u e o f a p a r t i c u l a r common s t o c k may c h a n g e d r a s t i c a l l y during the course of a dissolution while the v a l u e o f t h e f a m i l y home o r o t h e r p e r s o n a l property remains s t a b l e . Under s u c h c i r c u m stances selection of a single evaluation p o i n t f o r determining n e t worth o f t h e p a r t i e s c o u l d c r e a t e an i n e q u i t a b l e d i s p o s i tion." 6 2 7 P.2d a t 1 2 0 8 . Here, as previously noted, relying solely on the m a r k e t v a l u e of t h e s t o c k i n e a r l y 1 9 7 6 w o u l d b e i n a p p r o p r i ate. The h u s b a n d ' s s t o c k was r e s t r i c t e d a n d g r e a t l y r e d u c e d in value. was in The c o r p o r a t i o n w h i c h i s s u e d t h e h u s b a n d ' s s t o c k serious financial difficulty which caused a sharp d e c l i n e i n t h e s t o c k ' s v a l u e i n 1976, A s previously noted, t h e 1976 a n n u a l r e p o r t showed a low f i g u r e o f $.50 p e r s h a r e i n t h e f o u r t h q u a r t e r of 1976. The m a r k e t o f t i o n ' s main p r o d u c t had c o l l a p s e d , v i r t u a l l y o u t of c a s h , ally extended t h e corpora- and t h e c o r p o r a t i o n was I n a d d i t i o n , t h e husband had p e r s o n - himself to guaranteeing a $300,000 b u s i n e s s l o a n t o keep t h e c o r p o r a t i o n o p e r a t i n g the s a l a r i e s due. The must court have The husband the corporation. a substantial had o n l y 14.5 t o pay considered f a c t s i n a r r i v i n g a t t h e c o n s c i o n a b i l i t y of agreement. and small these the separation percent interest in Had h e g i v e n some o f t h i s up o r l i q u i d a t e d portion it of and paid the proceeds to the w i f e h i s p o s i t i o n i n t h e c o r p o r a t i o n would h a v e b e e n r e d u c e d t o s u c h a p o i n t t h a t h i s c o n t r o l would h a v e been i n s e r i o u s jeopardy, Had t h a t h a p p e n e d , i t would h a v e made no sense f o r him t o g u a r a n t e e t h e $300,000 l o a n t o t h e S m a l l B u s i n e s s A d m i n i s t r a t i o n s o t h a t t h e c o r p o r a t i o n c o u l d have c o n t i n u e d . I n a d d i t i o n , had t h e company c o l l a p s e d a f t e r h e borrowed t h e $300,000, n o t o n l y would h i s s t o c k h a v e b e e n w o r t h l e s s b u t t h e r e would have been no s o u r c e s t o pay t h e d e b t o t h e r t h a n h i s o t h e r a s s e t s , which were n o t s u f f i c i e n t . it is u n q u e s t i o n a b l e t h a t t h e husband I n e a r l y 1976 risked bankruptcy t o save the corporation. Viewing company and t h e these facts, risk the financial t h a t t h e husband condition of the took t o maintain t h e cornpany, n e i t h e r t h i s C o u r t n o r t h e t r i a l c o u r t i s c o m p e l l e d to reach a conclusion unconscionable. (1979) I - W e Mont. where a husband that noted in the In - 590 P.2d , property Re 606, r e c e i v e d $692,701.84 settlement Marriage of 36 St.Rep. was Jorgensen 233, (mostly in stock) that and h i s wife received $83,167, the disposition was not uncon- scionable. The w i f e c o n t e n d s t h a t a l l o f amounted t o undue influence, actions w h i c h would n e g a t e c o n s e n t a n d make t h e a g r e e m e n t u n c o n s c i o n a b l e . MCA, t h e husband's Under s e c t i o n 28-2-407, undue i n f l u e n c e c o n s i s t s o f : " (1) t h e u s e b y o n e i n whom a c o n f i d e n c e i s r e p o s e d b y a n o t h e r o r who h o l d s a r e a l o r a p p a r e n t a u t h o r i t y o v e r him o f s u c h c o n f i dence o r a u t h o r i t y for t h e purpose o f o b t a i n i n g a n u n f a i r a d v a n t a g e o v e r him; " ( 2 ) t a k i n g an u n f a i r weakness o f mind; o r advantage of a n o t h e r ' s " ( 3 ) t a k i n g a g r o s s l y o p p r e s s i v e and u n f a i r advantage of another's necessities or distress." Here i t is u n l i k e l y t h a t t h e w i f e had any c o n f i d e n c e o r t r u s t i n t h e husband i n t h e l a t t e r y e a r s of t h e m a r r i a g e , p a r t i c u l a r l y a f t e r 1 9 7 4 when t h e f i r s t d i v o r c e was f i l e d a n d i n 1 9 7 6 when t h e f i n a l d e c r e e was g r a n t e d . The e v i d e n c e i s c o n c l u s i v e t h a t t h e w i f e was n o t s u f f e r i n g f r o m a n y w e a k n e s s of Her a t t o r n e y t e s t i f i e d mind. that the final agreement was b a s e d on h e r p r o p o s a l a n d s h e u n d e r s t o o d i t s terms when she signed it. D i v o r c e s a r e f r e q u e n t l y t r a u m a t i c and a r i s e in stressful situations. undue i n f l u e n c e , competent what the the court that there is e s p e c i a l l y i f e a c h p a r t y is r e p r e s e n t e d b y counsel. considered, T h i s d o e s n o t mean When agreement, would have all the while facts are i t may b e d i f f e r e n t from decreed in relevant a contested matter, d o e s n o t become u n c o n s c i o n a b l e u n d e r t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . The next issue raised is whether a g r e e m e n t is c o n t r a r y t o p u b l i c p o l i c y . the separation The w i f e would h a v e t h i s C o u r t conclude t h a t a s e p a r a t i o n is v i o l a t i v e o f p u b l i c policy if one of the p a r t i e s threatened a custody f i g h t i n order t o gain in the property distribution. contends that only rarely would a While t h e w i f e separation s u b j e c t t o a t t a c k on t h i s ground, agreement be is t h a t the fact such a r u l i n g would e x p o s e many s e p a r a t i o n a g r e e m e n t s t o a t t a c k a n d w o r s e , would n o t b e b a s e d on a n y k i n d o f a r e a l i s t i c understanding of preagreement n e g o t i a t i o n s . The f a c t s a r e t h a t c u s t o d y i s f r e q u e n t l y a b a r g a i n i n g chip in the s e t t l e m e n t n e g o t i a t i o n s whether noted in our discussion of like it o r Gonzalez the we case, not. As supra, we a r e n o t a b o u t t o g o a s f a r a s t h a t c o u r t d i d i n s e t t i n g a s i d e p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t s , s u c h a s we h a v e h e r e , a s v i o l a t i v e of public policy. W f i n d it unnecessary, e principal issues presented, i n v i e w o f o u r h o l d i n g on t h e to consider whether the the question of laches. The have final refused to issue is enforce the decree of trial court dissolution should on the g r o u n d s t h a t t h e h u s b a n d came b e f o r e t h e c o u r t w i t h u n c l e a n hands. Stated another way, did the trial court properly o r d e r t h e e x e c u t i o n o f t h e q u i t c l a i m d e e d s by t h e wife. W have h e r e e tested relevant to s e v e r a l f i n d i n g s t h a t h a v e g o n e unconthe p a r t y gave anything of question, I t was n e v e r kind of interest is the an company, issue value for for consideration. t h e mining properties in t h e i n t e n t of e i t h e r t o r e t a i n any i n t h e mining p r o p e r t i e s . not Neither the husband, which Further, it ultimately is e n t i t l e d t o receive t h e mining p r o p e r t i e s s i n c e it has paid f o r them. I n view o f t h e s e f a c t s , t h e w i f e ' s argument l o s e s much o f i t s f o r c e , s i n c e t h e h u s b a n d is n o t g o i n g t o p e r s o n a l l y p r o f i t from t h e t r a n s f e r o f t h e q u i t c l a i m d e e d s . The h u s b a n d is s e e k i n g t o e n f o r c e t h e d e c r e e o f d i s solution, not a contract. on which t h e w i f e MCA, unclean hands, By i t s t e r m s , s e c t i o n 27-1-415, relies in asserting her defense of is a p p l i c a b l e o n l y t o c o n t r a c t s . Here, the s e t t l e m e n t a g r e e m e n t was i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t h e d e c r e e a n d , is e n f o r c e a b l e a s a such, s e c t i o n 40-4-201(5), the property signing it. be h e a r d Hopper S t .Rep. disposition However, under wife provided have the challenged decree by not s h e c h o s e n o t t o d o s o a n d c a n n o t now s h e could have done i n 1976. -, 6 0 1 P.2d See, 29, 36 1695. asserting is c o l l a t e r a l l y a t t a c k i n g that the decree is previously held extrinsic fraud directly. Deich v. that may a not be Deich the decree. unenforceable c i r c u m s t a n c e s u n d e r w h i c h i t was e n t e r e d has t h e p r o v i s i o n s of could in ( 1 9 7 9 ) , - Mont. Hopper The w i f e is The MCA. t o a r g u e what v. judgment as decree (1958), because into. free from collaterally 1 3 6 Mont. of This Court rendered attacked She 566, or 3 2 3 P.2d 35. We find under the circumstances h u s b a n d d o e s n o t come b e f o r e Further, the enforcement based unclean of a hands judgment, on a c t s o c c u r r i n g of this case the t h e c o u r t with unclean hands. doctrine is not e s p e c i a l l y when before t h e e n t r y of a defense to the defense is judgment, t h e judgment h a s n o t been set a s i d e . The j u d g m e n t o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i s a f f i r m e d . and W concur: e
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