SMALL v MCRAE

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No. 81-369 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1982 AARON P. SMALL, Plaintiff and Appellant, VS. ROBERT J. McRAE, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Yellowstone Honorable Charles Luedke, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Moses Law Firm, Billings, Montana Charles F. Moses, Billings, Montana For Respondent: John Bobinski argued, Helena, Montana J. Michael Young, Helena, Montana Submitted: Decided: Filed: May 12, 1982 October 4, 1982 M r . J u s t i c e John Court. Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d The a p p e l l a n t , P r o f e s s o r Aaron P . l i b e l action against the respondent, M c R a e moved f o r summary j u d g m e n t . complaint. The Yellowstone County, judgment third granted Small, a one count filed Dean R o b e r t J . and McRae, S m a l l t h e n moved to amend h i s Judicial Dean the in District, McRae s motion and for for summary and d e n i e d S m a l l ' s m o t i o n to amend t h e c o m p l a i n t . count without Thirteenth t h e O p i n i o n of of Small's prejudice to proposed his amended right to c o m p l a i n t was replead. The a p p e l l a n t was t h e a p p o i n t e d and 1i b e r a l a r t s , denied Small a p p e a l s . a c t i n g c h a i r m a n of E n g l i s h D e p a r t m e n t a t E a s t e r n Montana C o l l e g e . 1980, t h e respondent, The the On O c t o b e r 1 0 , R o b e r t J . M c R a e , as Dean of t h e s c h o o l of t e r m i n a t e d a p p e l l a n t 1 s c h a i r m a n s h i p and i n c o n n e c - t i o n t h e r e w i t h a d d r e s s e d and d e l i v e r e d a memorandum t o him a s a way of n o t i f y i n g him and t h e o t h e r d e p a r t m e n t s of s u c h c h a n g e i n chairmanship, Titles) of as p r o v i d e d by s e c t i o n 9 . l o 0 ( F ) (1) c ) ( T r a n s f e r of ( the collective bargaining E a s t e r n Montana C o l l e g e a t t h a t t i m e . change included inadequate leadership agreement in force at The r e a s o n s c i t e d f o r t h e that failed polarized department i n t o a smoother-functioning to unit, bring a increased acrimony w i t h i n t h e department, f a i l u r e t o handle the administrat i v e f u n c t i o n s of t h e o f f i c e e f f e c t i v e l y and c o n s c i e n t i o u s l y a n d , finally, c o n c e r n o v e r t h e p a s t and o n g o i n g c o o r d i n a t i o n o f newly-instituted the mass p l a c e m e n t p r o c e s s f o r f r e s h m a n c o m p o s i t i o n . The memorandum e n d s by s t a t i n g : " T h a n k y o u , A l , f o r t h e e f f o r t s you h a v e expended i n t h i s v e r y d i f f i c u l t p o s i t i o n i n t h e p a s t seven months. I am s o r r y t h a t t h i s a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a p p o i n t m e n t h a s n o t worked o u t . I w i s h you my s i n c e r e g o o d w i l l as you r e t u r n t o f u l l - t i m e t e a c h i n g , which I know i s y o u r f i r s t l o v e . M esteem f o r you a s a t e a c h e r of y y o u r d i s c i p l i n e is u n t a r n i s h e d . " Termination of stipend of t h i s chairmanship carried with i t l o s s of a $900 p e r a c a d e m i c y e a r and $ 1 5 0 p e r summer s e s s i o n , b u t d i d n o t a f f e c t a p p e l l a n t ' s academic rank, t e n u r e , base s a l a r y or membership i n t h e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g u n i t . Although the c o l l e c t i v e bargaining agreement provided which a p p e l l a n t c o u l d have p u r s u e d , he e l e c t e d factual court trial and instead to file adopt his trial memorandum. t h i s was a n a c t i o n i n l i b e l and was s u b m i t t e d t o Originally, the findings procedure W e agree with the t h i s l i b e l a c t i o n a g a i n s t Dean M c R a e . judge's a grievance t w o motions. on One by which the appellant s o u g h t t o f i l e a n amended c o m p l a i n t a d d i n g f o u r new c o u n t s . o r i g i n a l c o m p l a i n t s o u g h t damages caused by t h e a l l e g e d The libel. The amended c o m p l a i n t a l l e g e d C o u n t I , t h e same as t h e o r i g i n a l complaint; contrary Count to 11, his rights was appellant guaranteed deprived by the of due Constitution process of the U n i t e d S t a t e s and t h e S t a t e of Montana; C o u n t 111, a p p e l l a n t was denied freedom of expression and speech in violation of his r i g h t s u n d e r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n and C o n s t i t u t i o n of t h e S t a t e o f Montana; C o u n t I V , t h a t t h e l i b e l a l l e g e d i n C o u n t I v i o l a t e s t h e p r i v i l e g e s and i m m u n i t i e s c l a u s e and t h e e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n c l a u s e of the United S t a t e s Constitution; Count V , that a n y s t a t u t o r y p r i v i l e g e g i v e n by l e g i s l a t u r e is c o n t r a t o Montana and U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n s . B e f o r e g e t t i n g i n t o a d i s c u s s i o n of t h e i n d i v i d u a l c o u n t s of a p p e l l a n t s proposed amended c o m p l a i n t , r e s p o n d e n t a s s e r t s as a g e n e r a l matter t h a t a p p e l l a n t ' s m o t i o n to amend s h o u l d be d e n i e d on the granting ground of that it. points out that, the appellant settle improper all In justice support would of as a member of agreed disputes application to this exercise the be served argument through the the respondent the c o l l e c t i v e bargaining u n i t , alleging of not the grievance breach, terms procedure misinterpretation found in the to or collective bargaining agreement. The o f f i c i a l s t a t e p o l i c y , agreements, is found in r e l a t i n g to c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g section 39-31-101, MCA: "it is the p o l i c y o f t h e S t a t e of Montana t o e n c o u r a g e t h e p r a c t i c e and p r o c e d u r e of c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g to a r r i v e a t f r i e n d l y adjustment of a l l d i s p u t e s between p u b l i c employers and t h e i r employees. " A s c o r r e c t l y p o i n t e d o u t by t h e r e s p o n d e n t , t h i s Court h a s looked t o t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n p l a c e d on t h e N a t i o n a l L a b o r R e l a t i o n s A c t b y the f e d e r a l c o u r t s as a n a i d P u b l i c Employees S t a t e ex rel. to i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Collective Bargaining A c t . Department of Highways v . See, t h e Montana f o r example, P u b l i c Employees C r a f t C o u n c i l ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 1 6 5 Mont. 3 4 9 , 529 P.2d 7 8 5 . S e c t i o n 39-31-306(2), C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining A c t , a g r e e m e n t may final and disputed contain: binding of MCA, t h e Montana P u b l i c Employees states t h a t a c o l l e c t i v e bargaining " a grievance procedure arbitration interpretations of of unresolved agreements." culminating grievances The in and collective b a r g a i n i n g a g r e e m e n t of E a s t e r n Montana C o l l e g e c o n t a i n e d s u c h a provision in Finally, this See, case. section section 39-31-306 ( 3 ) 1 12.100, et provides MCA, seq. that: " [a]n agreement be t w e e n the public e m p l o y e r and a l a b o r o r g a n i z a t i o n s h a l l be v a l i d and e n f o r c e d u n d e r i t s terms when entered i n t o i n accordance with the provisions o f t h i s c h a p t e r and s i g n e d b y t h e c h i e f e x e c u t i v e o f f i c e r o f t h e s t a t e or p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n o r C o m m i s s i o n e r of h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n or h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ." As correctly noted by the respondent, the federal c o n s t r u i n g t h e Federal N a t i o n a l Labor R e l a t i o n s A c t , courts, h a v e enun- c i a t e d a s t r o n g p o l i c y f a v o r i n g a r b i t r a t i o n of l a b o r d i s p u t e s and r e q u i r i n g c o n t r a c t g r i e v a n c e p r o c e d u r e s t o be e x h a u s t e d p r i o r to t h e commencement o f a l a w s u i t . Corporation 614, 616-17, v. Maddox 13 S e e , f o r example, Republic S t e e l ( 1 9 6 5 ) r 379 U.S. L.Ed.2d 580, wherein 650, 652-653, Justice Harlan "As a g e n e r a l r u l e i n c a s e s t o which f e d e r a l applies, federal labor policy requires t h a t i n d i v i d u a l employees wishing to a s s e r t c o n t r a c t g r i e v a n c e s m u s t a t t e m p t u s e of t h e c o n t r a c t g r i e v a n c e p r o c e d u r e c r e e d upon b y If e m p l o y e r and u n i o n as t h e mode o f r e d r e s s . t h e u n i o n r e f u s e s t o p r e s s or o n l y p e r f u n c t o r i l y p r e s s e s t h e i n d i v i d u a l I s claim, d i f f e r e n c e s may a r i s e as to t h e f o r m s o f r e d r e s s then available. ( C i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d .) But unless the contract provides otherwise, there c a n be no d o u b t t h a t t h e e m p l o y e e m u s t af f o r d t h e union t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to act on h i s behalf Congress has e x p r e s s l y approved c o n t r a c t g r i e v a n c e p r o c e d u r e s as a p r e f e r r e d method f o r s e t t l i n g d i s p u t e s and s t a b i l i z i n g t h e 'common lawt o f t h e p l a n t . (Citations omitted. ) law . 8 5 S.Ct. stated: "Union interest in prosecuting employee Such a c t i v i t y c o m p l i g r i e v a n c e s is c l e a r . ments the union's status as exclusive b a r g a i n i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i v e by p e r m i t t i n g it to p a r t i c i p a t e a c t i v e l y i n t h e c o n t i n u i n g admin i s t r a t i o n of the c o n t r a c t . In addition, c o n s c i e n t i o u s h a n d l i n g o f g r i e v a n c e claims will enhance the union's prestige with employees. Employer i n t e r e s t s , for their p a r t , a r e s e r v e d by l i m i t i n g t h e c h o i c e of remedies a v a i l a b l e to aggrieved employees. it cannot be said, in the normal And s i t u a t i o n , t h a t contract grievance procedures a r e i n a d e q u a t e --o p r o t e c t t h e i n t e r e s t s - - n t - of a a g g r i e v e d e m p l o y e e - t i l the- -o y e e un empl - has a t t e m p t e d t o implement t h e p r o c e d u r e s - and o supplied. ) f o u n d --them s . . " A c o n t r a r y r u l e w h i c h would p e r m i t a n i n d i v i d u a l employee t o c o m p l e t e l y s i d e s t e p a v a i l a b l e g r i e v a n c e p r o c e d u r e s i n f a v o r of a l a w s u i t h a s l i t t l e t o commend i t . I n a d d i t i o n t o c u t t i n g across t h e i n t e r e s t s a l r e a d y m e n t i o n e d , i t would d e p r i v e e m p l o y e r and u n i o n of t h e a b i l i t y t o e s t a b l i s h a u n i f o r m and e x c l u s i v e method f o r o r d e r l y s e t t l e m e n t o f e m p l o y e e grievances. I f a grievance procedure cannot b e made e x c l u s i v e , i t l o s e s much o f its d e s i r a b i l i t y as a method o f s e t t l e m e n t . A r u l e c r e a t i n g such a s i t u a t i o n 'would i n e v i t a b l y e x e r t a d i s r u p t i v e i n f l u e n c e upon b o t h t h e n e g o t i a t i o n and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of c o l l e c t i v e agreements. t ( C i t a t i o n s omitted. ) " O n l y i n t h o s e cases w h e r e it is c e r t a i n t h a t t h e a r b i t r a t i o n clause contained in collective a bargaining agreement not is s u s c e p t i b l e t o a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t c o v e r s t h e d i s p u t e is a n employee e n t i t l e d to sidestep bargaining agreement. Workers Union Local t h e p r o v i s i o n s of the collective S e e , T o r r i n g t o n Company v . Metal P r o d u c t s 1645 1 9 6 6 ) r 362 F.2d (2nd C i r . 677. The r e s p o n d e n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e same c o n s i d e r a t i o n s and p o l i c i e s which m a n d a t e t h e u s e o f t h e g r i e v a n c e and a r b i t r a t i o n p r o c e d u r e s u n d e r t h e f e d e r a l a c t a p p l y e q u a l l y t o d i s p u t e s which a r i s e u n d e r t h e S t a t e P u b l i c Employees C o l l e c t i v e B a r g a i n i n g A c t . All the allegations contained in the a p p e l l a n t ' s proposed amended c o m p l a i n t r e v o l v e a r o u n d h i s r e m o v a l as c h a i r m a n of English Department whether proper falls definition of ... Eastern. procedures definitely member at within were the The argument used. Such collective " g r i e v a n c e ," as : "an boils down a contention bargaining allegation by the to most agreement's a faculty t h a t t h e r e h a s b e e n a b r e a c h , m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n or improper application of the terms of To allow a member of administration." this agreement by the c o l l e c t i v e bargaining u n i t t o completely s i d e s t e p a v a i l a b l e procedures would, j u s t under law, federal negotiation exert a disruptive and administration i n f l u e n c e upon of collective a g r e e m e n t s and e f f e c t i v e l y d e p r i v e e m p l o y e r s and to ability establish a uniform and exclusive o r d e r l y s e t t l e m e n t of employee g r i e v a n c e s The the respondent benefit chooses to of the both as the bargaining u n i o n s of method for the the . c o n t e n d s t h a t b e c a u s e t h e a p p e l l a n t h a s had the collective ignore the bargaining contractual agreement, and justice grievance procedure, would n o t be s e r v e d b y c o n d o n i n g h i s v i o l a t i o n of yet the agreement and a l l o w i n g him l e a v e o f c o u r t t o amend h i s c o m p l a i n t and s t a t e a d d i t i o n a l g r i e v a n c e s a g a i n s t r e s p o n d e n t , McRae , and t h e p r o p o s e d new d e f e n d a n t s . I n answer to the respondent grievance procedures agreement need contained o n l y be followed the in appellant argues the collective i n contractual that the bargaining disputes. The a p p e l l a n t u r g e s t h a t t h e i s s u e i n t h i s case d o e s n o t c e n t e r on a contractual dispute but, rather, constitutionally protected right. on a violation of A p p e l l a n t p r o c e e d s to d e v e l o p t h i s a r g u m e n t by f i r s t p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l sions cannot (1975), Bozeman Yunker be modified by 1 6 6 Mont. ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 8 0 Mont. statute. 504, a 534 5 4 , 589 P.2d See, P.2d No11 v . 880, 126. and proviCity of Madison v. Appellant concludes b y s t a t i n g t h a t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s c a n n o t be m o d i f i e d b y p r i vate contract. Such a contract would be T h i s r e s u l t f i n d s s u p p o r t i n s e c t i o n 1-3-204, of b e n e f i t of intended public The that cannot a "Waiver a law But a l a w e s t a b l i s h e d for a be contravened law established for b e c o n t r a v e n e d by a p r i v a t e a g r e e m e n t case law. MCA: Anyone may w a i v e t h e a d v a n t a g e o f solely for h i s benefit. reason rule a law. unenforceable. by a a private public agreement." purpose cannot is a l s o s u p p o r t e d i n the S e e , f o r e x a m p l e , New S i l v e r B e l l Mining Company v . County of L e w i s and C l a r k ( 1 9 5 5 ) , 1 2 9 Mont. and ex. State rel. Neiss District v. 269, Court 284 P.2d (1973), 1012; 1 6 2 Mont. 3 2 4 , 5 1 1 P.2d 9 7 9 . The appellant's point be limited his right to litigate the t h e p r o c e d u r e s used i n r e m o v a l o f h i s t i t l e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of cannot that is by c o n t r a c t u a l agreement. Although law the c i t e d b y t h e a p p e l l a n t is c o r r e c t , t h e p r e m i s e s upon which it is based is h e r e c a l l e d i n t o q u e s t i o n . The issue violation t o be a of is w h e t h e r t h i s is, determined constitutionally contractual dispute. protected right, in fact, or a a merely The a n s w e r t o t h a t q u e s t i o n f o l l o w s i n con- n e c t i o n w i t h c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the i n d i v i d u a l c o u n t s of t h e pro- p o s e d amended c o m p l a i n t . With these to directed incorporate introductory the matters individual into counts act i o n the via completed, which appellant amendment of is attention his sought to complaint. The p r o p o s e d C o u n t I1 a l l e g e s t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t w a s d e p r i v e d o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d u e p r o c e s s i n t h a t t h e memorandum w h i c h l e d t o his as dismissal reputation, honor opportunity to chairman and be placed integrity heard. In 92 (1972), S.Ct. 408 2701, U.S. issue without 33 L.Ed.2d 593, 92 548, Sect. his giving support R e g e n t s v. a p p e l l a n t r e l i e s o n Board o f 564, in of 2694, him this Roth, and good name, notice or allegation, ( 1 9 7 2 ) r 408 U.S. Perry 33 v. Sindermann L.Ed.2d 570. T h e s e a u t h o r i t i e s , and t h e numerous o t h e r s c i t e d b y a p p e l l a n t i n t h e t o t a l i t y of t h e b r i e f i n g he h a s s u b m i t t e d , a r e s u b j e c t t o the factual distinction that they involved summary d i s m i s s a l s f r o m p u b l i c e m p l o y m e n t , or t h e e q u i v a l e n t t h e r e o f , which is n o t t h e case h e r e . only, it A l t h o u g h s u c h d i s t i n c t i o n may be o n e of is n e v e r t h e l e s s p e r t i n e n t requirement of due process in determining has " 'Due p r o c e s s , u n l i k e some l e g a l r u l e s , conception with circumstances. " a fixed content Cafeteria and unrelated degree whether been any fulfilled. is n o t a t e c h n i c a l to time, R e s t a u r a n t Workers place v. and McElroy " [ D l u e p r o c e s s is f l e x i b l e and c a l l s f o r s u c h p r o c e d u r a l p r o t e c t i o n s as t h e p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n demands." Morrissey v. B r e w e r "The f u n d a m e n t a l r e q u i r e m e n t o f d u e p r o c e s s is t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to be heard 'at a meaningful time and Mathews v. E l d r i d g e ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 424 U.S. A d e t e r m i n a t i o n of whether the i n a meaningful manner.'" 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. procedures 893, 902, followed i n any g i v e n case i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y s u f f i c i e n t r e q u i r e s a n a n a l y s i s of t h e g o v e r n m e n t a l and p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t s t h a t are a f f e c t e d b y t h e a c t i o n taken. As stated 1 3 4 , 1 6 7 , 1 6 8 , 94 S . C t . i n A r n e t t v. Kennedy ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 416 U.S. 1 6 3 3 , 1 6 5 1 , 4 0 L.Ed.2d 15; by t h e u n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t : "Having d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l g u a r a n t e e of p r o c e d u r a l d u e p r o c e s s a p p l i e s to a p p e l l e e ' s d i s c h a r g e from p u b l i c e m p l o y m e n t , t h e q u e s t i o n arises whether a n e v i d e n t i a r y hearing, including the right to p r e s e n t f a v o r a b l e w i t n e s s e s and t o c o n f r o n t and e x a mine a d v e r s e w i t n e s s e s , m u s t be a c c o r d e d b e f o r e removal. The r e s o l u t i o n of t h i s i s s u e d e p e n d s on a b a l a n c i n g p r o c e s s i n which t h e G o v e r n m e n t 1s i n t e r e s t i n e x p e d i t i o u s r e m o v a l of a n u n s a t i s f a c t o r y e m p l o y e e i s weighed a g a i n s t t h e i n t e r e s t of t h e a f f e c t e d e m p l o y e e i n c o n t i n u e d p u b l i c employment. (Citations A s the Court s t a t e d i n C a f e t e r i a omitted.) and R e s t a u r a n t W o r k e r s v . McElroy, [supra] ' c o n s i d e r a t i o n of what p r o c e d u r e s due p r o c e s s may r e q u i r e u n d e r a n y g i v e n s e t of c i r c u m s t a n c e s m u s t b e g i n w i t h a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e p r e c i s e n a t u r e of t h e government f u n c t i o n i n v o l v e d as w e l l as o f t h e p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t that has been affected by governmental a c t i o n . "I I n s h o r t , d u e p r o c e s s is n o t a f i x e d c o n c e p t b u t , r a t h e r , is o n e which m u s t be t a i l o r e d t o e a c h s i t u a t i o n i n s u c h a way t h a t i t meets t h e n e e d s and p r o t e c t s t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e v a r i o u s p a r - ties involved. someone The destined termination of to due suffer employment process the are requirements grievous different loss from applicable associated the due to with process r e q u i r e m e n t s n e c e s s a r y to p r o t e c t t h e i n t e r e s t s of a c o l l e g e p r o f e s s o r who s u f f e r s t h e l o s s o f h i s t i t l e as d e p a r t m e n t c h a i r m a n and t h e n o m i n a l s t i p e n d w h i c h a c c o m p a n i e s i t . is concluded It that the governmental interest in orderly a d m i n i s t r a t i o n n e c e s s a r y t o p r e v e n t d i s r u p t i o n of t h e e d u c a t i o n a l process is s u f f i c i e n t t o allow summary d i s m i s s a l o f c h a i r m e n when the r e q u i r e m e n t s of department d u e p r o c e s s a r e accommodated t h r o u g h t h e g r i e v a n c e and a r b i t r a t i o n p r o c e d u r e o u t l i n e d i n section 12.000, et seq. , of the collective bargaining agreement. T h e s e p r o c e d u r e s g i v e a g g r i e v e d f a c u l t y members t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o c h a l l e n g e any a l l e g e d a p p l i c a t i o n of breach, misinterpretation or improper t h e terms o f t h e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g a g r e e m e n t . A l t h o u g h t h e y were n o t e x e r c i s e d , t h e s e p r o c e d u r e s were a v a i l a b l e to the t o s e e k r e i n s t a t e m e n t as d e p a r t m e n t c h a i r m a n . appellant Such a g r i e v a n c e p r o c e d u r e a f f o r d s t h e a p p e l l a n t a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o be h e a r d a t a m e a n i n g f u l t i m e and i n a m e a n i n g f u l m a n n e r . r e q u i r e m e n t s of due p r o c e s s are t h e r e b y m e t . The follows t h a t It C o u n t I1 d o e s n o t s e t f o r t h a c o g n i z a b l e claim and p e r m i t t i n g i t s i n c o r p o r a t i o n i n t o t h e a c t i o n by t h e r e q u e s t e d amendment would be a f u t i l e act. C o u n t I11 o f t h e p r o p o s e d amended c o m p l a i n t is g r o u n d e d upon the allegation, terminated stated in general terms, that and d i s c h a r g e d as a d i r e c t r e s u l t of appellant was t h e e x e r c i s e of h i s cons t i t u t i o n a l l y g u a r a n t e e d freedom of s p e e c h and e x p r e s s i o n with department respect administration. to the conduct of the and the I t a l s o a l l e g e s i n a r e v e r s e form t h a t t h e ter- m i n a t i o n and d i s c h a r g e c o n c e r n e d p r o x i m a t e l y r e s u l t s i n a d e n i a l o f h i s r i g h t t o f r e e d o m o f s p e e c h and e x p r e s s i o n . I t is s e t t l e d t h a t a v a l u a b l e g o v e r n m e n t a l b e n e f i t , s u c h as a j o b , may n o t be d e n i e d o n a b a s i s which i n f r i n g e s o n e s c o n s t i t u tionally-protected freedom of interests, speech. P e r r y v. especially Sindermann, ones supra, interest in and 4 2 U.S.C. s e c t i o n 1983 ( C i v i l R i g h t s S t a t u t e ) . The problem w i t h Count I11 is, first, whether a p p e l l a n t f r o m h i s t i t l e and s t i p e n d as c h a i r m a n of removal of the English Department, b u t n o t from h i s job, c o n s t i t u t e s a v a l u a b l e governm e n t a l b e n e f i t which f a l l s u n d e r t h e p r o t e c t i o n a c c o r d e d i n P e r r y m i t t i n g i t s i n c o r p o r t i o n i n t o t h e a c t i o n by t h e r e q u e s t e d amendm e n t would be a f u t i l e a c t . appellant However, t h i s d o e s n o t mean t h a t t h e is n o t e n t i t l e d t o r e p l e a d o r d e r t o meet t h e r e q u i r e m e n t of through the medium o f h i s p r o p o s e d C o u n t I11 i n s p e c i f i c i t y i n its a l l e g a t i o n s a p r o p e r motion and notice and hearing thereon. I n v i e w o f t h i s , t h e q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r a c h a i r m a n s h i p t i t l e does constitute a valuable or determined effect, if at any, time. this of governmental b e n e f i t the Likewise, grievance is n o t r e a c h e d the question of the procedure provided in the c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g a g r e e m e n t a s t h e same a p p l i e s to C o u n t I11 cannot be determined unless repleading is accomplished. t h e p r o p o s e d amended c o m p l a i n t a r e d i f - C o u n t s I V and V o f f e r e n t h u e s o f a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a l l e n g e f o u n d e d upon t h e p r i v i l e g e s and i m m u n i t i e s c l a u s e s and e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n c l a u s e s of t h e Montana and F e d e r a l C o n s t i t u t i o n s . I n substance, they comprise a c h a l l e n g e t o t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e s t a t u t o r y p r i v i l e g e a c c o r d e d to a p u b l i c a t i o n made i n t h e p r o p e r d i s c h a r g e o f a p u b l i c d u t y . e f f i c a c y of is t h e b a s i s of this privilege The the defense asserted b y r e s p o n d e n t McRae a n d , a l s o , t h e b a s i s f o r h i s m o t i o n f o r summary judgment lodged a g a i n s t b o t h t h e a c t i o n s t a t e d i n t h e o r i g i nal complaint and Count I of the proposed amended complaint. t h e y w i l l a l l be t r e a t e d t o g e t h e r i n t h e d i s c u s s i o n Consequently, which f o l l o w s : L i b e l is d e f i n e d i n S e c t i o n 27-1-802, unprivileged publication . . . MCA, which as: exposes " a f a l s e and any person to h a t r e d , c o n t e m p t , r i d i c u l e , o r o b l o g u y o r which c a u s e s him to be s h u n n e d or a v o i d e d o r which h a s a t e n d e n c y to i n j u r e him i n h i s occupation." S e c t i o n 27-1-804, c a t i o n s are p r i v i l e g e d : (I) In In the the proper case of MCA, i n t u r n , d e f i n e s what p u b l i - "A p r i v i l e g e d discharge of Storch Board v. an p u b l i c a t i o n is o n e made : official of duty Directors of . . ." Eastern Montana R e g i o n F i v e M e n t a l H e a l t h C e n t e r ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 6 9 Mont. 181-182, 5 4 5 P.2d 644, 647-648, 176, t h i s C o u r t had t h e o c c a s i o n to v. Sindermann, supra; and, second, whether the allegations of C o u n t 111, a s p r e s e n t l y f r a m e d , s a t i s f y t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of spec i f i c i t y a p p l i c a b l e t o a c l a i m of a denial of f i r s t amendment privileges. The memorandum i s s u e d by Dean M c R a e , the alleged offensive p o r t i o n o f w h i c h is i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o C o u n t I11 b y r e f e r e n c e from C o u n t I o f t h e amended c o m p l a i n t , g a v e as r e a s o n s f o r a p p e l l a n t ' s loss of t i t l e h i s inadequate leadership, h i s f a i l u r e to b r i n g a p o l a r i z e d department i n t o a smoother f u n c t i o n i n g u n i t , t h a t a c r i m o n y had the fact increased w i t h i n t h e English Department, his f a i l u r e t o e f f e c t i v e l y and c o n s c i e n t i o u s l y h a n d l e t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d e t a i l a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e o f f i c e , and h i s f a i l u r e t o p r o p e r l y c o o r d i n a t e t h e n e w l y i n s t i t u t e d mass p l a c e m e n t p r o c e s s f o r freshman composition. A l t h o u g h t h e s e r e a s o n s are a l l e g e d t o be f a l s e , nowhere a r e t h e y o f f s e t by a l l e g a t i o n s i n C o u n t 111, s p e c i f y i n g w h a t s p e e c h o r e x p r e s s i o n was e x e r c i s e d b y t h e a p p e l l a n t which is e n t i t l e d t o c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n as h a v i n g a p r o x i m a t e r e l e v a n c e t o the loss of his of title A s s t a t e d i n R o t o l o v. c h a i r i n a n of the E n g l i s h Department. Borough of C h a r l e r o i ( 3 r d C i r . 1 9 7 6 ) "The a l l e g a t i o n s i n t h e c o m p l a i n t s t r i k e u s as v a g u e and c o n c l u s o r y . They f a i l to i n d i c a t e , when, w h e r e , and how R o t o l o had ' e x e r c i s e d h i s it f i r s t amendment p r i v i l e g e s , ' r e n d e r i n g impossible t o determine i f indeed h i s a c t i v i t y was t h e s o r t a f f o r d e d p r o t e c t i o n u n d e r t h e f i r s t amendment and w h e t h e r i t had a n y relev a n c e t o t h e t e r m i n a t i o n o f h i s employment. The a l l e g a t i o n s s t a t e no f a c t s upon which to w e i g h t h e s u b s t a n t i a l i t y o f t h e claim; t h e y d o n o t a v e r t h e c o n t e n t of t h e a l l e g e d f i r s t amendment e x e r c i s e . " See, also, 1976)r 529 Kennedy F.2d v. F.2d 1270, cert. denied (3rd Cir. 1967), It 379 & v. Landing, M Kauffman 987; H Inc. Moss (3rd ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 400 U.S. 846; F.2d 213; and i s c o n c l u d e d t h a t C o u n t I11 o f Valley v. (9th Cir. 197O), Negrich Maule v. Cir. 420 Hohn (~.Conn. t h e amended c o m p l a i n t , as p r e s e n t l y f r a m e d , d o e s n o t s e t f o r t h a c o g n i z a b l e claim and per- c o n s i d e r t h i s code s e c t i o n and i t s t a t e d : " A p r i v i l e g e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n is o n e w h i c h , exc e p t f o r t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s u n d e r which it is made, may be defamatory and actionable. (Citation omitted. ) " W h i l e some o f t h e q u o t e d s u b s e c t i o n s d o ment i o n m a l i c e t h e p e r t i n e n t s u b s e c t i o n 1, s a y s nothing about qualified privilege. R a t h e r it c o n s t i t u t e s an absolute p r i v i l e g e with the o n l y requirement being t h a t the i n t r a d e p a r t m e n t c o m m u n i c a t i o n be o n e r e n d e r e d w h i l e T h e r e c a n be engaged i n an ' o f f i c i a l d u t y . ' n o d o u b t t h a t t h e h i r i n g and f i r i n g o f e m p l o y e e s is p a r t o f t h e ' o f f i c i a l d u t y 1 o f t h e Montana R e g i o n a l H e a l t h C e n t e r s . " W h e t h e r s t a t e m e n t s made by s u c h p u b l i c o f f ic e r s i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e h i r i n g and f i r i n g o f e m p l o y e e s may be s u b j e c t t o a b s o l u t e p r i v i l e g e h a s b e e n a n s w e r e d i n t h e a f f i r m a t i v e many times. Under f a c t s s i m i l a r t o t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t i n B a r r v . Matteo, 360 U.S. 5 6 4 , 5 7 1 , 79 S . C t . 1 3 3 5 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1 4 3 4 , 1 4 4 1 , s t a t e d t h a t i n s o f a r as a p u b l i c o f f i c e r was a c t i n g w i t h i n t h e s c o p e of h i s a u t h o r i t y h i s c o m m u n i c a t i o n was a b s o l u t e l y privileged. ( C i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d . ) The C o u r t w e n t on t o s a y why a n a b s o l u t e p r i v i l e g e as e s s e n t i a l i n such a circumstance, quoting a p p r o v i n g l y from J u d g e L e a r n e d Hand ' s d e c i s i o n 1 7 7 F.2d i n G r e g o i r e v. B i d d l e , 2 C i r . , 5 7 9 , 581: . . " I . it is i m p o s s i b l e t o know w h e t h e r t h e claim is w e l l f o u n d e d u n t i l t h e case h a s b e e n t r i e d , and t h a t t o s u b m i t a l l o f f i c i a l s , t h e i n n o c e n t a s w e l l a s t h e g u i l t y , to t h e b u r d e n o f a t r i a l and t o t h e i n e v i t a b l e d a n g e r of i t s o u t c o m e , would dampen t h e a r d o r of a l l b u t t h e most r e s o l u t e , o r t h e m o s t i r r e s p o n s i b l e , i n t h e u n f l i n c h i n g d i s c h a r g e of t h e i r d u t i e s ... 1 " S i n c e t h e i n t e r n a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n was w i t h i n t h e p r o p e r d i s c h a r g e of a n o f f i c i a l d u t y , it e n j o y e d a n a b s o l u t e p r i v i l e g e and c o u l d t h e r e f o r e n o t be t h e s u b j e c t of l i b e l a c t i o n . " STo p u t t h e meaning o f -t o r c h i n p e r s p e c t i v e f o r a p p l i c a t i o n to this case, certain provisions of the collective bargaining a g r e e m e n t and a Montana code s e c t i o n s h o u l d be n o t e d . The p r o v i s i o n allows the procedures under dean for section in the c o l l e c t i v e bargaining t o remove d e p a r t m e n t the s e l e c t i o n of 20-25-301, MCA. a g r e e m e n t which chairmen, and a new c h a i r m a n , S u b s e c t i o n 11 o f implements is a u t h o r i z e d this statute allows the regents to: " a p p o i n t a p r e s i d e n t and f a c u l t y f o r e a c h of the system, the i n s t i t u t i o n s of officers, agents, Subsection 15, regents' and and fix their compensation i n t u r n , a l l o w s t h e r e g e n t s to: discretion, t h e u n i t s of employees, a p p o i n t any o t h e r n e c e s s a r y upon t h e p r e s i d e n t and ." "confer, a t the f a c u l t y of t h e s y s t e m f o r t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t of e a c h of t h e u n i t such a u t h o r i t y r e l a t i n g t o t h e i m m e d i a t e c o n t r o l and management, o t h e r than financial, The and the collective s e l e c t i o n of bargaining teachers agreement and provides employees." in connection w i t h t r a n s f e r of t i t l e , b e i n g s e c t i o n 9 . 1 0 0 ( F ) ( l ) ( c ) : "1. The a p p r o p r i a t e Dean w i l l implement proc e d u r e s f o r t h e s e l e c t i o n of a new a c a d e m i c a d m i n i s t r a t i v e u n i t C h a i r p e r s o n when one of t h e following conditions occurs : " c . The Dean n o t i f i e s a l l members of t h e u n i t and t h e C h a i r p e r s o n t h a t i n h i s or h e r judgment a c h a n g e s h o u l d t a k e p l a c e ." The c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g a g r e e m e n t a l s o p r o v i d e s a g r i e v a n c e procedure under "grievance," as: section "An A.A.U.P. that there improper application administration." 12.100. allegation has been of the a This by a f a c u l t y member breach, terms of section or misinterpretation this agreement This section also provides that: m u s t be f i l e d by a f a c u l t y member of defines t h e A.A.U.P. by i n accordance with or the "A g r i e v a n c e within thirty ( 3 0 ) d a y s from t h e d a t e t h e g r i e v a b l e e v e n t was d e t e r m i n e d . grievance not processed the t h e time Any l i m i t spe- c i f i e d h e r e i n s h a l l f o r t h e p u r p o s e s of t h i s a g r e e m e n t be deemed null and without further recourse." The collective bargaining a g r e e m e n t t h e n d e t a i l s a p r o c e d u r e f o r t h e s e t t l e m e n t of g r i e v ances. In the event that the procedure is followed and the g r i e v a n c e r e m a i n s u n s e t t l e d , b i n d i n g a r b i t r a t i o n is p r o v i d e d f o r u n d e r s e c t i o n 12.200. J u s t a s t h i s C o u r t i n - r c h found t h a t t h e h i r i n g and f i r i n g Sto o f e m p l o y e e s was a n o f f i c i a l d u t y of t h e Montana R e g i o n a l H e a l t h C e n t e r s , t h e r e seems to be l i t t l e q u e s t i o n i n t h i s case t h a t t h e statutory authority 20-25-301(15) section found conferred in as MCA, the well the board as 9 . 1 0 0 ( F ) ( l ) ( c ) of section agreement giving upon of under enumerated the regents duty collective d e a n power appropriate the to bargaining remove depart- m e n t a l c h a i r p e r s o n s , makes t h e memorandum i n q u e s t i o n a n o f f i c i a l duty subject to absolute privilege under the statute. The -t o r c h d e c i s i o n a l s o p o i n t s o u t two i m p o r t a n t c o n c e p t s : SF i r s t of a l l , o n c e a c o m m u n i c a t i o n is l a b e l e d a s p r i v i l e g e d , i s n o t d e f a m a t o r y and t h e r e f o r e n o t a c t i o n a b l e . Secondly, it the a b s o l u t e p r i v i l e g e a r i s e s when t h e i n t r a d e p a r t m e n t c o m m u n i c a t i o n i s r e n d e r e d d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e of a n o f f i c i a l d u t y , The appellant raises a number of issues questioning the p r o p r i e t y o f t h e d e f e n s e of a b s o l u t e p r i v i l e g e : 1. First employment." of all, he asserts "a constitutional right to I n l i g h t of t h i s r i g h t t o employment, t h e a p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t d u e p r o c e s s r e q u i r e s a n o t i c e and o p p o r t u n i t y to be heard before Appellant notice a n y o n e c a n be deprived of c o n c l u d e s by s t a t i n g and opportunity to such a property right. t h a t any d i s m i s s a l w i t h o u t heard be would not be a such proper d i s c h a r g e of an o f f i c i a l d u t y , and t h e r e f o r e no s t a t u t o r y p r i v i l e g e would a r i s e . The m e r i t s of discussed in t h e due p r o c e s s connection a s s e r t i o n have w i t h Count I1 o f c o m p l a i n t and w i l l n o t be r e p e a t e d h e r e . a l r e a d y been t h e proposed amended S u f f i c e it t o s a y t h a t a p p e l l a n t ' s view d o e s n o t p r e v a i l . 2. The s e c o n d i s s u e r a i s e d by t h e a p p e l l a n t i n o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e m o t i o n f o r summary j u d g m e n t is t h a t , i n o r d e r f o r t h e r e t o be a p r o p e r d i s c h a r g e of statutory privilege, ments of a n o f f i c i a l d u t y which g i v e s r i s e to t h e t h e r e m u s t be c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h e r e q u i r e - the c o l l e c t i v e bargaining agreement. t h r e e a l l e g e d v i o l a t i o n s of First, Appellant r a i s e s the c o l l e c t i v e bargaining agreement: t h a t t h e r e was no n o t i f i c a t i o n t o a l l members of the u n i t under s e c t i o n 9 . 1 0 0 ( F ) ( l ) ( c ) . Secondly, appellant argues that this section of the col- lective bargaining agreement requires only that the dean give T h e r e is no r e q u i r e m e n t n o t i c e t h a t a change s h o u l d t a k e p l a c e . To g i v e t h a t t h e dean g i v e any r e a s o n n e c e s s i t a t i n g a change. s u c h a r e a s o n is beyond t h e p r o p e r d i s c h a r g e of an o f f i c i a l d u t y . Thirdly, the appellant argues t h a t the c o l l e c t i v e bargaining agreement o n l y r e q u i r e s should take place --- a notice not a from the that judgment dean the that a change r e m o v a l of the department chairperson has taken place. In support states that the evidence clearly show followed by Appellant's of that the first to the dean be of these set forth requirement until contentions, in of some affidavit appellant form w i l l notification Later period a f f i d a v i t s f i l e d F e b r u a r y 1 3 and 2 4 , was of not time. 1 9 8 1 , make no m e n t i o n of c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h i s r e q u i r e m e n t . The r e s p o n d e n t n o t e s i n t h i s r e g a r d t h a t t h e a f f i d a v i t s f i l e d by D r . L a r r y J o n e s and P r e s i d e n t Van de W e t e r i n g show t h a t t h e r e s p o n d e n t was a c t i n g w i t h i n t h e s c o p e of h i s o f f i c i a l d u t i e s and d i d d i s c h a r g e t h o s e d u t i e s i n a p r o p e r manner when he removed t h e respondent's t i t l e of memorandum which c h a i r m a n of is t h e b a s i s of t h e E n g l i s h Department. The t h i s lawsuit a l s o contained a n o t a t i o n a t t h e b o t t o m t h a t p h o t o c o p i e s were s e n t to members of t h e D e p a r t m e n t s of E n g l i s h , P h i l o s o p h y , H u m a n i t i e s and R e l i g i o u s studies. Finally, in this regard, the collective bargaining a g r e e m e n t o n l y r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e d e a n n o t i f y a l l members of u n i t and t h e c h a i r p e r s o n t h a t a c h a n g e s h o u l d t a k e p l a c e . the There i s no r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t s u c h n o t i c e t o t h e u n i t and t h e c h a i r p e r s o n be c o n t e m p o r a n e o u s . all u n i t members d i d I t is e v i d e n t h e r e t h a t n o t i f i c a t i o n of take place and the o n l y evidence i n the r e c o r d seems t o i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e n o t i f i c a t i o n was p r o x i m a t e to t h e n o t i f i c a t i o n g i v e n to t h e a p p e l l a n t . T u r n i n g t o a p p e l l a n t ' s second argument w e f i n d t h e c o n t e n t i o n r a i s e d t h a t because t h e c o l l e c t i v e bargaining agreement does not s p e c i f i c a l l y r e q u i r e t h e d e a n t o g i v e r e a s o n s f o r t h e r e m o v a l of a department chairman, t o g i v e s u c h r e a s o n s would v i o l a t e the collective bargaining agreement d i s c h a r g e of an o f f i c i a l d u t y . and would not be a proper Although the respondent does not a d d r e s s t h i s i s s u e beyond r e f e r e n c e t o t h e a f f i d a v i t s which n o t e t h a t t h e dean did p r o p e r l y d i s c h a r g e h i s d u t i e s under t h e c o l l e c a p p e l l a n t l s a r g u m e n t would a p p e a r to t i v e bargaining agreement, be w i t h o u t merit. I t would seem t o be n e c e s s a r i l y i m p l i e d i n a n y r e q u i r e m e n t of n o t i f i c a t i o n b e f o r e removal t h a t t h e r e a s o n s s u p p o r t i n g s u c h a d e t e r m i n a t i o n be g i v e n t o t h e o u t g o i n g c h a i r m a n t o p u t him o n n o t i c e o f why t h e c h a n g e is n e c e s s a r y . The t h i r d , and f i n a l , a r g u m e n t which a p p e l l a n t r a i s e s i n supp o r t of h i s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of the collective b a r g a i n i n g a g r e e m e n t were n o t met is t h a t t h e n o t i f i c a t i o n o n l y a requires than a judgment judgment that that the change s h o u l d the determination has take place, rather taken place. Once a g a i n , t h e r e s p o n d e n t d o e s n o t a d d r e s s t h i s a r g u m e n t beyond c i t a t i o n t o t h e two s u p p o r t i n g a f f i d a v i t s which n o t e t h a t t h e r e s p o n dent properly discharged his duties under the based collective on bargaining agreement. The appellant's interpretation of argument the "should," believes definition as contained Appellant here in the that is to be given a to c o l l e c t i v e bargaining "should," as used case, however, "should" does the word, agreement. i n t h i s case, means " s h a l l , " and is t h e r e f o r e n o t a f i n a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n . this semantic appear to A s used be a in final determination. Once t h e d e a n n o t i f i e s t h e u n i t members and the department c h a i r p e r s o n t h a t a change should t a k e place, t h e p r o c e d u r e s f o r s e l e c t i o n o f a new d e p a r t m e n t c h a i r p e r s o n a r e i m p l e m e n t e d . These ( p r o c e d u r e s are f o u n d a t s e c t i o n 9 . l o 0 ( F ) (1) a ) t h r o u g h ( f ) procedures . The a new d e p a r t m e n t c h a i r p e r s o n d o n o t f o r s e l e c t i o n of c o n t e m p l a t e a n y c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e d e a n 1s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t a c h a n g e i n t h e c h a i r m a n s h i p of Such a d e t e r m i n a t i o n correct avenue of by appeal the the department should take p l a c e . to be final and the decision would be the dean appears from such a grievance and arbitration 12.000 the collective of followed by the procedures bargaining d e a n do n o t spelled out at sect i o n agreement. procedures to v i o l a t e appear The the collective bargaining agreement. 3. The t h i r d c o n t e n t i o n r a i s e d by t h e a p p e l l a n t i n o p p o s i - t i o n t o r e s p o n d e n t ' s m o t i o n f o r summary j u d g m e n t is t h a t l i b e l is a v i o l a t i o n of t h e Montana c o d e , and t h e r e f o r e i t would n o t be a proper discharge therefore, reasoning no of to an official duty statutory privilege would involved in this argument libel arise. --- someone The is a p p a r e n t . circular Once it is d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t was made i n t h e p r o p e r d i s c h a r g e o f a n o f f i c i a l d u t y , it is c o n s i d e r e d p r i v i l e g e d and n o l o n g e r f a l l s w i t h i n t h e d e f i n i t i o n of libel. Not f a l l i n g w i t h i n t h e d e f i n i - t i o n o f l i b e l , s u c h a s t a t e m e n t would n o t be a n a c t i o n a b l e t o r t . 4. The f o u r t h a r g u m e n t which t h e a p p e l l a n t r a i s e s i n o p p o s i - t i o n t o r e s p o n d e n t ' s mot i o n f o r summary j u d g m e n t is t h a t r e l i a n c e upon a n y s t a t u t e g r a n t i n g p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s a b s o l u t e p r i v i l e g e and t h e r e b y making them immune from p r o s e c u t i o n d u r i n g t h e p r o p e r d i s c h a r g e of the governmental for libel arising an o f f i c i a l duty c o n f l i c t s with immunity statute, s i t u t i o n a l i n l i g h t of A r t . and 11, S e c . is therefore uncon- 1 8 , 1972 Mont.Const. This s e c t i o n p r o v i d e s t h a t t h e r e s h a l l be no s o v e r e i g n immunity e x c e p t as specifically provided law by and two-thirds vote of each House. S e c t i o n 2 - 9 - 0 1 1 ( d ) , MCA, a d d r e s s e s governmental and states i n t h e d e f i n i t i o n a l s e c t i o n : immunity, " ' P e r s o n a l i n j u r y ' means any i n j u r y r e s u l t i n g from l i b e l , s l a n d e r , m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n , or f a l s e a r r e s t , any b o d i l y i n j u r y , sickness, disease, o r death s u s t a i n e d by a n y p e r s o n and c a u s e d by a n o c c u r r a n c e f o r which t h e S t a t e may be MCA, held liable." S e c t i o n s 2-9-111 s p e l l o u t t h e immunity which t h e l e g i s l a t u r e h a s s e e n f i t to g r a n t t o t h e l e g i s l a t i v e body, of t h r o u g h 2-9-114, the judiciary, the t h e members, o f f i c e r s and a g e n t s governor's o f f ice and local government o f f i c i a l s d i s c h a r g i n g o f f i c i a l d u t i e s a s s o c i a t e d with approving - 17 - o r vetoing ordinance, o r while involved i n l e g i s l a t i v e a c t i v i t y S e c t i o n 2-9-305, . s p e l l s o u t when t h e g o v e r n m e n t a l e n t i t y is MCA, t o be j o i n e d as a d e f e n d a n t and p r o v i d e s f o r t h e i m m u n i z a t i o n and i n d e m n i f i c a t i o n of e m p l o y e e s whose or w r o n g f u l a c t , negligence e r r o r o r o m i s s i o n , or o t h e r a c t i o n a b l e c o n d u c t g a v e r i s e to t h e claim --- u n l e s s the t o r t or claim is b a s e d o n a n i n t e n t i o n a l f e l o n i o u s act of t h e employee. The appellant argues explain the provisions that of the these libel code sections s t a t u t e and modify and show t h a t t h e immunity g r a n t e d i n l i b e l a c t i o n s is n o t a b s o l u t e because it d o e s n o t c o v e r torts t h a t are i n t e n t i o n a l o r f e l o n i o u s . dent counters 2-9-101(a), this argument by pointing The r e s p o n - out that section provides: MCA, " ' C l a i m ' means a n y claim a g a i n s t a government a l e n t i t y , f o r money damages o n l y , which a n y p e r s o n i s l e g a l l y e n t i t l e d to r e c o v e r a s d a m a g e s b e c a u s e of p e r s o n a l i n j u r y or p r o p e r t y damage c a u s e d by a n e g l i g e n t o r w r o n g f u l a c t o r o m i s s i o n c o m m i t t e d by a n y e m p l o y e e of t h e governmental e n t i t y while a c t i n g w i t h i n t h e s c o p e o f h i s employment, u n d e r c i r c u m s t a n c e s where t h e governmental e n t i t y i f a p r i v a t e p e r s o n , would be l i a b l e t o t h e c l a i m a n t f o r s u c h damages u n d e r t h e laws of t h e s t a t e . " In the case of State rel. ex ( 1 9 7 7 ) r 1 7 5 Mont. 6 3 , 6 7 , 572 P.2d Byorth v. 201, 203, District Court t h i s Court s t a t e d : " t h e T o r t C l a i m s A c t a t t a c h e s l i a b i l i t y to t h e S t a t e i n t h e same m a n n e r and t o t h e same e x t e n t t h a t l i a b i l i t y a t t a c h e s t o a p r i v a t e person." T h e r e c a n be no l e g a l e n t i t l e m e n t to r e c o v e r y f o r l i a b i l i t y when t h e a c t i o n c o m p l a i n e d o f d o e s n o t f a l l w i t h i n t h e definition of a actionable libel, tort. Before a writing is considered an t h e Montana s t a t u t e r e q u i r e s t h a t it be u n p r i - vileged. Once t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n is made t h a t t h e w r i t i n g is p r i - vileged, no actionable e n t i t l e m e n t to r e c o v e r y . tort exists and The t w o code there is no legal s e c t i o n s are complemen- t a r y , and no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v i o l a t i o n e x i s t s . 5. The f i f t h a r g u m e n t which t h e a p p e l l a n t r a i s e s i n o p p o s i - t i o n t o t h e r e s p o n d e n t ' s m o t i o n f o r summary j u d g m e n t is t h a t t h e United States Supreme C o u r t , in the case of Butz v. Econmou ( 1 9 7 8 ) r 438 U.S. its overruled 478, 98 S . C t . earlier 2894, decision 5 7 L.Ed.2d in Barr 895, impliedly Matteo, v. supra. Appellant argues t h a t because t h i s Court i n - o r c h , s u p r a , r e l i e d St o n Barr i n s u p p o r t o f i t s d e c i s i o n , S t o r c h is no l o n g e r good l a w . The B u t z case arose u n d e r 42 U.S.C., s e c t i o n 1 9 8 3 , and c o n s i d e r e d t h e i s s u e o f w h e t h e r a f e d e r a l o f f i c i a l is p e r s o n a l l y immune i f , in the course of enforcing constitutional rights. a statute, he infringes someone's F e d e r a l o f f i c i a l s may n o t , w i t h i m p u n i t y , d i s c h a r g e t h e i r d u t i e s i n a way t h a t is known t o them to v i o l a t e the constitution o r transgress a clearly established cons t i t u - tional rule. I n answer t o t h i s argument t h e r e s p o n d e n t f i r s t p o i n t s o u t that this lawsuit arises under state law and, as such, this C o u r t h a s t h e f i n a l s a y as t o t h e s t a t e l a w g o v e r n i n g t h e s u i t . T h i s r u l e i s c l e a r l y i m p l i e d i n t h e h o l d i n g of Tompkins ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S . C t . Erie R a i l r o a d 817, 822, v. 8 2 L.Ed. 1188: " E x c e p t i n matters g o v e r n e d b y t h e F e d e r a l C o n s t i t u t i o n or by A c t s o f C o n g r e s s , t h e l a w t o be a p p l i e d i n a n y c a s e is t h e law of t h e S t a t e . And w h e t h e r t h e l a w o f t h e S t a t e s h a l l b e d e c l a r e d b y i t s L e g i s l a t u r e i n a s t a t u t e or b y i t s h i g h e s t C o u r t i n a d e c i s i o n is n o t a matter of f e d e r a l c o n c e r n . T h e r e is n o f e d e r a l g e n e r a l common l a w . C o n g r e s s h a s no p o w e r to d e c l a r e s u b s t a n t i v e r u l e s of common l a w a p p l i c a b l e i n a S t a t e w h e t h e r t h e y be local i n t h e i r n a t u r e o r ' g e n e r a l , be t h e y c o m m e r c i a l l a w or a p a r t of t h e l a w o f t o r t s . And n o c l a u s e i n t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n p u r p o r t s to c o n f e r s u c h a power upon t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s . " The S t o r c h d e c i s i o n b e i n g t h e l a t e s t p r o n o u n c e m e n t by t h i s C o u r t on t h e i s s u e of statutory privilege in libel actions, the deci- s i o n is s t i l l good law. I n S t o r c h , t h i s Court s t a t e d t h a t i n o r d e r t o t a k e advantage of the absolute privilege provided under s e c t i o n 27-1-804 ( I ) , MCA: " t h e only requirement [is] t h a t the intradep a r t m e n t c o m m u n i c a t i o n be o n e r e n d e r e d w h i l e engaged i n an ' o f f i c i a l duty. ' " S t o r c h , 169 Mont. a t 1 8 1 , 5 4 5 P.2d a t 647. If the respondent's actions f a l l within t h i s exception, then the memorandum i n q u e s t i o n would be a b s o l u t e l y p r i v i l e g e d w i t h i n t h e s t a t u t e and a n a b s o l u t e d e f e n s e t o t h e l i b e l a c t i o n f o u n d i n t h e original complaint Count I of the amended complaint. t h e r e s p o n d e n t p o i n t s o u t t h a t t h e B u t z case d i d Secondly, not and Barr overrule - . The cases involved different issues. In t h e q u e s t i o n was w h e t h e r a f e d e r a l o f f i c e r c o u l d be h e l d B-a r r , l i a b l e f o r t h e t o r t o f d e f a m a t i o n b a s e d on a p u b l i c a t i o n i s s u e d within the o f f i c i a l ' s authority. section 1983 a c t i o n , which B u t z , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , was a considered o f f i c i a l ' s p e r s o n a l immunity w h e r e , the issue of a federal i n t h e c o u r s e of e n f o r c i n g a s t a t u t e , t h e f e d e r a l o f f i c i a l i n f r i n g e s someone's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l rights. Moreover, t h i s Court i n Butz recognized t h a t its d e c i s i o n was c o n s i s t e n t w i t h - a r r . B - A t 438 U.S. 507, t h e Court s t a t e d : "We t h e r e f o r e h o l d t h a t , i n a s u i t f o r damages a r i s i n g from u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a c t i o n , f e d e r a l e x e c u t i v e o f f i c i a l s e x e r c i s i n g d i s c r e t i o n are e n t i t l e d o n l y t o t h e q u a l i f i e d immunity s p e c i f i e d i n S c h e u e r [ S c h e u e r v. R h o d e s , 416 U.S. 2321 s u b j e ~ ~ o t h o s x c e p t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n s ee w h e r e it is d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t a b s o l u t e immun i t y is e s s e n t i a l f o r t h e c o n d u c t of t h e public business. "The S c h e u e r p r i n c i p l e of o n l y q u a l i f i e d immun i t y f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v i o l a t i o n s is cons i s t e n t w i t h B a r r v. Matteo, . . ." Justice Rehnquist, joined S t e w a r t and J u s t i c e S t e v e n s , f o l l o w i n g a t 438 U.S. by the Chief Justice, i n a separate opinion, Justice stated the 522: " H e r e t h e C o u r t a t l e a s t r e c o g n i z e s and r e a f f i r m s t h e minimum p r o p o s i t i o n f o r which B a r r s t a n d s - - t h a t e x e c u t i v e o f f i c i a l s are a b s o l u t e l y immune a t l e a s t from a c t i o n s p r e d i c a t e d o n common-law claims as l o n g a s t h e y a r e a c t i n g w i t h i n t h e o u t e r l i m i t s of their Barr is authority. (Citation omitted. ) d i s t i n g u i s h e d , h o w e v e r , o n t h e g r o u n d t h a t it d i d n o t i n v o l v e a v i o l a t i o n of ' t h o s e fund a m e n t a l p r i n c i p l e s of f a i r n e s s embodied i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n . ' " ( C i t a t i o n omitted .) From this language w e can see t h a t B a r r , relied upon by this C o u r t t o s u p p o r t i t s d e c i s i o n i n S t o r c h , was n o t o v e r r u l e d by t h e United States Supreme C o u r t i n Butz. Additionally, Storch is w i t h i n t h e modern t r e n d o f t h e l a w which e x t e n d s to l o w e r p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s an absolute p r i v i l e g e i n regard to s t a t e m e n t s made i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e h i r i n g and d i s c h a r g e of e m p l o y e e s . S e e , 26 ALR 3 r d 4 9 2 . a As final contention, appellant urges that upon in Storch, i n t h i s case b e c a u s e , S t o r c h would be m i s p l a c e d reliance the p l a i n t i f f a s k e d t h e C o u r t t o r e a d i n t o t h e s t a t u t e on p r i v i l e g e d communications that t h e r e m u s t be such a defense w i l l arise. therefore, the dictum not the to relating malice b e f o r e N o s u c h claim is made asserts that language respondent i n a p p r o p r i a t e because a n a b s e n c e of cited issues i n t h i s case; reliance by on S t o r c h respondent the specifically is is presented to the Court. The defendant privilege in S to - rch specifically relied on absolute u n d e r t h e s t a t u t e a s a c o m p l e t e d e f e n s e to t h e l i b e l claimed. When the plaintiff alleging that attacked the statute the propriety requires an of the defense by absence malice, t h e C o u r t n e c e s s a r i l y had t o d e t e r m i n e what r e q u i r e m e n t s m u s t be m e t b e f o r e t h e d e f e n s e of a b s o l u t e p r i v i l e g e a r i s e s . of The r e s o l u t i o n o f t h e i s s u e was n e c e s s a r y to t h e C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n and t h e r e f o r e not dictum. 6. A p p e l l a n t a l l e g e s t h a t it is i m p r o p e r i n a l i b e l case to g r a n t a m o t i o n f o r summary j u d g m e n t the right case. to d e t e r m i n e b o t h Appellant argues that the dismissal i n l i g h t of T h i s p r o v i s i o n g i v e s to j u r i e s 11, S e c . 7 , 1 9 7 2 M o n t . C o n s t . Art. and l a w and the jury the facts in a libel h e r e m u s t be given the r i g h t t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e d e f e n d a n t c a n p r o p e r l y r e l y upon the absolute privilege under section 27-1-804, MCA. The i s s u e h a s b e e n c l e a r l y s e t t l e d by t h i s C o u r t i n G r i f f i n v. Opinion Publishing 580, and Manley v . Company ( 1 9 4 3 ) , 1 1 4 Mont. Harer ( 1 9 2 8 ) , 8 2 Mont. 30, 502, 264 P. 1 3 8 P.2d 937. In M a n l e y , t h e C o u r t h e l d t h a t w h e r e t h e r e is a f a i l u r e to e s t a b l i s h a n e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t o f t h e c a u s e of a c t i o n , t h e c a s e becomes o n e of l a w f o r the Court. See, a l s o C o o p e r v. Romney ( 1 9 1 4 ) , 49 Mont. 1 1 9 , 1 4 1 P. 289. 7. Appellant raises one final argument in opposition to . r e s p o n d e n t ' s m o t i o n f o r summary j u d g m e n t that summary judgment would not q u e s t i o n of f a c t is o u t s t a n d i n g . be The a p p e l l a n t c o n t e n d s proper because a disputed Based o n a p p e l l a n t ' s a f f i d a v i t , i t is a r g u e d t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r b r i e f s and p l e a d i n g s , a c t i o n s were a p r o p e r d i s c h a r g e o f a n o f f i c i a l d u t y appellant's is still disputed. I n t h e case o f S t a t e ex r e l . C i t y Motor Company v . Court ( 1 9 7 4 ) r 1 6 6 Mont. 52, 55, 5 3 0 P.2d 486, 487, District t h i s Court g a v e c i t a t i o n t o M o o r e ' s F e d e r a l P r a c t i c e D i g e s t and n o t e d t h a t a party opposing a motion for summary f a c t s i n p r o p e r form--conclusions judgment: "must p r e s e n t l a w w i l l not suffice; of and t h e o p p o s i n g p a r t y ' s f a c t s m u s t be m a t e r i a l and of a s u b s t a n t i a l nature, not fanciful, f r i v o l o u s , gauzy, nor merely suspicions ." R u l e 56 ( e ) o f t h e Montana R u l e s of C i v i l P r o c e d u r e p r o v i d e s t h a t supporting and knowledge, s h a l l s e t f o r t h s u c h f a c t s as would be a d m i s s i b l e i n evidence, opposing a f f i d a v i t s , " s h a l l be made o n p e r s o n a l and s h a l l show a f f i r m a t i v e l y t h a t t h e a f f i a n t is com- p e t e n t t o t e s t i f y to t h e matter s t a t e d t h e r e i n show] that there a is genuine issue for ... trial." [and s h a l l Rule 56(e) F4.R.Civ.P. R u l e 5 6 ( c ) s t a t e s t h a t a m o t i o n f o r summary j u d g m e n t , "shall rendered be forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, a n s w e r s t o i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s , and a d m i s s i o n s on f i l e , t o g e t h e r w i t h the affidavits, any material judgment as I n the i f a n y , show t h a t t h e r e is no g e n u i n e i s s u e as to fact and a matter case o f that t h e moving p a r t y of Harland law." v. Anderson Rule is e n t i t l e d 56(c) " T h i s C o u r t h a s o n many o c c a s i o n s commented upon t h e n a t u r e o f t h e b u r d e n of p r o o f imposed o n t h e moving p a r t y u n d e r Rule 5 6 . The C o u r t h a s c o n s i s t e n t l y h e l d t h a t t h e p a r t y moving f o r summary j u d g m e n t h a s t h e b u r d e n of s h o w i n g t h e c o m p l e t e a b s e n c e of a n y g e n u i n e i s s u e a s t o a l l f a c t s w h i c h a r e deemed i n a t e r i a l i n l i g h t of t h o s e s u b s t a n t i v e p r i n c i p l e s which e n t i t l e d him t o a judgment as a m a t t e r of l a w . W e have a l s o h e l d t h e r u l e o p e r a t e s t o h o l d t h e movant t o a ' s t r i c t s t a n d a r d 1 and t h a t : "'. make . . a M.R.Civ.P. ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 6 9 Mont. 4 5 0 , 548 P.2d 6 1 3 , 6 1 5 , t h i s C o u r t n o t e d : To s a t i s f y h i s b u r d e n t h e movant m u s t s h o w i n g t h a t i s q u i t e c l e a r what t h e to a 447, t r u t h i s , and t h a t e x c l u d e s a n y r e a l d o u b t as t o t h e e x i s t e n c e of any genuine i s s u e of material fact. .I1' Kober & K y r i s s v. S t e w a r t & B i l l i n g s Deaconess H o s p i t a l , 148 Mont. 1 1 7 , 1 2 2 , 417 P.2d 4 7 6 , 478. . "The d i s t r i c t c o u r t d o e s n o t f u n c t i o n to a d j u d i c a t e g e n u i n e i s s u e s of f a c t o n a m o t i o n f o r summary j u d g m e n t c a u s e - - i t m e r e l y d e t e r m i n e s whether such i s s u e s e x i s t . Thus t h e p a r t y o p p o s i n g t h e m o t i o n w i l l be i n d u l g e d to t h e e x t e n t of a l l i n f e r e n c e s which may be r e a s o n Mally v. a b l y drawn from t h e o f f e r e d p r o o f . A s a n o v i c h , 1 4 9 Mont. 9 9 , 1 0 5 , 4 2 3 P.2d 294; J o h n s o n v. S t . P a t r i c k ' s H o s p i t a l , 1 4 8 Mont. 1 2 5 , 417 P.2d 469." In determining whether disputed questions of fact remain o u t s t a n d i n g i n t h i s case i t s h o u l d be k e p t i n mind t h a t t h e b a r e assertions found in appellant's briefs d e f e a t a m o t i o n f o r summary j u d g m e n t . are not sufficient Likewise, to the conclusory s t a t e m e n t s f o u n d i n a p p e l l a n t ' s a f f i d a v i t s o f F e b r u a r y 1 3 and 2 4 , t o the effect t h a t h i s dismissal: "was n o t d o n e i n t h e p r o p e r d i s c h a r g e of d u t y i n t h a t it v i o l a t e d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s , b o t h S t a t e and F e d e r a l , ments within of the any was n o t d o n e i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e r e q u i r e - C o l l e c t i v e B a r g a i n i n g Agreement superseding to appellant's c o n c l u s i o n s of defeat a motion not was requirements . . ." for done judgment. statutory sufficient and summary a r e not The l a w would c l e a r l y n o t be a d m i s s i b l e and a r e n o t p r o p e r l y b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t . i n t o evidence at t r i a l , S e e , R u l e 5 6 ( e ) M.R.Civ.P. It is c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e a l l e g e d l i b e l o u s c o m m u n i c a t i o n w a s absolutely tionally privileged valid, outstanding issue under as a of fact, the statute, consequence and the of which which respondent h a v e h i s m o t i o n f o r summary j u d g m e n t g r a n t e d , is cons t i t u - there is no is e n t i t l e d to effective against t h e c a u s e s t a t e d i n t h e o r i g i n a l c o m p l a i n t and r e p e a t e d as C o u n t I i n t h e p r o p o s e d amended c o m p l a i n t . We turn now t o a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the remaining constitu- t i o n a l a t t a c k s a g a i n s t t h e s t a t u t o r y p r i v i l e g e found i n C o u n t s I V and V o f t h e p r o p o s e d amended c o m p l a i n t . Count I V c o n t e n d s t h a t r e l i a n c e on t h i s s t a t u t o r y p r i v i l e g e is a v i o l a t i o n of t h e p r i v i l e g e s and i m m u n i t i e s c l a u s e of t h e f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n , as w e l l a s t h e e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n c l a u s e , a s it p e r m i t s a l i b e l which would be actionable against any o t h e r person. Count V a l l e g e s r e l i a n c e o n t h e s t a t u t o r y p r i v i l e g e is u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l Appellant's contention i n Count I V o f c o m p l a i n t is a n o v e l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of that . t h e proposed amended the c o n s t i t u t i o n , but one w i t h o u t merit. The p r i v i l e g e s and i m m u n i t i e s c l a u s e of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n p r o h i b i t s a s t a t e from d i s c r i m i n a t i n g a g a i n s t t h e c i t i z e n s of o t h e r s t a t e s w h e r e t h e r e is no s u b s t a n t i a l r e a s o n f o r t h e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n beyond t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y are c i t i z e n s o f o t h e r s t a t e s . Toomer v . Witsell ( 1 9 4 8 ) , 3 3 4 U.S. 385, 68 S.Ct. See 1 1 5 6 , 9 2 L.Ed. The i n q u i r y i n e a c h case is w h e t h e r r e a s o n s e x i s t f o r t h e 1460. d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , and w h e t h e r t h e d e g r e e of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n b e a r s a close r e l a t i o n t o t h e r e a s o n s . The s t a t u t o r y p r i v i l e g e a t i s s u e i n t h i s case c a n n o t p o s s i b l y violate t h e p r i v i l e g e s and immunities c l a u s e . persons, A l l be t h e y c i t i z e n s o f Montana o r c i t i z e n s of a n y o t h e r s t a t e b r i n g i n g a l i b e l a c t i o n i n t h i s s t a t e , are e q u a l l y s u b j e c t to t h e s t a t u - t o r y defense . to Turning the issue of a n a l y z e d by u s i n g a t w o - s t e p consider the nature of equal protection, process. the that Initially, classification issue is t h e Court must and the individual i n t e r e s t s a f f e c t e d , t o d e t e r m i n e w h a t l e v e l of s c r u t i n y is a p p l i cable to County the classifications. (1974), 415 U.S. Memorial 250, 94 S.Ct. Hospital 1076, 39 v. Maricopa L.Ed.2d 306. U n l e s s t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n t o u c h e s on a f u n d a m e n t a l r i g h t ( s u c h as r e l i g i o u s freedom, right to travel), distinction t i o n a l i t y of speech or a s s o c i a t i o n , freedom of or is drawn means that inherently that 96 S . C t . the suspect the constitu- t h e s t a t u t o r y d i s c r i m i n a t i o n is p r e s u m e d ; the only t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n be r a t i o n a l l y r e l a t e d to a l e g i t i m a t e state i n t e r e s t . 297, an ( s u c h as race, r e l i g i o n or a l i e n a g e ) , requirement being U.S. upon p r i v a c y or 2513, 49 N e w O r l e a n s v. Dukes ( 1 9 7 6 ) r 427 L.Ed.2d classification will 511. be "Rationally related" upheld if it has any - rational basis. See, Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas No f u n d a m e n t a l r i g h t or s u s p e c t c l a s s is a t i s s u e h e r e , t h e Court should a p p l y the r a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n test. Co. so The r a t i o n a l b a s i s f o r r e c o g n i z i n g t h e s t a t u t o r y p r i v i l e g e is o b v i o u s , and h a s a l r e a d y been d i s c u s s e d . Storch S e e G r e g o i r e v. B i d d l e , s u p r a , q u o t e d i n . Equal p r o t e c t i o n r e q u i r e s t h a t a l l p e r s o n s s h a l l be t r e a t e d a l i k e under l i k e circumstances. v. H a r r i s o n ( 1 9 3 7 ) r 3 0 1 U.S. As noted clause, are above in See, f o r example 459, 5 7 S . C t . discussing the Hartford Co. 8 3 8 , 8 1 L.Ed. privileges and 1223. immunities t h e s t a t u t o r y p r i v i l e g e is e q u a l l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l who "libeled" by t h e i r employment. public officials acting within the s c o p e of C o u n t I V o f t h e p r o p o s e d amended c o m p l a i n t h a s no b a s i s i n l a w . The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e s r a i s e d b y t h e a p p e l l a n t i n C o u n t V are essentially variations considered. Bozeman The on appellant ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 1 6 6 Mont. a cites 504, theme which the case o f 507, has 5 3 4 P.2d a l r e a d y been v. No11 C i t y of 880, 881, wherein t h i s Court said: " W i t h r e f e r e n c e to t h e s u b j e c t s upon which t h e Constitution speaks, its d e c l a r a t i o n s are b i n d i n g upon t h e l e g i s l a t u r e ; S t a t e ex r e l . P i e r c e v. G ~ w d y , 62 Mont. 1 1 9 , 2 0 3 P . 1 1 1 5 . C o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s a r e c o n c l u s i v e upon t h e l e g i s l a t u r e and p r e v e n t t h e e n a c t m e n t o f a n y law w h i c h e x t i n g u i s h e s o r l i m i t s t h e powers c o n f e r r e d by t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n ; S t a t e e x r e l . Bonner v. D i x o n , 5 9 Mont. 5 8 , 1 9 5 P. 8 4 1 ; S t a t e e x r e l . DuFresne v . L e s l i e , 1 0 0 Mont. 4 4 9 , 50 P.2d 9 5 9 . " Appellant argues t h a t , Const. which i n l i g h t of A r t . abolishes " e x c e p t a s may be immunity for s p e c i f i c a l l y provided 11, S e c . 1 8 , 1 9 7 2 Mont. governmental entities, by l a w by a t w o - t h i r d s v o t e o f e a c h House o f t h e L e g i s l a t u r e , " t h e l e g i s l a t u r e ' s a t t e m p t t o expand the constitutional privilege s e c t i o n 27-1-804, that this appellant's MCA, sta1:utorily in is u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l created privilege clear constitutional right libel . under Appellant contends would t o be actions not stand protected up t o against libel under A r t . 11, S e c . 1972 Mont.Const. 7, This provision g i v e s e v e r y p e r s o n t h e r i g h t to s p e a k f r e e l y and p u b l i s h w h a t e v e r t h e y p l e a s e o n a n y s u b j e c t , b u t makes them r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a n y abuse of t h a t l i b e r t y . Appellant's merit. claims i n r e g a r d t o C o u n t V a r e c l e a r l y w i t h o u t The c o n s t i t u t i o n d o e s n o t d e f i n e l i b e l , j u s t a s it d o e s n o t d e f i n e t h e e l e m e n t s which make up a n y o t h e r a c t i o n a b l e t o r t . T h i s job is l e f t t o t h e c o u r t s and t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . Libel has a l w a y s b e e n d e f i n e d as a f a l s e and u n p r i v i l e g e d p u b l i c a t i o n . T h i s is true under principles. actionable Montana If a libel. statute, as communication wrong under is p r i v i l e g e d , Such p r i v i l e g e s were common l a w f o r p u b l i c p o l i c y r e a s o n s . supra. as well common is it established not under S e e , G r e g o i r e v. law an the Biddle, B e c a u s e s u c h a c o m m u n i c a t i o n is n o t a t o r t , n o r e c o g n i z e d has action. been Count: suffered V of which would t h e proposed give amended rise The j u d g m e n t o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t is a f f i r m e d . U Chief ~ u s t i c e \ a cause of c o m p l a i n t is w i t h o u t l e g a l foundation. We c o n c u r : to Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy, dissenting: I confess at the outset that I do not understand the foregoing opinion. Its ratio decidendi escapes me. Rather than attempting to refute what is in the foregoing opinion, therefore, I will here assert only what I think the rule in this case ought to be. (1) This case comes to us on essentially two grounds: that Aaron P. Small was deprived of due process when he was removed as chairman of the English department of Eastern Montana College; and (2) that in his removal, he was libelled. It is clear that Aaron P. Small was removed as chairman of the English department without being afforded due process as to his removal, including an evidentiary hearing where he would have the right to present favorable witnesses, and to confront and examine adverse witnesses. The grievance procedure provided in the collective bargaining agreement for the unit of which Small was a member is not a sufficient substitute for Small's right to come to the courts for protection of his constitutional due process rights. Section 1-3-204, MCA. I find no case cited in the foregoing opinion stating otherwise, and there could be none. In like manner, summary judgment should not be granted against Small on his first amendment claims, and his libel claims, on the ground of lack of specificity in the pleadings. NcRae gave as his reasons for dismissing Small as chairman his "inadequate leadership", his "failure to bring a polarized department into a smoother functioning unit", "acrimony had increased within the English department", and an allegation that Small had failed to effectively and conscientiously handle the administrative detail associated with his office. Small has answered that these allegations are false. What more specificity could he at this stage allege, if his contention is true that such statements are false? The District Court and this Court are applying here the specificity requirements of civil right actions under federal law as exemplified by Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi (3rd Cir. 19761, 532 F.2d 920, 923. In our state court, Small is not suing for a deprivation of his federal civil rights, but for his constitutionally protected rights under our state and federal constitution. In that situation, it should be recognized that our pleadings under the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure are notice pleadings only and that specificity occurs after discovery has been completed. Further, with regard to Small's libel action, there is a factual question existent as to whether he was discharged pursuant to "official action." The pleadings evince an underlying allegation that McRae was acting in concert with others to deprive Small of his chairmanship. Without further proceedings we cannot tell at this point whether "official action" was actually involved here or whether there was a drive to impugn his teaching and administrative integrity and ability in the guise of official action. That is an issue a jury should decide. For those reasons, I would set aside the summary judgment, and let the facts come to light as to which party should receive judgment in this case. Therefore, I dissent. Justice Mr. J u s t i c e Daniel J. Shea concurring. I a g r e e w i t h t h e r e s u l t r e a c h e d by t h e m a j o r i t y , b u t n o t i n its reasoning. C l e a r l y , t h e r e was n o l i b e l . And j u s t as c l e a r l y , t h e p l a i n t i f f should have exhausted t h e c o n t r a c t g r i e v a n c e proc e d u r e s b e f o r e r e s o r t i n g to t h e c o u r t s .

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